P.A. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jan 29 2015, 10:02 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew D. Anglemeyer Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Ian McLean
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
P.A., January 29, 2015
Appellant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
49A02-1407-JV-450
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court, Juvenile Division
Honorable Geoffrey Gaither,
STATE OF INDIANA, Magistrate
Appellee. Cause No. 49D09-1308-JD-002386
Friedlander, Judge.
[1] P.A. appeals his delinquency true findings for acts that would constitute two
counts of class B felony child molesting if committed by an adult. He presents
one issue for review, which we restate as follows: Did the juvenile court
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commit fundamental error when it allowed the State to make an offer to prove
regarding the substance of excluded evidence?
[2] We affirm.
[3] P.A. and A.B. are paternal cousins. In the summer of 2012, P.A. stayed the
night at A.B.’s house for his first and only time. P.A. and A.B. were sixteen
and eleven years old, respectively. The two, along with one of A.B.’s friends,
eventually relaxed on the living room floor while they talked and watched
television together. After the friend fell asleep, P.A. pulled down A.B.’s pajama
bottoms and placed his penis in her vagina and then in her anus. A.B. did not
react to her older cousin’s actions. When he was done, P.A. pulled up A.B.’s
pajama bottoms and turned over. The next morning he asked if she was okay.
A.B. testified that she did not report the incident immediately because she was
afraid she would get in trouble. She disclosed the abuse about a year later
during a conversation with her mother and sisters about “being safe around
boys”. Transcript at 49.
[4] The police were called, and A.B.’s disclosures were investigated by Detective
Justin Hickman of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. After
taking a report from A.B., Detective Hickman met with P.A. and his mother on
August 19, 2013. During a video recorded interview, P.A. admitted to having
had vaginal and anal intercourse with A.B. He was taken into custody, and the
State filed a petition alleging P.A. was delinquent for having committed acts
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that would be three counts of child molesting, two class B felonies and one class
C felony, if committed by an adult.
[5] A.B. and her mother testified at the denial hearing. Detective Hickman was
then called by the State. P.A. objected to the admission of the videotaped
statement due to procedural irregularities. Specifically, after securing signatures
on a juvenile waiver of rights form, Detective Hickman said, “mom do you
want to come back out to the waiting room with me right now to wait with
grandma”, and P.A.’s mother left. Id. at 79. P.A. claimed this was a denial of
his right to have his mother present during the custodial interrogation. The
juvenile court agreed and excluded the videotaped statement from evidence.
[6] The State requested that the court view the initial portion of the video and
reconsider its ruling. After viewing the portion of the video up to and including
when the mother left, the court reaffirmed its ruling. Immediately thereafter,
the State indicated its desire to make an offer to prove, and P.A. did not object.
The State proceeded to detail what the video would reflect if it were permitted
into evidence. This included P.A.’s eventual confession as to each of the
delinquency allegations.
[7] At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the court entered true findings
with respect to the two class B felony allegations and a not true finding with
respect to the class C felony allegation.1 P.A. now appeals.
1
The evidence for this allegation would have come exclusively from P.A.’s statement, which was not
admitted into evidence.
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[8] P.A. asserts the novel argument that the trial court committed fundamental
error by allowing the State to make an offer to prove regarding his videotaped
statement. He claims there was no legally justifiable reason to make the offer of
proof2 and the State must have done so to influence the court in a close case.
[9] It is well established that fundamental error is “an extremely narrow exception
to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that
the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to ‘make a fair
trial impossible.’” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson
v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)). “[F]undamental error is a daunting
standard that applies ‘only in egregious circumstances.’” Knapp v. State, 9
N.E.3d 1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068
(Ind. 2003)), cert. denied.
[10] P.A. has failed to establish fundamental error. First, he makes absolutely no
effort on appeal to establish that the videotape was in fact inadmissible under
Indiana law. His argument just assumes this to be so. See, e.g. Appellant’s Brief
at 10 (“[t]he State put inadmissible evidence in front of the trier of fact using a
procedural process to which it was not entitled to bolster a close case, thereby
tipping the balance in favor of a true finding”). Moreover, P.A.’s argument that
he was prejudiced by the alleged error belies the longstanding judicial-
temperance presumption in which “[w]e presume that the trial judge is aware of
2
P.A. contends that the State had no right to appeal the suppression ruling and, moreover, that the details
of his statement would be irrelevant when reviewing the propriety of the ruling, which was based on
procedural irregularities.
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and knows the law and considers only evidence properly before him or her in
reaching a decision.” Hinesley v. State, 999 N.E.2d 975, 987 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014), trans. denied. See also Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. 2012)
(“[t]he risk of prejudice is quelled when the evidence is solely before the trial
court”).
[11] The juvenile court ruled that the videotaped statement was inadmissible. Upon
urging from the State, the court reconsidered its ruling but once again excluded
the evidence. Regardless of the purpose behind the State’s offer to prove, it is
evident from the record before us that the juvenile court did not consider P.A.’s
statement when making its findings. We reject P.A.’s groundless invitation to
presume otherwise and to impugn the integrity of the juvenile court.
Accordingly, even assuming that the evidence was inadmissible and the offer to
prove was improper, P.A. has not established prejudice, let alone error “so
prejudicial to [his] rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’” Ryan v. State, 9
N.E.3d at 668 (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d at 756).
Judgment affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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