In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: T.G. (Minor Child) And T.G. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Feb 20 2018, 6:08 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John T. Wilson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Termination of the Parent- February 20, 2018
Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Case No.
48A04-1708-JT-1771
T.G. (Minor Child)
Appeal from the Madison Circuit
And Court
T.G. (Father), The Honorable George G. Pancol,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
v. 48C02-1610-JT-81
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Respondent, T.G. (Father), appeals the termination of his parental
rights to his minor child, T.G. Jr. (Child).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Father raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the Indiana
Department of Child Services (DCS) presented clear and convincing evidence
to support the termination of Father’s parental rights.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Father and M.F. (Mother) 1 are the biological parents of the Child, born on
August 28, 2011. After the Child was born, Father and Mother lived together
in a three-bedroom apartment with the Child and Mother’s children from
previous relationships, T.F. and A.F. The apartment was leased by Father’s
mother, and A.F. reported that eight children and eight adults lived there, with
the Child and his half-siblings sleeping in a closet. Father did not have regular
employment but would wash cars “off and on[] when [he] need[ed] a little
money.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 81). Mother had a part-time job, but it appears that the
1
Mother’s parental rights to the Child were terminated on July 6, 2017. Mother is not a participant in this
appeal, but facts pertaining to Mother are included where appropriate.
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individuals residing in the apartment largely relied on the social security income
of Father’s mother.
[5] On August 14, 2013, Father pled guilty to battery with a deadly weapon and
battery resulting in serious bodily injury, both Class C felonies, for an incident
that had occurred in December of 2011. At the same time, he also pled guilty
to charges of intimidation as a Class C felony, pointing a firearm as a Class A
misdemeanor, and carrying a handgun without a license as a Class A
misdemeanor for events that occurred in December of 2012. The two sets of
crimes involved two different victims. On August 26, 2013, Father was
sentenced to an aggregate term of twelve years, to be executed in the Indiana
Department of Correction (DOC).
[6] Shortly after Father was sentenced to the DOC, in October of 2013, Mother
contacted the Madison County office of DCS and requested that her three
children be placed in foster care. Mother described that she was currently
homeless and unable to provide for the children’s needs. With Father also
unavailable to care for the children, DCS took them into custody on October 5,
2013. 2
2
Father is not the biological parent of either T.F. or A.F., and although facts pertaining to the Child’s half-
siblings are included for background information, they are not the subject of this appeal. Prior to his
incarceration, Father had acted as a father-figure to T.F. and A.F. At the time of removal, T.F.’s and A.F.’s
fathers were also incarcerated. CHINS and termination proceedings for T.F. and A.F. have been concurrent
with the Child’s.
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[7] On October 8, 2013, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Child is a child in
need of services (CHINS) based on Father and Mother’s inability to care for the
Child. That day, the trial court conducted an initial and detention hearing, at
which Mother appeared but Father did not. Mother waived her right to counsel
and admitted the allegations contained in the CHINS petition. Accordingly,
the trial court adjudicated the Child to be a CHINS. On November 6, 2013, the
trial court held a continued initial/detention hearing as to Father, at which time
Father also admitted that the Child is a CHINS. Also on November 6, 2013,
the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing and granted wardship of the
Child to DCS. The trial court determined that the Child should remain in
foster care, with his half-siblings, and ordered both parents to comply with a
parental participation plan. Specifically for Father, the trial court ordered him
to “comply with any programs offered by the [DOC] to increase his ability to be
a safe and appropriate parent.” (DCS Exh. 4). The trial court further ordered
both Father and Mother to obtain and maintain a suitable and legal source of
income and a stable residence, as well as to maintain weekly contact with DCS.
[8] In January of 2014, Mother was convicted of promoting prostitution, a Class C
felony, and received a two-year suspended sentence pursuant to her plea
agreement. Otherwise, Mother complied with her court-ordered reunification
services. As a result, in March of 2015, the Child and his half-siblings were
placed in Mother’s care. However, by July of 2015, Mother was again unable
to provide for the children’s needs, so DCS placed them back in foster care.
Thereafter, Mother did not engage in reunification services.
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[9] For the duration of the CHINS case, Father remained incarcerated and never
saw the Child. Father did, however, maintain weekly phone calls with the
Child for a period of time, and the Child’s foster mother attempted to keep
Father updated on the Child’s activities. Father did not maintain regular
contact with DCS, and DCS did not endeavor to initiate communications with
Father. Father did send at least one letter to DCS, requesting that the Child be
placed with a paternal aunt; DCS responded in kind, indicating that it was best
for the Child to remain placed with T.F. and A.F. Father also claimed that he
attempted to call DCS in 2015 but “couldn’t get in touch with anybody.” (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 82). At some unknown point, Father stopped calling the Child—
purportedly because he did not have money in his prison account to make calls.
[10] As to Father’s attempts at reunification, he claimed to have completed both a
parenting class and an anger management class offered by the DOC, although
he did not provide the certificates of such to DCS. Father explained that the
DOC policy permits prisoners to engage in only one course at a time. Thus,
after completing the parenting class and the anger management class, Father
initiated a literacy course as a prerequisite for obtaining his GED. However,
before completion of the literacy course, in November of 2015, Father assaulted
another inmate and was moved to an administrative segregation unit. Prior to
the assault, Father had accumulated “probably like fifteen write-ups” for other
DOC violations. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 88). His last offense, however, resulted in the
loss of a year of credit time. Furthermore, the move to the isolated
administrative segregation unit prohibited Father from engaging in any classes;
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instead, he was confined to his cell for twenty-three hours of each day, spending
most of his time “sitting on [his] bunk watching [television].” (Tr. Vol. II, p.
89).
[11] On November 3, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of
Father and Mother. On May 9, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on
DCS’s termination petition. Father appeared by telephone; Mother did not
attend. By the time of the termination hearing, Father had been in the DOC’s
administrative segregation unit for approximately eighteen months and still had
“ninety days left” before he would be released to the general population and
could resume his literacy course. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 90). Father testified that his
release date was scheduled for January 10, 2021, but he was administratively
appealing the loss of his credit time. Father stated that he had a bond with the
Child, who used to “chas[e] after me everywhere I went.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 81).
Father expressed that he did not want to lose his parental rights and requested
that the Child be placed in the care of a paternal uncle pending his release.
Conversely, DCS and the Child’s court-appointed special advocates (CASAs)
testified in favor of terminating the parent-child relationship. Evidence was
presented that, despite all three children struggling with behavioral issues, they
had demonstrated marked improvement in their foster care placement and
shared a bond. The children’s foster mother indicated that while she would
endeavor to maintain the children’s relationships with their biological families,
she loved them, was committed to keeping them placed together, and was
willing to adopt all three.
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[12] On July 6, 2017, the trial court issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Judgment Terminating the Parent-Child Relationship. The trial court
concluded, in pertinent part, that there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions resulting in the Child’s removal and continued placement outside of
Father’s care will not be remedied; there is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s well-
being; and it is in the Child’s best interests that the parent-child relationship be
terminated.
[13] Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[14] Father challenges the termination of his parental rights. The Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of
parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). It is well established that
“[a] parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is
‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” Id. (quoting Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). Yet, parental rights “are not absolute and
must be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining the proper
disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” Id. If “parents are unable
or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities,” termination of parental
rights is appropriate. Id. However, we acknowledge that the termination of a
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parent-child relationship is “an extreme measure and should only be utilized as
a last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the
natural relationship between parent and child have failed.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of
Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[15] Indiana courts rely on a “deferential standard of review in cases concerning the
termination of parental rights” due to the trial court’s “unique position to assess
the evidence.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
dismissed. As such, on appeal, we do not reweigh evidence or assess the
credibility of witnesses. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. We “consider only the
evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment.”
Id. In addition, because the trial court entered special findings of fact and
conclusions thereon, we rely on the standard set forth in Indiana Trial Rule
52(A), whereby we “shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.” In applying this two-tiered standard, we
must first determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s findings;
second, we consider whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will
find a judgment to be clearly erroneous “if the findings do not support the trial
court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id.
II. Termination of Parental Rights Statute
[16] In order to terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child, DCS must prove:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
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(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
months under a dispositional decree.
****
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been
under the supervision of a local office . . . for at least fifteen (15)
months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning
with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of
the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] . . . ;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a [CHINS];
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove each of the foregoing elements by
clear and convincing evidence. C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85,
92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “[C]lear and convincing evidence requires the
existence of a fact to ‘be highly probable.’” Id.[17] In this case, Father concedes that the Child has been removed from the home
for the requisite period of time pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-
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4(b)(2)(A) and that DCS has established a satisfactory plan for the care and
treatment of the Child pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D). He
thus argues that DCS failed to establish the remaining two elements: (1) that
there is a reasonable probability either that the conditions resulting in the
Child’s removal or continued placement out of his custody will not be remedied
or that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
Child’s well-being; 3 and (2) that termination is in the Child’s best interests.
A. Remediation of Conditions
[18] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires DCS to prove only one of
three listed elements. See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 220-21. The two relevant
inquiries in this case are whether there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions resulting in the Child’s removal and continued placement outside of
the home will not be remedied or whether there is a reasonable probability that
the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s
well-being. Here, we elect to dispose of this statutory element by reliance on
Father’s remediation of the conditions that resulted in the Child’s removal and
continued placement outside of Father’s care and custody.
[19] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that conditions will not
be remedied, we must identify what conditions led to the Child’s “placement
and retention” outside the home and subsequently determine whether there is a
3
DCS did not allege that the Child had twice previously been adjudicated a CHINS to satisfy Indiana Code
section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B).
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reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K. v. Ind.
Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). In making these
decisions, a court “must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the
termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed
conditions—balancing a parent’s recent improvements against habitual
pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of
future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bester, 839
N.E.2d at 152; K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “Habitual conduct may include
‘criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide
support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.’” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at
647. “A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to
cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged
conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the
conditions will change.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 861
N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. DCS “is not required to
provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need only
establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior will not
change.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.
[20] Here, the Child was taken into DCS’s custody and remained in foster care for
three and one-half years (as of the time of the termination hearing) as a result of
Mother’s admitted inability to provide shelter and other necessities for the Child
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and Father’s inability to do the same based on his incarceration. In support of
its determination that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions
resulting in the Child’s removal and prolonged placement out of Father’s care
would not be remedied, the trial court found that
[o]ther than the weekly calls, Father has had no meaningful
participation in services, has not complied with services or the
court’s dispositional orders, and has had no meaningful or
consistent visitation with the [C]hild, from the beginning of
CHINS proceedings through to the date of the termination trial
on the termination petition.
(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 24).
[21] Father now disputes the trial court’s findings that he has not meaningfully
participated in services or complied with the trial court’s dispositional orders.
Rather, Father points to the dispositional order’s directive that he “comply with
any programs offered by the Department of Correction[] to increase his ability
to be a safe and appropriate parent” and notes his completion of a parenting
class and an anger management class, as well as participation in a literacy
program and his intent to complete the GED program upon his release from the
administrative segregation unit. (DCS Exh. 4). Father also challenges the trial
court’s determination that he has not maintained meaningful contact with the
Child, as the evidence establishes that he regularly called the Child every
Sunday throughout most of the CHINS case. Father further contends that the
trial court improperly assessed his lack of parental fitness based solely on the
fact of his incarceration. Father relies on In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind.
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2009), and K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 641, where our supreme court twice upheld the
parental rights of an incarcerated parent, as a basis for according him additional
opportunity to establish that he can provide permanency for the Child upon
release.
[22] Father is correct that our courts have previously recognized that “incarceration
is an insufficient basis for terminating parental rights.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 643.
In the cases cited by Father, In re G.Y. and K.E., the supreme court found
insufficient evidence to support the termination of parental rights based on the
substantial efforts taken by the incarcerated parents and their marked
improvements by the time of the termination hearing. Specifically, in In re G.Y.,
904 N.E.2d at 1262, the mother was incarcerated for a serious drug offense that
she had committed prior to the child’s conception but “for the first [twenty]
months of [the child’s] life” was nothing “but a fit parent.” Id. While
incarcerated, the mother completed drug courses, engaged in counseling,
demonstrated her sobriety, completed a parenting class, and was “actively
participating in an inmate to work mate program . . . which results in an
apprenticeship, certification, and job placement after release from prison.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). The mother testified at the termination
hearing that she was on track to complete an associate’s degree before her
release and had both employment and housing arranged. Id. at 1263.
Furthermore, the mother “maintained a consistent, positive relationship” with
the child and demonstrated a “commitment to reunification with [the child]
from the very point of her arrest,” even repeatedly attempting to arrange for
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relative care of the child during her incarceration. Id. at 1264-65. At the time
of the termination order, the mother’s release was approximately one year
away, and the supreme court, considering the child’s best interests, determined
that there was no reason that permanency could not be delayed in light of “the
positive steps [the mother] has taken while incarcerated, her demonstrated
commitment and interest in maintaining a parental relationship with [the child],
and her willingness to continue to participate in parenting and other personal
improvement programs after her release.” Id. at 1265.
[23] A few years later, in K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 648, our supreme court found
insufficient evidence of a reasonable probability that the father would not
remedy the conditions resulting in the removal of his children where the father,
who was incarcerated after a methamphetamine lab was discovered in his
home, “made substantial efforts towards bettering his life through programs
that were available during his incarceration.” The father “completed twelve
programs”—most voluntarily and without the benefit of a sentence reduction.
Id. The programs “particularly targeted parenting and life skills,” as well as
substance abuse. Id. at 649. While incarcerated, the father enjoyed regular
visits with his children and called them “nightly.” Id. “[T]here [was] seemingly
nothing else that [the father] could have been doing to demonstrate his
dedication to obtaining reunification.” Id. At the time of the termination
hearing, the father’s release date “was still over two years away,” but the
supreme court indicated that “the potential release date is only one
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consideration of many that may be relevant in a given case.” Id. at 648. The
court stated:
We do not seek to establish a higher burden upon incarcerated
parents based upon their possible release dates nor do we believe
the burden of proof should be reduced merely because a parent is
incarcerated. Because the release date alone is not determinative,
we consider whether other evidence, coupled with this
consideration, demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence a
reasonable probability that [the parent] would be unable to
remedy the conditions for removal.
Id.
[24] In the present case, Father’s crimes occurred after the Child’s birth and resulted
in a twelve-year executed sentence. At the time of the termination hearing,
Father had nearly four more years on his sentence, which he indicated could be
reduced by one year if he completed a GED class. While incarcerated, Father
claimed to have completed a parenting class—although he could not recall the
contents of the class by the time of the termination hearing—and an anger
management class, and he began a literacy course. He hoped to complete the
GED class prior to his release. There is also evidence that he, for some time,
called the Child once per week. Despite indicating that he did not have money
in his account to continue calling the Child, evidence was presented that Father
maintained phone contact with his brother until two weeks prior to the
termination hearing. While we recognize that in-person visits with the Child
were not within Father’s control, there is no evidence that Father wrote the
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Child letters or otherwise attempted to develop his relationship with the Child
after discontinuing the once-weekly calls.
[25] Father fails to recognize the distinctions between his case and that of In re G.Y.
and K.E. in that Father did not undertake to avail himself of every opportunity
to demonstrate his dedication to reunification with the Child. DOC policy
allows inmates to enroll in only one course at a time and prohibits individuals
housed in the administrative segregation unit from participating in the various
classes. Instead of maintaining focus on completing courses and meaningfully
working toward reunification, Father repeatedly violated DOC rules, resulting
in at least fifteen write-ups, and even assaulted another inmate. Thus, by virtue
of his own misconduct, Father was precluded from participating in any courses
for a period of at least eighteen months while he was confined to the
administrative segregation unit. Father’s criminal actions also resulted in the
loss of one year of credit time. See Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842
N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that “[i]ndividuals who
pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop
positive and meaningful relationships with their children”), trans. denied.
Furthermore, it is apparent that Father failed to internalize the lessons taught in
his anger management course, and we can therefore infer that Father also failed
to implement the teachings of his parenting class. In addition, Father made no
effort to maintain regular contact with DCS to stay involved in the case.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that
Father failed to meaningfully participate in services and comply with the
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dispositional order. Father now complains that the breakdown in
communication was the fault of DCS, but it was Father’s responsibility to
demonstrate a commitment to reunification with his Child.
[26] The parents in In re G.Y. and K.E. had specific, attainable plans for housing and
supporting their children upon release. Here, Father thinks that he can
“probably” stay with his mother or grandmother upon release. (Tr. Vol. II, p.
79). There is no basis in the record for finding that such a plan for housing
would be inappropriate except that Father’s testimony indicates that he has not
actually confirmed whether he (and the Child) would be permitted to live with
his mother or grandmother. He also wants to “open me up like a little nacho
stand something like that,” notwithstanding the fact that, prior to incarceration,
Father did little more than intermittently wash cars whenever he decided that
he needed money. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 79). He instead apparently relied on other
resources and the gratuity of others (namely, his mother’s social security
income and the use of her apartment) to make sure that the Child and his half-
siblings “had food in they belly [and] clothes on they back.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 81).
At the time of the termination hearing, Father had been incarcerated for nearly
four years. Instead of taking advantage of every opportunity to establish that he
could provide for the necessary care and support of the Child soon after his
release, Father broke the rules and engaged in additional criminal conduct,
disqualifying himself from programs and opportunities to prepare for life
outside of prison. As the Child was removed based on his parents’ inability to
provide for his basic needs, we find that the evidence supports the trial court’s
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determination that there is a reasonable probability that Father will not remedy
the conditions that resulted in the Child’s removal and continued placement
outside of the home.
B. Best Interests of the Child
[27] Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the
Child’s best interests. The parent-child relationship is undoubtedly “one of the
most valued relationships in our culture.” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147 (quoting
Neal v. DeKalb Cnty. Div of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 2003)).
Accordingly, the purpose of terminating a parent-child relationship is to protect
the child, not to punish the parent. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003), trans. denied. When considering whether termination would be in a
child’s best interests, the trial court must “look beyond the factors identified by
[DCS] and . . . look to the totality of the evidence.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at
1158. “The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such
that the child’s physical, mental and social development is permanently
impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d
at 1235. Permanency is a central consideration in determining a child’s best
interests. Id.
[28] Father acknowledges that DCS and the two CASAs assigned to the case all
recommended that termination of his parental rights would serve the Child’s
best interests. DCS and the CASAs emphasized the Child’s need for
permanency—given the significant time elapsed since removal—and that he
would suffer additional trauma if separated from T.F. and A.F. All agreed that
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the Child is in a “wonderful” foster placement, and the foster mother has
agreed to adopt all three children. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 58). Nevertheless, Father
now argues that “[t]he general idea that children need permanency is not
sufficient to prove that [the Child] would be harmed by remaining with the care
giver without termination and adoption while his Father completed his
sentence and services.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 16). Father also contends that he
“has pursued programs to better himself and to be a better parent[, and his]
interactions with [the Child] are healthy and the two are bonded.” (Appellant’s
Br. p. 17). He adds that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Father
living with his mother and grandmother upon release, or Father’s past criminal
history, would pose a threat to the Child.
[29] At the time of the termination hearing, the Child was almost six years old, and
Father had been incarcerated since the Child was two years old. During that
time, Father demonstrated more of a commitment to violating DOC’s rules
than to reunifying with the Child. It is well established that “[a] parent’s
historical inability to provide a suitable environment, along with the parent’s
current inability to do the same, supports finding termination of parental rights
is in the best interests of the children.” In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013). Moreover, the testimony of the DCS caseworker and child
advocates is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that termination is
in the Child’s best interests. See McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family &
Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). While Father correctly
notes that termination is not appropriate simply because a better home might be
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1708-JT-1771 | February 20, 2018 Page 19 of 20
available, the fact remains that the Child’s foster mother can provide him with
the consistent care and stability that Father cannot. We find there is sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s determination that termination is in the
Child’s best interests.
CONCLUSION
[30] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing
evidence to support the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to
the Child.
[31] Affirmed.
[32] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A04-1708-JT-1771 | February 20, 2018 Page 20 of 20