Ricci Davis v. State of Indiana

FILED
Dec 19 2019, 9:28 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stephen T. Owens Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jonathan O. Chenoweth Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Public Defender Supervising Deputy Attorney
Indianapolis, Indiana General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ricci Davis, December 19, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-PC-984
v. Appeal from the Huntington
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jennifer Newton,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
35D01-1511-PC-22
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Ricci Davis appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The relevant facts as discussed in Davis’s direct appeal follow:
Shortly before 11:00 p.m. on May 19, 2014, a man called the
Huntington County Sheriff’s Department on its non-emergency
line and reported that he had a warrant and “was strung out on
meth and to come get him and take it all out of his house.” (Tr.
p. 99). In response to the call, the Sheriff’s Department
dispatched the Huntington Police Department to 533 East
Franklin Street, Huntington, Indiana, upon verification that the
occupant thereof, Davis, had an active warrant.
*****
Fifteen minutes after the police had first knocked on the door,
Davis came downstairs, along with Thomas Hale (Hale) and
Amanda (Casto). The officers escorted him outside, placed him
in handcuffs, and administered his Miranda warnings. Davis
indicated that he and Hale had been manufacturing
methamphetamine on the second floor of the house. Davis
further stated that when they heard the officers knocking on the
door, Hale began hiding the supplies. Thus, Davis offered to
accompany the officers inside to show them where everything
was. For safety reasons, the officers would not allow Davis back
into the house, but upon questioning as to whether there was an
active lab that could pose any danger to the officers, Davis
assured them that everything was safe.
As the officers climbed the staircase, they detected the “very
distinct,” “overwhelming chemical” odor associated with
manufacturing methamphetamine. (Tr. pp. 247, 262). The odor
was most potent in the upstairs bathroom, emanating from the
toilet and the sink in particular. Once they confirmed that there
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was nobody else in the house, the officers went back outside to
retrieve their protective gear. After obtaining consent to search
the home from the landlord, several officers trained in
dismantling methamphetamine labs entered the house to process
the scene.
No active methamphetamine lab was discovered, nor did the
police officers recover any finished methamphetamine product.
However, spread throughout nearly every room of the house, the
officers found evidence of all of the ingredients and other
equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine,
including: numerous empty boxes and blister packs that had
contained pseudoephedrine pills; empty boxes and the water
bladders from cold compresses and the ammonium nitrate that
had been extracted therefrom; lithium batteries and empty
battery packages; salt; several bottles of drain cleaner (lye);
Liquid Fire (sulfuric acid); three empty one-gallon containers of
Coleman fuel (an organic solvent); coffee filters; plastic tubing;
funnels; Ziploc bags; side cutters (for stripping the lithium out of
the batteries); gas masks; and latex gloves. The search also
revealed a plastic bag containing a liquid substance; a bottle that
had been used as a “one-pot” (first stage of methamphetamine
manufacturing); at least six bottles that had been used as
hydrochloric gas (HCL) generators (second stage of
methamphetamine manufacturing), one of which was located on
the upstairs toilet lid; a cast iron skillet coated in white powder; a
pill crusher; several loose syringes; and “partial directions on a
couple steps of manufacturing methamphetamine.” (Tr. pp. 206,
211). Testing on the liquid substance indicated the presence of
methamphetamine, but the sample was too diluted to run a
confirmatory test.
Davis v. State, No. 35A02-1411-CR-804, slip op. at 2-5 (Ind. Ct. App. June 2,
2015) (“Davis I”).
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[3] The State charged Davis with dealing in methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of
a youth program center as a class A felony. Id. at 5. In October 2014, the court
held a jury trial. Id. During opening argument, Davis’s trial counsel stated:
And in the end, in the final analysis you will be asked to make a
decision and the decision will be to convict or is there sufficient
evidence to convict Ricci Davis of manufacturing
methamphetamine or in the alternative, is there sufficient
evidence to convict him of the possession of two (2) or more
ingredients for methamphetamine and to convict him of
permitting his house and we call that Maintaining a Common
Nuisance, permitting his house to be used for the manufacture of
methamphetamine.
Ricci Davis isn’t going to leave this trial without a conviction.
That is clear. It’s clear to me and it’s clear to him. What we are
going to ask you ladies and gentleman of the jury to determine
what the conviction or convictions should actually be. And the
Judge will guide you on that in final instructions.
Trial Transcript Volume II at 93.
[4] During the State’s evidence, Dathen Strine, a GIS / IT Technician for
Huntington County, testified regarding the creation of maps and buffer zones
and that on either side of a point of measurement would be a two and one-half
foot margin of error for a total margin of error of five feet. He testified he
created a map that measured the distance between Davis’s residence and
Trinity United Methodist Church. The court admitted the map as State’s
Exhibit 58, which indicates the distance as 970 feet. He stated that the distance
could be as little as 965 feet and as great as 975 feet. He testified that he created
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a map that measured the distance between Davis’s residence and the Boys &
Girls Club as 940 feet with a total margin of error of five feet. The court
admitted the map as State’s Exhibit 59.
[5] Outside the presence of the jury, the parties and the court discussed the
admission of a disclaimer which states in part:
By using this site, I agree that I understand and am bound by the
following conditions.
General. The information on this Web Site was prepared from a
Geographic Information System established by Huntington
County for their internal purposes only, and was not designed or
intended for general use by members of the public. Huntington
County, its employees, agents and personnel, makes no
representation or warranty as to its accuracy, and in particular,
its accuracy as to labeling, dimensions, contours, property
boundaries, or placement or location of any map features
thereon; nor to the accuracy of any other information contained
thereon.
Disclaimer. Huntington County Digital Data is the property of
Huntington County, Indiana © 2000 Huntington County, IN.
All graphic data supplied by Huntington County has been
derived from public records that are constantly undergoing
change and is not warranted for content or accuracy. The county
does not guarantee the positional or thematic accuracy of the
data. . . . The data represents an actual reproduction of data
contained in Huntington County’s computer files. This data may
be incomplete or inaccurate, and is subject to modifications and
changes. . . .
Defendant’s Exhibit A. The court sustained the prosecutor’s objection to the
disclaimer, stated that it would not allow the disclaimer into evidence, and
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stated: “It is a disclaimer of liability and that’s what it is. It’s not a declaration
as far as accuracy.” Trial Transcript Volume III at 516.
[6] Davis’s counsel tendered an instruction which stated that the jury could
consider the included crimes of possession of chemical reagents or precursors
with intent to manufacture controlled substances, possession of
methamphetamine, or maintaining a common nuisance. The court refused to
give the jury the instruction.
[7] During closing argument, Davis’s counsel stated:
[T]he elected prosecutor of Huntington County, ultimately gets
to decide what charges are brought against the defendant . . . .
And tin [sic] this case, ladies and gentlemen, boy did she reach
for that brass ring. She went right for the A felony. She went
right for the crime that has and is in the same category as
aggravated rape and one spot less than murder. That’s what she
went for . . . which she’s allowed to do. She has prosecutorial
discretion. She can bring that charge if she wants but that means
that she has to prove every element of that crime to you. It’s not
enough that she proves some other lesser crime. She has to prove
that crime to you beyond a reasonable doubt. And I will submit
to you, ladies and gentleman, that she has failed in that task.
Trial Transcript Volume IV at 587. Davis’s counsel also stated:
So then they move on to this thousand (1000) feet issue. I don’t
dispute that those buildings, by the way, are youth program
centers. Those are good and (INAUDIBLE) programs that they
have out there. They are a great thing for the community. They
should be maintained. But what do we have as far as distances.
Well, we know they didn’t go out there and measure manually.
It’s what they used to do by the way. They used to go out with
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one of those wheels that has the quickie things on it and every
time you go a feet (sic), you get a foot. That is what they used to
do. They don’t do that anymore, apparently. They are content
to have someone who sits downstairs in the same building to get
on a computer and not type in addresses. He doesn’t do that. He
picks. He takes his mouse and clicks one spot and goes down.
Then he clicks another spot and gets a distance. Now this has a
margin of error. We know that. He testified that it is a five (5)
foot margin of error. Of course, that is not verified. He stated
they haven’t verified that. It could be about anything. So we’ve
got that margin of error. We’ve got the human margin of error.
And then and this is the most important part, he has no idea how
they get those . . . those distances. The head of the GIS website
sat here and told you, “I don’t know how they get those photos.
I guess there is a plane or something and they must use a
camera.” That’s how you are going to convict on an A felony?
‘I guess there is a plan [sic] and there might be a camera?’
Id. at 597-598.
[8] The jury found Davis guilty as charged. Davis I, slip op. at 5. After the jury
was released, the court stated:
This is just for part of the record. I would like the record to
indicate that neither the State nor the defendant had requested a
lesser included offense upon the Class B felony, Dealing in
Methamphetamine. Had it been submitted the Court would have
given to it . . . neither party requested it.
Trial Transcript Volume V at 625. The court sentenced him to fifty years in the
Department of Correction. Davis I, slip op. at 5.
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[9] On direct appeal, Davis argued that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses of dealing in
methamphetamine and excluding evidence regarding the accuracy of the State’s
measurement of distance between Davis’s house and two youth program
centers. Id. at 2. Davis also argued that his sentence was inappropriate in light
of the nature of the offense and his character. Id. This Court affirmed. Id.
[10] On November 17, 2015, Davis filed a petition for post-conviction relief and on
June 6, 2018, counsel amended the petition to include three claims: (1) that the
subsection under which he had been convicted was unconstitutionally vague;
(2) that appellate counsel had provided ineffective assistance by not raising a
vagueness claim; and (3) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not
tendering jury instructions on manufacturing methamphetamine as a class B
felony and the State’s burden to prove less than 1,000 feet separated each youth
program center from the exact center where methamphetamine had been made.
[11] On January 7, 2019, the court held an evidentiary hearing. Attorney Andrew
Teel testified that he was Davis’s trial counsel with Attorney Don Swanson as
co-counsel. He indicated that the general trial strategy was to try to convince
the jury “if they were going to enter [a] conviction to convict on . . . some ‘D’
Felonies would have been possession of precursors . . . that sort of thing . . .
rather than going all way for the . . . ‘A’ Felony.” Post-Conviction Transcript
Volume II at 7. When asked if he ever thought about tendering a jury
instruction on a lesser offense of manufacturing as a class B felony, he
answered:
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I don’t, uh, I-I think that had we been able to get the evidence of
the disclaimer in, I think the answer would have been yes, um,
and obviously you’re trying to do anything you can to avoid ‘A’
felony, um, but given the-the facts that were in-in evidence by the
time it came around to-to Instruction time, I don’t believe, you
know, that it was, uh, an option, at least in my mind, any longer.
Id. at 9. He indicated it was fair to say that he did not think that an instruction
on the class B felony was supported by the evidence. He indicated that the
decision on the lesser included offense was probably Attorney Swanson’s
decision.
[12] Attorney Swanson testified that he represented Davis as lead counsel. When
asked why he did not consider offering the jury an instruction on the lesser
included offense of manufacturing as a class B felony, 1 he answered:
Because, uh, I feel that the Jury were – if you gave the Jury, uh,
too much options you’re creating excuses. Uh, I think that if, uh,
if your [sic] delivering on a lesser included, it should be, a lesser
included. Uh, Judge Heffelfinger appointed me in this case due
to conflicts and the public defender appeal and, uh, I have about
as much respect for him and he for me, uh, but, (laughing) that’s,
uh, he was- he was a very, uh, strict sentencing individual and if
the Jury convicted of the ‘B’ Felony it would have been twenty
(20) years, uh, no discussion.
1
The Transcript states that Davis’s post-conviction counsel asked Attorney Swanson, “given that – the
thousand (1,000) foot element was an issue at trial, did you consider, uh, offering the Jury a lesser included
on Manufacturing as a Class D felony?” Post-Conviction Transcript Volume II at 15. It appears that the
reference to the class D felony is a scrivener’s error or that Davis’s post-conviction counsel intended to ask
about an instruction on a class B felony.
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Id. at 15-16. When asked if he felt that the class B instruction was not
warranted by the evidence, he answered:
Oh, no, clearly it would be, um, uh, warranted by the evidence.
Uh, but I didn’t think that that would be enough of a break, uh,
you know, I thought it would be better strategically, uh, to go for
the two (2) Class D Felony (SIC), uh, rather than the ‘B’.
Id. at 16. When asked if this was a strategic decision on his part, he answered
affirmatively. He indicated that he did not recall considering tendering an
instruction to the jury that the 1,000 feet distance had to be between the youth
program center and the exact location where the methamphetamine was made
as opposed to the property line of where it was made. When asked on cross-
examination whether he had a trial strategy in terms of trying to dispute the
1,000 foot enhancement, he answered:
I believe that, uh, it was Andrew Teel that came up with this
concept mid trial. Uh, he carefully evaluated their evidence and
how they were doing measurements and there was a disclaimer,
uh, which I was unaware of, which he discovered during the
trial, uh, and the disclaimer should have come into evidence as
far as I’m concerned, uh, but, I wasn’t the Judge.
Id. at 17. He indicated he did not consider challenging whether the Boys &
Girls Club was a youth program center. He testified that he considered
challenging the preschool at a church as a youth program center but did not
“feel as though it was going to go anywhere.” Id. at 18. He indicated that he
did not think about submitting any other instructions on lesser included offenses
besides the two that he did.
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[13] On redirect examination, the following exchange occurred:
Q Um, I – I took your testimony to mean, when I was
questioning you, that you did think of other lesser includeds
(SIC). You just decided not to tender them as a matter of
strategy, is that correct?
A Uh, to clarify, I thi- I understood her question to be other than
the lesser included ‘B’ and the two (2) ‘Ds’. I took it that way. If
she’s asking me, um, did I consider the ‘B’, I did, and didn’t do
it.
Id. at 19.
[14] After Davis’s post-conviction counsel rested, the State presented the testimony
of Strine, the GIS Coordinator for Huntington County, who stated that he
testified at Davis’s trial regarding two maps he created. The court admitted a
map that had been admitted at trial, and Strine testified that the entire property
at 533 East Franklin Street was “incased in that thousand (1,000) foot ‘buffer’”
and that the entire house would be within 1,000 feet of part of the property of
the Trinity Church. Id. at 24. When showed another map he created for
Davis’s trial, he indicated that the entire structure of the house was inside the
green buffer zone.
[15] On cross-examination, he testified that producing maps was not a normal
feature that he did on a regular basis. He also testified that the measurements
had a margin of error of “two and a half (2 1/2 ) feet, so a grand total, from
point to point, of five (5) foot . . . margin of error, and that’s based off of the
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company that supplied the aerial photography for us.” Id. at 30. On redirect
examination, he indicated that the margin of error was not on the “buffer zone”
itself and the two and one-half feet did not have anything to do with the buffer
zone but “just the red line” on the map. Id. at 31.
[16] Linda Grossman, the Director at Trinity pre-school, stated that she testified at
Davis’s trial, that the building or property for the preschool had two signs, one
which read “Pre-School Trinity United Methodist Church” and another which
read “Trinity Methodist Pre-school.” Id. at 35. Mandy Reber, the Executive
Director for the Boys & Girls Club in Huntington, stated that she testified at
Davis’s trial and that the Boys & Girls Club had a sign on the property in early
2014 which read “Boys and Girls Club of Huntington County.” Id. at 40.
[17] Davis’s post-conviction counsel stated that his argument was not that the
statute was vague as applied to the facts of the case but that it was vague in its
entirety and was “unconstitutionally vague as a whole.” Id. at 45. He stated:
“And I just want to make clear to the Court that we’re not arguing that it’s
vague as applied to the facts of this case, I mean it’s probably not vague as
applied to the facts of this but, the Johnson case from the U.S. Supreme Court
says it can still be vague overall, even if it’s not vague in this case.” Id. at 46.
On April 4, 2019, the court denied Davis’s petition.
Discussion
[18] Before discussing Davis’s allegations of error, we note the general standard
under which we review a post-conviction court’s denial of a petition for post-
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conviction relief. The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the
burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.
Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5).
When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands
in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. Fisher, 810 N.E.2d
at 679. On review, we will not reverse the judgment unless the evidence as a
whole unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached
by the post-conviction court. Id. “A post-conviction court’s findings and
judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which
leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.
In this review, we accept findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but we
accord no deference to conclusions of law. Id. The post-conviction court is the
sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id.
A. Vagueness
[19] We first address whether the statutes governing Davis’s offense are
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. On appeal, Davis concedes that the
relevant statutes are not vague as applied to him and that the statutes are not
void under a traditional vagueness analysis. However, Davis appears to argue
that the vagueness doctrine has been transformed and that, under the new
analysis, “the YPC statute can be – and, in fact, is – void, even though it was
not vague in all its applications and even though it reached no constitutionally
protected conduct,” and cites Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015),
and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2019). Appellant’s Brief at 21. He also
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cites Whatley v. Zatecky, 833 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2016), and contends that case
applied the new vagueness analysis to the statutes under which he was
convicted.
[20] The amended charging information cited Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(b)(3)(B)(iv)
and alleged that, “[s]ometime during the time period of January 1, 2014
through May 20, 2014, . . . [Davis] knowingly manufactured
methamphetamine, pure or adulterated, . . . within one thousand (1,000) feet of
a youth program center.” Appellant’s Direct Appeal Appendix Volume I at 12.
[21] At the time of the alleged offense, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1 provided that a
person who “knowingly or intentionally . . . manufactures . . .
methamphetamine, pure or adulterated . . . commits dealing in
methamphetamine, a Class B felony,” and “[t]he offense is a Class A felony if .
. . the person manufactured . . . the drug . . . in, on, or within one thousand
(1,000) feet of . . . a youth program center.” 2 Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-357
provides:
(a) “Youth program center” means the following:
(1) A building or structure that on a regular basis provides
recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other
2
(Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 158-2013, § 623 (eff. July 1, 2014); Pub. L. No. 168-2014, § 92 (eff.
July 1, 2014); Pub. L. No. 226-2014(ts), § 7 (eff. July 1, 2014); Pub. L. No. 44-2016, § 3 (eff. July 1, 2016);
Pub. L. No. 252-2017, § 22 (eff. July 1, 2017)). “In 2014, as part of Indiana’s comprehensive criminal code
reform, the legislature made three changes. It deleted the youth program center and family housing complex
zones, tightened the proximity element to 500 feet, and . . . added the element that a minor’s presence be
‘reasonably expected.’” McAlpin v. State, 80 N.E.3d 157, 162 (Ind. 2017).
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programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18)
years of age.
(2) The real property on which a building or structure
described in subdivision (1) is located.
(b) The term does not include school property (as defined in
section 285 of this chapter).
[22] In Johnson v. United States, the United States Supreme Court discussed the
Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, which provided that a defendant
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm faces more severe
punishment if he has three or more previous convictions for a “violent felony.”
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555 (2015) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)). The Act
defined “violent felony” as follows:
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.
Id. at 2555-2556 (quoting § 924(e)(2)(B)) (emphasis added in opinion). The
Court indicated that the italicized words had come to be known as the Act’s
residual clause and addressed whether it survived the Constitution’s prohibition
of vague criminal laws. Id. at 2556. The Court granted certiorari to decide
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whether Minnesota’s offense of unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun
ranked as a violent felony under the residual clause. Id.
[23] The Court held:
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
Our cases establish that the Government violates this guarantee
by taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a
criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair
notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-
358, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983). The prohibition of
vagueness in criminal statutes “is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled
rules of law,” and a statute that flouts it “violates the first
essential of due process.” Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926). These principles
apply not only to statutes defining elements of crimes, but also to
statutes fixing sentences. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,
123, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1979).
In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 109
L. Ed. 2d 607 (1990), this Court held that the Armed Career
Criminal Act requires courts to use a framework known as the
categorical approach when deciding whether an offense “is
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another.” Under the categorical approach, a
court assesses whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony “in
terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how
an individual offender might have committed it on a particular
occasion.” Begay, supra, at 141, 128 S. Ct. 1581.
Deciding whether the residual clause covers a crime thus requires
a court to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in
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“the ordinary case,” and to judge whether that abstraction
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. James, supra,
at 208, 127 S. Ct. 1586. The court’s task goes beyond deciding
whether creation of risk is an element of the crime. That is so
because, unlike the part of the definition of a violent felony that
asks whether the crime “has as an element the use . . . of physical
force,” the residual clause asks whether the crime “involves
conduct” that presents too much risk of physical injury. What is
more, the inclusion of burglary and extortion among the
enumerated offenses preceding the residual clause confirms that
the court’s task also goes beyond evaluating the chances that the
physical acts that make up the crime will injure someone. The
act of making an extortionate demand or breaking and entering
into someone’s home does not, in and of itself, normally cause
physical injury. Rather, risk of injury arises because the
extortionist might engage in violence after making his demand or
because the burglar might confront a resident in the home after
breaking and entering.
We are convinced that the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging
inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair notice to
defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.
Increasing a defendant’s sentence under the clause denies due
process of law.
Id. at 2556-2557. The Court further held that “the residual clause leaves grave
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime,” “ties the judicial
assessment of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to
real-world facts or statutory elements,” and “leaves uncertainty about how
much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.” Id. at 2557-2558.
[24] In Sessions v. Dimaya, the Court addressed whether a similarly-worded clause in
a statute’s definition of “crime of violence” suffers from the same constitutional
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defect. 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2019). The Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) renders deportable any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after
entering the United States. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)). The INA
defines “aggravating felony” by listing numerous offenses and types of offenses,
often with cross-references to federal criminal statutes. Id. According to one
item on that list, an aggravated felony includes “a crime of violence (as defined
in section 16 of title 18 . . .) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one
year.” Id. at 1211 (quoting § 1101(a)(43)(F)). The specified statute, 18 U.S.C. §
16, provides the federal criminal code’s definition of “crime of violence.” The
statute’s two parts, “often known as the elements clause and the residual
clause,” cover:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person
or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.
Id. Section 16(b), the residual clause, was the part of the statute at issue in the
case. Id.
[25] Justice Kagan announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion
with respect to Parts I, III, IV-B, and V, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-984 | December 19, 2019 Page 18 of 32
and Sotomayor joined. 3 Writing for the plurality, she wrote that to decide
whether a person’s conviction falls within the ambit of the residual clause,
courts use a distinctive form of what they have called the categorical approach.
Id. at 1211. She stated:
The question, we have explained, is not whether “the particular
facts” underlying a conviction posed the substantial risk that §
16(b) demands. [Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7, 125 S. Ct. 377
(2004)]. Neither is the question whether the statutory elements of
a crime require (or entail) the creation of such a risk in each case
that the crime covers. The § 16(b) inquiry instead turns on the
“nature of the offense” generally speaking. Ibid. (referring to §
16(b)’s “by its nature” language). More precisely, § 16(b)
requires a court to ask whether “the ordinary case” of an offense
poses the requisite risk. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208,
127 S. Ct. 1586, 167 L. Ed. 2d 532 (2007); see infra, at 1213-1214.
Id. at 1211. She summarized:
In sum, § 16(b) has the same “[t]wo features” that “conspire[d] to
make [the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(‘ACCA’)] unconstitutionally vague.” [Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at
2557]. It too “requires a court to picture the kind of conduct that
the crime involves in ‘the ordinary case,’ and to judge whether
that abstraction presents” some not-well-specified-yet-sufficiently-
large degree of risk. Id., at ––––, 135 S. Ct., at 2556-2557. The
result is that § 16(b) produces, just as ACCA’s residual clause
3
Justice Gorsuch authored a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment and stated
that he joined Parts I, III, IV-B, and V of the Court’s opinion. See Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1224-1234. Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito dissented. See id. at 1234-1259.
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did, “more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due
Process Clause tolerates.” Id., at ––––, 135 S. Ct., at 2558.
Id. at 1216. She concluded:
Johnson tells us how to resolve this case. That decision held that
“[t]wo features of [ACCA’s] residual clause conspire[d] to make
it unconstitutionally vague.” 576 U.S., at ––––, 135 S. Ct., at
2557. Because the clause had both an ordinary-case requirement
and an ill-defined risk threshold, it necessarily “devolv[ed] into
guesswork and intuition,” invited arbitrary enforcement, and
failed to provide fair notice. Id., at ––––, 135 S. Ct., at 2559.
Section 16(b) possesses the exact same two features. And none
of the minor linguistic disparities in the statutes makes any real
difference. So just like ACCA’s residual clause, § 16(b)
“produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due
Process Clause tolerates.” Id., at ––––, 135 S. Ct., at 2558.
Id. at 1223.
[26] In United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court addressed 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),
which authorizes heightened criminal penalties for using or carrying a firearm
“during and in relation to,” or possessing a firearm “in furtherance of,” any
federal “crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2324
(2019) (quoting § 924(c)(1)(A)). The statute defines “crime of violence” in two
subparts—the first known as the elements clause, and the second the residual
clause. Id. According to § 924(c)(3), a crime of violence is “an offense that is a
felony” and
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or
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(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
Id.
[27] The Court held:
What do Johnson and Dimaya have to say about the statute before
us? Those decisions teach that the imposition of criminal
punishment can’t be made to depend on a judge’s estimation of
the degree of risk posed by a crime’s imagined “ordinary case.”
But does § 924(c)(3)(B) require that sort of inquiry? The
government and lower courts have long thought so. For years,
almost everyone understood § 924(c)(3)(B) to require exactly the
same categorical approach that this Court found problematic in
the residual clauses of the ACCA and § 16. Today, the
government acknowledges that, if this understanding is correct,
then § 924(c)(3)(B) must be held unconstitutional too.
But the government thinks it has now found a way around the
problem. In the aftermath of our decisions holding the residual
clauses of the ACCA and § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague, the
government “abandon[ed] its longstanding position” that §
924(c)(3)(B) requires a categorical analysis and began urging
lower courts to “adopt a new ‘case specific’ method” that would
look to “the ‘defendant’s actual conduct’ in the predicate
offense.” [United States v. Davis, 903 F.3d 483, 485 (5th Cir.
2018)]. Now, the government tries the same strategy in this
Court, asking us to abandon the traditional categorical approach
and hold that the statute actually commands the government’s
new case-specific approach. So, while the consequences in this
case may be of constitutional dimension, the real question before
us turns out to be one of pure statutory interpretation.
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Id. at 2326-2327 (footnote omitted).
[28] The Court held that § 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague and stated:
The language of the residual clause itself reinforces the
conclusion that the term “offense” carries the same “generic”
meaning throughout the statute. Section 924(c)(3)(B), just like §
16(b), speaks of an offense that, “by its nature,” involves a certain
type of risk. And that would be an exceedingly strange way of
referring to the circumstances of a specific offender’s conduct.
As both sides agree, the “nature” of a thing typically denotes its
“‘normal and characteristic quality,’” Dimaya, 584 U.S., at ––––,
138 S. Ct., at 1217 (quoting Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 1507 (2002)), or its “‘basic or inherent features,’”
United States v. Barrett, 903 F.3d 166, 182 (CA2 2018) (quoting
Oxford Dictionary of English 1183 (A. Stevenson ed., 3d ed.
2010)). So in plain English, when we speak of the nature of an
offense, we’re talking about “what an offense normally—or, as
we have repeatedly said, ‘ordinarily’—entails, not what
happened to occur on one occasion.” Dimaya, 584 U.S., at ––––,
138 S. Ct., at 1217; see Leocal, 543 U.S. at 7, 125 S. Ct. 377
(contrasting the “nature of the offense” with “the particular facts
[of] petitioner’s crime”).
Id. at 2329. The Court observed:
Congress always remains free to adopt a case-specific approach
to defining crimes of violence for purposes of § 924(c)(3)(B) going
forward. As Mr. Davis and Mr. Glover point out, one easy way
of achieving that goal would be to amend the statute so it covers
any felony that, “based on the facts underlying the offense,
involved a substantial risk” that physical force against the person
or property of another would be used in the course of committing
the offense. Brief for Respondents 46 (quoting H. R. 7113, 115th
Cong., 2d Sess. (2018); emphasis deleted); see also Tr. of Oral
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Arg. 19 (government’s counsel agreeing that this language would
offer “clearer” support for the case-specific approach than the
current version of the statute does). The dissent’s catalog of case-
specific, risk-based criminal statutes supplies plenty of other
models Congress could follow. Alternatively still, Congress
might choose to retain the categorical approach but avoid
vagueness in other ways, such as by defining crimes of violence
to include certain enumerated offenses or offenses that carry
certain minimum penalties. All these options and more are on
the table. But these are options that belong to Congress to
consider; no matter how tempting, this Court is not in the
business of writing new statutes to right every social wrong it
may perceive.
Id. at 2336. 4
[29] With that background in mind, we turn to Whatley v. Zatecky, 833 F.3d 762 (7th
Cir. 2016), which was issued after Johnson but prior to Dimaya and Davis. In
that case, the Seventh Circuit addressed a conviction for possession of cocaine
within 1,000 feet of a youth program center. The Court held:
Whatley contends that the statute is impermissibly vague because
it defines “youth program center” as a facility with “regular”
youth programs, and “regular” is a word with multiple,
inconsistent constructions. According to Whatley, no reasonable
person could have known which facilities the state would deem
“youth program centers,” or that the state would consider the
Robinson Community Church to meet the definition. The
church, he notes, hosted children’s events for a few hours at a
time, a few days each week. In contrast, facilities such as
4
Justices Kavanaugh, Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts dissented. See Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336-
2355.
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YMCAs or Boys and Girls Clubs provide youth events
constantly, or at least as a normal part of their programming.
These types of facilities lie at the core of the “school-zone”
statute, according to Whatley, and the statute’s use of the word
“regular” provided no discernable standard for defendants,
prosecutors, judges or juries to apply to facilities outside that
core.
833 F.3d at 776.
[30] The Court held that “[i]t is the particular language of the Indiana statute that is
at issue here, and more importantly the unique circumstances of its application
to Whatley.” Id. at 782. The Court stated:
[T]he State argues that a person of ordinary intelligence would
understand that the number of youth programs held at the
Robinson Community Church were sufficient to render it a youth
program center. This is essentially an argument that the church
held so many programs that it would meet any definition of
“regular,” and that Whatley’s case is in the core of the conduct
prohibited by the statute. But four or six activities a week at a
facility that is not otherwise identifiable as a youth program
center is nowhere near the core of the statute. Had Whatley
possessed drugs within 1000 feet of a YMCA or a Boys and Girls
Club, there would be no doubt that his conduct was within the
core of the law. The State conceded in its argument to the
Indiana Supreme Court that churches are not inherently places
where children gather, and a handful of weekly events does
nothing to provide fair notice or to discourage arbitrary
enforcement of the statute.
Id. at 783 (footnote omitted). The Court noted:
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In Johnson, the Supreme Court remarked that “our holdings
squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is
constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly
falls within the provision’s grasp.” 135 S. Ct. at 2561. In
analyzing the vagueness of a federal sentencing statute, the Court
also noted that “If we hold a statute to be vague, it is vague in all
its applications[.]” Id. Whatley argued to the state courts that
the law was vague “as applied” to him and so we will
nevertheless consider the State’s argument that Whatley’s
conduct fell within some constitutional core of the statute.
Id. at 783 n.15. The Court concluded:
In sum, a triad of factors convince us that the state courts were
not simply wrong but unreasonable in applying federal law on
vagueness in Whatley’s case: (1) the use of the word “regular” in
the definition of “youth program center” provides no objective
standard, and thereby fails to place persons of ordinary
intelligence on notice of the conduct proscribed and allows for
arbitrary enforcement; (2) defendants are strictly liable for
violating the terms of this nebulous sentencing enhancement,
exacerbating the effect of the subjectivity; and (3) the
consequences of violating this indeterminate strict liability
provision are extreme: an increase in the sentencing range from
2-to-8 years to 20-to-50 years’ imprisonment. The Indiana courts
failed to narrow the statute by adding an intent element, by
limiting application to the core cases of facilities such as YMCAs
or Boys and Girls Clubs, or by providing any objective standard
to the meaning of “regular.” There was no “reasonable basis for
the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98, 131 S. Ct.
770. As applied to Whatley, the statute delegated to the police,
the prosecutor and the jury the task of determining what conduct
was proscribed. No one in Whatley’s position could have known
that the Robinson Community Church would fall within the
definition simply because it hosted a handful of children’s events
each week and otherwise bore no indicia of the children’s
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activities within. We therefore reverse and remand the judgment,
with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus ordering that,
within sixty days, Whatley either be released or that he be re-
sentenced under the Class C felony statute.
Id. at 784.
[31] We cannot say that the Seventh Circuit applied the categorical approach
mentioned in Johnson, Dimaya, and Davis. Rather, it held that “[i]t is the
particular language of the Indiana statute that is at issue here, and more
importantly the unique circumstances of its application to Whatley,” and
concluded that “[a]s applied to Whatley, the statute delegated to the police, the
prosecutor and the jury the task of determining what conduct was proscribed.”
Id. at 782, 784 (emphases added). Unlike the statutes discussed in Johnson,
Dimaya, and Davis, we cannot say that Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1, which governs
dealing in methamphetamine, or Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-357, which defines a
youth program center, suffers from the same qualities as those statutes
warranting a categorical approach. Rather, we note that the Court in Davis
observed that a way of adopting a case-specific approach is to create a statute
that covers any felony that, based on the facts underlying the offense, involved a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another
would be used in the course of committing the offense. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at
2336. Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1.1 and 35-31.5-2-357 adopt a case-specific
approach by focusing on the facts underlying the offense. We conclude that
reversal is not warranted on this basis.
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B. Effective Assistance of Counsel
[32] The next issue is whether Davis was denied the effective assistance of trial
counsel and appellate counsel. Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel a petitioner must demonstrate both that his counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the
deficient performance. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), reh’g denied). A
counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms. Id. To meet the
appropriate test for prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. Id. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Perez v. State,
748 N.E.2d 853, 854 (Ind. 2001). Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the
claim to fail. French, 778 N.E.2d at 824. Most ineffective assistance of counsel
claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. Id.
[33] When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a “strong
presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”
Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. 2001). “[C]ounsel’s performance
is presumed effective, and a defendant must offer strong and convincing
evidence to overcome this presumption.” Williams v. State, 771 N.E.2d 70, 73
(Ind. 2002). Evidence of isolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics will
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-984 | December 19, 2019 Page 27 of 32
not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Clark v. State, 668
N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171, 117 S.
Ct. 1438 (1997). “Reasonable strategy is not subject to judicial second
guesses.” Burr v. State, 492 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ind. 1986). We “will not lightly
speculate as to what may or may not have been an advantageous trial strategy
as counsel should be given deference in choosing a trial strategy which, at the
time and under the circumstances, seems best.” Whitener v. State, 696 N.E.2d
40, 42 (Ind. 1998).
[34] We apply the same standard of review to claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel as we apply to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1070, 1078 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied, cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1128, 121 S. Ct. 886 (2001). Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claims fall into three categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of
issues; and (3) failure to present issues well. Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710,
724 (Ind. 2013). To show that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an
issue on appeal thus resulting in waiver for collateral review, the defendant
must overcome the strongest presumption of adequate assistance, and judicial
scrutiny is highly deferential. Id. To evaluate the performance prong when
counsel waived issues upon appeal, we apply the following test: (1) whether the
unraised issues are significant and obvious from the face of the record and (2)
whether the unraised issues are clearly stronger than the raised issues. Id. If the
analysis under this test demonstrates deficient performance, then we evaluate
the prejudice prong which requires an examination of whether the issues which
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appellate counsel failed to raise would have been clearly more likely to result in
reversal or an order for a new trial. Id.
1. Appellate Counsel
[35] Davis argues that “a vagueness claim based on Johnson was unavailable at the
time of Davis’s direct appeal, which means that appellate counsel cannot be
faulted for not having raised it.” Appellant’s Brief at 40. He also asserts that,
“[i]f this Court finds that the claim was available, however, then appellate
counsel provided ineffective assistance by not raising it.” Id. In light of our
earlier discussion, we cannot say that Davis’s appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise a vagueness claim under Johnson.
2. Trial Counsel
[36] Davis argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to tender a lesser
included instruction on dealing in methamphetamine as a class B felony. He
asserts that he was prejudiced because both youth program centers were over
900 feet from his residence and the State made no effort to measure to the
upstairs bedroom. (Br. 44) He also asserts that “though [his] house was within
the green shaded areas on Exhibits 58 and 59, those areas, like the red lines,
presumably included a margin of error.” Appellant’s Brief at 44.
[37] To prevail on this claim, Davis has the burden to show that counsel
unreasonably failed to request a proper instruction and that he was prejudiced
by the failure. See Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 1997). The
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Indiana Supreme Court has held that “a tactical decision not to tender a lesser
included offense does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, even
where the lesser included offense is inherently included in the greater offense.”
Autrey v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind. 1998). In Autrey, the Court held
that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request lesser-included offense
instructions on a charge of murder because it represented a reasonable “all or
nothing” tactical choice by defense counsel to obtain a full acquittal for the
defendant by placing the blame for the victim’s death on another person and
highlighting the “discordant” testimony of the witnesses. Id. at 1141-1142. See
also Sarwacinski v. State, 564 N.E.2d 950, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
it was not ineffective assistance not to request voluntary manslaughter
instruction on a murder charge because it might have undermined defense of
self-defense and/or lessened chance of the defendant’s acquittal).
[38] In deciding whether counsel was ineffective for failure to tender an instruction
on dealing in methamphetamine as a class B felony, we must determine
whether Davis could have been convicted of it as a lesser offense. See Sanchez v.
State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 311 (Ind. 1996). We look first to whether the offense of
dealing in methamphetamine as a class B felony is included within the charged
crime of dealing in methamphetamine as a class A felony, and second to
whether an instruction on dealing in methamphetamine as a class B felony
would have conformed to the evidence presented at trial. See id. To justify a
lesser included instruction, “there must exist ‘evidence before the jury such that
it could conclude the lesser included offense was committed while the greater
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-984 | December 19, 2019 Page 30 of 32
one was not.’” Id. (quoting Pedrick v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992), reh’g denied).
[39] During closing argument, Davis’s trial counsel argued for an all-or-nothing
approach and asserted that the prosecutor reached for “that brass ring,” “went
right for the A felony,” and “[h]er reach has exceeded her grasp.” Trial
Transcript Volume IV at 587, 599. At the post-conviction hearing, Attorney
Teel testified that given the evidence he did not believe a class B felony was an
option when the instructions were being discussed. Attorney Swanson stated
that a class B felony instruction was warranted by the evidence but later testified
that the disclaimer should have been admitted into evidence. He also stated
that he considered offering an instruction on the class B felony and decided
against it as a matter of strategy.
[40] To the extent Davis points to the trial exhibits, State’s Exhibit 58 states that the
distance from the Trinity UMC Structure to Davis’s residence was 970 feet, and
State’s Exhibit 59 states that the distance between the Boys & Girls Club and
his residence was 940 feet. At the post-conviction hearing, Strine, the GIS
Coordinator for Huntington County, testified that the entire property at 533
East Franklin Street was “incased in that thousand (1,000) foot ‘buffer’” and
that the entire house would be within 1,000 feet of part of the property of the
Trinity Church. Post-Conviction Transcript Volume II at 24. When presented
with another map he created for Davis’s trial, he indicated that the entire
structure of the house was inside the green buffer zone. He also testified that
the margin of error was not on the buffer zone itself and the two and one-half
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feet did not have anything to do with the buffer zone but just the red line on the
map. We cannot say that the evidence as a whole unerringly and unmistakably
leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.
[41] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Davis’s petition for post-
conviction relief.
[42] Affirmed.
Baker, J., concurs.
Riley, J., concurs in result without opinion.
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