Curtis Foster v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 27 2017, 8:38 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ruth Johnson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Darren Bedwell Attorney General of Indiana
Marion County Public Defender
Ian McLean
Appellate Division Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Curtis Foster, January 27, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1603-CR-541
v. Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Robert York, Judge Pro Tempore
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-1404-MR-18875
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Following a jury trial, Curtis Foster (“Foster”) was convicted of murder 1 and
was sentenced to fifty-five years executed. He appeals, raising the following
issue: whether the State committed fundamental error by engaging in
prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On April 9, 2014, Jerome Warren (“Warren”) and his wife, Genean Hoskin
(“Genean”), along with other family members, were in the front yard of their
home on East 20th Street in Indianapolis, Indiana. Also present were Genean’s
son, Daniel Kelly (“Kelly”), her daughter, Shenean Kelly (“Shenean”), and
Shenean’s young children, and Warren’s son, Jerome Warren, Jr. (“Junior”).
Foster, who was known to the parties on the front yard because he lived in an
apartment complex near Genean’s sister, drove up to the end of the driveway in
front of the house in a black Grand Am. Foster was in the driver’s seat of the
Grand Am, and he had a passenger in the car, who Kelly knew only as
“Oodie.” Tr. at 59.
[4] Kelly and Junior approached Foster’s car and spoke with Foster for a few
minutes. Warren, who did not like Foster, walked over to the car and told
Foster to leave. When Foster did not leave, Warren and Foster exchanged
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
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some heated words, and Warren slapped Foster in the face. Foster then drove
away.
[5] After this incident, Shenean decided to take her children into the house, and as
she came back to the door of the house, she saw Foster returning in his car and
screamed, “Mom, here he comes.” Id. at 203. Foster pulled up in front of the
house at the end of the driveway, and when he stopped, he pointed a handgun
at Kelly and in the direction of the house. Foster tried to fire a shot, but the gun
did not fire on the first attempt. Kelly was able to observe the gun and believed
it to be a .40 caliber handgun. Foster then attempted to shoot the gun again,
and this time, the gun fired. He fired at least four shots, one of which hit
Warren.
[6] Kelly pulled out his own handgun, which was a 9 millimeter semiautomatic,
and returned fire at Foster. Foster drove away as Kelly continued to fire at the
car. Foster lost control of the car at a nearby intersection, crashing into a ditch.
Foster and his passenger exited the car and fled in different directions. Andrew
Lash (“Lash”), who lived nearby and was returning home at the time, saw
Foster’s car lose control and crash. Lash then observed Foster run past him
carrying a handgun.
[7] The shot that hit Warren struck him in the head and passed through his skull,
killing him almost instantly. The bullet was never located. Genean went to
assist her husband, and two neighbors attempted to perform CPR on him.
Genean called 911, but gave the phone to Shenean to complete the report to
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dispatch. Police were dispatched to the residence at 4:23 p.m., and one
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) officer arrived at 4:25
p.m. The passenger from Foster’s car was located nearby and detained. Foster
was not arrested until July 17, 2014.
[8] The State charged Foster with murder, unlawful possession of a firearm by a
serious violent felon as a Class B felony, and with a sentencing enhancement for
using a firearm in an offense causing serious bodily injury or death. A jury trial
was held, during which the defense argued that Kelly, not Foster, had shot
Warren. Foster relied on three witnesses for this assertion, Anquinten Brown
(“Brown”), Pamela Atkins (“Atkins”), and an investigator paralegal employed
by defense counsel. Brown, a lifelong friend of Foster’s, testified that Kelly had
called him and asked him to “come and get [Foster]. [Foster] on some
bullshit.” Tr. at 385. Brown alleged that he went to the scene of the crime and
saw Warren lying on the ground in front of the house and Genean in the yard,
“with nobody kneeling down trying to do nothing.” Id. at 398. Brown testified
that Kelly was “trying to say that [Foster] shot his daddy.” Id. at 387. Brown
claimed that he stayed at the scene for about six to ten minutes until he heard
the police approaching, and then he left. Id. at 426. Brown also alleged that
Kelly asked him to meet later in the day and that Kelly said, “Either I shot
[Warren] or [Foster] shot him.” Id. at 390.
[9] Atkins testified that she had a child with Warren and had been in a relationship
with him for many years at the time of his death. She also testified that she had
a conversation with Kelly about a year after the shooting. Atkins stated that
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Kelly approached her and stated, “I didn’t kill him. I didn’t kill him,” referring
to Warren. Id. at 432. Atkins responded, “The word on the street is that you
shot him.” Id. Although Dr. Joyce Carter, the Marion County Coroner’s Chief
Pathologist who presented Warren’s autopsy findings at trial, had testified that
Warren’s head wound provided insufficient information to determine the
trajectory of the bullet that killed him, an investigator paralegal from defense
counsel’s office testified to measurements he had made, including the height of
the window in a vehicle like the one Foster was driving. Defense counsel later
argued that, according to these measurements, it “would have been impossible
for whoever was in that car” to have fired a shot with the trajectory that killed
Warren. Id. at 474-75.
[10] During closing argument, the State made the following statements:
But like we talked about in voir dire, the witnesses that come up
here and tell you what happened, they get the presumption that
they are telling you the truth and until they give you a reason to
believe otherwise, you are to believe them. Now what did we
hear? There were some inconsistencies. But, again, like we
talked about in voir dire, people remember things differently.
Id. at 457. Foster did not object to these statements. The State argued that its
witnesses were more credible based partly on corroboration by the physical
evidence. The State also asserted that Foster’s witnesses were less credible due
to inconsistencies in their testimony. In addressing Brown’s testimony, the
State noted that Brown testified that he had been at the scene for six to ten
minutes before the police showed up, but the IMPD records showed that an
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officer responded two minutes after the 911 call. Further, while Brown stated
that no one was attending to Warren’s body, testimony from other witnesses
established that Genean and two neighbor women were administering CPR. At
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Foster guilty on the murder charge,
and the State moved to dismiss the remaining counts. The trial court sentenced
Foster to fifty-five years executed. Foster now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[11] When reviewing an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, we make two
inquiries. First, we determine by reference to case law and rules of conduct
whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and if so, we next determine
whether the misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in
a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected
otherwise. Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014). The gravity of the peril
is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s
decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct. Id.[12] Generally, in order to properly preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for
appeal, a defendant must not only raise a contemporaneous objection but must
also request an admonishment; if the admonishment is not given or is
insufficient to cure the error, then the defendant must request a mistrial. Neville
v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1252, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Here, Foster
concedes that he did not object to the challenged statements made by the
prosecutor during closing argument. Where a defendant does not raise a
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contemporaneous objection, request an admonishment, or, where necessary,
request a mistrial, the defendant does not properly preserve his claims of
prosecutorial misconduct. Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006).
[13] “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that has been procedurally
defaulted, the defendant must establish not only the grounds for the
prosecutorial misconduct, but also the additional grounds for fundamental
error.” Neville, 976 N.E.2d at 1258. Fundamental error is an “extremely
narrow exception” to the contemporaneous objection rule that allows a
defendant to avoid waiver of an issue. Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835. “For a claim
of prosecutorial misconduct to rise to the level of fundamental error, it must
‘make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and
elementary principles of due process and present an undeniable and substantial
potential for harm.’” Neville, 976 N.E.2d at 1258-59 (quoting Booher v. State,
773 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ind. 2002)). The element of harm is not shown by the
fact that a defendant was ultimately convicted. Id. Instead, it depends upon
whether the defendant’s right to a fair trial was detrimentally affected by the
denial of procedural opportunities for the ascertainment of truth to which he
would have been entitled. Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668 (quotation marks omitted).
[14] Foster argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when she made certain
statements during closing argument regarding the presumption that witnesses
are telling the truth. He contends that the prosecutor’s statements were a
misstatement of the law, “invaded the province of the jury in determining
witness credibility, and conflicted with [his] constitutional right to the
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presumption of innocence.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. Foster alleges that it is
inappropriate for counsel to misstate the law and that an erroneous statement of
the law is misconduct. He further claims that the jury instructions given by the
trial court did not cure the harm done by the prosecutor’s misstatement of the
law and that the prosecutor’s statements constituted impermissible vouching.
Foster asserts that the prosecution’s case depended on the jury believing the
State’s witnesses and that the misstatement of the law, telling the jury had a
legal duty to believe every witness was telling the truth, violated his
presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial.
[15] Foster specifically asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making
the following comments in the State’s closing argument:
But like we talked about in voir dire, the witnesses that come up
here and tell you what happened, they get the presumption that
they are telling you the truth and until they give you a reason to
believe otherwise, you are to believe them. Now what did we
hear? There were some inconsistencies. But, again, like we
talked about in voir dire, people remember things differently.
Tr. at 457. The State continued to argue that its witnesses were more credible
based partly on corroboration by the physical evidence presented. The State
further contended that Foster’s witnesses were less credible due to
inconsistencies in their testimony, particularly Brown’s, where he (1) claimed to
have been at the scene for six to ten minutes before the police showed up,
although the IMPD records established that an officer responded two minutes
after the 911 call, and (2) stated that no one was attending to Warren’s body at
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the time he was present, although other testimony established that Genean and
two neighbor women were administering CPR to Warren. Id. at 461-62.
[16] Foster relies on Castillo v State, 974 N.E.2d 458 (Ind. 2012), for his argument
that a prosecutor’s erroneous statement of the law is misconduct even if such
statement is only a “small part of a much longer exposition by the prosecutor in
closing argument, was not repeatedly reiterated, and was countered by a correct
statement of the law in the final instructions.” Id. at 469. In that case, the
defendant was sentenced to life without parole after the prosecutor’s statement
during the penalty phase that “told the jury not to compare the mitigating and
aggravating factors” and “implored the jury to consider the defendant’s
unsavory character” in a “colloquy on the defendant’s character [that]
comprised nearly one-third of the prosecutor’s closing statements to the jury.”
Id. at 468-69. Our Supreme Court held that these statements were misconduct
because the prosecutor urged the jury to act contrary to law in ignoring the
mitigating and aggravating factors and in considering the defendant’s character,
which was not one of the statutory factors to be considered in making its
sentencing decision. Id. at 469-70.
[17] Although, pursuant to the holding of Castillo, a prosecutor’s erroneous
statement of the law is misconduct, we do not find that the prosecutor’s
statements in the present case were erroneous statements of the law. The
Indiana Supreme Court has previously held that jury instructions that inform
the jury “to presume that every witness was telling the truth” are proper and not
error. Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 258-69 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied, 525
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U.S. 1073 (1999). Here, as the prosecutor’s statements in closing argument
were not misstatements of the law, we conclude they were proper. The
prosecutor did not engage in misconduct; therefore, Foster was not placed in a
position of grave peril as a result of the prosecutor’s comments. 2
[18] Notwithstanding that we conclude that there was no prosecutorial misconduct,
even had there been, Foster must prove that the State’s actions reached the level
of fundamental error. “In evaluating the issue of fundamental error, our task in
this case is to look at the alleged misconduct in the context of all that happened
and all relevant information given to the jury -- including evidence admitted at
trial, closing argument, and jury instructions -- to determine whether the
misconduct had such an undeniable and substantial effect on the jury’s decision that a
fair trial was impossible.” Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668 (emphasis in original).
[19] In looking at the challenged comments in light of these things, we do not
believe that the statements by the prosecutor had a substantial effect on the
jury’s decision, making a fair trial impossible. The remarks that Foster takes
issue with were simply a statement that the jury should start with the theory
that all witnesses were telling the truth; the prosecutor did not specify that the
2
Foster also contends that the prosecutor’s statements during closing constituted improper vouching for the
credibility of a witness. “It is inappropriate for the prosecutor to make an argument which takes the form of
personally vouching for a witness.” Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Vouching
occurs when an attorney states a personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness. Gaby v. State, 949 N.E.2d
870, 880-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Here, the prosecutor did not state any personal opinions concerning the
credibility of any of the witnesses and, therefore, did not engage in improper vouching.
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jury should presume only the State’s witnesses were telling the truth.
Therefore, the statements suggested to the jury that it should initially presume
that both the State’s and Foster’s witnesses were telling the truth, and until the
witnesses gave reason to believe otherwise, the jury was to believe them. The
prosecutor’s remarks were mentioned only once and not made repeatedly.
[20] The jury was instructed that Foster was presumed innocent and that the
presumption continued throughout the trial. The jury was given the following
instruction:
If the evidence in this case is susceptible to two (2) constructions
or interpretations, each of which appears to you to be reasonable,
and one of which points to the guilt of the Defendant and the
other to his innocence, it is your duty under the law to adopt that
interpretation which is consistent with the Defendant’s innocence
and to reject that which points to his guilt.
Appellant’s App. at 83. The jury was also instructed that it should not disregard
the testimony of any witness without a reason and without careful
consideration and that if it found conflicting testimony, it must determine
which witness to believe and which to disbelieve. Id. at 85.
[21] The jury is presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions and not law recited
by counsel during arguments. Laux v. State, 985 N.E.2d 739, 750 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013), trans. denied. See also Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind. 1991)
(observing that it is presumed that a jury will obey a trial court’s instructions);
Hudgins v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (Ind. 1983) (holding that “[a]ny
misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final
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instruction”). Absent evidence to the contrary, we generally presume the jury
follows the trial court’s instructions in reaching its determination. Gibson v.
State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 n.5 (Ind. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 54 (2016). We,
therefore, conclude that in the context of all that occurred during the trial and
all relevant information given to the jury, the alleged misconduct did not have a
substantial effect on the jury’s decision, and it has not been proven that a fair
trial was impossible. Foster has not shown that error, if any, was fundamental.
[22] Affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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