John Deckard v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Feb 25 2015, 10:13 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Frederick A. Turner Gregory F. Zoeller
Bloomington, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John Deckard, February 25, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
53A01-1405-PC-222
v. Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kenneth G. Todd,
Appellee-Respondent. Judge
Cause No. 53C03-0903-PC-787
Brown, Judge.
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[1] John Deckard appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
Deckard raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the
post-conviction court erred in denying his petition for relief. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The relevant facts as discussed in Deckard’s direct appeal from his conviction of
felony murder for the burglary and subsequent death of Barry Scroggins follow:
The victim, Barry Scroggins, lived in a cabin in a rural area of Monroe
County, Indiana. Near Scroggins’ cabin was an abandoned home at
which youth from the area congregated. Defendant Deckard, then
seventeen, and his friend Will Taylor, age twenty, frequented the
abandoned home, often overnight. On July 27, 1991, Deckard,
Taylor, and several of their friends were stranded at the home after
their car broke down. That evening Deckard and Taylor left the house
on foot, returning several hours later with a pickup, two pistols, and a
rifle. That evening, Barry Scroggins, the victim, reported to police that
someone had broken into his cabin and stolen three guns and his
pickup. Deckard sold two of the guns a few days later, and, after
selling parts of the truck to raise money for spirits, abandoned it. The
record indicates that Deckard conducted something of a petty-crime
spree over the next several days, including repeated intrusions upon
Scroggins’ cabin in Scroggins’ absence.
On August 7, 1991, Scroggins apparently met intruders at his cabin.
At that meeting, Scroggins suffered a single gunshot wound, the bullet
piercing his sternum. The bullet proved to be of the same caliber as
one of the guns possessed by Deckard, and forensic evidence admitted
at trial indicates that the bullet could have come from that weapon.
Scroggins, within fifteen minutes of receiving the wound, passed on.
Deckard v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (Ind. 1996).
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[3] Later that evening, while responding to a report of gunshots being fired, police
discovered Deckard driving the victim Scroggins’ blue Camaro. Three other
young men and a young woman were also in the car. Id. Stinesville Town
Marshal Fred Walls asked Deckard if he had a driver’s license and registration,
and Deckard stated that he did not have a driver’s license and said that he did
not know whether there was a registration in the vehicle because the car had
just been purchased by his cousin and that he had borrowed it for a couple of
days. Marshal Walls asked Deckard if he had weapons in the vehicle, and
Deckard indicated that he did not. Marshal Walls then asked the female in the
vehicle if there were any weapons in the vehicle, and she indicated
affirmatively. Marshal Walls then advised Deckard that he would like to look
in the trunk, and “if he declined, we would stay there until we received a search
warrant.” Trial Record at 1030. Deckard then agreed to let Marshal Walls into
the trunk. When the trunk was opened, Marshal Walls observed an AR-15,
which is “basically a military-type weapon,” and a .223 rifle, which is a “high-
powered rifle,” with a tripod. Id. at 1033.
[4] At some point, Monroe County Sheriff’s Deputy Anthony Bruner arrived on
the scene. Investigating officers found Scroggins’ wallet, guns, and clothing in
the car. Deckard, 670 N.E.2d at 3. After further investigation, Deckard assisted
police in recovering various stolen items and was subsequently released to his
grandparents. Id.
[5] On August 8, 1991, the police obtained a search warrant for a residence under
construction. Later that day, Deckard went with his parents to the
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Bloomington Police Department. Id. Bloomington Police Officer Daniel W.
Conley informed Deckard of his rights. Id. Deckard and his parents waived
those rights, and Deckard gave a statement admitting that he knew of Will
Taylor’s intent to return to Scroggins’ cabin, burglarize it again, and steal
Scroggins’ blue Camaro, killing the owner if necessary. Id. Deckard also
admitted helping Taylor after the killing, but denied actually participating in the
murder. Id.
[6] At the June 1992 trial, Deckard’s counsel argued during his opening statement
that seventeen-year-old Deckard became friends with twenty-year-old Will
Taylor and that Taylor killed Scroggins on August 7, 1991. Deckard was
convicted of felony murder. Id. at 3. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Deckard’s
trial counsel filed a petition for appointment of sentencing expert to hire Dr. Jan
Smith to evaluate Deckard, which the court denied. The court sentenced
Deckard to sixty years imprisonment. Id. at 3.
[7] Deckard brought a direct appeal and his appellate counsel filed a brief on
February 14, 1994. Deckard argued that the evidence was insufficient, that the
prosecutor committed misconduct, that the trial court improperly denied his
motion for a mistrial, that the court improperly admitted his statements to
police, and that the court erred in imposing an aggravated sentence. Id. at 3-6.
On August 7, 1996, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 6.
[8] On March 26, 2009, Deckard, pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief.
Deckard argued that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective.
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Specifically, Deckard argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
file a pretrial motion to suppress, object to the introduction of 404(b) evidence,
and move for dismissal or discharge for a lack of probable cause in support of
the arrest warrant. Deckard alleged that his appellate counsel failed to properly
litigate the admissibility of Deckard’s statements to police officers and failed to
raise the introduction of 404(b) evidence. In 2009, the State filed an answer and
an amended answer that alleged in part that relief should be denied due to laches
and/or res judicata.
[9] On December 30, 2011, Deckard, represented by counsel, filed an amended
petition for post-conviction relief. Deckard alleged that his conviction was
based primarily on evidence obtained after an illegal and unconstitutional
search of his vehicle, that statements and evidence were procured from
Deckard, who was then seventeen years old, after his arrest without the
consultation of either parent. Deckard asserted that his trial counsel did not
object to this evidence. Deckard also asserted that the trial court’s denial of his
trial counsel’s request for funds for a sentencing expert violated his
constitutional rights under both the United States and Indiana Constitutions.
He also asserted that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue
on direct appeal.
[10] On April 4, 2013, Deckard filed a second amended petition for post-conviction
relief. In part, Deckard alleged that the denial of funds for a sentencing expert
denied him his fundamental rights to the extent that it denied him the effective
assistance of counsel.
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[11] On April 4, 2013, the court held a hearing on Deckard’s petition. At the
hearing, Marshal Walls testified regarding the August 8, 1991 traffic stop.
Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 consists of a map that includes Gosport and according to
Marshal Walls’s testimony Moon Road.1 Deckard’s counsel asked Marshal
Walls to make either an X or a circle on the section of Moon Road that he
believed the shots were coming from. The X on Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 is on a
portion of Moon Road between the location where Moon Road dead-ends to
the north and where West Sand College Road meets Moon Road to the south.
Deckard’s counsel asked Marshal Walls to put a P where he pulled the car over.
Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 does not contain a clear indication that a P was marked.
Marshal Walls stated: “It was just north of Sand College, where I don’t, I don’t
recall.” Id. at 9. On redirect examination, Deckard’s counsel asked Marshal
Walls to mark the intersection where he met Marshal Hall with an H.
Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 appears to contain an H near where Moon Road and W.
Wampler Road meet. It is unclear whether the H was written over a P.
[12] According to Marshal Walls, he received a report around ten, eleven, or twelve
at night on August 7, 1991 from the town marshal in Gosport in reference to
1
The map does not identify any roadway as Moon Road, but Marshal Walls identified Moon Road on the
map by placing an X on it.
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high-powered weapons being fired over the river into the town of Gosport and
that the shots were coming from the Moon Road area. Marshal Walls testified
that Moon Road was not paved in 1991, was narrow, dead-ended at the river,
and was not a high traffic area. The area of Moon Road that dead-ends was
something that “kids, teenagers, twenty-somethings use to go back and drink
beer by the creek, or by the river.” Post-Conviction Transcript at 18. Marshal
Walls did not see any other vehicular traffic while he was on the road just prior
to the stop of the vehicle driven by Deckard and he did not expect to see other
traffic.2 Marshal Walls testified that he was driving north on Moon Road and
stopped the first vehicle that he saw on Moon Road. When asked where he first
made contact with the vehicle driven by Deckard, Marshal Walls said it was
“[j]ust north of Sand College” Road, which according to the map and
testimony is the first road that meets Moon Road south of where Moon Road
2
The following exchange occurred during cross-examination of Walls:
Q Alright. Would you have expected to see any other vehicular traffic given what you
knew about traffic patterns in that area?
A Well, no I wouldn’t expect it, you never know, you know.
Post-Conviction Transcript at 13.
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dead-ends.3 Id. at 9. On redirect examination, Marshal Walls testified that he
met Marshal Hall on Wampler Road and Moon Road.
[13] Deputy Sheriff Jeff Brahaum testified regarding the stop and the aftermath.
Deckard’s trial counsel testified that he did not think that he filed any kind of
motion to suppress the evidence seized from the traffic stop. When asked
whether there was a strategic reason for not filing a motion to suppress, he
answered: “I don’t know what reason there would be. I don’t remember.” Id.
at 37. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked how trial counsel would
characterize the state of his memory with respect to this case, and trial counsel
stated: “It’s been too long ago, I don’t remember details.” Id. at 45. Deckard’s
sister, Dr. Michael Kane, and Deckard also testified.
3
On direct examination of Marshal Walls, the following exchange occurred:
Q Now back to Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, the map, when did you first make contact with the
car driven by John Deckard that night?
A If I recall it was just past Sand College.
Q Just south of Sand College?
A Just north of Sand College.
Post- Conviction Transcript at 8-9.
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[14] On February 26, 2014, the court denied Deckard’s petition in a twenty-four
page order. The court found that Deckard had not demonstrated that his trial
counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. The court also found that the
State had not met its burden with respect to the claim of laches. On March 28,
2014, Deckard filed a motion to correct error. On April 24, 2014, the court
denied Deckard’s motion to correct error.
Discussion
[15] Before discussing Deckard’s allegations of error, we observe that the purpose of
a petition for post-conviction relief is to raise issues unknown or unavailable to
a defendant at the time of the original trial and appeal. Reed v. State, 856
N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind. 2006). A post-conviction petition is not a substitute for
an appeal. Id. Further, post-conviction proceedings do not afford a petitioner a
“super-appeal.” Id. The post-conviction rules contemplate a narrow remedy
for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions. Id. If an issue was known
and available but not raised on appeal, it is waived. Id.
[16] We also note the general standard under which we review a post-conviction
court’s denial of a petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner in a post-
conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a
preponderance of the evidence. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004);
Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). When appealing from the denial of post-
conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a
negative judgment. Fisher, 810 N.E.2d at 679. On review, we will not reverse
the judgment unless the evidence as a whole unerringly and unmistakably leads
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to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. Further,
the post-conviction court in this case entered findings of fact and conclusions
thereon in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). “A post-
conviction court’s findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing
of clear error – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Id. In this review, we accept findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous, but we accord no deference to conclusions of law. Id. The
post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses. Id.
[17] Deckard argues that: (A) his trial counsel and appellate counsel were
ineffective; and (B) the trial court denied his constitutional right to present
evidence when it denied him funds and the opportunity to have a complete
evaluation.
A. Ineffective Assistance
[18] Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must demonstrate both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that
the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient performance. French v. State, 778
N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S. Ct. 2052 (1984), reh’g denied). A counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional
norms. French, 778 N.E.2d at 824. To meet the appropriate test for prejudice,
the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. Perez v. State, 748 N.E.2d 853, 854 (Ind. 2001).
Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail. French, 778 N.E.2d at
824. Most ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a
prejudice inquiry alone. Id. We apply the same standard of review to claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as we apply to claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1070, 1078 (Ind. 2000),
reh’g denied, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1128, 121 S. Ct. 886 (2001).
[19] When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a “strong
presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”
Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. 2001). “[C]ounsel’s performance
is presumed effective, and a defendant must offer strong and convincing
evidence to overcome this presumption.” Williams v. State, 771 N.E.2d 70, 73
(Ind. 2002). Evidence of isolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics will
not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Clark v. State, 668
N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171, 117 S.
Ct. 1438 (1997). “Reasonable strategy is not subject to judicial second
guesses.” Burr v. State, 492 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ind. 1986). We “will not lightly
speculate as to what may or may not have been an advantageous trial strategy
as counsel should be given deference in choosing a trial strategy which, at the
time and under the circumstances, seems best.” Whitener v. State, 696 N.E.2d
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40, 42 (Ind. 1998). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance due to
the failure to object, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the
objection would have been sustained if made. Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d
766, 772 (Ind. 2013) (citing Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1192 (Ind. 2001),
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019, 122 S. Ct. 1610 (2002)).
[20] Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims fall into three categories: (1)
denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure to present
issues well. Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 193-195 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied,
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S. Ct. 550 (1998). To prevail on a claim about
appellate counsel’s failure to raise an issue, the first prong of the Strickland test
requires the claimant to show from the information available in the trial record
or otherwise known to appellate counsel that appellate counsel failed to present
a significant and obvious issue and that this failure cannot be explained by any
reasonable strategy. Carter v. State, 929 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (Ind. 2010). We
“consider the totality of an attorney’s performance to determine whether the
client received constitutionally adequate assistance.” Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at
194.
1. Traffic Stop and Search
[21] Deckard argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to
suppress or making a contemporaneous objection to evidence seized pursuant
to the traffic stop. He argues that the State’s entire case from the murder
weapon to the evidence about the prior burglaries was discovered as a result of
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the stop. He argues that Marshal Walls did not have reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was or had been committed by Deckard. He claims that there
was no evidence that the shooting occurred on Moon Road, that the shooters
were driving a vehicle, or that the shooters had left the area of the shooting.
Deckard points out that Marshal Walls testified at the post-conviction hearing
that the reason he stopped the vehicle was because it was the first vehicle he
saw on Moon Road. He asserts that the traffic stop was unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because Marshal
Walls “had no description of the vehicle, no knowledge that the shooters had
left the river area or were in a vehicle, and no particularized suspicion for the
vehicle he stopped.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. Without citation to the record,
Deckard asserts that he was a minor at the time of the traffic stop and consented
to the search of the trunk without any parental consultation. He asserts that
Marshal Walls testified at the trial that if Deckard declined his request to look
in the trunk they would stay there until a search warrant was received. He
argues that the consent to search the vehicle was not voluntary and was not
reasonable under Article 1 Section 11.
[22] The State argues that the reported conduct of gunshots constituted criminal
recklessness and that the post-conviction court’s finding that the area was
secluded and irregularly frequented is supported by evidence that “shots were
fired near midnight; the area of Moon Road from which the shots were fired
was a dead-end road; that Moon Road was unpaved; that only one or two
houses may have been situated along Moon Road at the time; [and] that only
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two roads enter onto Moon Road, neither of which continues past Moon Road
to some other location.” Appellee’s Brief at 18. The State asserts that the facts
and inferences available to Marshal Walls showed that the first such car may
well have contained the individual or individuals who had been firing into
Gosport, and that Deckard’s vehicle “was seen and stopped north of the
junction of Moon Road and West Sand College Road.” Id. To the extent that
Deckard mentions Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, the State
asserts that the rule of Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005), which is
cited by Deckard, and its progeny are not retroactively applicable to Deckard’s
case and that, both before and after Litchfield, Indiana applied the standard in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to claims that an investigatory stop was
unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11.
[23] The post-conviction court found:
Deckard challenges the search of the blue Camaro at the site of the
Moon Road stop on two bases, as the Court understands his argument.
He contends that Deputy Wall[s] had no reasonable suspicion to stop
the blue Camaro in the first place. He also contends that the search of
the Camaro violated his constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure.
As stated in Deckard’s proposed findings of fact, Deputy Walls
proceeded to the Moon Road area after receiving a report from the
Gosport Town Marshal of rapid-fire gunshots from the area which
resulted in bullets striking the tree tops in Gosport. That report from
another police officer warranted Deputy Wall[s]’s assistance in
investigating what reasonably appears to have been an act of criminal
recklessness. When Walls and the Gosport Town Marshal arrived at
the Moon Road location minutes later, they observed a vehicle
approaching from the area from which the shots were believed to have
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been fired. The vehicle was approaching on a dead-end road which
terminated in the area from which the shots which had been heard
were believed to have originated, approximately 300 to 400 yards from
where the stop was effected (Kelley, page 1708). There were no
houses on that road which was located in an isolated area utilized
upon occasion by under-aged drinkers.
Wall[s]’s decision to stop the blue Camaro was not an unparticularized
hunch, but based on a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the
sole vehicle leaving that area were those who had fired the shots which
struck tree-tops in Gosport. Walls and the Gosport Town Marshal
had a sufficient basis to conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle to
further investigate that act of criminal recklessness. [Finger v. State],
799 N.E.2d 528, [5]33-[5]34 (Ind. [] 2003); [Bridgewater v. State], 79[3]
N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)[, trans. denied]; [State v.
Renzulli], 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1146-1147 (Ind. [] 2011)[.]
After the stop was effected, Wall[s], pursuing the matter which he was
investigating, asked the occupants if there were guns in the vehicle.
Deckard denied that there were, but Kelley and /or Greene quickly
contradicted him and said that there were, in fact, guns in the trunk.
Walls asked that the trunk be opened, advising the occupants that if
they did not do so, a search warrant would be requested. Deckard
then opened the trunk.
Assuming, for the moment, the right to object, none of the occupants
of the blue Camaro were in custody and no [Pirtle] warning was
required. ([Sellmer v. State], 842 N.E.2d 358, 363, Ind. [] 2006; [Miller
v. State], 846 N.E.2d 1077, 1081, Ind. Ct. App. 2006, trans. den.)
Deckard voluntarily opened the trunk and, had he not, Walls had
probable cause to believe that the trunk contained evidence related to
the shots fired into the town of Gosport.
However, that aside, Deckard had no standing to object to the search
of the stolen vehicle as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy
which attached to it and could demonstrate no legitimate right to
ownership of, control over, possession of, or interest in the car or the
guns in the trunk. [Campos v. State], 867 N.E.2d 686, 679-681 (Ind. Ct.
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Ohio App. 2007)[, trans. granted, 885 N.E.2d 590 (Ind. 2008)4]; [State v.
Lucas], 859 N.E.2d 1244, 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)[, reh’g denied, trans.
denied]; [DeBerry v. State], 659 N.E.2d 665, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995);
[Mendelvitz v. State], 416 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)[.] To
challenge the search, Deckard must “establish ownership, control,
possession, or interest in either the premises searched or the property
seized prior to challenging the illegality” of the search. [Peterson v.
State], 674 N.E.2d 528, 533-534 (Ind. [] 1996)[, reh’g denied, cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1078, 118 S. Ct. 858 (1998).] This he did not do and could
not do. [DeBerry], supra; [Mendelvitz], supra.
Deckard’s contention that the performance of either of, or both, his
trial attorney or appellate attorney was deficient for failing to challenge
either the investigatory stop of the blue Camaro on Moon Road or the
search of the blue Camaro is without merit.
Appellant’s Appendix at 157-158 (paragraph indents omitted).
[24] In addressing Deckard’s claims of ineffective assistance, we focus on case law
present at the time of the trial and direct appeal. See Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d
710, 724 (Ind. 2013) (holding that appellate counsel cannot be held ineffective
for failing to anticipate or effectuate a change in existing law); Reed, 856 N.E.2d
at 1197 (holding that an ineffective assistance claim cannot be based upon
counsel’s failure to argue legal reasoning of cases not yet decided at the time of
4
In Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 598 (Ind. 2008), the Court held that to challenge a search a defendant
must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in the premises searched and must show a
subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the premises.
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appeal); Singleton v. State, 889 N.E.2d 35, 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that
the relevant inquiry when determining whether an attorney rendered deficient
performance is whether his or her performance fell below an objective level of
reasonableness based upon prevailing professional norms and examining the
case law available to petitioner’s counsel at the time of trial and at the time of
his direct appeal).
[25] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” A police officer may make an initial or
investigatory stop of a person or automobile under circumstances where
probable cause for arrest is lacking when the facts known to the officer at the
time of the stop are such as to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe
an investigation is appropriate. Poling v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (Ind.
1987) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968); Taylor v. State, 273
Ind. 558, 561, 406 N.E.2d 247, 250 (1980)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1008, 109 S.
Ct. 1646 (1989). Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer who lacks
probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a
particular person is committing a crime may detain that person briefly in order
to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. State v. Pease, 531
N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). Although stopping a car and
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detaining its occupant constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, the governmental interest in investigating an officer’s reasonable
suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, may outweigh the Fourth
Amendment interest of the occupant in remaining secure from the intrusion.
Id.
[26] Article 1, Section 11 provides, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure,
shall not be violated . . . .” In Rutledge v. State, 426 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ind. 1981),
the Indiana Supreme Court addressed an argument that a stop of a vehicle was
in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and held that “[i]n order to
determine the reasonableness of such a warrantless intrusion, the court must
examine the facts known to the officer at the time he stopped the car, and
determine from those specifically articulable facts, and reasonable inferences
from them, whether they reasonably warrant a suspicion of unlawful conduct.”
[27] Deckard argues that “Walls testified at trial and at the PCR hearing that they
stopped the vehicle on Moon Road between Sandy College Road and Wampler
Road.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. Deckard cites Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 and
portions of Marshal Walls’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing.
However, in the portions of testimony to which Deckard cites, Marshal Walls
testified that he first made contact with Deckard’s vehicle “[j]ust north of Sand
College” and that he first saw the vehicle “[j]ust north of Sand College.” Post-
Conviction Transcript at 9.
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[28] Based upon his testimony and Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, Marshal Walls believed
that shots were being fired from the portion of Moon Road north of the point
where it met West Sand College Road. Moon Road was not paved in 1991,
was narrow, dead-ended at the river, and was not a high traffic area. Marshal
Walls made contact with the car driven by Deckard north of West Sand College
Road, which would be the portion of Moon Road between where Moon Road
dead-ended in the north to where the first access off of Moon Road is available
by West Sand College Road. Deckard does not argue and did not question
Marshal Walls regarding the length of the delay between the time of the shots
and the time of the stop. We cannot say that the evidence as a whole
unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the
post-conviction court.
[29] Deckard cites State v. Barker, 734 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), and Daniel v.
State, 582 N.E.2d 364 (Ind. 1991), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838, 113 S.
Ct. 116 (1992), for the idea that the consent to search the vehicle was
involuntary. Both cases addressed the Fourth Amendment and dealt with
officers indicating that they could obtain a search warrant. See Daniel, 582
N.E.2d at 369 (holding that the admission of evidence relating to appellant’s
fingerprints was not error where detective’s advisement regarding a warrant to
obtain fingerprints to be that one would be sought rather than routinely
obtained); Barker, 734 N.E.2d at 673 (holding that the officers’ statement “they
could go get a search warrant if they were not allowed inside” was troubling).
However, neither case dealt with stolen property.
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[30] Here, the post-conviction court’s order stated Deckard had no standing to
object to the search of the stolen vehicle as he had no reasonable expectation of
privacy which attached to it and could demonstrate no legitimate right of
ownership of, control over, possession of, or interest in the car or the guns in
the trunk. Deckard does not specifically challenge the post-conviction court’s
analysis in this regard. We cannot say that the post-conviction court erred. See
DeBerry v. State, 659 N.E.2d 665, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the
defendant had no standing to object to the search of a stolen automobile as he
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in a stolen automobile) (citing
Mendelvitz v. State, 416 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that “if
we were to assume, arguendo, the search was unlawful, [defendant] has no
legitimate expectation of privacy or any other personal, proprietary, or
possessory interest in the stolen automobile, the violation of which would
invoke the exclusionary rule”).
2. Search Warrant
[31] Deckard argues that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for
not having raised the issue of the unsupported search warrant issued on August
8, 1991. He contends that the warrant contains no cause number nor does it
reference any affidavit or hearing, that the record is void of any supporting
evidence for the issuance of the search warrant, that the lack of an affidavit or a
hearing makes it impossible for anyone to determine whether probable cause
existed, and that had trial counsel raised this issue through a motion to suppress
and contemporaneous objection at trial, the motion would have been granted.
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[32] The State argues that to prevail Deckard must show that no sworn evidence
was presented in support of the warrant in the first place and that Deckard
failed to do that. The State asserts that it is entirely possible that the sworn
application for the warrant rests with the judge that issued the search warrant.
The State also points out that Deckard did not inquire into this issue with his
trial counsel and did not ask Deputy Brahaum about the process used to obtain
the search warrant.
[33] The post-conviction court found:
On August 8, 1991, a search warrant was issued by the Honorable
Douglas R. Bridges of the Monroe Circuit Court for what was
described as “a residence under construction located approximately 1
mile east of 2001 McGowan Road.” It is apparent, as conceded by
Deckard in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, that
the subject of the search warrant was the abandoned house at which
Deckard, Taylor, and their friends spent time.
The Indiana State Police and / or Monroe County Sheriff’s
Department officers did execute the warrant and seize a number of
items there, including three knives, five compact discs, a box of .45
caliber ammunition, a box of .22 caliber ammunition, some shell
casings, and other assorted items.
Deckard contends that his trial attorney should have filed a motion to
suppress the fruits of that search. It is accurate that, for reasons
unexplained, the record of proceedings does not contain an affidavit or
transcript of testimony supporting the request for the warrant.
However, the absence of an affidavit or testimony in support of that
request might have as much material bearing on the State’s defense of
laches as any other issue before the Court.
Most of the items seized were not admitted as evidence at trial and it is
not apparent to the Court that the admitted items, other than possibly
the box of .45 caliber ammunition could have much weight bearing on
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the determination of Deckard’s guilt or innocence on the charged
offense of murder.
However, of greater, and controlling, significance is the fact that
Deckard did not claim, and, in fact, had no, right of “ownership,
control, possession, (or) interest” in the abandoned house. He was a
trespasser at the abandoned house and thus lacked any “legitimate
right” to object to the search of that location. [Allen v. State], 893
N.E.2d 1092, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)[, reh’g denied, trans. denied];
[Livingston v. State], 542 N.E.2d 192 (Ind. [] 1989)[.] Nor does he claim
a legitimate expectation of privacy in anything in the house.
Therefore, he could not challenge the search of the abandoned house
nor the seizure of items from it.
Deckard’s contention that the performance of either his trial attorney
or appellate attorney was deficient for failing to the [sic] search of the
abandoned house is without merit.
Appellant’s Appendix at 156-157 (paragraph indents omitted).
[34] At the time of the offense and search warrant, Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2 provided
that no search warrant shall be issued until there is filed with the judge an
affidavit setting forth certain details. However, Deckard does not point to the
record to demonstrate that an affidavit was never completed or that he asked
Deputy Sheriff Brahaum whether an affidavit had ever been completed. On
cross-examination, Deputy Sheriff Brahaum testified that the evidence from the
cases still exists but “as far as case reports, search warrants, all the paperwork
stuff has been, is gone.” Post-Conviction Transcript at 32-33. Moreover,
Deckard does not develop an argument that he had any interest in the
abandoned house or claim an expectation of privacy in anything in the house.
We cannot say that reversal is warranted on this basis.
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3. Deckard’s Juvenile Status
[35] Deckard appears to focus on Ind. Code § 31-6-7-3 which provided for
consultation by a child with his parents.5 Deckard argues that “the atmosphere
of being a 17 year old, alone, stopped and detained by law enforcement, is not a
relaxing atmosphere” and “[i]t is exactly the kind of situation that the statute
was meant to provide protection for the juvenile.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. We
had difficulty parsing Deckard’s arguments. The title of this section in his brief
appears to focus on the effectiveness of appellate counsel as it is titled:
5
At the time of the offense, Ind. Code § 31-6-7-3 provided in part:
(a) Any rights guaranteed to the child under the Constitution of the United States, the
Constitution of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only:
(1) by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child, if the child
knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver; or
(2) by the child’s custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem if:
(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right;
(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;
(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the
child; and
(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver.
(Subsequently repealed by Pub. L. No. 1-1997, § 157 (eff. July 1, 1997)).
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“Deckard’s Appellate Counsel was ineffective for not having raised the issue of
the admission of evidence obtained after the stop and objected to by trial
counsel.” Id. at 9. In the argument section, he appears to assert that his trial
counsel and appellate counsel were both ineffective.
[36] Deckard contends that he “told and showed Deputy Brahaum and Detective
Bruner the location [of] Barry Scroggins’ (decedent) stolen truck, Scroggins’
neighbor’s stolen, [sic] motorcycle and the abandon [sic] house where evidence
was retrieved.” Id. at 10. He asserts that trial counsel “made an attempt to
keep out the 404(b) but never made an attempt to suppress the evidence.” Id.
(citing “Rec.App.p. 1673-1674”).6 Without citation to the record, he claims
that his trial counsel “did object to some of the evidence through Officer Conley
but that was overruled.” Id. He argues that “[a]ppellate counsel was ineffective
for not raising Trial Counsel’s objection in the appeal.” Id. at 11. However,
Deckard does not specify what objection his appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise. In the conclusion section of his brief, he argues that his
6
On pages 1673-1674 of the trial record, Deckard’s trial counsel did not specifically mention Rule 404(b).
Rather, he objected to the admission of “the statement of John Deckard, chapters one and two” based upon
“the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Article I,
Section 12, 13 and 14 of the Indiana Constitution.” Trial Record at 1673. Trial counsel also argued: “Our
argument is under 31-6-7-3, the Indiana juvenile provisions, that no meaningful consultation was allowed in
the initial contact between Mr. Deckard and Officer Brahaum, the matters overlap, tainting as fruit of the
poisonous tree, any subsequent statement taken by Conley or taken at the Monroe County Prosecutor’s
Office.” Id.
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appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that his objection to evidence
based on his lack of meaningful consultation with a parent at the scene of the
traffic stop should have been sustained. Lastly, he asserts that his trial counsel
“did not argue that the evidence obtained by the custodial interrogation that
immediately followed the traffic stop and lasted until 8:00 AM the next day,
should not have been admitted into evidence” and that “Trial Counsel was
ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress the evidence of the truck, the
motorcycle, and the items taken from the abandon [sic] house.” Id.
[37] The State argues that the admissibility of Deckard’s communications to police
was not only known and available during his direct appeal, but actively raised
and litigated in that appeal. The State also argues that Ind. Code § 31-6-7-3
applies to the custodial interrogation of juveniles, that when a juvenile deceives
officers about his age the juvenile’s statement will be admitted because the
deceit relieved officers of their obligation to observe the statute, and that
Deckard told the officers that he was born on December 1, 1972, which would
have made him eighteen years old. The State also argues that the evidence that
Deckard took Officer Bruner to the motorcycle’s location was admitted by
Deckard’s trial counsel during cross-examination of Officer Bruner, that
evidence regarding Deckard taking Deputy Brahaum to the pickup truck was
introduced, and that this was reasonable strategy given Deckard’s later
confession.
[38] In his reply brief, without citation to the record, Deckard posits that the State’s
argument concerning the defense’s admission of the motorcycle and the pickup
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truck is inapposite, that “[t]his may have been legitimate trial strategy if you’re
not contesting the admission of the evidence,” and that “[b]ecause Trial
Counsel put himself in the position to make this a legitimate trial strategy
doesn’t mean that Trial Counsel should not have objected to the entirety of
Deckard’s statements.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4.
[39] The post-conviction court found:
It is clear from the evidence that none of the officers at the Moon Road
location had any reason to suspect that a homicide had been
committed, though they did have reason to believe that the blue
Camaro was a stolen vehicle and suspected that the guns in the trunk
of that vehicle might be stolen. They also had reason to believe that
Deckard, a minor, had consumed alcoholic beverages and that he had
been involved in the firing of the shots over the town of Gosport.
However, it is also clear from the evidence that they had no interest in
pursuing either of the latter two potential charges.
Brahaum did not advise Deckard of his [Miranda] rights at the Moon
Road location. (Brahaum, page 2357) (Nor does the evidence reveal
that any other officer did so.) Brahaum testified that he did not advise
Deckard of his rights because he denied any involvement in the July
27, 1991, burglary of the Scroggins residence, the theft of Scroggins’s
Camaro, or the guns in the trunk of the Camaro. Rather, Deckard
originally told Brahaum that the vehicle had been loaned to him by
someone else. (Brahaum, page 2330). And he initially stated that the
guns, concerning which the officers had no corroborating evidence
were actually stolen, had been loaned to him by someone else.
(Brahaum, Investigative Narrative, page 235) At that point, Brahaum
said Deckard “gave him several stories. He had me going pretty
good.” (Brahaum, page 2331)
Subsequently, Brahaum asked Deckard who had taken the truck, if he
had not done so. Deckard told Brahaum that he knew where the truck
was located and who had taken it, identifying those subjects as Matt
(presumably Daugherty) and Greg (presumably Saunders). (Brahaum,
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page 2330; Brahaum, Investigation Narrative, page 235)
Brahaum asked Deckard, “Would you mind showing me (where the
truck is located?” Deckard agreed to do so. (Brahaum Deposition,
page 579[)]
From the time of the stop of the blue Camaro on Moon Road by Walls
during the late evening hours of August 7, 1991, Deckard was
perceived by the investigating officers as a material witness to the July
27, 1991, burglary of the Scroggins residence, the theft of the Snapp
motorcycle, and the suspected theft of the blue Camaro and the guns
in its trunk. (Bruner, pages 1644-1649; Brahaum, Investigative
Narrative, page 235; Brahaum, Deposition, page 579)
While both the trial prosecutor and trial defense counsel argued their
positions based on the assumption that statements made by Deckard at
the Moon Road investigatory stop and thereafter were in the context of
custodial interrogations, there is no evidence which supports that
conclusion.
At the scene of the Moon Road stop, none of the occupants of the blue
Camaro were placed under arrest or handcuffed (notwithstanding
Hughes’s deposition speculation to the contrary, Hughes, Deposition,
pages 672-673)
Deckard submitted proposed findings of fact which included a finding
that he was handcuffed when Brahaum questioned him about the July
27, 1991, burglary and the State agreed with that proposed finding.
However, the only testimony which could be considered favorable to
Deckard’s proposed finding of fact is Brahaum’s hearing testimony
that he could not recall twenty-two (22) years later if Deckard was
handcuffed when questioned on Moon Road about the July 27, 1991,
burglary. That was one of a number of salient details of which
Brahaum now has no independent memory.
The Court has diligently searched the record and has found no direct
or inferential evidence supporting that proposed finding. There was no
such evidence either in the record of the case or in any of the
deposition testimony or in the investigative narratives of the
investigating officers that Deckard or any other person at the Moon
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Road investigative stop was ever placed under arrest or handcuffed.
Deputy Bruner testified on cross-examination that he would not have
allowed Deckard to leave the area due to evidence that Deckard, a
minor, was in possession of alcohol or had consumed alcohol. Rather,
Bruner testified that he would have taken Deckard to his parents and
cited him into court. (Bruner, page 1649). However, Deckard was, if
[sic] fact, allowed to leave the scene of the stop. He first voluntarily
accompanied Brahaum and another deputy to assist the officers in
finding the stolen vehicles. After the green pickup truck was located,
he was then dropped off at a diner for pickup by Bruner to locate the
motorcycle. After that, he was taken by Bruner to the home of his
grandmother and entrusted to her care. (Bruner, page 1623)
There is no evidence that Deckard was subjected to custodial
interrogation prior to his arrival at the Sheriff’s office, with his parents,
on the afternoon of August 8, 1991. [Wissman v. State], 540 N.E.2d
1209, Ind. [] 1989; [Cliver v. State], 666 N.E.2d 59, 66 (Ind. [] 1996)[,
reh’g denied]; [Laster v. State], 918 N.E.2d 428, 432-434[ (Ind. Ct. App.
2009)]. At that time, he was properly advised of his rights and given a
meaningful opportunity to consult with his parents before making the
statements admitted into evidence at trial.
At trial, the issue of Deckard’s minority, the sufficiency of
advisements, and a meaningful opportunity to consult with his parents
was vigorously litigated at length. (Record, pages 1616-1620; pages
1631-1654; pages 2297-2339)[.] Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court
reviewed the admissibility of Deckard’s pretrial statements at length in
considering his direct appeal of his conviction and found no error.
([Deckard v. State], supra)
The Court notes that there are references to Deckard possibly having
been at the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department or the Monroe
County Prosecuting Attorney’s office on August 8, 1991, before being
interviewed by Detective Conley. The record of proceedings is
completely devoid of any evidence or inference as to the purpose of
any such presence, whether that appearance, if it in fact occurred, was
voluntary or whether he was summoned, what may have happened
during any such visit, or whether he made any statements of any kind
related to the investigation. The Court thus concludes that any such
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prior contact was irrelevant and immaterial to the issue before the
Court.
It appears to the Court that Deckard argues that his trial attorney’s
performance was deficient because he did not file a motion to suppress
Deckard’s pretrial statements, regardless of the extent to which the
issue was litigated at trial.
Deckard’s contention that the performance of either of, or both, his
trial attorney or appellate attorney was deficient for failing to “properly
litigate” the admissibility of his pretrial statements is without merit.
Furthermore, it has not been brought to the attention of the Court that
were matters pertaining to Deckard’s pretrial statements that were not
litigated at trial or on appeal. The Supreme Court’s ruling on
Deckard’s direct appeal deals directly with his contentions here, thus
constituting res judicata.
Appellant’s Appendix at 158-160 (paragraph indents omitted).
[40] With respect to his appellate counsel, we observe that Deckard does not point
to the record and our review of the record does not reveal a copy of his 1994
appellant’s brief from his initial direct appeal. Deckard also did not present the
testimony of his appellate counsel at the post-conviction hearing. Based upon
the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in his direct appeal, it appears that
Deckard’s appellate counsel raised a number of issues including challenging the
trial court’s decision to admit, over trial counsel’s objection, his statements to
police. Deckard, 670 N.E.2d at 5. To the extent that Deckard suggests that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to develop an argument under Ind.
Code § 31-6-7-3 or that his trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained by the custodial interrogation immediately
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following the traffic stop, we observe that the Indiana Supreme Court discussed
this statute and custodial interrogation on direct appeal. The Court held that
the requirements for the interrogation of juveniles are set out in Lewis v. State,
259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972), and codified at Ind. Code § 31-6-7-3. Id.
at 5. The Court held that the Bloomington police officers complied with those
requirements when acquiring Deckard’s waiver, and after acquiring the valid
waiver, Bloomington police heard Deckard’s confession. Id. As for Deckard’s
argument that his trial counsel failed to move to suppress the evidence of the
truck, the motorcycle, and the items from the abandoned house based upon
Ind. Code § 31-6-7-3 or that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the issue, we observe that appellate counsel argued that Deckard’s
confession was inadmissible because the post-Miranda confession was the result
of statements he made to police during their pre-Miranda investigation, and the
Court held that the record contained no suggestion that police engaged in any
pre-Miranda custodial interrogation. Id. at 5-6. The Court also held that
“[s]ince the earlier investigation was not custodial interrogation, it is not
possible for it to taint the later statements.” Id. at 6. The Court added that,
“even if the earlier statements were the result of an improper custodial
interrogation, the results of this later station-house interrogation, where
Deckard had been properly apprised of his rights, would remain admissible.”
Id. Further, we observe that Deckard does not develop an argument as to how
he was prejudiced by the evidence of the truck or the motorcycle and does not
specify which items that were discovered in the abandoned house prejudiced
him. Again, we cannot say that reversal is warranted.
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B. Expert
[41] Deckard phrases the issue as: “The Trial Court denied [his] constitutional right
to present evidence when it denied him funds and the opportunity to have a
complete psycho-psychiatric evaluation.” Appellant’s Brief at iv. In his
argument section, Deckard argues in part that “[t]he denial of the sentencing
expert was a denial of [his] right to the effective assistance of counsel . . . .” Id.
at 12. However, he also asserts that “[t]rial [c]ounsel zealously pursued an
expert for Deckard,” that “[t]he Trial Court denied [his] request preferring to
use the short-lived IPDC Sentencing Resource Center despite [his] repeated and
exhausting attempts to gather evidence,” and that his trial counsel “moved for
several continuances because of difficulties in getting a doctor from the
Resource Center to exam [sic] [him].” Id. at 12-13. Thus, he does not appear
to argue that his trial counsel was ineffective with respect to the expert.
Deckard also does not contend on appeal that his appellate counsel was
ineffective with respect to the trial court’s denial of funds or even mention his
appellate counsel in this portion of his brief. Rather, Deckard appears to focus
on the trial court’s denial of his request to hire an expert. We conclude that
Deckard’s claim amounts to a freestanding claim of error, which is not available
in post-conviction proceedings. See Martin v. State, 760 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.
2002) (“Freestanding claims that the original trial court committed error are
available only on direct appeal.”); Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind.
2001) (holding that post-conviction procedures do not provide a petitioner with
a “super-appeal” or opportunity to consider freestanding claims that the original
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trial court committed error and that such claims are available only on direct
appeal), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136, 122 S. Ct. 1082 (2002).
Conclusion
[42] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of
Deckard’s petition for post-conviction relief.
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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