Charles Dunson v. State of Indiana

FILED
Nov 18 2016, 10:03 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael G. Moore Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Deputy Attorney General
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charles Dunson, November 18, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1603-CR-469
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Shatrese Flowers,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable Peggy Hart,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G20-1412-F5-53840
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Charles Dunson challenges his conviction for Level 5 felony carrying a
handgun without a license. We affirm.
Issue
[2] Dunson raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly
admitted into evidence a handgun seized during an investigatory stop.
Facts
[3] On November 20, 2014, officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department were dispatched to the 2400 block of Kenwood Avenue after a
number of 911 calls reported men with guns in the area. There was angry
shouting audible in some of the calls, and one of the dispatches to police noted
those sounds. The dispatchers also relayed reports from callers that there were
thirty people gathering and that one caller reported someone was attempting to
kick in his door.
[4] Officer Matthew Addington and Deputy William Bennett responded to the
dispatches and participated in a traffic stop involving someone thought to be
involved in the incident. Meanwhile, Officers Tiffany Wren and Cathy Faulk
also responded to the disturbance and spoke with Tamika Coleman, who was
the victim of the altercation. Coleman was bleeding around her lips and nose,
her nose appeared to be broken, and sections of her hair were torn out.
Coleman’s shirt was also torn, and there were footprints on her shirt. Coleman
was “very upset, she was crying, she was agitated . . . .” Tr. p. 152. While
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Officers Wren and Faulk talked to Coleman, a man drove past on a scooter or
motorcycle, and Coleman indicated to the other nearby officers that he was
“involved.”1 Id.
[5] Officer Faulk issued a police radio broadcast indicating she had a “conscious
and alert” female who was “bleeding from the face” and then stated “there’s a
“black male on a silver scooter, he’s coming toward you; he may be involved”
and described it as a “big scooter, looks like a motorcycle.” Ex. 3, track 14.
Officer Addington responded, “I see it. It’s coming down Kenwood towards
Twenty-Second,” and then stated, “I have him detained.” Id.
[6] After Dunson stopped his motorcycle, Officer Addington approached him and
“noticed a bulge[] in [Dunson’s] groin area . . . there was a flat top to it with a
shirt over top that. Ah, there’s a larger bulge beneath that about the waist line a
belt line of the pants of the driver.” Tr. p. 67. Officer Addington believed the
bulge was a weapon, and he patted Dunson down. Officer Addington
discovered a 9mm Ruger in Dunson’s waist band and seized it.
[7] The State charged Dunson with Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun
without a license and enhanced the charge to a Level 5 felony because Dunson
had a prior conviction for the same offense. Dunson filed two motions to
suppress, both of which the trial court denied following evidentiary hearings.
1
Coleman testified during Dunson’s trial that she did not state Dunson was involved in the incident.
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[8] Dunson was tried in a bifurcated bench trial. During the trial, Dunson
challenged the admissibility of the handgun. The trial court overruled
Dunson’s objection, admitted the handgun into evidence, and found Dunson
guilty of carrying a handgun without a license. Dunson stipulated to the Level
5 felony enhancement. The trial court sentenced Dunson to 2210 days in the
Department of Correction. Dunson now appeals his conviction.
Analysis
[9] Because Dunson appeals following trial and did not seek interlocutory review of
the denials of his motions to suppress, the issue in this matter is “appropriately
framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence
at trial.” Rhodes v. State, 50 N.E.3d 378, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citation
omitted), trans. denied. “We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider
conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Id. We also
consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id.[10] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally prohibits a
warrantless search or seizure absent a valid exception to the warrant
requirement. Peak v. State, 26 N.E.3d 1010, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). A
traffic stop is a seizure. Id. However, an officer may “stop and briefly detain a
person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion
supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” Robinson v.
State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 367 (Ind. 2014) (quotations omitted) (citing United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (2014)). “The existence of
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reasonable suspicion is determined by looking at the totality of the
circumstances to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting wrongdoing.” Peak, 26 N.E.3d at 1015. “The
reasonable suspicion requirement is met where the facts known to the officer,
together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an
ordinarily prudent person to believe criminal activity has occurred or is about to
occur.” L.W. v. State, 926 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[Stops initiated pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct.
1868 (1968)] are limited in scope and purpose. Their purpose is
not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence . . . . Since
reasonable suspicion is all that is necessary to support a Terry
stop and it is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . .
[t]he Fourth Amendment requires [only] some minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop.
[11] Kellems v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind. 2006) (second and third alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted), reh’g granted on other grounds.
[12] Dunson contends the Terry stop in this case violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment2 because “[t]he stopping officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
believe [he] was engaged in criminal activity prior to stopping him and any
knowledge known to the investigating officer cannot be imputed on the
stopping officer.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. Dunson acknowledges that
2
Dunson does not challenge the propriety of the stop pursuant to the Indiana Constitution.
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“information obtained by one investigating officer may be relied upon by other
law enforcement officials called upon to assist in the investigation of a suspect”
under the theory of “collective knowledge.” Id. However, he contends that
Officer Faulk’s radio broadcast that Dunson “‘may be involved’ is not specific
and articulable enough to support the finding that the stopping offers had a
reasonable suspicion that Dunson was involved in criminal activity.” Id. at 10.
[13] Our supreme court has stated: “Information obtained by one officer may be
relied upon by other law enforcement officials who are called upon to assist in
the investigation and arrest of a suspect, as long as the officer who obtained the
information possessed probable cause3 to make the arrest.” Heffner v. State, 530
N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind. 1988) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.
Ct. 675 (1985)).
In an era when criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and
increasingly likely to flee across jurisdictional boundaries, this
rule is a matter of common sense: it minimizes the volume of
information concerning suspects that must be transmitted to
other jurisdictions and enables police in one jurisdiction to act
promptly in reliance on information from another jurisdiction.
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 230, 105 S. Ct. at 681.
3
We note that several of the cases on which we rely discuss collective knowledge of law enforcement officials
as it relates to possessing probable cause and making arrests as opposed to reasonable suspicion and
investigatory stops. Because the former is a higher standard, we see no reason these cases should not apply
equally to arrest scenarios and scenarios, like the one at issue here, involving investigatory stops. See Clark v.
State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 261 (Ind. 2013) (noting reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than that required for
an arrest).
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[14] More recently, our supreme court again stated:
Probable cause can rest on collective information known to the
law enforcement organization as a whole, and not solely on the
personal knowledge of the arresting officer. The police force is
considered a unit. Where there is a police-channel
communication to the arresting officer, he acts in good faith
thereon, and such knowledge and information exist within the
department, the arrest is based on probable cause.
Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003) (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401
U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031 (1971), and Francis v. State, 161 Ind. App. 371, 316
N.E.2d 416 (1974)); see also Kindred v. State, 524 N.E.2d 279, 292 (Ind. 1988)
(“Probable cause should be determined on the basis of the collective
information known to the law enforcement organization as a whole and not
solely to the personal knowledge of the arresting officer,” and discussing
“police-channel communication.”) (citing Benton v. State, 273 Ind. 34, 401
N.E.2d 697 (Ind. 1980); Moody v. State, 448 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. 1983); and
Hensley). There was such a “police-channel communication” from Officer
Faulk to Officer Addington in this case and, pursuant to Heffner, Hensley, and
Griffith, we conclude the investigative stop could properly be “based upon the
collective information known to the law enforcement organization as a whole.”
L.W., 926 N.E.2d at 58.
[15] Dunson directs us to Jamerson v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
and Murray v. State, 837 N.E.2d 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. In
Jamerson, three police officers received a request over dispatch from an
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unidentified detective to locate Jamerson, who was reportedly sitting in a
vehicle behind a specific residence. The detective indicated he was seeking
Jamerson in connection with a carjacking incident. Individuals in the residence
behind which Jamerson was sitting had notified the police that Jamerson was
there. Based on the detective’s information, the three police officers
approached Jamerson and detained him “for investigative purposes until the
officers heard back from the county detective who had made the initial report.”
Id. at 1053. One of the officers then observed a handgun underneath
Jamerson’s car seat and seized it. Jamerson was charged with and convicted of
carrying a handgun without a license. On appeal, Jamerson challenged the
propriety of the investigatory stop.
[16] This court rejected the State’s argument that the officers who detained
Jamerson were acting “upon the police department’s collective knowledge that
Jamerson was wanted in connection with [a carjacking].” Id. at 1056. Instead,
this court noted that the responding officers “did not know who the detective
was who had related [the] information over dispatch, that the detective never
responded or came to the scene, that [they were] not in touch with the
detective, and that [they] had no firsthand knowledge of any conversations this
detective had had.” Id. at 1057. The court stated:
While the report over dispatch did make an assertion of illegality,
such assertion was not supported by any specific and articulable
facts. Indeed the message over dispatch asserted only that
Jamerson was wanted in connection with an alleged crime of
carjacking . . . . Yet no facts accompanied such assertion, and
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the detective making the assertions never followed up with his
claims and has yet to be identified.
Id. Finally, this court noted that the officers who detained Jamerson “pointed
to no statements or behaviors tending to corroborate Jamerson’s link to the
alleged carjacking.” Id. at 1058. This court concluded: “the State has failed to
demonstrate that Jamerson’s reported link to the alleged illegal activity was
anything more than an unparticularized hunch on the part of the unnamed
reporting officer” and that the officers did not make an adequate showing of
reasonable suspicion to justify detaining Jamerson. Id.
[17] Jamerson is readily distinguishable from Dunson’s case. In Jamerson, the
detective who broadcast a message regarding Jamerson’s alleged involvement in
a crime was unidentified. The record in that case contained no information
regarding the facts that led the unidentified detective to suspect Jamerson was
involved in the carjacking. None of the officers who detained Jamerson had
any knowledge of information that could have linked Jamerson to the
carjacking.
[18] In contrast, Officer Faulk was known to Officer Addington and was working in
conjunction with Officer Addington and other officers to investigate the reports
regarding a disturbance. Even though Officer Faulk did not explain the basis
for her reasonable suspicion in her radio broadcast, she has done so
subsequently, and that information is part of the record and available for
review.
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[19] In Murray, a law enforcement officer responded to a dispatch regarding a
disturbance at a pool hall. When the officer arrived, witnesses reported Murray
had gotten into a fight and described his appearance and the car in which he
left. The officer then radioed dispatch and related that information. The officer
additionally radioed a second law enforcement officer and gave him a
description of Murray and Murray’s vehicle and told the second officer that “he
just needed to speak with Murray.” Murray, 837 N.E.2d at 224. The second
officer soon observed Murray’s vehicle, initiated a traffic stop, and noticed
Murray appeared to be intoxicated. The officer arrested Murray, and the State
charged him with operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Murray filed a motion
to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, which the trial
court granted. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s suppression order.
This court concluded:
The record reveals that [the second officer] received no
information from [the first officer] that Murray had been or was
involved in criminal activity before [the second officer] made his
investigatory stop. [The first officer] merely radioed other units
that he “needed to speak with the subject.” In order to rely on
collective knowledge, the knowledge sufficient for reasonable
suspicion must be conveyed to the investigating officer before the
stop is made. The collective knowledge cannot be relied upon
after the fact. To hold otherwise would allow police officers to
conduct investigatory stops before having any reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
Id. at 226.
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[20] While there may be some factual similarities between Murray and this case, we
believe that the collective knowledge of the police, the description of Dunson
and the motorcycle he was riding, and the totality of the circumstances
sufficiently differentiate the case. We further believe that the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in Hensley and a number of our supreme court’s
decisions lead us to this conclusion.
[21] We believe that a rationale similar to the one Justice O’Connor articulated in
Hensley can be applied to this case. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231, 105 S. Ct. at
681. Here, law enforcement officers were cooperating in investigating reports
of a disturbance. Officers Faulk and Wren spoke to the victim while Officer
Addington and Deputy Bennett detained a suspect. When Officers Faulk and
Wren acquired information that Dunson may have been involved, they were
outside their vehicles, and Dunson was travelling on a motorcycle. Officer
Addington was nearby and available to assist his fellow officers. Requiring a
law enforcement officer in Officer Faulk’s position to relay the exact details of
her reasonable suspicion would be cumbersome and impractical, if not
dangerous, in situations such as this one where the officers are simultaneously
investigating the possible commission of a crime, keeping the area safe, and
attempting to apprehend possible suspects. Requiring the level of detail
Dunson suggests is necessary could hamstring an officer’s ability to effectively
carry out his or her duties. Allowing officers to rely on the collective
knowledge of the law enforcement organization is practical and leads to more
efficient police work.
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[22] Based on our review of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that
Officer Addington’s investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.
After multiple people made 911 calls reporting a disturbance, which reportedly
involved a number of men, some of whom had guns, several law enforcement
officers responded to the calls. Officers Faulk and Wren spoke to Coleman,
who was injured in and upset by the incident, while Officer Addington and
Deputy Bennett detained another individual who may have been involved.
While Officers Faulk and Wren were speaking to Coleman, Dunson rode past
on his motorcycle, and the victim identified Dunson as someone who was
involved in the incident. Officer Faulk, who was engaged in her investigation,
communicated to her fellow law enforcement officers that Dunson may have
been involved and called on them for assistance. Collectively, the officers had
specific and articulable information from a known person—Coleman—
regarding Dunson’s involvement in the incident. That information was
sufficient to lead an ordinarily prudent person to believe Dunson was involved
in the criminal activity the officers were investigating. See L.W., 926 N.E.2d at
55. Officer Addington thus had reasonable suspicion to detain Dunson in order
to further investigate, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the evidence seized as a result of the investigatory stop. 4
4
Officer Addington testified he observed Dunson driving at an unsafe speed, and Dunson contends Officer
Addington’s opinion that Dunson was speeding did not amount to reasonable suspicion that Dunson
committed a traffic violation and did not justify the investigatory stop. Because we conclude the officers’
collective knowledge amounted to reasonable suspicion, we need not determine whether Officer Addington
had reasonable suspicion to believe Dunson was speeding.
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Conclusion
[23] The collective information known to the law enforcement organization was
sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that Dunson had been involved in
criminal activity. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
evidence gathered as a result of the investigatory stop. We affirm.
[24] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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