Scottie Edwards v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION Aug 11 2015, 10:24 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cynthia M. Carter Gregory F. Zoeller
Law Office of Cynthia M. Carter, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Larry D. Allen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Scottie Edwards, August 11, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
49A04-1502-CR-47
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Cause No. 49G06-0102-PC-36584,
49G02-0102-CF-36584, 49G03-0102-
State of Indiana, CF-3658
Appellee-Plaintiff.
The Honorable Mark D. Stoner,
Judge
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Scottie Edwards appeals the denial of his petition for modification of his
sentence. We affirm.
Issue
[2] Edwards raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly
denied his petition for modification of his sentence.
Facts
[3] In 2001, Edwards stabbed Lynn Ford, who was dating Edwards’s ex-wife. The
State charged Edwards with Class A felony attempted murder, and he was
convicted by a jury. On direct appeal, Edwards’s conviction was reversed
because the jury was erroneously instructed. See Edwards v. State, 773 N.E.2d
360, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Edwards was retried, convicted,
and sentenced to forty years. On direct appeal, we concluded that the trial
court improperly enhanced Edwards’s sentence based on Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004). See Edwards v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1106, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). Following a hearing, Edwards was resentenced to forty years. Edwards
appealed his sentence, and we determined that his sentence was not
inappropriate. See Edwards v. State, No. 49A04-0702-CR-75 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct.
22, 2007), trans. denied.
[4] On December 19, 2014, Edwards filed a petition for modification of his
sentence. The prosecutor did not respond to the petition. On January 6, 2015,
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the trial court denied Edwards’s petition. The trial court’s order provided in
part:
1. The court believes the original sentence imposed was appropriate
given the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s criminal
history.
2. The nature of the motion is better handled by a clemency petition to
the Governor.
[5] App. p. 61. Edwards now appeals.
Analysis
[6] Edwards argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition for
modification of his sentence. Generally, we review a trial court’s decision to
modify a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gardiner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194,
196 (Ind. 2010). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision clearly
contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court.” Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 796-97 (Ind. 2012).
[7] As an initial matter, the parties dispute which version of the sentencing
modification statute applies. Prior to July 1, 2014, if more than 365 days had
elapsed since defendant began serving his or her sentence, a trial court could,
after a hearing, reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of the
prosecuting attorney. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17 (2012). On July 1, 2014, an
amended modification statute became effective. It provided in part:
If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the
convicted person began serving the sentence, the court may reduce or
suspend the sentence and impose a sentence that the court was
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authorized to impose at the time of sentencing. The court must
incorporate its reasons in the record.
I.C. § 35-38-1-17(c) (2014). Issues arose regarding whether the amended statute
applied to defendants who committed crimes before July 1, 2014. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. State, No. 48A05-1408-CR-390 (Ind. Ct. App. June 25, 2015).
Effective May, 5, 2015, the statute was amended again to clarify that the statute
applies “to a person who: (1) commits an offense; or (2) is sentenced; before
July 1, 2014.” I.C. § 35-38-1-17(a). The statute was also amended to define a
person convicted of attempted murder as a “violent criminal.” I.C. § 35-38-1-
17(d)(2) (2015). The newly amended statute provided:
A convicted person who is a violent criminal may, not later than three
hundred sixty-five (365) days from the date of sentencing, file one (1)
petition for sentence modification under this section without the
consent of the prosecuting attorney. After the elapse of the three
hundred sixty-five (365) day period, a violent criminal may not file a
petition for sentence modification without the consent of the
prosecuting attorney.
I.C. § 35-38-1-17(k) (2015).
[8] The State contends that 2015 version of the statute applies to Edwards and that,
because Edwards is a violent criminal, he could not file a petition for sentence
modification without the consent of the prosecuting attorney. On the other
hand, Edwards’s petition references the 2014 version of the statute and the trial
court considered Edwards’s petition on the merits before the 2015 amendment
became effective. On appeal, Edwards asserts that the 2014 version applies and
that his appeal should be decided on the merits.
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[9] Assuming Edwards is correct, he has not established that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his petition. Edwards contends that the trial court
improperly used the Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) standard in denying his
petition. Under that standard an appellate court may revise a sentence “if, after
due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence
is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.” App. R. 7(B).
[10] Although the trial court found Edwards’s sentence “was appropriate given the
seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s criminal history[,]” we do not
believe the trial court was applying the Appellate Rule 7(B) test of
inappropriateness. App. p. 61. First, as our supreme court has explained of
appellate review of a sentence, “We do not look to determine if the sentence
was appropriate; instead we look to make sure the sentence was not
inappropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). Thus, the
terms “appropriate” and “not inappropriate” are not interchangeable. Further,
the trial court’s consideration of the seriousness of the offense and Edwards’s
criminal history are not the equivalent of our review of “the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender” under Appellate Rule 7(B). We are
convinced the trial court applied the correct standard when it considered
Edwards’s petition.
[11] On the merits, Edwards faced a maximum sentence of fifty years for Ford’s
attempted murder and was sentenced to forty years. There was evidence that
then fifty-four-year old Edwards had been watching Ford, who was dating
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Edwards’s ex-wife. Edwards, 773 N.E.2d at 362. As Ford returned home after
a date with Edwards’s ex-wife, Edwards approached Ford and stabbed him
several times. Id. Ford was treated for stab wounds to the back, arm, side, and
back of the head, and for a punctured lung. Id. Further, although Edwards’s
criminal history is not extensive, it does include a conviction for criminal
recklessness. Under these circumstances, Edwards has not shown that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying his petition for sentence modification.
[12] Edwards also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by abdicating its
role of modifying sentences and suggesting that a clemency petition was a better
avenue for Edwards. However, it is clear that the trial court considered the
merits of Edwards’s petition and was not persuaded that modification of his
sentence was proper. This suggestion was not an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
[13] Edwards has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
petition for sentence modification. We affirm.
[14] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Najam, J., concur.
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