Brittany N. Veal v. Indiana Department of Workforce Development (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Jun 30 2015, 7:51 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brittany Veal Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Kristin Garn
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Brittany N. Veal, June 30, 2015
Appellant-Claimant, Court of Appeals Case No.
93A02-1411-EX-778
v. Appeal from the Review Board of the
Department of Workforce
Development
Indiana Department of
Workforce Development, Case Nos. 14-R-1937, 14-R-1938,
and 14-R-1939
Appellee-Respondent.
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Brittany Veal appeals the decision of the Indiana Department of Workforce
Development Unemployment Insurance Review Board (“the Review Board”)
affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s decision to suspend Veal’s
unemployment benefits and ordering her to repay benefits and assessing civil
penalties. However, due to Veal’s disregard of the appellate rules, we do not
reach the merits of her appeal.
[2] We dismiss.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for the Department of Workforce
Development set out the facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal as
follows:
This matter addresses three different claims: 63163, 63165, and
63170. Each file addressed separate claims for unemployment
benefits by the Claimant.
The Claimant filed for unemployment benefits from the weeks
ending June 4, 2011 through June 15, 2012, with the exception of
the week ending June 11, 2011. The Department discovered that
the Claimant had been working two jobs during that entire
period. The Department requested and received documentation
from the Employers concerning the Claimant’s income during
that time. The Claimant agreed that the amounts listed by the
Department were the income that she received.
The Claimant filed unemployment vouchers via computer. The
Claimant did read the warning page when she initially filed for
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benefits, which reads: “I understand that I must report all
earnings from employment or self-employment regardless of
source, including regular payroll.” On that screen, the Claimant
had to click on a button that declared that she agreed with the
statement before she could file a claim for unemployment.
Another screen that the Claimant had read again advised the
Claimant that she must report all earnings.
The Claimant did not file for benefits for the week ending June
11, 2011. For each of the other weeks, the Claimant did file for
benefits and did not report her income, even though on a weekly
claim agreement the Claimant certified that she had reported
“any and all work, earnings, and self-employment activity for this
week, even though I may not have been paid.” The Claimant
also certified that “all answers and information given in this
application for benefits are true and accurate.”
On every voucher filed, the Claimant was required to answer
questions about her claim. One question on the claims screen
asked the Claimant “Did you work?” The Claimant answered
“No” every week, even though she was working two jobs.
***
The Claimant stipulated to the [evidence of wages she had
received from working the two jobs,] but asserts that Department
representatives told her that if each paycheck did not rise above
the benefit amount, she did not have to report it.
The testimony of the Claimant is found to be not credible and
reliable. The Claimant admitted to certifying on each benefit
voucher that she had reported all earnings, and that she had
responded “no” to the question “Did you work?” The credibility
of the Claimant is in doubt because of her answers to these
questions.
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Appellee’s App. at 4-6. The ALJ ordered Veal “to repay all benefits received in
the three claims,” and the ALJ imposed civil penalties. Id. at 7. Veal appealed
that decision to the Review Board, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision. This
appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[4] We do not address the merits of Veal’s appeal. Veal’s brief on appeal contains
several violations of the appellate rules, and she failed to file an appendix. We
recognize that Veal is proceeding pro se. Nonetheless, it is well settled that pro
se litigants are held to the same standard as are licensed lawyers. Goossens v.
Goossens, 829 N.E.2d 36, 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
[5] Veal’s brief wholly fails to comply with Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a),
which requires that the argument must contain the contentions of the appellant
on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must
be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts
of the Record on Appeal relied on. Id. Rule 46(A)(8)(a) is the most important
of the appellate rules in that compliance with it is essential to this court’s ability
to address an appeal.
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[6] Here, Veal fails to set out her contentions in a coherent manner, and she does
not present any cogent reasoning.1 Indeed, Veal does not include citations to
any legal authority in support of her contentions. And Veal does not support
her bare allegations with citations to evidence in an appendix, which she did
not file. Finally, Veal does not set out the appropriate standard of review on
appeal, in violation of Rule 46(A)(8)(b).
[7] Our review of Veal’s appeal is so hampered by the deficiencies in her brief that
we must dismiss the appeal. See, e.g., Galvan v. State, 877 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007). We simply cannot discern Veal’s contentions or argument
beyond her general contentions that she did not intentionally lie on the
unemployment vouchers she had submitted in seeking benefits. As we have
explained above, an adequate brief on appeal requires more than contentions.
Veal’s substantial failure to comply with various appellate rules is not merely a
technical violation but makes it virtually impossible to discern the merits of her
appeal, let alone address them. This court will not fashion an argument on
behalf of a party who fails to make an argument and support it with cogent
reasoning and appropriate citations to authority and the record. See Young v.
Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “A court which must search
the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately
1
Veal appears to ask that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See, e.g., T.B. v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind.
Dept. of Workforce Dev., 980 N.E.2d 341, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
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presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an
adjudicator.” Id.
[8] Dismissed.
Baker, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.
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