Jevon Deandre Ollins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jul 28 2015, 9:23 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Rebecca A. Trent Gregory F. Zoeller
Brookston, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Karl M. Scharnberg
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jevon Deandre Ollins, July 28, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
79A02-1412-CR-843
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court.
State of Indiana, The Honorable Randy J. Williams,
Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Cause No. 79D01-1311-FB-30
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jevon Ollins (Ollins), appeals his thirteen-year sentence
after pleading guilty to burglary, a Class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (2013).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Ollins raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether Ollins’
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
[4] On September 25, 2012, at around mid-morning, Sergeant Ricks of the
Tippecanoe Sherriff’s Department responded to a burglary report on Country
Road 700 West, West Point, Indiana. Sergeant Ricks met with Melody Clouser
(Clouser), who informed him that when she approached her house, she saw a
white vehicle backed into her driveway, and a female, later identified as
1
Pursuant to Indiana Administrative Rule 9(G)(2)(b) and Indiana Code section 35-38-1-13, the presentence
investigation (PSI) report must be excluded from public access. However, in this case, the information
contained in the PSI report “is essential to the resolution” of Ollins’ claim on appeal. Ind. Admin. Rule
9(G)(7)(a)(ii)(c). Accordingly, we have included confidential information in this decision only to the extent
necessary to resolve the appeal.
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Natasha Ollins (Natasha), was sitting in the driver’s seat. Clouser told Sergeant
Ricks that she attempted to block the white vehicle with her truck but Natasha
drove around Clouser’s vehicle, and after turning on Country Road 700 West,
Natasha proceeded east on County Road 800 South. Once the car was out of
sight, Clouser walked inside her house. She observed that her television had
been moved to the kitchen floor, at that point, she contacted the police.
Clouser informed Sergeant Ricks that an iPad, charger, and jewelry were
missing. Sergeant Ricks found some fingerprints on the television, which he
lifted and sent for analysis. The fingerprints lifted from the television matched
Ollins, Natasha’s husband.
[5] On November 20, 2013, the State charged Ollins with one Count of conspiracy
to commit burglary, a Class B felony; one Count of burglary, a Class B felony;
one Count of conspiracy to commit theft, a Class D felony; and one Count of
theft, a Class D felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement entered with the State on
September 8, 2014, Ollins pled guilty to burglary, and the State agreed to
dismiss the remaining Counts and not to revoke any probation that Ollins may
have been serving. In addition, the agreement stipulated that the sentence for
the guilty plea would not be less than “eleven (11) and no more than fourteen
(14) years.” (Appellant’s App. p. 29).
[6] On November 3, 2014, a sentencing hearing was held and the trial court
identified Ollins’ extensive juvenile and adult criminal history as aggravating
factors. In mitigation, the trial court observed that Ollins pled guilty and
accepted responsibility for his crime. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced
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Ollins to thirteen years executed in the Department of Correction and ordered
him to pay restitution to Clouser in the amount of $500.
[7] Ollins now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[8] Ollins contends that his thirteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides
that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration
of the trial court’s decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light
of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The burden is on
the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is
inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
“Ultimately the length of the aggregate sentence and how it is to be served are
the issues that matter.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
Whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our
sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage
done to others, and a myriad of other considerations that come to light in a
given case. Id.
[9] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an
appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Abbott v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1016,
1019 (Ind. 2012). For his Class B felony burglary conviction, Ollins faced a
sentencing range of six to twenty years, with the advisory sentence being ten
years. Here, the trial court imposed a thirteen-year sentence.
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[10] Regarding the nature of his offense, we find that Ollins was on probation for:
maintaining common nuisance, a Class D felony; possession of marijuana, a
Class A misdemeanor; and conversion, a Class A misdemeanor. On September
25, 2012, Ollins broke into Clouser’s residence while Natasha waited in the
driveway with the getaway-vehicle. While inside, Ollins took an iPad, charger,
and jewelry belonging to Clouser.
[11] Regarding Ollins’ character, at the time of sentencing, Ollins was only twenty-
four years old, yet he had accumulated a significant history of criminal and
delinquent behavior. As a juvenile living in Cook County, Chicago, Ollins “has
had contacts with the law [] since he was 12” years old. (Sentencing Transcript
p. 30). Between 2002 and 2008, Ollins was adjudicated delinquent for about
nine misdemeanors and eight felonies. 2 As an adult living in Tippecanoe
County, Indiana, Ollins was convicted of false informing, carrying a handgun
without a license, criminal confinement, residential entry, theft, and battery
resulting in bodily injury. To top it off, after being arrested for the immediate
2
Ollins argues that there was an addendum to the PSI which shows that he only had ten contacts with the
criminal justice system as a juvenile, and that and six of those charges “were stricken, dismissed or closed
without action.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 6). We note that “[w]hile a record of arrests does not establish the
historical fact of prior criminal behavior, such a record does reveal to the court that subsequent antisocial
behavior on the part of the defendant has not been deterred even after having been subject to the police
authority of the State and made aware of its oversight activities of its citizens.” Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d
530, 534 (Ind. 2002).
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offense, Ollins committed two additional misdemeanor offenses—domestic
battery on Natasha, and invasion of privacy. Ollins admitted to using drugs at
the time he committed the instant crime.
[12] Comparing his situation to Natasha’s, Ollins argues that his wife received a ten-
year sentence with five years to be served in community corrections and five
years to be served on probation. Ollins contends that “obviously, the nature of
the offense, does not call for a [thirteen]-year fully executed sentence.”
(Appellant’s Br. p. 6.). We have held that a defendant’s criminal history is a
valid aggravating circumstance. See Deloney v. State, 938 N.E.2d 724, 732 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We note that Ollins’ criminal history in this case
shows that he has not been deterred from criminal activity and that, in itself,
reflects poorly on his character.
[13] In sum, Ollins’ extensive criminal history does not help in advancing his
inappropriateness argument. Given this record, we conclude that Ollins’
sentence is appropriate in light of character and the nature of his offense.
CONCLUSION
[14] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Ollins’ sentence is appropriate in light
of the nature of the offense and his character.
[15] Affirmed.
[16] Bailey, J. and Barnes, J. concur
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