Theron L. Bailey v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Jun 15 2015, 10:11 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theron L. Bailey Gregory F. Zoeller
Carlisle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Theron L. Bailey, June 15, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
27A05-1404-PC-199
v. Appeal from the
Grant Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey D. Todd,
Judge
Appellee-Respondent.
Cause Nos. 27D01-1007-PC-143 &
27D01-0703-FA-54
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Theron L. Bailey was convicted of Class A felony attempted murder,1 Class A
felony kidnapping,2 Class B felony criminal confinement,3 two counts of Class
C felony intimidation,4 six counts of Class D felony pointing a firearm at
another person,5 Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy,6 and Class C felony
carrying a handgun without a license.7 Due to double jeopardy concerns, the
trial court vacated four of his convictions and sentenced him to an aggregate
sentence of 108 years in prison. Bailey now appeals the denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief, raising the following consolidated and restated issue:
whether his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his trial
counsel was ineffective when, during voir dire, trial counsel did not thoroughly
explore the potential bias of a juror.
[2] The post-conviction court did not err in finding that Bailey’s appellate counsel
provided effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
1
See Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1(a); Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). We note that, effective July 1, 2014, a new version
of the criminal statutes at issue was enacted. Because Bailey committed his crimes prior to July 1, 2014, we
will apply the statutes in effect at the time he committed his crimes.
2
See Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2(b)(2).
3
See Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a)(2), (b)(2)(A).
4
See Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(1), (b)(2).
5
See Ind. Code § 35-47-4-3(b).
6
See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(5).
7
See Ind. Code §§ 35-47-2-1(a); 35-47-2-23(c).
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Facts and Procedural History
[3] This court’s unpublished memorandum decision for Bailey’s direct appeal
provides us with facts and procedural history. Bailey v. State, 908 N.E.2d 712(Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rita Underwood (“Underwood”) obtained a no-contact
order against Bailey, her ex-boyfriend. Underwood worked at a diner in
Marion, Indiana and lived in an apartment above the diner. On the night of
March 3, 2007, Underwood and one of her sons, Dustin Cox (“Cox”), were in
her apartment when Cox saw Bailey near the apartment. Bailey came to the
door of the apartment, but Underwood was able to exit without Bailey noticing
and went downstairs to the diner. Bailey searched Underwood’s apartment and
then searched the diner, where patrons were dining. Soon after, Underwood
exited the restaurant, followed by Bailey and the diner’s cook, Jesse Henry
(“Henry”). As these events were occurring, Underwood’s other son,
Christopher Sherron (“Sherron”), arrived at the diner.
[4] Bailey and Underwood argued in the parking lot while her two sons and Henry
looked on. Bailey pointed a handgun at Henry, and everyone stepped back.
Bailey and Underwood struggled; meanwhile, the others urged Bailey to put
away the gun, which Bailey later admitted he had no license to carry. Bailey
then pointed his handgun at Henry, and everyone stepped back. Underwood
walked back into the diner. Bailey followed her, and in front of witnesses, shot
Underwood in the back of the head. Before fleeing the scene, Bailey pointed
the gun at Cox and Sherron, asking them whether they wanted to die.
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[5] A short time later, Bailey entered the Marion V.F.W. Hall and saw Charles
Teegarden (“Teegarden”), a former co-worker. Teegarden agreed that, after he
finished a game of pool, he would give Bailey a ride. Not satisfied by the delay,
Bailey drew his gun, pointed it at Teegarden, and stated that he would shoot
Teegarden if he did not immediately help him flee. Teegarden managed to
escape from the situation, and Bailey left the hall.
[6] Bailey then approached a pub, outside of which he found a man named James
Johnson (“Johnson”) talking on his cell phone. Bailey pressed his gun into
Johnson’s chest and told him that he would shoot him in the head if Johnson
did not agree to drive Bailey where he wanted to go. Johnson drove Bailey to a
trailer court.
[7] Bailey was later arrested and charged with thirteen counts, including attempted
murder, kidnapping, criminal confinement, invasion of privacy, carrying a
handgun without a license, two counts of intimidation, and six counts of
pointing a firearm. During voir dire at Bailey’s jury trial, trial counsel, Don
Gallaway (“Gallaway”) asked a prospective juror (“Juror 4”), “Can you give
[Bailey] the presumption of innocence even knowing the type of crime[s] with
which he has been charged,” to which Juror 4 said, “No.” Trial Tr. at 57.
Gallaway noted, “[B]eside[s] burden of proof an[d] reasonable doubt, the
fundamental element of this process that we call a jury trial is fairness.” Id.Gallaway then impressed on the prospective jurors, “if you can’t be fair an[d]
impartial then this may not be the case for you.” Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1404-PC-199 | June 15, 2015 Page 4 of 16
[8] Gallaway asked the prospective jurors whether any of them had seen Bailey “in
a little different light” after they heard “what he’d been accused of doing.” Id.Only one juror, Webb, raised his hand and explained that when he heard about
the case he “had an opinion immediately.” Id. at 58. Webb was dismissed
from the jury. Juror 4 was not moved to answer Gallaway’s question and was
placed on the jury.
[9] Approximately thirty witnesses testified on behalf of the State, at least six of
whom had been present when Bailey shot Underwood. Testimony from those
six witnesses revealed: Bailey had been banned from the diner and had been
asked to leave on the night in question; patrons were in the diner at the time
Underwood was shot; Underwood was afraid of Bailey; and Bailey had opened
the door to the diner, raised his hand, and fired at Underwood. Bailey was one
of only two witnesses to testify in his own defense. He claimed that he was
drunk and high on the night in question and that the gun had accidentally fired.
[10] Outside the presence of the jury, the State argued that Bailey’s opening
statement had opened the door to evidence of prior bad acts. The trial court
concluded that it would “allow evidence of prior acts of violence by the
Defendant against the alleged victim, Rita Underwood, and Rita Underwood
only.” Trial App. at 23. Following the trial, Bailey was found guilty of all
counts.
[11] Cognizant of double jeopardy concerns, the trial court later vacated four of the
thirteen convictions and sentenced Bailey to an aggregate sentence of 108 years
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in prison. On direct appeal, Bailey raised two issues: (1) whether the trial court
committed fundamental error by admitting evidence regarding Bailey’s prior
convictions; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to
the admission of the prior convictions. This court affirmed Bailey’s
convictions, finding that Bailey had failed to establish that the admission of the
evidence concerning two previous convictions constituted fundamental error.
Additionally, this court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for
failing to object to the admission of this evidence.
[12] Bailey filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in July 2010, but
withdrew his petition in July 2012. Again, acting pro se, Bailey filed an
amended petition for post-conviction relief on August 22, 2013. In this petition,
Bailey claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective, among other reasons,
for failing to include in his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim – raised
on direct appeal – that trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to question
Juror 4 regarding his potential bias against Bailey.
[13] At Bailey’s request, the post-conviction court admitted Petitioner’s Exhibit A –
the record of proceedings from trial, including the transcript. PCR Tr. at 6.
Bailey was unable to have his appellate counsel, Robert Bratch (“Bratch”),
testify at the February 14, 2014 post-conviction hearing because Bratch had
died prior to that date. Instead, Bailey called Gallaway to testify. On March
18, 2014, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions thereon, denying
Bailey’s petition for post-conviction relief.
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[14] The post-conviction court found that Gallaway met Bailey at the county jail to
discuss trial strategy and possible defenses. PCR Ruling at 5.8 Gallaway
conducted discovery and shared that discovery with Bailey, and while
Gallaway took no depositions, he reviewed witness statements received from
the State during discovery. Id. Furthermore, the record at trial reflected that
Gallaway filed a motion in limine to exclude Bailey’s prior criminal history and
a motion to bifurcate count 12 to be heard with the enhancement on count 13.
Gallaway argued in favor of the motions, made an opening statement, cross
examined the State’s witnesses, questioned Bailey (after Bailey decided to
testify), and made a closing argument. Specifically addressing Bailey’s claim
that Gallaway failed to adequately question Juror 4 during voir dire, the post-
conviction court found that Gallaway had no recollection of such a hostile
juror, and Bailey presented no evidence to support his claim that Juror 4 was
biased against him.9 The post-conviction court concluded that “Bailey wholly
failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel, Don Gallaway, was ineffective.”
PCR Ruling at 7. The post-conviction court also concluded that Bailey did not
prove that appellate counsel Bratch was ineffective when he failed to claim that
8
A copy of the post-conviction court’s findings of fact and conclusions thereon, denying Bailey’s request for
post-conviction relief, is included in the back of the Appellant’s Brief; however we do not find a copy of this
document in the Appellant’s Appendix. Therefore, for ease of reference, we will refer to the post-conviction
court’s ruling merely as “PCR Ruling.”
9
The post-conviction court also found that Bailey presented no evidence to support his contention that
Gallaway was ineffective because he did not object to the court’s use of remorse as an aggravating factor
during sentencing. PCR Ruling at 5. Bailey does raise this issue on appeal.
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Gallaway’s improper inclusion of Juror 4 was ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Bailey now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[15] Bailey has the burden of establishing his grounds for post-conviction relief by a
preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). A petitioner
appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief stands in the position of one
appealing from a negative judgment. Soucy v. State, 22 N.E.3d 683, 685 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014). Thus, the decision will be disturbed as being contrary to law
only if the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the
post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion. Id. Ineffectiveness
of counsel claims are evaluated under the standard of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a petitioner must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Brown v.
State, 880 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687), trans. denied (emphasis added).
[16] Bailey first contends that his trial counsel was ineffective when, during voir
dire, trial counsel did not question Juror 4 regarding his possible prejudice
against Bailey and strike the juror from the jury.10 Appellant’s Br. at 7. The State
10
We note that in his amended petition for post-conviction relief, which was filed on August 22, 2013, Bailey
claimed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and judicial fundamental error as the only grounds for granting
post-conviction relief. Appellant’s Supp. App. at 4, 12, 13. During the post-conviction hearing – likely due to
the unavailability of appellate counsel – Bailey’s questioning focused on the actions of Gallaway as trial
counsel. The post-conviction court concluded that Bailey had failed to demonstrate that either his trial
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argues that Bailey is barred from asserting this claim because he raised an
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in his direct appeal. We agree. Our
Supreme Court addressed this issue in Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind.
1998), Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ind. 2000), and, again, in
Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 602 (Ind. 2001). The Supreme Court held
that “once the defendant chooses to raise his claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel (either on direct appeal or post-conviction), he must raise all issues
relating to that claim, whether record-based or otherwise.” Timberlake, 753
N.E.2d at 602 (citation omitted). Accordingly, a defendant who chooses to
raise on direct appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is
foreclosed from relitigating that claim. Id.; see also Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d
188, 200-01 (Ind. 1997) (“Some of the [defendant’s arguments on post-
conviction appeal] are new arguments about aspects of trial counsel’s
performance we considered on direct appeal; others focus on aspects not
mentioned earlier. In either case, the earlier ruling that trial counsel was not
ineffective is res judicata.”). On direct appeal, Bailey raised, and this court
considered and rejected, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Res
judicata thus bars him from relitigating this issue in post-conviction
proceedings. Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 602.
counsel or appellate counsel was ineffective. PCR Ruling at 7, 8. On appeal, Bailey challenges both of those
conclusions.
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[17] A petitioner, however, can claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to properly raise and support deficient performance of trial counsel.
Sweeney v. State, 886 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Timberlake, 753
N.E.2d at 606), trans. denied. The standard of review for a claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel is identical to the standard for trial counsel.
Walker v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1181, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The
petitioner must establish deficient performance by appellate counsel resulting in
prejudice. Id.Deficient performance is representation that fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the
defendant did not have the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. We assess counsel’s performance based on facts that are
known at the time and not through hindsight. Evidence of isolated
poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics will not support an
ineffective assistance claim; instead, we evaluate counsel’s
performance as a whole. Counsel’s performance is presumed effective,
and a defendant must offer strong and convincing evidence to
overcome this presumption. Prejudice occurs when a reasonable
probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Id. at 1186 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
[18] Here, Bailey maintains that his appellate counsel was ineffective when he did
not raise on direct appeal that trial counsel was not effective because he failed to
properly question Juror 4 regarding whether that juror harbored possible
prejudice against Bailey, which prejudice allegedly compromised the verdict
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and resulted in fundamental error.11 “In evaluating whether appellate counsel
performed deficiently by failing to raise an issue on appeal, we apply the
following test: (1) whether the unraised issue is significant and obvious from
the face of the record and (2) whether the unraised issue is ‘clearly stronger’
than the raised issues.” Walker, 988 N.E.2d at 1191. Ineffective assistance is
very rarely found in cases where a defendant asserts that appellate counsel
failed to raise an issue on direct appeal because the decision of what issues to
raise is one of the most important strategic decisions to be made by appellate
counsel. Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1196 (Ind. 2006).
[19] Bratch died before the post-conviction hearing; therefore, he was unavailable to
testify regarding why he raised the issues he did, instead of raising issues
concerning Juror 4’s potential prejudice. Gallaway testified at the post-
conviction hearing; however, he was unable to recall his conversation with
Juror 4. Therefore, to evaluate Bratch’s representation of Bailey on direct
appeal, we look for guidance in Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 to the post-conviction
hearing, the transcript of Bailey’s trial. In particular, we examine the voir dire.
[20] To determine which issues would be most likely to succeed and thus should be
raised on direct appeal, Bratch would have had to review the trial transcript,
11
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Bailey claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise claims of Gallaway being ineffective when he did not: (1) question Juror 4 regarding bias; (2) prepare
adequately for trial; (3) call certain defense witnesses; (4) request a speedy trial; and (5) object to the trial
court using lack of remorse as an aggravating factor for sentencing. Appellant’s Supp. App. at 15, 16, 19, 35,
40, 42. On appeal, Bailey only raises his concerns regarding Juror 4.
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including the voir dire. “‘The purpose of voir dire is to determine whether a
prospective juror can render a fair and impartial verdict in accordance with the
law and the evidence.’” Gregory v. State, 885 N.E.2d 697, 706 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008) (quoting Joyner v. State, 736 N.E.2d 232, 237 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied.
“[S]uch examination of prospective jurors is used to discover whether a
prospective juror has any opinion, belief, or bias [that] would affect or control
his determination of the issues to be tried, providing a basis to exercise the right
of challenge either peremptory or for cause.” Id. “[P]roper examination may
include questions designed to disclose the jurors’ attitudes about the type of
offense charged.” Id. at 707. Biased jurors may be removed for cause. Whiting
v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 29 (Ind. 2012). Additionally, “state law provides
defendants with a limited number of peremptory challenges, I.C. § 35-37-1-3;
Ind. Jury Rule 18, which they may use to excuse jurors for almost any reason.”
Id. For the crimes committed by Bailey, Gallaway should have had ten
peremptory challenges. Ind. Code § 35-37-1-3(b) (2006).
[21] Here, the transcript of the voir dire proceedings revealed the following
regarding Juror 4’s potential bias. Juror 4 said that he would be open-minded
and listen to the evidence on both sides. Trial Tr. at 43. He also said that he
understood part of his job as a juror would be to assess the credibility of
witnesses, and he stated that he was up to the task. Id. at 44. Juror 4 said that
he would watch the demeanor of each witness to determine by their body
language whether they were telling the truth. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A05-1404-PC-199 | June 15, 2015 Page 12 of 16
[22] Gallaway and Juror 4 acknowledged that they knew each other. Gallaway
stated, “Nobody here indicated that they knew [Bailey], correct? Can you give
him the presumption of innocence even knowing the type of crime with which
he’s been charged?” Trial Tr. at 57. Without elaboration, Juror 4 simply said
“No.” Gallaway continued,
Saying that you know what I am not gonna pass judgment on you
until I’ve heard it all. Can each one of you do that? Anyone here say
you know what I don’t know. I heard the charges an[d] then jus[t]
hearing an[d] you haven’t heard the details yet. Just hearing the
charges caused me kinda inside kinda gasp a little bit an[d] all the
sudden [sic] you look at [h]im in a little different light. How many of
you did that? Came in here an[d] saw Theron sittin[g] here, but then
heard the charges an[d all the sudden maybe [] you saw him in a
different light after you’d heard what he’d been accused of doing.
Anybody? An[d] it’s okay if you did. Because . . . beside burden of
proof an[d] reasonable doubt the fundamental element of this process
that we call jury trial is fairness. An[d] if you can’t be fair an[d]
impartial then this may not be the case for you. Okay an[d] we need
t[o] know that. I will get as transparent and open with you, buy [sic]
in turn we need you t[o] do the same with us, okay? Can anybody say
that [] hey you know what when we were all sittin[g] here I saw [h]im
one way, but then [] when I heard what he’d been charged with I kinda
saw [h]im [in a] different way. Nobody? . . . .
Trial Tr. at 57-58.
[23] Juror 4 did not raise his hand in response to Gallaway’s question. Potential
juror Webb, however, did raise his hand and explained that when he heard
about the case he “had an opinion immediately in [his] mind.” Id. at 58. When
asked, Webb confirmed that he still carried that opinion. Id. Gallaway
specifically asked Webb, “Do you think you can be fair? Having read what
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you’ve read an[d] know what you known can you be fair an[d] give him a fair
trial?” Id. at 59. Webb answered that he was not sure. Id. Gallaway moved to
strike Webb for cause. Id. at 60. Thereafter, Webb said he thought he could
wait to make up his mind regarding guilt until he had heard all of the evidence.
Id. at 61. Gallaway withdrew his motion to strike Webb for cause. While it is
not clear whether defense counsel or the State challenged Webb as a juror, he
was dismissed from the jury. After Juror 4 confirmed that his familiarity with
Gallaway would not in any way affect his ability to be a juror, Juror 4 remained
on the jury. Id. at 70, 73.
[24] Appellate counsel’s performance is presumed effective. Here, Bailey has not
offered strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption. The
record supported that Gallaway intensively questioned each potential juror,
including Juror 4. During voir dire, about twenty-four potential jurors were
dismissed from the jury pool. Some were dismissed for cause and others by
preemptory challenge. Gallaway, himself, used at least seven preemptory
challenges – an amount that the prosecutor characterized as “a lot.” Trial Tr. at
119.12 Gallaway was clearly concerned about the fairness of trial and removed
from the jury any individual that he believed would not provide Bailey with a
fair trial. We cannot say that Bailey has met his burden of proving that Bratch
12
During voir dire, Gallaway asked the court, “[C]ould you please give me a count on my strikes?” The trial
court told Gallaway that he had three strikes left, to which the State prosecutor responded, “You mean
you’ve used seven (7)? That’s a lot.” Trial Tr. at 119.
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was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the ineffectiveness of
Gallaway for not more fully questioning or striking Juror 4 from the jury pool.
[25] Further, even if we were to find that Bratch was ineffective for not raising on
direct appeal the ineffectiveness of Gallaway for failing to remove Juror 4 from
the jury pool, no prejudice resulted. The evidence against Bailey was
overwhelming. Witnesses testified that Underwood had a no-contact order
against Bailey, Bailey went to Underwood’s apartment to find her, he followed
her to the diner, the two struggled while Bailey was in possession of a gun,
Bailey followed Underwood back into the diner, and when he was a couple of
feet away from her, he pointed the gun at head and fired. Trial Tr. at 147-50,
218-19, 240-41. Witnesses also testified as to the events surrounding the other
charged crimes. In his defense, Bailey testified that he did not mean to shoot
Underwood, that it was an accident. Bailey admitted that he pointed his
handgun at Henry; however, he claimed that it was in self-defense. As to the
other crimes, Bailey claimed to have no memory about what happened.
Approximately thirty witnesses testified on behalf of the State, at least six of
whom had been present when Bailey shot Underwood. The jury believed that
the shooting of Underwood was intentional. Additionally, in the absence of
any defense except that Bailey could not remember, the jury believed that
Bailey had committed each of the remaining charged crimes. Prejudice occurs
when a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors the result of
the proceeding would have been different. We find no prejudice caused by the
inclusion of Juror 4.
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[26] Here, Bailey failed to prove either that appellate counsel was deficient or that
such deficiency resulted in prejudice. Finding that Bailey did not receive
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we affirm the post-conviction court’s
denial of Bailey’s petition.
[27] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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