Jeffrey Murto v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Nov 18 2016, 7:14 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
estoppel, or the law of the case. Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ann M. Sutton Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Agency–Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana Matthew B. Mackenzie
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jeffrey Murto, November 18, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1604-CR-720
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Allan W. Reid,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Pro Tempore
Trial Court Cause No.
49G10-1503-CM-8009
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1604-CR-720 | November 18, 2016 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] Appellant-Defendant Jeffrey Murto was convicted of Class A misdemeanor
criminal trespass after he refused to leave the Irvington Public Library (“the
Library”) after being instructed to do so by a Library employee. On appeal,
Murto contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction.
Concluding otherwise, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The Library is located on East Washington Street in Indianapolis. Michael
Hylton is a Public Services Associate with the Indianapolis Public Library who
was assigned to work at the Library1 on the date in question. The rules
governing patron conduct are posted in both the lobby of the Library and on the
Library’s website. Violation of the Library rules may result in expulsion from
the Library. As part of his position as a Public Services Associate, Hylton had
the authority to ask patrons to leave for violations of the Library’s rules
governing patron conduct.
[3] On March 6, 2015, Murto went to the Library. While at the Library, Murto
became involved in a noisy “ruckus” with another patron. Tr. p. 49. Fearing
that a fight was about to break out, Hylton approached Murto and the other
patron. Hylton first engaged Murto, a frequent Library patron, because he felt
1
The Library is a branch of the Indianapolis Public Library.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1604-CR-720 | November 18, 2016 Page 2 of 6
that, in light of his previous encounters with Murto at the Library, he had some
level of rapport with Murto. The other patron left the Library while Hylton was
speaking with Murto about his conduct, i.e., yelling and loud talking, which
violated the Library’s rules. In the interest of maintaining decorum, Hylton
repeatedly asked Murto to leave the Library. Murto refused, instead opting to
continue to yell and to loudly tell Hylton that he was “Hitler and the Gestapo,
and was taking away his rights.” Tr. p. 52. Murto also loudly told Hylton to
“have another donut.” Tr. p. 53.
[4] After approximately five minutes, and numerous warnings to Murto, Hylton
called the police. When the police arrived, Hylton, another Library employee,
and the responding officers escorted Murto to the lobby of the Library. Murto
refused the continued requests of Hylton and the responding officers to leave
the Library. Once in the lobby, Hylton gave Murto a trespass notice indicating
that Murto was, at least temporarily, not welcome at the Library. Hylton also
read this notice aloud to Murto.
[5] Eventually, the responding officers were able to get Murto to step outside the
Library. Once outside the Library, Murto positioned himself under the
Library’s awning and refused to move further. Despite clear instruction that the
area where he was standing constituted Library property, being told to leave at
least fifteen additional times, and being warned that he would be arrested for
criminal trespass if he refused to leave, Murto refused to leave the Library.
Even though the responding officers considered arrest their “last resort,” given
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1604-CR-720 | November 18, 2016 Page 3 of 6
Murto’s continued refusal to leave the Library, Murto was eventually arrested
for criminal trespass. Tr. p. 103.
[6] Also on March 6, 2015, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (“the State”)
charged Murto with one count of Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass and
one count of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Following a February
8, 2016 jury trial, Murto was found guilty of Class A misdemeanor criminal
trespass. The jury did not reach a unanimous decision with respect to the
disorderly conduct charge. The State subsequently moved to dismiss the
disorderly conduct charge. At sentencing, the trial court sentenced Murto to a
term of 365 days with credit for time served and the remaining time suspended
to probation. As a condition of Murto’s probation, Murto was ordered to
complete forty hours of community service. The trial court also ordered Murto
not to have any contact with Hylton and to stay away from the Library.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Murto contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for
Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1604-CR-720 | November 18, 2016 Page 4 of 6
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and
quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be
reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence
presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in
original). Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess
the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind.
2002).
[8] Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(b)(2) provides that a person who “not having a
contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave
the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the other
person or that person’s agent … commits criminal trespass, a Class A
misdemeanor.” Thus, in order to convict Murto of Class A misdemeanor
criminal trespass, the State was required to prove that Murto did not have a
contractual interest in the Library and that he knowingly or intentionally
refused to leave the Library after having been asked to do so by the Library’s
agent. See Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142-43 (Ind. 2012).
[9] It is undisputed that Murto did not have a contractual interest in the Library.
The only question at issue in the instant appeal is whether the evidence is
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1604-CR-720 | November 18, 2016 Page 5 of 6
sufficient to prove that Murto knowingly or intentionally refused to leave the
Library after having been asked to do so by the Library’s agent. We conclude
that it is.
[10] The evidence clearly demonstrates that throughout the entire episode, which
lasted approximately thirty minutes, Murto was continuously and repeatedly
told by both Hylton and the responding police officers to leave the Library.
Hylton also read aloud and gave Murto a trespass notice which indicated that
he had to leave the Library. In light of these facts, we conclude that the
evidence is sufficient to prove that Murto knowing or intentionally refused to
leave the Library after having been instructed to do so by the Library’s agent.
Murto’s claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation for
this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.2 See Stewart, 768
N.E.2d 433, 435.
[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.
2
Further, to the extent that Murto cites to Olsen v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1194 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996) for the proposition that he could not be found guilty of criminal trespass because he had
a reasonable belief that he had a right to remain at the Library, we observe that the facts of this
case do not support a determination that Murto’s claimed belief was reasonable.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1604-CR-720 | November 18, 2016 Page 6 of 6