Sierra Hill v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Nov 20 2019, 6:46 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher Taylor-Price Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana Courtney Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Sierra Hill, November 20, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1074
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Amy Jones, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. The Honorable David Hooper,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G08-1809-CM-30447
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1074| November 20, 2019 Page 1 of 5
Case Summary
[1] In September of 2018, Sierra Hill was charged with Class A misdemeanor
criminal trespass due to her refusal to leave a Boston Market after being told to
do so by the assistant general manager. In April of 2019, Hill was convicted of
criminal trespass. Hill contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to
sustain her conviction. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On September 10, 2018, DoorDash delivery woman Hill entered a Marion
County Boston Market to pick up a food order for delivery. Assistant General
Manager Timothy Dixson encountered Hill and asked to view the order
confirmation on Hill’s mobile telephone, which is Boston Market’s standard
procedure. Hill refused and began “yelling and screaming and saying that that
was theft and that I was not giving her the food that she was there to pick up[.]”
Tr. p. 6. At that point, Dixson asked Hill to leave, but rather than leave, Hill
called the police. Dixson gave Hill her food and she left the restaurant.
Approximately thirty-five to forty minutes later, Hill returned to the Boston
Market and demanded the names and phone numbers of Dixson’s employees.
Dixon refused, only offering to give Hill his name and phone number. After
Dixon refused, Hill called the police to have them come back to the restaurant
and retrieve the names of all the employees. Dixon reminded Hill that he had
already asked her to leave the restaurant. Police arrived at the Boston Market,
and Hill was taken into custody.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1074| November 20, 2019 Page 2 of 5
[3] On September 11, 2018, the State charged Hill with Class A misdemeanor
criminal trespass and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. On April 15,
2019, a bench trial was held, after which Hill was found guilty of criminal
trespass. The trial court sentenced Hill to 365 days with 361 days suspended to
probation.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Hill contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her
criminal-trespass conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to
support a conviction, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the factfinder’s decision. Young v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1225,
1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. It is the role of the factfinder, not ours,
to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm a
conviction unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. To convict Hill of Class A
misdemeanor criminal trespass, the State had to establish that Hill, not having a
contractual interest in Boston Market, knowingly or intentionally refused to
leave Boston Market after having been asked to leave by Dixson. Ind. Code §
35-43-2-2(b)(2).1
1
Indiana Code section 35-41-2-2 dictates that
(a) A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his
conscious objective to do so.
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[5] We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Hill’s conviction. The
record indicates that approximately thirty-five to forty minutes after Hill had
received her order and left, she returned to the Boston Market. At that point,
the contractual interest Hill had, if any, had dissipated. The record also
indicates that Dixson again told Hill to leave the restaurant, but she refused and
called the police. Given the record, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
Hill committed criminal trespass.
[6] Hill argues that because she had returned to the Boston Market to file a police
report against an employee that she alleges threatened her, she had a fair and
reasonable foundation for believing that she had a right to be present at the
Boston Market. See Curtis v. State, 58 N.E.3d 992, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“[I]f
a person has a fair and reasonable foundation for believing that he or she has a
right to be present on the property, there is no criminal trespass.”). Hill’s own
testimony, however, is the only evidence that indicates that an employee at the
Boston Market had threatened her, which the trial court was not required to
believe and apparently did not. Hill’s argument is merely an invitation for us to
reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility, which we will not do.
Young, 973 N.E.2d at 1226.
[7] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
(b) A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a
high probability that he is doing so.
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Vaidik, C.J, and Riley, J., concur.
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