Craig Leonard Strand v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Aug 13 2015, 8:05 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marce Gonzalez, Jr. Gregory F. Zoeller
Dyer, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Craig Leonard Strand, August 13, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A03-1410-CR-370
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
State of Indiana,
The Honorable Salvador Vasquez,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Cause No. 45G01-1305-FC-59
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Craig Strand appeals his conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury, as a
Class D felony. Strand presents one issue for our review, namely, whether the
State presented sufficient evidence to negate Strand’s claim of self-defense.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History1
[3] In May 2013, Officer Curtis Minchuk, a police officer with the Merrillville
Police Department, also worked private security at the Merrillville Planned
Parenthood Clinic (“the Clinic”). While working private security, Officer
Minchuk wore his police uniform and drove a marked police car.
[4] On May 20, 2013, Officer Minchuk arrived at the Clinic to relieve Officer
Michael Bunnell, who also worked private security at the Clinic. Upon his
arrival, Officer Minchuk observed a semi-truck, driven by Strand, parked in the
Clinic parking lot in violation of a town ordinance.2 Officer Minchuk and
Officer Bunnell approached the truck and knocked on the cab door but received
no response. Officer Minchuk spoke to some of the Clinic’s staff, but no one
1
The statement of facts contained in Strand’s appellate brief fails to comply with Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(b).
Strand does not present the facts “in accordance with the standard of review appropriate to the judgment,”
and, accordingly, we strike his statement of facts. See id.
2
See Merrillville Code § 12-86.
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was able to tell Officer Minchuk anything about the truck. Officer Minchuk
wrote citations for parking on private property and for a load limit violation.
[5] Over an hour later, Officer Minchuk returned to the semi-truck. By that time,
Strand had returned to the vehicle. Strand asked why he had received the
citations, and Officer Minchuk explained why he had written them. Strand
appeared to be agitated. Officer Minchuk explained that Strand could contest
the tickets in court and informed Strand that he needed to leave the property.
Officer Minchuk then drove away from Strand but parked where he could still
see Stand and his truck.
[6] Officer Minchuk observed Strand walk back to his truck with his cell phone in
his hand. He waited three to five minutes, but Strand made no attempt to move
his truck. Officer Minchuk drove back to Strand’s truck and again instructed
him to leave. Strand again appeared agitated, and he stated he would not leave.
Officer Minchuk then demanded Strand’s identification, but he refused that
command.
[7] At this time, Officer Minchuk notified Strand that he was under arrest for
refusing to provide identification. Strand backed away from Officer Minchuk
and said, “No, I’m not.” Tr. at 89. Officer Minchuk grabbed Strand’s right
arm. Strand hit Officer Minchuk in the chest. As Officer Minchuk fell
backward, he grabbed Strand’s shirt, which tore. Strand punched the officer in
the mouth and continued to punch him in the face. Officer Minchuk fell to the
ground, and Strand sat on top of Officer Minchuk and continued to punch him
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in the face with both hands. Eventually Officer Minchuk was able to push
Strand away from him. Strand then came back towards Officer Minchuk. At
that time, Officer Minchuk unholstered his gun and shot Strand one time.
Officer Minchuk suffered bruising and swelling to his face as well as cuts to his
arms and legs.
[8] On May 22, 2013, the State charged Strand with disarming a law enforcement
officer, as a Class C felony; battery resulting in bodily injury, as a Class D
felony; and resisting law enforcement, as a Class D felony. The court held
Strand’s jury trial on August 11 through August 14, 2014. At trial, Strand
argued that he acted in self-defense when he struck Officer Minchuk. At the
conclusion of his trial, the jury found Strand not guilty of disarming a law
enforcement officer and resisting law enforcement, but the jury found Strand
guilty of battery resulting in bodily injury, as a Class D felony. The trial court
sentenced Strand to twenty months executed in the Indiana Department of
Correction. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Strand contends that the State failed to disprove his claim of self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. We apply the same standard of review to
challenges of sufficiency of the evidence for a claim of self-defense as we do to
other challenges of sufficiency of the evidence. Murrell v. State, 960 N.E.2d 854,
857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Our standard of review for sufficiency of the
evidence claims is well-settled. Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 2000).
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In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the
verdict. We do not assess witness credibility, nor do we reweigh
the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to support a
conviction. Under our appellate system, those roles are reserved
for the finder of fact. Instead, we consider only the evidence
most favorable to the trial court ruling and affirm the conviction
unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pillow v. State, 986 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
[10] To prove that Strand committed battery, as a Class D felony, the State had the
burden to show that Strand “knowingly or intentionally touche[d]” Officer
Minchuk in a “rude, insolent, or angry manner,” which resulted in bodily
injury to Officer Minchuk while Officer Minchuk was “engaged in the
execution of . . . [his] official duty.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1. At trial, Strand
defended against the battery charge by arguing that he struck Officer Minchuk,
a public servant, in self-defense. In this regard, Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2
provides:
(i) A person is justified in using reasonable force against a public
servant if the person reasonably believes the force is necessary to:
(1) protect the person or a third person from what the person
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.
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(Emphasis added.) We now apply that statute here.3
[11] Although Officer Minchuk was off duty and working in his capacity as a private
security guard, he was necessarily a public servant acting in his official capacity
when he confronted Strand. See I.C. 35-31.5-2-185(a)(1); Cupello v. State, 27
N.E.3d 1122, 1127-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Specifically, the evidence
presented at Strand’s trial demonstrated that Officer Minchuk acted in response
to an ordinance violation, namely, that Strand had parked his truck in the
Clinic’s parking lot. Further, Strand had an objective basis to determine that
the officer was acting in his official capacity and not in a private capacity
because Officer Minchuk wore his official uniform, drove a marked police car,
and informed Strand that Officer Minchuk was enforcing a local ordinance. See
Cupello, 27 N.E.3d at 1127.
[12] Despite Officer Minchuk’s instruction for Stand to remove his vehicle, Strand
refused to move it and remained in violation of the ordinance. At this point,
Officer Minchuk asked Strand for identification, which Strand refused to
provide. Strand’s refusal to provide Officer Minchuck with identification when
stopped for an ordinance violation was a crime. See I.C. § 34-28-5-3.5.
3
Both Strand and the State rely on self-defense cases that predate the amendments to Indiana Code Section
35-41-3-2. Thus, they dispute whether Strand “1) was in a place where he had a right to be; 2) . . . was
without fault; and 3) . . . had a reasonable fear of apprehension of bodily harm.” Appellant’s Br. at 7.
However, the statute supercedes our case law on the question of what the elements of self-defense against a
public servant are. See Cupello v. State, 27. N.E.3d 1122, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Thus, we consider the
statute’s requirements alone.
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Consequently, Officer Minchuk moved to arrest Strand. In response, Strand hit
Officer Minchuk in the chest followed by repeated punches to Officer
Minchuk’s face.
[13] In order for Strand to succeed on a claim of self-defense he needed to
demonstrate a “reasonabl[e] belie[f]” that he had been placed in danger by
Officer Minchuk’s “imminent use of unlawful force.” I.C. 35-41-3-2(i)(1).
Under these circumstances, however, a reasonable jury could find that an
objective person would not have a reasonable belief that Officer Minchuk’s
arrest was an unlawful act by a public servant or that Officer Minchuk exerted
unlawful force in executing the arrest. Strand’s argument on appeal is merely a
request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot not do.
[14] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.
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