Roger D. Levy v. Elizabeth Jackson

Jun 11 2015, 9:05 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Robert A. Durham Nicholas C. Deets
Indianapolis, Indiana Hovde Dassow & Deets, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Roger D. Levy, June 11, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A02-1407-CT-482
v. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior
Court;
The Honorable Daniel Pfleging,
Elizabeth Jackson, Judge;
Appellee-Plaintiff. 29C02-1204-CT-3751
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 29A02-1407-CT-482 | June 11, 2015 Page 1 of 11
[1] Roger D. Levy appeals the trial court’s order granting a new trial.
[2] We reverse and remand for the court to reinstate the jury verdict.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On April 4, 2011, Levy ran his vehicle into the back of Elizabeth Jackson’s
vehicle. Minimal damage was done to the vehicles. No airbags deployed in the
accident. Jackson declined medical treatment at the scene but went to the
emergency room later in the evening.
[4] One month later Jackson sought treatment from a chiropractor. She continued
this treatment until March 2012. Jackson then sought treatment from an
orthopedic surgeon and had shoulder surgery in July 2012.
[5] Jackson filed a civil negligence action against Levy requesting damages for her
“medical expenses and lost income as well as other compensable damages.”
(App. at 12.) The jury returned a verdict for Levy. Jackson filed a motion for a
new trial pursuant to Trial Rule 59(J). The court granted Jackson’s motion.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Levy asserts the trial court’s grant of a new trial must be reversed because the
court did not comply with the Trial Rule 59(J) requirement to set forth all the
evidence in the order for a new trial. 1 That rule states:
1
Levy also asserts the trial court erred even if it complied with Trial Rule 59(J); however, we need not
address that issue as the first is dispositive.
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(J) Relief granted on motion to correct error. The court, if it
determines that prejudicial or harmful error has been committed, shall
take such action as will cure the error, including without limitation the
following with respect to all or some of the parties and all or some of
the errors:
(1) Grant a new trial;
*****
(5) In the case of excessive or inadequate damages, enter final
judgment on the evidence for the amount of the proper damages, grant
a new trial, or grant a new trial subject to additur or remittitur;
*****
(7) In reviewing the evidence, the court shall grant a new trial if it
determines that the verdict of a non-advisory jury is against the weight
of the evidence; and shall enter judgment, subject to the provisions
herein, if the court determines that the verdict of a non-advisory jury is
clearly erroneous as contrary to or not supported by the evidence, or if
the court determines that the findings and judgment upon issues tried
without a jury or with an advisory jury are against the weight of the
evidence.
In its order correcting error the court shall direct final judgment to be
entered or shall correct the error without a new trial unless such relief
is shown to be impracticable or unfair to any of the parties or is
otherwise improper; and if a new trial is required it shall be limited
only to those parties and issues affected by the error unless such relief
is shown to be impracticable or unfair. If corrective relief is granted,
the court shall specify the general reasons therefor. When a new trial is
granted because the verdict, findings or judgment do not accord with
the evidence, the court shall make special findings of fact upon each
material issue or element of the claim or defense upon which a new
trial is granted. Such finding shall indicate whether the decision is
against the weight of the evidence or whether it is clearly erroneous as
contrary to or not supported by the evidence; if the decision is found to be
against the weight of the evidence, the findings shall relate the supporting and
opposing evidence to each issue upon which a new trial is granted; if the
decision is found to be clearly erroneous as contrary to or not
supported by the evidence, the findings shall show why judgment was
not entered upon the evidence.
Ind. Trial Rule 59 (J) (emphasis added).
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[7] We review the trial court’s decision applying the following standard:
A trial court has wide discretion to correct errors and to grant new
trials. In determining whether to grant a new trial, the trial judge has
an affirmative duty to weigh conflicting evidence. The trial judge sits
as a thirteenth juror and must determine whether in the minds of
reasonable men a contrary verdict should have been reached.
When a trial court grants a new trial pursuant to Trial Rule 59(J), the
granting of relief is given a strong presumption of correctness. We will
reverse the grant of a new trial only for an abuse of discretion. This
court neither weighs the evidence nor judges the credibility of the
witnesses. An abuse of discretion will be found when the trial court’s
action is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before it and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom. An abuse of
discretion also results from a trial court’s decision that is without
reason or is based upon impermissible reasons or considerations.
Leroy v. Kucharski, 878 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations
and quotations omitted), trans. denied.
[8] Our Indiana Supreme Court held the “substantive and procedural
requirements” needed to grant a new trial under Trial Rule 59(J) are
“paramount.” Weida v. Kegarise, 849 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (Ind. 2006). When
correcting errors, a trial court is required to “specify the general reasons
therefor.” Ind. Trial Rule 59(J). However, when granting a new trial against
the jury verdict, a court is required to make “additional special findings.”
Weida, 849 N.E.2d at 1151. This task is intended to be difficult and onerous to
ensure the trial court is not abusing its power over the will of the jury:
Justice DeBruler explained that this “extraordinary and extreme”
power can be properly used “only if it is based upon a complete
analysis of the relevant facts and applicable law, and sets out on paper
the constituent parts of that analysis.” Nissen, 265 Ind. at 464-65, 358
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N.E.2d at 978. Complete analysis is required because it is
“compliance with the arduous and time-consuming requirements of
the Rule which provides assurance to the parties and the courts that
the judge’s evaluation of the evidence is better than the evaluation of
the jury.” Id. Put another way, compliance with the requirement is
necessary to assure the public that the justice system is safe not only
from capricious or malicious juries, but also from usurpation by
unrestrained judges.
Id. at 1153.
[9] The trial court granted Jackson’s motion for a new trial in an order that
provided, in pertinent part:
2. At trial, Defendant Roger Levy admitted that he was negligent
and at fault for the collision on April 4, 2011. As a result, the jury was
instructed that the only issue it must decided [sic] is the amount of
money that would fairly compensate Plaintiff Elizabeth Jackson for
the injuries and damages sustained in the collision. (Parties’ Agreed
Issue Instruction).
3. At trial, Plaintiff Elizabeth Jackson called three medical
providers as witnesses: Jamie Vanderwielen, PAC, the physician’s
assistant who saw her in the emergency room on the night of the
collision; Mark Woloshin, D.C.; and Ralph Buschbacher, M.D. Each
of these expert medical witnesses testified that they believed Plaintiff
Elizabeth Jackson suffered injuries in the collision on April 4, 2011.
4. The parties stipulated to the cost of Plaintiff Elizabeth Jackson’s
medical treatment, including the fact that the cost of her visit to the
emergency on the night of the collision was $444.00. (Joint Exhibit
Binder, Ex. 5).
5. Defendant Roger Levy did not call any medical witnesses at
trial to provide expert testimony that Plaintiff Elizabeth Jackson was
not injured in the collision on April 4, 2011.
6. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict for the
defense despite the fact that Defendant Roger Levy admitted fault of
the collision on April 4, 2011. The jury did not award Plaintiff
Elizabeth Jackson the amount for the medical bill for her visit to the
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emergency room on the night of the collision. This verdict is against
the weight of the evidence presented at trial.
*****
10. The Court finds that the jury’s decision to render a defense
verdict in this case is against the weight of the evidence. Liability was
admitted. Every medical witness who testified at trial concluded that
the Plaintiff suffered injuries in this collision. A medical bill for the
Plaintiff’s medical treatment at the emergency room on the night of the
collision was incurred.
(App. at 7-10.)
[10] That order sets out evidence in favor of a verdict for Jackson but does not
mention any of the evidence in favor of a verdict for Levy. Our review of the
record confirmed, as Levy’s brief alleged, the existence of significant evidence
in the record supporting the jury’s verdict in favor of Levy. 2 Therefore, as the
2
For example, at trial, evidence was presented of the minimal damage done to Jackson’s vehicle.
(Joint Ex. 6.) Levy fixed the damage to his vehicle with touch up paint. (Tr. at 378.) Levy’s vehicle
was travelling less than five miles per hour at impact. (Id. at 377.) No airbags deployed in either
vehicle. (Id. at 348, 378.)
Jackson refused an ambulance at the scene. (Id. at 325.) When Jackson did go to the emergency room
later that day, the emergency room physicians’ assistant found that Jackson had no discoloration, no
swelling, and no signs of injury, and that Jackson had full range of motion. (Id. at 178-79.) Jackson
did not pursue further treatment until a month after the accident. (Id. at 224.) Jackson told doctors
and testified that Levy was going fifty miles per hour and “coming up like a maniac.” (Id. at 347-48.)
Jackson reported to one doctor the symptoms started six to seven months after the accident. (App. at
53.) Jackson reported to this doctor the cause of the problem was unknown. (Id.)
Dr. Ralph Buschbacher testified it was possible “for one car to rear end another and just simply not
generate enough force to cause injury . . . [and] the more damage there is to the vehicle, the more likely
it is that someone will get injured from it.” (Tr. at 291.) Buschbacher testified it was possible the
shoulder injury was not caused by the accident, (id. at 281-82), but rather Jackson’s injuries were
“largely caused by the normal wear and tear that goes along with aging,” (id. at 283), and neck pain is
a very common complaint in people over age forty. (Id. at 290.) Buschbacher testified swimming and
rowing could lead to Jackson’s injuries and working at a computer is the statistically most likely
activity leading to neck pain. (Id. at 284-85.)
Jackson’s husband testified Jackson swam and kayaked prior to the accident. (Id. at 367.) Jackson
worked at a computer. (Id. at 203.) Dr. Mark Woloshin testified Jackson’s work “keeps things
irritated.” (Id.)
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court’s order only states the evidence in favor of Jackson, and no evidence in
favor of the jury verdict, the court’s order failed to comply with Trial Rule
59(J). See Weida, 849 N.E.2d at 1155.
[11] When a court fails to comply with Trial Rule 59(J)’s requirements, we have no
choice but to reinstate the jury’s verdict because “[e]xplanations crafted after
appellate remand - six months or a year after the trial court heard the evidence
(or in this instance, two years) - represent an inadequate exercise of [the court’s]
obligation.” Id. at 1153. Accordingly, we reinstate the jury verdict.
[12] We reverse and remand for the court to reinstate jury verdict.
Mathias, J., concurs. Robb, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 29A02-1407-CT-482 | June 11, 2015 Page 7 of 11
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Roger D. Levy, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A02-1407-CT-482
Appellant-Defendant,
v.
Elizabeth Jackson,
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Robb, Judge, dissenting
[13] At the outset of the decision in Weida, the court stated:
Setting aside a verdict because the trial court concludes that it is
against the weight of the evidence is a weighty but well-recognized
power of common law judges. Our rules require a judge who exercises
this power to describe the reasons in some detail. When the trial court
acts without giving reasons, the verdict should be reinstated on appeal.
849 N.E.2d at 1148 (emphasis added). The trial court in that case had not only
failed to make special findings, it “[did] not even ‘specify the general reasons’
why corrective relief was granted,” which was required even before the
adoption of Rule 59(J). Id. at 1154 n.5; see also Walker v. Pullen, 943 N.E.2d
349, 352 (Ind. 2011) (“In this case, the trial court granted a new trial because it
believed the verdict did not accord with the evidence. It did not state whether
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous. The
court made only general findings and not the special findings required by Rule
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59(J).”); State v. White, 474 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (Ind. 1985) (where the trial court
did not expressly state it was granting a new trial because the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence and did not otherwise enter a statement of
evidence supporting the grant of a new trial, the supreme court reversed and
ordered the jury verdict reinstated, noting a trial court “may not overturn a jury
verdict by a naked statement that it is erroneous”).
[14] I acknowledge our supreme court precedent in Weida and the concerns it
addresses as set forth by the majority. See slip op. at ¶ 8. However, I believe it
is antithetical to the principles of due process to penalize a party for a trial
court’s failure to follow protocol without at least offering the opportunity for the
trial court to correct its failings. White acknowledged that “[i]t may be regarded
as harsh treatment to deny the appellee the benefit of a ruling won at the trial
court level when a remand might preserve it.” 474 N.E.2d at 1000; see also
American Family Home Ins. Co. v. Bonta, 948 N.E.2d 361, 366 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011) (“[W]e understand that this result may seem harsh as a litigant may be
disadvantaged not through his own fault but because a trial court failed to
follow all the [procedural] requirements . . . .”). However, Weida, Walker, and
White all addressed orders in which a trial court completely failed to even
attempt to make special findings to support its decision. I would limit
application of the rule announced therein to cases with those facts and would
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not extend it to cases such as this one, where the trial court at least tried to
make the required findings. 3
[15] In addition, Weida hearkens back to White, which in turn hearkens back to
Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank, 265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d
974 (1976). In Nissen, the court noted that when a trial court has failed to
comply with Rule 59, courts have responded in differing ways: some have
made a rough judgment as to whether the trial court was correct based upon its
own review of the evidence in the record; some have remanded to the trial court
for additional findings; and some have reversed and ordered reinstatement of
the judgment. Id. at 976, 358 N.E.2d at 460. “No single relief has been deemed
appropriate in such cases.” Id. The court in Nissen ultimately reversed the
order granting a new trial, but due to a motion to correct error pointing out that
the trial court’s original order did not set forth the supporting and opposing
evidence as required by the rule, the trial court had been afforded an
opportunity prior to appeal to reconsider its findings and order in light of the
rule’s requirements and was still unable to supplement the findings or set forth
the supporting and opposing evidence. Id. at 977-78, 358 N.E.2d at 463-64.
Because in Nissen, the parties were afforded the opportunity to point out the
deficiencies of the trial court’s order and the trial court was afforded the
3
I acknowledge another panel of this court recently decided a case similar to this one and held the trial
court’s failure to include opposing evidence in its order granting a new trial pursuant to Trial Rule 59
required reinstatement of the jury verdict. See Diehl v. Clemons, 12 N.E.3d 285, 294-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),
trans. denied.
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opportunity to correct the omissions in light of the requirements of the rule,
Nissen does not necessarily lay the groundwork for the later, harsher rule, but
supports the notion that the trial court can and should be allowed to reconsider
its order when it comes up short.
[16] Here, the trial court gave the reasons why it believed the ends of justice required
a new trial, describing in some detail the evidence supporting such a judgment
but failing to specifically weigh it against the opposing evidence. If the trial
court considered the opposing evidence in reaching its conclusion, then an
amended order on remand would be a simple matter. And if the trial court did
not consider the opposing evidence, then it has the chance on remand to fix the
problem on its own accord and vacate the order for a new trial. I do not mean
to imply that a trial court should not endeavor in every instance to fully comply
with the requirements placed upon it by our rules and statutes. As White noted,
“if the court overrides the jury in its special domain and substitutes its verdict
for theirs without a clear showing that the ends of justice required it, it is likely
that they did not.” 474 N.E.2d at 1000. When a trial court does not even
attempt to make that showing, perhaps it is because it would be unable to do so.
But when it appears that a trial court has endeavored to do so but has simply
fallen short in some particular, I would allow the trial court an opportunity to
supplement its order.
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