C.P. v. State of Indiana

Jun 23 2015, 1:31 pm
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joel M. Schumm Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
George P. Sherman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
C.P., June 23, 2015
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1411-JV-789
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither,
Magistrate
Appellee-Petitioner. The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores,
Judge
Case No. 49D09-1407-JD-1720
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
1. Many state and federal courts have applied an exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule called the new-crime exception. This
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exception provides that notwithstanding a strong causal connection in
fact between an illegal search or seizure by law enforcement and a
defendant’s response, if the defendant’s response is itself a new and
distinct crime, then evidence of the new crime is admissible
notwithstanding the prior illegality. Because the purpose of the
exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct—is not advanced by
suppressing evidence of a new crime committed by a defendant after an
illegal search or seizure, we apply the new-crime exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule. And we also conclude that this
exception applies equally to the Indiana Constitution. Accordingly,
evidence that C.P. battered a police officer after being illegally seized is
admissible. We therefore affirm C.P.’s adjudication as a juvenile
delinquent for committing what would be Level 6 battery against a
public-safety official if committed by an adult.
Facts and Procedural History
[1] On July 14, 2014, C.P. attended Holy Spirit Festival at Holy Spirit Catholic
Church on East 10th Street in Indianapolis. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department Officer Jeffrey Wood was working as a security guard for the
church. 1 Officer Wood’s responsibilities included enforcing the church’s
1
Officer Wood, who was wearing an IMPD uniform, explained that although he was off-duty, “as a sworn
law enforcement officer for the City of Indiana[polis], I am subject to enforce any laws whether I am
technically on the clock with the city or not.” Tr. p. 4.
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policies on dress and language. One policy provided that “no underclothing be
exhibited in a public fashion where the other people would be forced to observe
their undergarments.” Tr. p. 5. Another policy prohibited “loud noises and
obscenities.” Id. at 7. Officer Wood was authorized to deal with violators “as
deemed necessary.” Id. at 5.
[2] Officer Wood saw C.P. and some of his friends walking around the festival.
C.P. was wearing his pants down below his “buttocks exposing [his] underwear
to the patrons of the festival.” Id. When Officer Wood asked C.P. to pull up
his pants, C.P. nodded his head and pulled them up.
[3] About an hour later, Officer Wood again saw C.P., whose “pants [were] down
exposing his undergarments to the patrons of the . . . festival.” Id. at 6. Officer
Wood asked C.P. for a second time to pull up his pants. C.P. briefly turned
around but then walked away from Officer Wood. As C.P. walked away, he
said something to Officer Wood, but Officer Wood could not hear him. So,
Officer Wood told C.P. that if he wanted to talk to him, C.P. needed “to turn
around and speak to [him].” Id. Using profanity, C.P. told Officer Wood that
he “didn’t have the right to follow” and “talk to him.” Id. Officer Wood told
C.P., who was “getting more and more agitated and louder,” “to leave the
festival.” Id. But because C.P. continued to curse and started walking deeper
into the crowd, Officer Wood “put [his] left hand on [C.P.’s] right shoulder to
sort of steer him” off church property. Id. at 7; see also id. at 17 (“STATE:
When you placed your hand on the respondent’s shoulder, what was your goal
at that time? WITNESS: To guide him through the crowd and off the
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property.”). In response, C.P. threw his arm in the air and said “don’t put your
mother fu**ing hands on me . . . .” Id. at 23. Because C.P. was getting more
agitated and “women and children [were] around,” Officer Wood tried “to
move [C.P.] through the crowd quicker to get him off of the property.” Id. In
order to do so, Officer Wood put his hand on C.P.’s shoulder a second time, at
which point C.P. “threw his hand in the air, spun around[,] took up a fighting
stance[,] and shoved [Officer Wood] in [the] chest.” Id. Officer Wood “went
backwards” and had to regain his footing. Id. at 24. Officer Wood arrested
C.P. for battery.
[4] The State filed a petition alleging that C.P. was a delinquent child for
committing what would be Level 6 battery against a public-safety official if
committed by an adult. 2 At the fact-finding hearing, defense counsel argued
that when Officer Wood put his hand on C.P.’s shoulder, he was illegally seized
because “there [was] no legal reason for [C.P.] to be stopped.” Id. at 9, 18.
Accordingly, defense counsel moved to suppress everything that occurred after
Officer Wood put his hand on C.P.’s shoulder. Although initially granting
C.P.’s motion to suppress, the juvenile court later reversed course and ruled that
Officer Wood’s act of putting his hand on C.P.’s shoulder was not a “stop”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 22. Thereafter, the
juvenile court entered a true finding for battery. At the dispositional hearing,
2
The State also alleged that C.P. committed what would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement
if committed by an adult, but the juvenile court entered a not-true finding on this count. Therefore, we do
not discuss this charge or its underlying facts.
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the juvenile court adjudicated C.P. a delinquent child but closed the case and
discharged C.P. and his mother.
[5] C.P. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] C.P. contends that he was illegally seized when Officer Wood put his hand on
C.P.’s shoulder to steer him off church property and, therefore, “the resulting
evidence regarding the battery of Officer Wood is inadmissible” pursuant to the
exclusionary rule. Appellant’s Br. p. 6. He raises this issue under both the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11
of the Indiana Constitution.
I. Seizure
[7] C.P. argues that because there was no concern that a crime had occurred or was
about to occur, he was illegally seized when Officer Wood put his hand on
C.P.’s shoulder to steer him off church property.
A. United States Constitution
[8] First, we address whether C.P. was illegally seized under the United States
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, and this protection
has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Taylor v.
State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). The fundamental purpose of the Fourth
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Amendment is “to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens
possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings.” Id. (citing Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)). Here, the State does not dispute that wearing
saggy pants and cursing does not create reasonable suspicion that a crime has
occurred or is about to occur. See Tr. p. 16 (Officer Wood testifying that he was
not investigating any delinquent activity by C.P.).
[9] The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures be founded
upon an objective justification governs all seizures of the person, including
seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980). Accordingly, if Officer Wood
seized C.P. when he put his hand on C.P.’s shoulder, Officer Wood’s conduct
was constitutional only if he reasonably suspected C.P. of criminal activity. See
id. at 551-52. “But obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen
and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons.” Id. at 552 (quotation omitted).
Rather, it is “[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen . . . that a ‘seizure’
has occurred.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The word ‘seizure’ readily bears the
meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain
movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.” California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 626 (1991). Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure
include “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by
an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language
or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be
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compelled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55 (emphasis added). “In the absence
of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the
public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that
person.” Id. at 555.
[10] Here, the evidence shows that Officer Wood “put [his] left hand on [C.P.’s]
right shoulder to sort of steer him” off church property. Tr. p. 7; see also id. at 17
(“STATE: When you placed your hand on the respondent’s shoulder, what was
your goal at that time? WITNESS: To guide him through the crowd and off the
property.”). Officer Wood put his hand on C.P.’s shoulder a second time when
he tried “to move [C.P.] through the crowd quicker to get him off of the
property.” Id. at 23. We find that C.P. was seized under the Fourth
Amendment because Officer Wood twice put his hand on C.P.’s shoulder and
restrained his movement by trying to guide him off church property. And
because Officer Wood did not reasonably suspect C.P. of any criminal activity,
the seizure was illegal.
B. Indiana Constitution
[11] We reach the same conclusion under the Indiana Constitution. The language
of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution mirrors the Fourth
Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 143 (Ind. 1999). However, the tests for
determining a rights violation differ for the state and federal provisions. Id.
This is because the Indiana Constitution has “unique vitality, even where its
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words parallel federal language.” State v. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind.
2002); see also Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind. 2010). When evaluating
Section 11 claims, we place the burden on the State to show that under the
totality of the circumstances its intrusion was reasonable. Gerschoffer, 763
N.E.2d at 965. This determination turns on a balance of: (1) the degree of
concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of
intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary
activities; and (3) the extent of law-enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824
N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).
[12] Here, there was no concern, suspicion, or knowledge that any criminal
violation had occurred. See Tr. p. 16. Rather, C.P. was wearing baggy pants
and cursing in violation of church policy. Although the degree of intrusion
from a brief investigatory stop is slight, the extent of law-enforcement needs in
this case was non-existent. Officer Wood, an IMPD officer, was working as a
security guard for the church and enforcing the church’s policies on dress and
language. Balancing these factors, we conclude that C.P. was illegally seized
under Article 1, Section 11 when Officer Wood twice put his hand on C.P.’s
shoulder and restrained his movement by trying to guide him off church
property.
II. Exclusionary Rule
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[13] Because he was illegally seized, C.P. argues that the evidence of his battery of
Officer Wood is inadmissible pursuant to the exclusionary rule. See Appellant’s
Br. p. 6.
A. United States Constitution
[14] First, we address the exclusionary rule under the United States Constitution.
The exclusionary rule “is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard” the
right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). The fact that a Fourth Amendment
violation has occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not
necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. Herring v. United States, 555
U.S. 135, 140 (2009). Indeed, “exclusion ‘has always been our last resort, not
our first impulse.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).
[15] To trigger the exclusionary rule, the police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it and sufficiently culpable that
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. Id. at 144. That
is, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct or, in some circumstances, recurring or systemic negligence. Id.
[16] Because the exclusionary rule only applies when the benefits of deterrence
outweigh the social costs of excluding the evidence—such as setting the guilty
free and the dangerous at large, id. at 141; Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591—the United
States Supreme Court has identified several exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
For example, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the exclusionary
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rule does not apply when police act in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated search warrant, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922
(1984) (good-faith exception), or when the causal connection between the
Fourth Amendment violation and the evidence objected to is “remote,” Hudson,
547 U.S. at 593 (attenuation doctrine). The exclusionary rule also does not
apply when the evidence in question would inevitably have been discovered
without reference to the police error or misconduct, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 448 (1984) (inevitable-discovery doctrine), or when a later, lawful seizure
is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one, Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533, 542 (1988) (independent-source doctrine).
[17] But there is another exception to the exclusionary rule that many federal and
state courts have applied under the Fourth Amendment: the new-crime
exception. Indiana courts have yet to directly address whether we, too, should
apply the new-crime exception under the Fourth Amendment. 3 Professor
LaFave discusses this exception in his treatise on the Fourth Amendment:
On occasion, when the police conduct an illegal arrest or an illegal
search, this will prompt the person arrested or subjected to the search
to react by committing some criminal offense. He might attack the
arresting or searching officer, flee from that officer, attempt to bribe
him, threaten the officer with harm should he testify against him,
3
Although we have never explicitly applied the new-crime exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule, this topic has surfaced in several Indiana cases. See, e.g., State v. Owens, 992 N.E.2d 939,
943 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied; Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), abrogated on
other grounds by Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind. 2014); Ronco v. State, 840 N.E.2d 368, 376 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006), issue summarily aff’d by Ronco v. State, 862 N.E.2d 257, 259 n.1 (Ind. 2007); Dennis v. State, 736 N.E.2d
300, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g denied.
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attempt to destroy evidence, or make some criminal misrepresentation
in an effort to bring the incident to a close. In such cases, courts are
confronted with the question of whether evidence of this new crime (or
other evidence discovered after it) must be suppressed as a fruit of the
prior illegal arrest or search.
6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §
11.4(j) (5th ed. 2012) (footnotes omitted). LaFave explains that in cases where
the response has been a physical attack or threat of a physical attack on the
officer who made the illegal arrest or search, “courts have . . . held that the
evidence of this new crime (or, other evidence discovered after the ‘intervening
circumstances’ of a new crime) is admissible.” Id. (footnotes omitted). In fact,
it “appears to be a nearly universal rule in American jurisdictions that when a
suspect responds to an unconstitutional search or seizure by a physical attack
on the officer, evidence of this new crime is admissible [under the Fourth
Amendment] notwithstanding the prior illegality.” State v. Lusby, 198 P.3d 735,
738 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008); see also Brown v. City of Danville, 606 S.E.2d 523, 530
(Va. Ct. App. 2004) (“[F]ederal and state courts alike have uniformly rejected
the argument that trial courts should suppress evidence relating to [a
defendant’s] violence or threatened violence toward police officers subsequent
to an unlawful search or seizure or a warrantless entry.” (quotation omitted)).
[18] For example, in State v. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d 145 (Conn. 2003), the defendant
threatened to release his dog when police officers, without a warrant, entered
his driveway and fenced-in backyard to ticket his unregistered and abandoned
cars pursuant to city ordinance, and an altercation ensued. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Connecticut, the State argued that “the defendant’s conduct
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constituted a new crime subsequent to the unlawful police entry and that [the
Connecticut Supreme Court] should apply the new[-]crime exception to the
exclusionary rule adopted by many other jurisdictions.” Id. at 150-51.
[19] The Connecticut Supreme Court decided as a matter of first impression the
“issue of whether a new crime committed in response to an unlawful police
entry into one’s residence is attenuated sufficiently to break the chain of
causation from the unlawful entry.” Id. at 151. The court acknowledged that
many jurisdictions, “both federal and state, have considered and adopted a
new[-]crime exception to the [Fourth Amendment’s] exclusionary rule.” Id. at
152 (citing federal cases from the 1st, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th
Circuits as well as state cases from Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Washington, and Washington, D.C.). 4 In deciding whether to adopt the new-
crime exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, the Connecticut
Supreme Court found persuasive the rationale that “the limited objective of the
exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct—not to provide citizens
with a shield so as to afford an unfettered right to threaten or harm police
officers in response to the illegality.” Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court
4
More states should be added to this list, including Alaska, Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983);
Idaho, see Lusby, 198 P.3d 735; Kentucky, see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 245 S.W.3d 821 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008);
Maine, see State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380 (Me. 1985); Montana, see State v. Ottwell, 779 P.2d 500 (Mont.
1989); New Mexico, see State v. Travison B., 149 P.3d 99 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); Texas, see State v. Mitchell, 848
S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); and Virginia, see Brown, 606 S.E.2d 523.
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specifically agreed with the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Pryor, in which
Judge Easterbrook said:
Police do not detain people hoping that they will commit new crimes
in their presence; that is not a promising investigative technique, when
illegal detention exposes the police to awards of damages. Thus the
gains from extending the rule to exclude evidence of fresh crimes are
small, and the costs high. If the rule were applied rigorously, suspects
could shoot the arresting officers without risk of prosecution. An
exclusionary rule that does little to reduce the number of unlawful
seizures, and much to increase the volume of crime, cannot be
justified.
32 F.3d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009,
1016-17 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[N]otwithstanding a strong causal connection in fact
between lawless police conduct and a defendant’s response, if the defendant’s
response is itself a new, distinct crime, then the police constitutionally may
arrest the defendant for that crime. . . . A contrary rule would virtually
immunize a defendant from prosecution for all crimes he might commit that
have a sufficient causal connection to the police misconduct.”). Accordingly,
the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that “in light of the defendant’s
ability to obtain relief to protect his constitutional rights[ 5] and the public[-
]policy concerns regarding escalating violence, we hereby adopt the new[-]crime
5
The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that “there already exist legal remedies available to victims of
unlawful police actions.” Brocuglio, 826 A.2d at 153. For instance, the court noted that “the defendant in the
present case properly could have invoked the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence regarding the
vehicles that the police had obtained while unlawfully present in the defendant’s backyard.” Id.
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exception to the [Fourth Amendment’s] exclusionary rule.” Brocuglio, 826 A.2d
at 153.
[20] Like the many federal and state courts before us, we agree that the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct—is not
advanced by suppressing evidence of a new crime committed by the defendant
after an illegal search or seizure. We therefore hold that notwithstanding a
strong causal connection in fact between an illegal search or seizure by law
enforcement and a defendant’s response, if the defendant’s response is itself a
new and distinct crime, then evidence of the new crime is admissible
notwithstanding the prior illegality. 6
[21] Applying this exception to the facts of this case, we conclude that although C.P.
was illegally seized when Officer Wood twice put his hand on C.P.’s shoulder
to guide him off church property, C.P. committed a new and distinct crime
against Officer Wood when he battered him. Accordingly, the juvenile court
properly admitted evidence of C.P.’s commission of battery against Officer
Wood.
6
We acknowledge an exception for the crime of resisting law enforcement by fleeing. The Indiana Supreme
Court held in Gaddie v. State that a defendant is not guilty of resisting law enforcement by fleeing if the police
order to stop is unlawful, that is, not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 10 N.E.3d 1249,
1255 (Ind. 2014).
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B. Indiana Constitution
[22] The focus of the exclusionary rule under the Indiana Constitution is the
reasonableness of police conduct. Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind.
2001). “Admissibility [of evidence] is lawful if the court can declare the process
reasonable.” Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1995); see also id. at 80
(holding that because the search of the defendant’s car was unreasonable, the
Indiana Constitution “mandate[d]” that the evidence found as a result of the
search be suppressed). Although Indiana’s exclusionary rule is different from
the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, we do recognize the good-faith
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule under the Indiana
Constitution. See Hopkins v. State, 582 N.E.2d 345, 351 (Ind. 1991) (“[T]he
federal good-faith exception enunciated in United States v. Leon, [468 U.S. 897
(1984),] has been held applicable to the prohibition of unreasonable search and
seizure found in [Article 1, Section 11] of the Indiana Constitution.”), reh’g
denied; Wendt v. State, 876 N.E.2d 788, 790-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied; see also Ind. Code § 35-37-4-5 (codification of good-faith exception). 7
[23] We, however, have not adopted the attenuation doctrine under the Indiana
Constitution as it applies to a defendant’s commission of a new and distinct
7
Indiana, however, has not adopted two of the other federal exclusionary-rule exceptions under the Indiana
Constitution. For example, we have not adopted the inevitable-discovery exception, see Gyamfi v. State, 15
N.E.3d 1131, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), reh’g denied; Ammons v. State, 770 N.E.2d 927, 935 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002), trans. denied, or the attenuation doctrine, see Trotter v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
We discuss Trotter more above.
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crime after an illegal search or seizure by law enforcement. In fact, another
panel of this Court held in Trotter v. State that “the attenuation doctrine as it
currently exists as a separate analysis to circumvent the exclusionary rule for
Fourth Amendment purposes has no application under the Indiana
Constitution.” 933 N.E.2d 572, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. not sought. In
Trotter, the defendant responded to police officers’ illegal entry into the pole
barn attached to his house by pointing a rifle at them and yelling at them to get
out, after which a standoff ensued between the defendant and police for several
hours. Id. at 578. The Trotter Court concluded that the defendant’s “act of
pointing a firearm was a direct response to the police misconduct, and in no
way does [the defendant’s] behavior make the police misconduct any more
reasonable. . . . [W]e will not hold [the defendant] to a higher standard of
reasonableness than the trained professionals who unlawfully invaded his
residence in the night.” Id. at 582; see also Webster v. State, 908 N.E.2d 289, 293
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“[W]e are not convinced that after we determine the
police acted unreasonably under the Indiana Constitution, we then must
determine whether the attenuation doctrine prevents the exclusionary rule from
applying, and the State provides no specific argument regarding the application
of the attenuation doctrine under the Indiana Constitution. We believe that a
defendant’s actions during a police encounter are considered as part of the
totality of the circumstances in determining whether the police acted
reasonably.”), trans. denied.
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We disagree with the Trotter Court that evidence of new and distinct crimes
committed by a defendant in response to an illegal search or seizure by law
enforcement is inadmissible under the Indiana Constitution. Although in some
cases the Indiana Constitution “confers greater protections to individual rights
than the Fourth Amendment affords,” see Shotts, 925 N.E.2d at 726, the Indiana
Constitution does not compel a different result here. We find the rationale that
the other federal and state courts have cited in applying the new-crime
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule equally applicable to
the Indiana Constitution. That is, if evidence that defendants committed new
and distinct crimes in response to illegal searches or seizures by law
enforcement were inadmissible, then defendants could attack or shoot arresting
officers without risk of prosecution. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Pryor,
“An exclusionary rule that does little to reduce the number of unlawful
seizures, and much to increase the volume of crime, cannot be justified.” 32
F.3d at 1196; see also Lusby, 198 P.3d at 739 (“In sum, the exclusionary rule
does not give the aggrieved individual carte blanche to commit criminal acts
against a police officer with impunity merely because the officer erred by
conducting an unlawful search or seizure.”); State v. Ottwell, 779 P.2d 500, 502-
03 (Mont. 1989) (“[T]o allow a person whose Fourth Amendment rights were
violated to respond with unlimited violence toward[] the violator and then to
grant the person immunity via the exclusionary rule, would create intolerable
results. Such a ruling would allow, and possibly even encourage, more
violence.”). Such a rule cannot be justified under the Indiana Constitution
either. We therefore hold that the new-crime exception applies to Indiana’s
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exclusionary rule. Because the juvenile court properly admitted evidence that
C.P. battered Officer Wood after he was illegally seized, we affirm C.P.’s
adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for committing what would be Level 6
battery against a public-safety official if committed by an adult.
[24] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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