Julie Bickford v. State of Indiana

Feb 13 2015, 8:02 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Weineke Gregory F. Zoeller
Weineke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Plainfield, Indiana
Brian Reitz
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Julie Bickford, February 13, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
62A01-1409-CR-389
v. Appeal from the Perry County
Circuit Court
The Honorable Lucy Goffinet
State of Indiana, Cause No. 62C01-1210-CM-660
Appellee-Plaintiff
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Julie Bickford (“Bickford”) pled guilty to three counts of Cruelty to an Animal,
as Class A misdemeanors.1 As part of its sentencing order, the trial court
required Bickford to pay restitution for costs associated with a rescue
organization’s care for the three horses Bickford had mistreated. She now
appeals.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
[3] Bickford presents a single issue for our review, which we restate as whether the
trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay restitution associated
with the care of three horses she formerly owned.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] Bickford lived in an unincorporated area of Perry County with her husband,
children, and mother. The family owned a number of animals, including three
horses acquired over the course of 2011 and 2012.
[5] On September 4, 2012, Perry County Sheriff’s Deputy Daymion Marsh
(“Deputy Marsh”) observed the three horses while on patrol near Bickford’s
home. Based upon the condition of the horses, on September 5, 2012, Deputy
1
Ind. Code § 35-46-3-7 (West 2013). Our Legislature has amended significant portions of Indiana’s criminal
statutes, effective July 1, 2014. We refer to the statutory provisions in effect at the time of Bickford’s offense.
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Marsh, together with Jodi Lovejoy (“Dr. Lovejoy”), a veterinarian from the
State Board of Animal Health, and members of a local rescue organization,
Horse Rescue South (“HRS”), went back to Bickford’s home. Deputy Marsh
informed Bickford that he had probable cause to believe that the horses were
being neglected, and requested that Bickford permit Dr. Lovejoy and HRS to
examine the horses.
[6] Bickford allowed the examination of the horses. Dr. Lovejoy concluded that
the horses were severely malnourished, none of the horses had received proper
care for their hooves, and one horse was ill. After Dr. Lovejoy’s examination,
she provided Bickford with information on proper care of the numerous
animals on the property. At the conclusion of the visit, Bickford voluntarily
transferred the three animals to HRS.
[7] The ill horse died in HRS’s care within ten days of the transfer. A second,
elderly horse died several months later, and the third horse was eventually
adopted from HRS’s care in December 2012. HRS incurred $691.82 in costs for
its care of the animals.
[8] On October 8, 2012, Bickford was charged with four counts of Cruelty to an
Animal. On February 20, 2014, the fourth count, which related to the care of
several kittens, was dismissed.
[9] On April 1, 2014, Bickford pleaded guilty to the three remaining counts of
Cruelty to an Animal—one count for each of the three horses. After a hearing
on April 1, 2014, which was continued to April 29, 2014, the trial court entered
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judgments of conviction and sentenced Bickford to three consecutive one-year
terms of imprisonment, with all three sentences suspended to probation. The
court imposed several conditions to Bickford’s probation, and further ordered
that Bickford pay restitution to HRS totaling $691.82 over eighteen months as
reimbursement for HRS’s costs in caring for the three horses.
[10] This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[11] Bickford’s appeal challenges the trial court’s order of restitution to HRS for the
costs it incurred while caring for the three horses that were removed from
Bickford’s property.
[12] Bickford frames her question as a purely legal one: were the requirements of
Indiana Code section 35-46-3-6 met, such that the trial court was authorized to
order her to pay restitution to HRS? To the extent Bickford’s appeal centers
upon construction of the applicable statutes, we review such issues de novo. See
Vanderburgh Cnty. Election Bd. v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 833
N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Animal Cruelty Statute
[13] Bickford contends that the trial court’s restitution order was beyond its statutory
authority under Section 35-46-3-6. The statute provides, “[a]ny law
enforcement officer or any other person having authority to impound animals
who has probable cause to believe there has been a violation [of certain animal
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cruelty laws] may take custody of the animal involved.” I.C. § 35-46-3-6(b).
The owner of an animal thus impounded may seek a separate hearing to
determine whether probable cause exists. I.C. § 35-46-3-6(d). The owner of an
animal impounded under the statute’s authority “may prevent disposition of the
animal by an animal shelter” by timely posting bond to provide for the animal’s
care, and may renew that bond under certain conditions. I.C. § 35-46-3-6(c).
However, “[i]f the owner of an animal impounded under this section is
convicted of an offense under this chapter or I.C. 15-20-1-4, the owner shall
reimburse the animal shelter for the expense of the animal’s care and keeping.”
Id.
[14] Upon sentencing Bickford, the trial court ordered her to pay restitution to HRS.
That is, Bickford argues that the trial court ordered reimbursement of HRS as
though HRS was in the position of an animal shelter. Bickford does not
challenge HRS’s status as a shelter. Rather, Bickford contends that her horses
were not impounded within the meaning of Subsection 35-46-3-6(b) & (c), and
thus, as a matter of law, the trial court could not properly order her to pay
restitution to HRS. Specifically, Bickford notes that she voluntarily surrendered
the horses to HRS, and that she did not seek to reclaim ownership of the
animals at any point during the proceeding.
[15] In support of this position, Bickford directs us to her testimony and that of Jo
Sodel (“Sodel”), the President of HRS who was present at Deputy Marsh’s
request on September 5, 2012. Sodel helped arrange care for the horses and
presented paperwork to Bickford that Bickford signed at the conclusion of Dr.
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Lovejoy’s examination of the horses. Bickford never sought to challenge
Deputy Marsh’s contention that probable cause existed, and never posted bond
to recover the horses, as allowed under the statute. Because she surrendered the
animals and took no action indicative of any intent to retrieve them at the close
of the proceedings in this case, then, Bickford argues that the animals were not
impounded as contemplated by the Section 35-46-3-6.
[16] Under this specific set of facts, we agree with Bickford that the horses were not
impounded within the contemplation of Section 35-46-3-6. Looking at the
entirety of the statute in light of the plain and ordinary meanings given to the
term “impound,” we cannot conclude that the course of events here amounted
to impoundment, because Bickford voluntarily relinquished possession and
ownership of the horses. The horses were not seized with any possibility of
return, a condition the impoundment statute contemplates.
Restitution Statute
[17] Our analysis does not stop there, however. For while we conclude that the
horses were not impounded under Section 35-46-3-6, we must also look to
whether restitution to HRS was proper under the general restitution statute.
The statute provides, in relevant part,
in addition to any sentence imposed under this article for a felony or
misdemeanor, the court may, as a condition of probation or without
placing the person on probation, order the person to make restitution
to the victim of the crime, the victim's estate, or the family of a victim
who is deceased. The court shall base its restitution order upon a
consideration of:
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(1) property damages of the victim incurred as a result of the crime,
based on the actual cost of repair (or replacement if repair is
inappropriate);
(2) medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the date of
sentencing) as a result of the crime;
(3) the cost of medical laboratory tests to determine if the crime has
caused the victim to contract a disease or other medical condition;
(4) earnings lost by the victim (before the date of sentencing) as a result
of the crime including earnings lost while the victim was hospitalized
or participating in the investigation or trial of the crime; and
(5) funeral, burial, or cremation costs incurred by the family or estate
of a homicide victim as a result of the crime.
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-5-3(a). We review restitution orders for an abuse of
discretion. Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
[18] An order of restitution may be ordered as part of a defendant’s sentence
“wholly apart from probation.” Edsall v. State, 983 N.E.2d 200, 208 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013). “Restitution is a means of impressing upon a criminal defendant
the magnitude of the loss he has caused.” Ault v. State, 705 N.E.2d 1078, 1082
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Restitution also serves to “vindicate the rights of society.”
Esdall, 983 N.E.2d at 207.
[19] Arguing against the applicability of the general restitution statute, Bickford
argues that HRS was not a victim as contemplated by the statute. A victim is
someone “shown to have suffered injury, harm or loss as a direct and
immediate result of the criminal acts of a defendant.” Reinbold v. State, 555
N.E.2d 463, 471 (Ind. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Wright v. State, 658
N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995). Our courts have held that third parties—notably the
State—may be entitled to restitution for criminal offenses that resulted in
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monetary expenses for treatment of injuries. Thus, in Ault, this Court affirmed
an order of restitution favoring the State, where the State incurred expenses
associated with medical treatment for an infant who suffered severe injuries due
to Ault’s conduct, despite Ault’s contention that the State was merely serving a
role similar to that of “an insurance agency.” 705 N.E.2d at 1082-83 (citations
and quotations omitted).
[20] Here, HRS was contacted by Deputy Marsh to provide care for the horses, and
HRS provided such care. There is no indication in the record that HRS would
have refused to take care of the horses if Deputy Marsh had impounded them in
lieu of Bickford’s voluntary surrender of the animals. HRS would have not
been in a position to assume care of the horses had Bickford provided that care
herself—and Bickford cannot now claim, after a guilty plea, that she was not
neglectful in her care for the horses.2 Further, despite Bickford’s argument to
the contrary, just as the general restitution statute does not specify that only the
parent of a minor child may receive compensation associated with the child’s
injuries, neither does the statute limit compensation to the owner of damaged
property. See id.
[21] We accordingly find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to order
Bickford to pay restitution to HRS.
2
Bickford argues there was some form of “as-is” transaction between her and HRS, but does not develop the
argument. That argument is, accordingly, waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(a)(8)(A).
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[22] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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