Michael Grantland v. Office of Clark County Treasurer, David Reinhardt and Office of Clark County Recorder, Richard Jones (Mem. Dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Jan 27 2015, 9:57 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Michael Grantland Jacob C. Elder
Sellersburg, Indiana Jeffersonville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Grantland, January 27, 2015
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Cause No.
10A01-1409-MI-421
v. Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court
The Honorable Daniel E. Moore,
Office of Clark County Treasurer, Judge
David Reinhardt,
Trial Court Cause No.
10C01-1404-MI-44
and
Office of Clark County Recorder,
Richard Jones,
Appellees-Defendants.
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Michael Grantland, pro se, appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his lawsuit
against the Office of Clark County Treasurer, David Reinhardt, and the Office
of Clark County Recorder, Richard Jones, (together, “Clark County”)
requesting a permanent injunction prohibiting Clark County from seeking
payment of property taxes from him, and the denial of his motion to correct
errors. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 14, 2014, Grantland, pro se,1 filed a complaint against Clark County in
the Clark County Circuit Court alleging in part that he is the owner of land and
improvements in Clark County, he has possessed “perfect equity in the
described property since 2003,” he is not a debtor, “[t]he constitutions of
Indiana, both the original 1816 and 1851 protect the inalienable rights of the
people,” “[a]ll power is inherent in the people, and leaving no power inherent
in the government,” “[t]he free government of Indiana, being based solely on
the power and authority of the people, lacks any lawful authority to materially
burden the rights of any of the people,” and that his property is “strictly
1
Grantland identified himself in his complaint and on his appellant’s brief as sui juris, which is Latin for “of
one’s own right; independent.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1662 (10th ed. 2014).
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personal and private and has no other use or purposes concerning the public”
and “serves no commercial or business purpose.” Appellant’s Appendix at 6-8.
Grantland stated that he “makes absolutely no claims concerning the
constitutionality of the taxing powers or taxing statutes of the state of Indiana
and only claims that the taxing powers of Indiana are limited by the limits
placed upon the legislature within the constitution itself.” Id. at 8. Under the
heading “Offence” in his complaint, Grantland alleged: “The defendants, being
of government office, possess no powers or authority over the inalienable right
to property of the plaintiff, yet are using their offices, statutes, code and
administrative procedures to alienate and to place a material burden upon that
right of the plaintiff.” Id. at 9. Under the heading “Demanded Relief,” the
complaint stated:
The plaintiff hereby respectfully demands that this honorable court
order an injunction against the defendants ordering them to cease any
and all mailings with demands for the payments of money, directed
against the property and or the owner, Michael Grantland. The
plaintiff also respectfully demands the injunction to order the
defendants to cease any recordings of any tax due or unpaid within the
county or state government, and to alter any such existing recording to
show no tax due or unpaid. It is also demanded that said injunction be
made permanent and be attached to the property records as to inform
any future office holders, until such time that the property is lawfully
assigned to another entity not possessing such inalienable rights.
Id.
[3] On April 30, 2014, Clark County filed a Response to Complaint for Injunctive
Relief and Motion to Dismiss in which it argued that Grantland failed to meet
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the burden necessary for the court to grant injunctive relief, noted that
Grantland does not make any constitutional claim, and maintained that “Ind.
Code § 6-1.1 et seq. establishes a county’s ability to tax real property and
obligations therein.” Id. at 15. Grantland filed an Objection and Motion to
Strike on May 2, 2014, arguing in part that the injury to property is a valid
cause of action and he has the right to be heard, that “the defendants and their
attorney owes [sic] a fiduciary duty to the people of Indiana,” that “[t]he action
of the defendants and their attorney of placing a response into the record of this
court, denying the constitutionally protected inalienable rights of the people is a
tort, and is a repugnant breach of the duty of loyalty owed,” that “[t]hese are
actions of a faithless servant, as these actions are directly against the interests of
all the people of Indiana,” and that, “[f]or these reasons, the plaintiff
respectfully demands that the entire answer of the defendants be stricken from
the record.” Id. at 17.
[4] Grantland submitted interrogatories to Clark County, file-stamped on May 29,
2014, and the Office of Clark County Treasurer, David Reinhardt, submitted
responses, file-stamped June 19, 2014. In response to an interrogatory asking
“[s]pecifically which definition of the term ‘taxpayer’ in title 6-1.1 of Indiana
code, property taxes, do you deem applicable to the plaintiff, Michael
Grantland,” Clark County answered that it could not “aver with any certainty
that the term ‘taxpayer’ does or does not apply to Michael Garland.” Id. at 34.
In response to an interrogatory asking if demand for payment had ever been
sent to the mailing address of Grantland concerning the property described in
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the complaint, Clark County answered “Mr. Grantland owes taxes for the
current billable year (2013 PAY 2014 taxes) which were mailed to his address . .
. on April 7, 2014.” Id. at 35. In response to an interrogatory stating “[p]lease
describe the entire process that is used against anyone not complying with the
payment demands sent from your office, including the final result for not
paying such demands,” Clark County answered:
Each year on or before June 30 the County Treasurer shall certify to
the County Auditor all parcels that are Tax Sale eligible. To be Tax
Sale eligible, a parcel must have property taxes outstanding from the
previous May due date. All parcels that currently have May 2013
taxes outstanding, and which are not paid by June 30, 2014, will be
certified to the county Auditor as Tax Sale eligible. There are some
exceptions for parcels with less than $25.00 of Tax Sale tax due and
parcels on which we have an installment plan in place. A notice by
certified mail will be sent to each tax sale eligible parcel owner
advising the owner that the parcel will be offered on the tax sale if not
sooner paid. The listing of parcels is also advertised in the News
Tribune three times before the sale. We then petition the court for a
Judgment and Order of Sale, and once granted, proceed with the Tax
Sale, which is a tax lien sale. Successful tax lien buyers can then
petition the court for a Tax Deed if the parcel is not redeemed within
one year of the date of the Tax Sale.
[5] Id. at 35-36. Grantland also filed a document with the trial court titled Filings
for Judicial Notice setting forth portions of certain statutory provisions found at
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Ind. Code §§ 6-1.1-8.2-2, -11-4.5, -12.2-8, -12.3-11, and -21.9-1.2 The court held
a hearing on Clark County’s motion to dismiss on July 15, 2014, and entered an
order that day granting the motion.3 Grantland filed a motion to correct errors
arguing in part that “[t]he court’s order to dismiss holds that IC 6-1.1, Property
Taxes, is in direct conflict with the constitution(s) of Indiana, and yet the court
holds it as valid law and utilizes it to dismiss the valid claim of inalienable right
of the plaintiff,” that the court failed to address the fiduciary duties of the
defendants and the law of agency, and that the order contains no special
findings of fact. Id. at 39. The court denied Grantland’s motion to correct
errors.
2
Ind. Code § 6-1.1-8.2-2 defines a taxpayer for the purpose of a credit for railroad car maintenance and
improvements under Ind. Code §§ 6-1.1-8.2. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-11-4.5 applies to taxpayers who lease certain
property to the bureau of motor vehicles or bureau of motor vehicles commission. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.2-8
defines a taxpayer for the purpose of a deduction for aircraft under Ind. Code §§ 6-1.1-12.2. Ind. Code § 6-
1.1-12.3-11 defines a taxpayer for the purpose of an intrastate aircraft deduction under Ind. Code §§ 6-1.1-
12.3. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-21.9-1 defines a qualifying taxpayer and a qualified taxing unit for the purpose of
rainy day fund loans under Ind. Code §§ 6-1.1-21.9.
3
A copy of the transcript is not included in the record. Grantland filed a motion to proceed without
transcript which states in part: “In preparing my brief, I realize that the standard of review is de novo.
Considering this fact, I now think the transcript from the trial court hearing on July 15, 2014 to be irrelevant
to the review by this court.” Motion to Proceed without Transcript, December 3, 2014. A motions panel of
this court granted his motion.
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Discussion
[6] The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing
Grantland’s complaint requesting a permanent injunction prohibiting Clark
County from seeking payment of property taxes from him and ordering Clark
County to cease any recordings of any tax due or unpaid and in denying
Grantland’s motion to correct errors. We note that, although Grantland is
proceeding pro se, such litigants are held to the same standard as trained counsel
and are required to follow procedural rules. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. This court will not “indulge in any
benevolent presumptions on [their] behalf, or waive any rule for the orderly and
proper conduct of [their] appeal.” Ankeny v. Governor of State of Ind., 916 N.E.2d
678, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), reh’g denied, trans. denied (citation omitted).
[7] Generally, we review rulings on motions to correct error for an abuse of
discretion. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009); Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Holmes, 885 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind.
2008), reh’g denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Lighty v. Lighty, 879 N.E.2d 637, 640
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh’g denied.
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[8] Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6)4 provides in part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading . . .
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required;
except that at the option of the pleader, the following defenses may be
made by motion:
*****
(6) Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . .
.
A complaint may not be dismissed under Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears to a certainty on
the face of the complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to any relief.
McQueen v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Corp., 711 N.E.2d 62, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999),
trans. denied. We view motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim with
disfavor because such motions undermine the policy of deciding causes of
action on their merits. Id. When reviewing a trial court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss, we view the pleadings in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, and we draw every reasonable inference in favor of that party. Id.
4
While Clark County did not specify the Trial Rule on which its motion to dismiss rested, it appears the trial
court dismissed the complaint because it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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[9] On appeal, Grantland raises a number of issues and attempts to make a number
of arguments,5 but fails to cite to relevant authority or develop cogent argument
with respect to several of the issues he attempts to raise, and, accordingly, those
arguments are waived. See Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 764 N.E.2d 658, 668 (Ind.
5
For instance, in his Statement of the Issues, Grantland states:
Is the unauthorized encumbrance and injury of property a proper cause of action in the
Indiana trial courts? Does the constitution of Indiana limit the authority and powers of
the government of Indiana? Does the constitution of Indiana 1816 unalterably establish
the free government of Indiana by forever excepting out the powers of government, the
inalienable rights of the people, including the right to property? Are the actions of the
defendants acting against the inalienable right of property of Michael Grantland, one of
the people, in contradiction with the constitutional exception? Have the defendants acted
beyond their authority and against the rights of Michael Grantland? Are the defendants
officers of public trust, owing a fiduciary duty to the people, including Michael
Grantland, as settlor / beneficiary of the public trust? Does the authorized power of
agency over the rights and property of Michael Grantland exist or has it ever existed?
Does the actions of Clark County Treasurer impose a material burden upon the right of
property of Michael Grantland. Does Michael Grantland fit any of the definitions within
IC 6 1.1, Property Taxes of the term ‘taxpayer’?
Appellant’s Brief at 3. In his Statement of the Facts, Grantland states that “[n]o contract has been claimed,
and none submitted into the record,” that he “has no agreement with the Treasurer or any other entity
concerning his payment demands,” and that “[n]o authorized power of agency exists nor has it ever existed
concerning the plaintiff’s right to property or the land described in the original complaint.” Id. at 5. He
further states that “[a] fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of representative
government is that government is the servant of the people and not their master,” that “[t]he government of
Indiana is a trust, and the officers and employees of government trustees of that trust, and the people,
including the plaintiff are the settlor / beneficiaries,” that “[t]he state holds the bed of Lake Michigan in trust
for the people as the common property of all,” that “[i]t is in the best interest of the people to retain as many
rights as possible and it is not the place of a servant to oppose the claim of those rights,” that “[t]he answer of
the defendants is scandalous, as it consists of a tort (breach of the duty of loyalty), on the record of the trial
court,” and that “[t]he government of Indiana, being a creation of the people have no natural authority or
power to diminish or define the inalienable rights of the people, their creator. And it is against their created
purpose to do so, or attempt to do so. Natural law.” Id. at 5-6.
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Ct. App. 2002) (holding argument waived for failure to cite authority or provide
cogent argument), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Also, to the extent Grantland
asserts that the court’s order of dismissal is erroneous as it lacks findings of fact
under Ind. Trial Rule 52, we note that Trial Rule 52 provides in part that
“[f]indings of fact are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule[] 12 . . .
.”
[10] To the extent that Grantland argues that certain Indiana Code provisions are
applicable only to “commercial and business type entities” or that he is
otherwise not liable for taxes imposed on his real property in Clark County,
Indiana, see Appellant’s Brief at 6, we will address his arguments. He contends
that “[t]he several definitions of the term ‘taxpayer’ within IC 6 1.1, all define a
taxpayer as a business or commercial entity,” that neither he nor the land
described in the complaint are involved in any business or commercial
activities, and that he “is not a taxpayer as defined within the code that the
defendants claim is their authority for acting against the rights of Michael
Grantland.” Id. at 7. In support of his argument, Grantland asserts that “[t]his
issue is made apparent by the definitions submitted of the term taxpayer from
IC6 1.1, that the court took mandatory judicial notice of” and by the
interrogatory answer which stated Clark County could not “aver with any
certainty that the term ‘taxpayer’ does or does not apply to Michael
Grantland.” Id.
[11] Clark County maintains, citing to Ind. Code § 6-1.1-2-4(a), that an owner of
real property is responsible for paying for the taxes imposed on the property by
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the county, that every statute is clothed with the presumption of
constitutionality, that Grantland has owned real property in Clark County,
Indiana, since 2000 and has not challenged the constitutionality of Ind. Code §
6-1.1-2-4(a), and that, therefore, Ind. Code § 6-1.1-2-4(a) controls and
Grantland is responsible for the taxes assessed against his real property.
[12] Ind. Code § 6-1.1-2-4 provides:
(a) The owner of any real property on the assessment date of a year is liable
for the taxes imposed for that year on the property, unless a person
holding, possessing, controlling, or occupying any real property
on the assessment date of a year is liable for the taxes imposed
for that year on the property under a memorandum of lease or
other contract with the owner that is recorded with the county
recorder before January 1, 1998. A person holding, possessing,
controlling, or occupying any personal property on the
assessment date of a year is liable for the taxes imposed for that
year on the property unless:
(1) the person establishes that the property is being
assessed and taxed in the name of the owner; or
(2) the owner is liable for the taxes under a contract with
that person.
When a person other than the owner pays any property taxes,
as required by this section, that person may recover the amount
paid from the owner, unless the parties have agreed to other
terms in a contract.
(b) An owner on the assessment date of a year of real property that
has an improvement or appurtenance that is:
(1) assessed as real property; and
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(2) owned, held, possessed, controlled, or occupied on
the assessment date of a year by a person other than the
owner of the land;
is jointly liable for the taxes imposed for the year on the
improvement or appurtenance with the person holding,
possessing, controlling, or occupying the improvement or
appurtenance on the assessment date.
(c) An improvement or appurtenance to land that, on the
assessment date of a year, is held, possessed, controlled, or
occupied by a different person than the owner of the land may
be listed and assessed separately from the land only if the
improvement or appurtenance is held, possessed, controlled, or
occupied under a memorandum of lease or other contract that
is recorded with the county recorder before January 1, 1998.
[13] (Emphasis added). Ind. Code § 6-1.1-1-9 defines “owner” and provides in part
that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the holder of the . . . the
legal title in fee to real property . . . is the owner of that property.” (Emphasis
added). Grantland alleged in his complaint and states on appeal that he is the
owner of real property in Clark County, Indiana, that he has possessed perfect
equity in the property since 2003, and that he is not a debtor. He does not
claim or point to the record to show that his property is exempt under any
applicable statutory provision.
[14] In his filing with the trial court titled Filings for Judicial Notice, to which he
cites on appeal, Grantland listed and set forth portions of certain statutory
provisions found at Ind. Code §§ 6-1.1-8.2-2, -11-4.5, -12.2-8, -12.3-11, and -
21.9-1. These provisions relate to certain credits, deductions, and other funds
available to certain, but not all, taxpayers. The fact that Grantland does not
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qualify for a credit for railroad car maintenance and improvements under Ind.
Code §§ 6-1.1-8.2, does not lease property to the bureau of motor vehicles or
bureau of motor vehicles commission under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-11-4.5, does not
qualify for an aircraft deduction under Ind. Code §§ 6-1.1-12.2 or -12.3, and
does not qualify for a rainy day fund loan under Ind. Code §§ 6-1.1-21.9 does
not mean that he is not liable for the taxes imposed on real property where he is
the owner of that property. We can say, viewing the pleadings in a light most
favorable to Grantland as the nonmoving party, that it appears to a certainty on
the face of the complaint that Grantland is not entitled to any relief.
[15] Based upon the record, we conclude that Grantland’s complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted and that the trial court did not err in
granting Clark County’s motion to dismiss his complaint and in denying his
motion to correct errors.
Conclusion
[16] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the rulings of the trial court.
[17] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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