Lawrence J. Anderson v. State of Indiana

Jun 30 2015, 7:15 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Timothy P. Broden Gregory F. Zoeller
Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Christina D. Pace
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lawrence J. Anderson, June 30, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A02-1501-CR-10
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior
Court No. 2
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas H. Busch,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Case No. 79D02-1402-FA-09
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that walking through an open door does
not satisfy the “breaking” element of burglary—but opening an unlocked door
does. In this case, the defendant “rushed” a victim to gain unauthorized entry
into a dwelling when the door was voluntarily opened for another person whom
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1501-CR-10 | June 30, 2015 Page 1 of 7
the victim was expecting. We find that “rushing” someone to gain
unauthorized entry is sufficient evidence of force used. Thus, we affirm the
defendant’s conviction for Class A felony burglary.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Alexis Daniels owed her neighbor Cortez Collins $1000.00 for drugs she had
purchased from him. Collins asked Alexis if she knew anyone who sold drugs
in the Lafayette area so that he could obtain the money she owed him. Alexis
informed Collins that Timothy Mounts sold spice. Collins told Alexis to go to
Mounts’ apartment to buy spice and see if he kept any guns there. When Alexis
returned from buying the spice, Collins had her draw a floorplan of Mounts’
apartment. Collins later returned to Alexis’s apartment and told Alexis that
they were going to rob Mounts. The plan was for Lawrence Anderson, Alexis,
Collins, and Jaaz Jones to go to Mounts’ apartment, wait for him to open the
door for Alexis, and then enter the apartment to rob him. At Collins’ request,
Alexis initiated another buy from Mounts for a larger quantity of spice.
[3] After Alexis texted Mounts that she was on her way, Mounts briefly left the
apartment to get food for his pregnant girlfriend—Jessica Wise—who lived with
him. As Alexis approached the door of Mounts’ apartment, Anderson and the
two other men hid around the corner of the apartment; all were dressed in black
and two had their faces covered with pantyhose while the third one had a sock
hat over his head. When Alexis knocked on the door, Jessica answered.
Because Jessica expected Alexis, she opened the door, turned, and started
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1501-CR-10 | June 30, 2015 Page 2 of 7
walking toward the couch. As Alexis “stepped inside [the apartment] and to
the side . . . [the men] bombarded themselves inside.” Tr. Vol. 1 p. 67. Alexis
“got shoved” as the men made their way into the apartment, and Jessica was
“rushed.” Id. at 21-22, 78. Jessica was pushed on the couch by one of the
men—later identified as Anderson—who began to choke and hit her. Id. at 22-
23, 78. When Jessica asked Anderson to stop hitting her because she was
pregnant, he responded “Bit** I don’t give a fu** what you are.” Id. at 24.
After Anderson stopped hitting her, he dragged her off the couch by her hair
through the living room to the safes in the bedroom where he hit her in the back
of the head repeatedly with a gun as she tried to open one of the safes. Id. at 30.
The men eventually left with one safe and a PlayStation 3.
[4] The State charged Anderson with seven counts in connection with this incident:
Count I: Class A felony conspiracy to commit burglary, Count II: Class A
felony burglary, Count III: Class B felony conspiracy to commit robbery while
armed with a deadly weapon, Count IV: Class B felony robbery, Count V: Class
D felony theft, Count VI: Class C felony battery, and Count VII: Class C felony
battery. A jury found Anderson guilty on all counts. The trial court entered
judgment of conviction for Counts II, IV, and VII only and merged the other
counts due to double-jeopardy concerns. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 17; Appellant’s App. p.
15.
[5] Before sentencing, Anderson filed a motion to correct errors contending that
there was insufficient evidence to support his Class A felony burglary
conviction. Appellant’s App. p. 37. Specifically, Anderson argued there was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1501-CR-10 | June 30, 2015 Page 3 of 7
no evidence “of a movement of a structural impediment that could be
considered ‘breaking.’” Id. The court denied Anderson’s motion, finding “that
entering the apartment without permission and by force, as occurred here, is
sufficient to constitute a breaking, whether or not the door was moved in doing
so.” Id. at 29-30. The court reasoned that “the doorway itself was a structural
impediment designed to prohibit unauthorized entry, the door was opened by
subterfuge, and by forcibly crossing the threshold the defendant satisfied the
requirement of breaking.” Id. at 30. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial
court sentenced Anderson to thirty years for Count II: Class A felony burglary,
twenty years for Count IV: Class B felony robbery, and eight years for Count
VII: Class C felony battery. The court ordered the sentences to be served
concurrently with five years suspended to probation. Id. at 15-20.
[6] Anderson now appeals his burglary conviction only.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Anderson contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for
burglary. On a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction,
a reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the
witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). This Court
respects the jury’s exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence. Id. It
considers only the evidence most favorable to the verdict. Id. This Court must
affirm if the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1501-CR-10 | June 30, 2015 Page 4 of 7
have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
[8] Anderson argues that there was no evidence of physical movement of a
structural impediment that could be considered a “breaking” within the
statutory definition for the crime of burglary. Appellant’s Br. p. 4. The State
responds that in order to establish that a breaking has occurred, it needs only to
introduce “evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the
slightest force was used to gain unauthorized entry.” Appellee’s Br. p. 7
(quotation omitted). The State relies on the fact that Anderson and the other
men “rushed” Jessica after coming through the open door, and argues that by
running forcefully at Jessica, they used force to push their way into the
apartment. Id. at 7-8. We agree.
[9] At the time of the crime, Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1 provided that a person
who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to
commit a felony in it, commits burglary, a Class C felony. Ind. Code Ann. §
35-43-2-1 (West 2012). Burglary was elevated to a Class A felony if it resulted
in bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any person other than the defendant.
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-43-2-1(2)(A), (B) (West 2012).
[10] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that walking through an open door does
not establish “breaking”; however, breaking is established when even the
slightest force is used to gain unauthorized entry, such as opening an unlocked
door. See Cockerham v. State, 204 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Ind. 1965); Smith v. State,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1501-CR-10 | June 30, 2015 Page 5 of 7
535 N.E.2d 117, 118 (Ind. 1989); Trice v. State, 490 N.E.2d 757, 758-59 (Ind.
1986).
[11] The Indiana Supreme Court addressed a similar factual scenario in Henley v.
State, 519 N.E.2d 525 (Ind. 1988). In that case, the defendant knocked on the
front door of the victim’s house. When the victim answered the door, the
defendant asked for the location of an address about a block away. After being
given directions, the defendant asked to use the victim’s phone. The victim
handed the phone to the defendant through the front door. After making a
phone call, the defendant pushed the front door farther open against the victim
and entered her house as she tried to close the door. On appeal, the defendant
argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish a breaking because he
“merely pushed past her through an open door.” Id. at 526-27. The Supreme
Court noted that although the victim opened her door in response to the
defendant’s knock, she did not intend to allow him to enter her house, as
demonstrated by the fact that she handed the telephone to him through the
door. Id. at 527. Accordingly, the Court found that the evidence was sufficient
to prove a breaking because the defendant “used force to push the door farther
open to gain entrance.” Id.
[12] Here, the evidence shows that Alexis was the only person who had permission
to enter Mounts’ apartment. Although Anderson did not push the door farther
open to gain access to the apartment like the defendant in Henley, Anderson,
Collins, and Jones—who were hiding from view when Jessica opened the
door—“rushed” Jessica after she let Alexis in. We find that this constitutes
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1501-CR-10 | June 30, 2015 Page 6 of 7
force used to gain unauthorized entry into Mounts’ apartment. Moreover, the
action of barging in and jumping on Jessica can be seen as force used to gain
unauthorized entry into the apartment. Like the victim in Henley, Jessica did
not intend to let Anderson in. We therefore find that rushing someone to gain
unauthorized entry into a dwelling is sufficient evidence of force. 1 Because the
evidence is sufficient to establish the breaking element of burglary, we affirm
Anderson’s conviction for Class A felony burglary.
Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
1
Because we reach this conclusion, we need not address Anderson’s argument that subterfuge is not
sufficient to prove the breaking element of burglary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1501-CR-10 | June 30, 2015 Page 7 of 7