Brian Pierce v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 18 2014, 8:21 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN T. WILSON GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KENNETH E. BIGGINS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
BRIAN PIERCE, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 48A02-1405-CR-324
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Thomas Newman, Jr., Judge
Cause No. 48C03-1210-FC-2038
December 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Brian Pierce appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Pierce asserts that
the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted hearsay evidence during the revocation
hearing. Pierce also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
finding that he violated a condition of his probation. Finding no abuse of discretion and
sufficient evidence that Pierce violated a condition of his probation, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Pierce pled guilty to one count of class C felony battery resulting in injury to a
pregnant woman and one count of class D felony domestic battery in the presence of a child
less than sixteen years old. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Pierce to
four years of probation. Pierce began serving his probation on March 11, 2013. In January
2014, the Madison County Department of Child Services investigated child molestation
allegations made by four-year-old W.A. against Pierce. Pierce is not W.A.’s biological
father, but has always played the role of a father in her life. During a forensic interview,
W.A. revealed that Pierce had touched her vagina on three separate occasions and had also
taken inappropriate pictures of her. On March 6, 2014, the State filed a notice of probation
violation alleging that Pierce violated the terms of his probation by committing the new
offense of child molestation. Following a hearing, the court found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Pierce had violated his probation, and therefore the court revoked his
probation. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
Probation is a matter of grace left to the trial court’s discretion and not a right to
which a criminal defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).
The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the
conditions are violated. Id. Probation revocation is a two-step process. Alford v. State, 965
N.E.2d 133, 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. First, the trial court must make a factual
determination that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. Id. Second, the trial
court must make a determination as to whether the violation warrants revocation. Id. It is
well settled that violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation.
Wilson v. State, 708 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Section 1 – Admission of Evidence
Pierce initially contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his
constitutional right to confrontation during the revocation hearing in admitting hearsay
evidence through the testimony of Jenny Chambers, a forensic interviewer with the Madison
County Department of Child Services. Over Pierce’s hearsay objection, Chambers was
permitted to testify regarding the child victim’s statements that Pierce had touched her vagina
on three separate occasions. Our standard of review for the admissibility of hearsay evidence
during revocation proceedings is well settled.
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A probation revocation hearing is not to be equated with an adversarial
criminal proceeding. Because probation revocation procedures are to be
flexible, strict rules of evidence do not apply. The trial court may consider
hearsay bearing some substantial indicia of reliability. Hearsay is admissible
in this context if it has a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness. A trial court
possesses broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we
will not disturb its decision absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion.
Peterson v. State, 909 N.E.2d 494, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, our supreme court has held that a defendant’s due process right to
confrontation is satisfied upon a finding that the hearsay evidence is substantially
trustworthy. Smith v. State, 971 N.E.2d 86, 92 (Ind. 2012).1
The record presented supports the trial court’s decision to admit the hearsay
statements. Chambers gave extensive testimony regarding her training as a forensic
interviewer, the general procedure and purposes of child forensic interviews, and her
experience in conducting over fifty of these interviews. She explained how non-leading
questions are used to discuss body safety and to promote open dialogue with the child. She
stated that she provided the four-year-old victim in this case with anatomically accurate
diagrams of a child’s body, and that the victim was able to use age-appropriate language to
correctly identify body parts and to indicate that Pierce had touched her vagina on at least
three occasions. Under the circumstances, the trial court had sufficient information before it
to deem the hearsay statements substantially trustworthy. We note that Pierce declined to
1
Although not required, ideally the trial court should explain on the record why the hearsay is
substantially trustworthy. See Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 442 (Ind. 2007).
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cross-examine Chambers. Pierce has not established that the trial court abused its discretion
when it admitted Chambers’s testimony.
Section 2 – Sufficiency of the Evidence
Pierce next argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s finding that he violated a condition his probation. Specifically, Pierce argues
that the witness testimony presented at trial did not establish the specific dates that he
committed the three alleged separate acts of child molesting, and therefore there was
insufficient evidence that he committed a new crime during his probationary period. We
disagree.
A probation revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding. Marsh v. State,
818 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Therefore, an alleged violation of probation need
only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. When we review the revocation
decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility. Id. “Instead, we
look at the evidence most favorable to the probation court’s judgment and determine whether
there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting revocation. If so, we will affirm.”
Id. (citation omitted). When the alleged violation of probation is the commission of a new
crime, it is not necessary that the State show the probationer was convicted of a new crime.
Whatley v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The State must demonstrate
the commission of that new crime by only a preponderance of the evidence. Heaton v. State,
984 N.E.2d 614, 617 (Ind. 2013).
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During the revocation hearing in this case, Chambers testified that, in January 2014,
she was assigned to investigate recent sexual abuse allegations made by a four-year-old
victim against Pierce. Chambers testified that the young child told her that Pierce had
touched her vagina on at least three separate occasions. Based upon the statements made by
the victim during the forensic interview, as well as additional police interviews of Pierce, the
State filed multiple charges against Pierce. At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the
State requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the charging information, which
alleges that Pierce committed two acts of child molesting between January 1, 2011 and July
31, 2013, and another act of child molesting on or about January 5, 2014. Tr. at 32.2 This
evidence indicates that the State had probable cause to believe that Pierce committed multiple
offenses of child molesting, some of which clearly occurred during his probationary period,
which began on March 11, 2013. The aforementioned evidence and reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom were sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that it was more
likely than not that Pierce committed the crime of child molesting, and that he did so during
the probationary period.3 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of probation.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
2
Pierce did not object to the State’s request.
3
We note that Pierce suggests that the trial court improperly employed a “probable cause” standard
when it determined that he had violated a condition of his probation. Appellant’s Br. at 6. To the contrary, the
trial court specifically stated that it found Pierce’s violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Tr. at 32.
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