Tyrone Shelton v. State of Indiana

Feb 27 2015, 10:32 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas P. Keller Gregory F. Zoeller
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyrone Shelton, February 27, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A03-1408-CR-309
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior
Court.
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jane Woodward
Miller, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Cause No. 71D01-0701-FC-22
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Tyrone D. Shelton, Jr. (Shelton), appeals his conviction
of Count I, possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-
48-4-11 (2006); Count II, possession of cocaine, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-
6(b)(1) (2006); and Count III, possession of a Schedule I controlled substance, a
Class D felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-7(a) (2006).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Shelton raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that was seized during the
course of a warrantless search.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] In 2004, following his conviction of Class A felony cocaine possession, Shelton
received a twenty-year sentence. As an alternative to incarceration in the
Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), the trial court ordered Shelton to
serve his sentence in the DuComb Community Corrections of St. Joseph
County (Community Corrections) in South Bend, Indiana. As a condition of
his home detention/work release, Shelton was outfitted with an electronic
monitoring device and required to report daily to his case manager, Judi Ross
(Case Manager Ross).
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[5] On July 7, 2006, Shelton entered into a contract with Community Corrections,
whereby he agreed to the terms governing his home detention. In part, Shelton
“[c]onsent[ed] to allow [Community Corrections] staff and/or law enforcement
officers to enter [his] residence at any time, without prior notice or warrant, to
make reasonable inquiry into the activities of the residents of the home or assist
in investigations of rule violations.” (State’s Exh. 1). He further “[a]gree[d] to
submit to searches of person, residence, vehicle, or personal property at any
time by staff or law enforcement officers.” (State’s Exh. 1). By signing the
contract, Shelton acknowledged that his failure to abide by Community
Corrections’ regulations could result in the revocation of his placement in order
to serve the remainder of his sentence in the DOC.
[6] On November 3, 2006, the Metro Special Operations Section—i.e., the
narcotics unit for St. Joseph County—received an anonymous tip on the Crime
Stoppers hotline that “Shelton was talking about having some marijuana in his
house, and he was on house arrest or something like that, and the marijuana
supposedly was stolen from a South Bend police car.” (Transcript p. 15). The
information was passed on to Officer Charles Flanagan (Officer Flanagan) of
the South Bend Police Department for further investigation.
[7] A day or two earlier, Officer Flanagan learned that marijuana had, in fact, been
stolen from a squad car. The theft was not released to the public, and only a
few police officers were even aware of the incident. Officer Flanagan was privy
to the information because he worked as a K-9 handler, and the stolen
marijuana was intended to be used for training the drug-sniffing dogs. Because
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the informant had specifically mentioned Shelton’s house arrest through the
DuComb Center, Officer Flanagan contacted Community Corrections, and
Case Manager Ross verified that Shelton was serving a sentence on home
detention. Case Manager Ross also stated that Shelton had signed a consent to
have his house searched at any time, so she offered to do a surprise inspection.
[8] At approximately 2:30 p.m., Case Manager Ross—along with Officer
Flanagan, his K-9 partner Dixie (K-9 Dixie), and a few other officers—arrived
at Shelton’s home, located at 55185 Melrose Avenue in South Bend. Case
Manager Ross explained the purpose of the search to Shelton, and Shelton
denied that there were any narcotics in the home. Officer Flanagan then
escorted K-9 Dixie throughout the house and the attached garage. K-9 Dixie,
who was trained to detect eight types of drugs, did not indicate that any drugs
were present inside the house. Once in the garage, K-9 Dixie detected an odor
and “worked her way back to a cooler . . . and she started alerting on the cooler
by scratching at it[,] knocking it over.” (Tr. p. 112).
[9] Inside the cooler, Officer Flanagan found a plastic grocery bag containing seven
“bags of a green leafy substance which I immediately recognized to be
marijuana, and there were two smaller bags. One was an off-white substance,
and another one was a couple of pills.” (Tr. p. 112). There was also a digital
scale in the cooler. A field test confirmed that the leafy substance was
marijuana, but the officers were advised not to arrest Shelton until after the
evidence could be submitted for chemical and fingerprint analyses.
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[10] Further testing confirmed that the bag of white powder consisted of 4.04 grams
of cocaine. The three pills were identified as Ecstasy (MDMA) tablets and had
a net weight of 0.92 grams. The marijuana weighed a total of 428 grams. In
addition, a fingerprint analyst concluded that two latent fingerprints found on
two of the clear plastic marijuana bags were left by Shelton, and one of the
fingerprints found on the plastic grocery bag contained “similarities in the
pattern, in the flows, to Mr. Shelton. But it came short of having a sufficient
amount of minutia or detail to make an identification.” (Tr. p. 150).
[11] On January 25, 2007, the State filed an Information charging Shelton with
Count I, possession of marijuana, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-11 (2006);
Count II, possession of cocaine, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-6(b)(1) (2006);
and Count III, possession of a Schedule I controlled substance, a Class D
felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-7(a) (2006). On April 1, 2014, Shelton filed a motion to
suppress “any and all items of evidence seized . . . on the grounds that said
seizure was done without warrant and beyond the terms of his contract with
[Community Corrections].” (Appellant’s App. p. 89). On April 4, 2014, the
trial court held a hearing and denied Shelton’s motion.
[12] On July 28 and 29, 2014, a jury trial was conducted. At the close of the
evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all Counts.1 On August 26,
1
Shelton was initially charged with Count I, possession of marijuana as a Class D felony, but during closing
arguments, the State discovered that it had omitted the evidence to establish that the total weight of the
marijuana exceeded thirty grams. Therefore, the parties agreed that the charge should be reduced to the
lesser included Class A misdemeanor offense, for which the jury found him guilty.
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2014, the trial court sentenced Shelton to concurrent terms of one year on
Count I, five years on Count II, and two years on Count III.
[13] Shelton now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[14] Shelton claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
the evidence seized during the warrantless search of his property. However,
Shelton appeals from a completed trial, and “[d]irect review of the denial of a
motion to suppress is only proper when the defendant files an interlocutory
appeal.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). Therefore, this
“appeal is best framed as challenging the admission of evidence at trial.” Id.[15] Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are reserved to the sound
discretion of the trial court and are subject to review only for an abuse of that
discretion. Id. at 259-60. It is an abuse of discretion if the trial court’s decision
“is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the
error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Id. at 260. On review, our court will
not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will
consider only the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s
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evidentiary ruling. Nowling v. State, 955 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011),
clarified on reh’g on other grounds; trans. denied.
II. Search and Seizure
[16] Shelton asserts that the search of his property violated the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, which protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government.2 See Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462,
464-65 (Ind. 1998) (“[T]his protection has been extended to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). In general, searches may only “be conducted
pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause.” State v. Schlechty, 926
N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 2010), reh’g denied. Absent a well-delineated exception,
evidence that is seized in violation of the warrant requirement is subject to
exclusion from the defendant’s prosecution. Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 260.
[17] It is undisputed that Officer Flanagan did not obtain a warrant prior to
searching Shelton’s residence. Nevertheless, it is well-established that certain
“special needs” beyond the normal need for law enforcement “may justify
departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements.” Kopkey v.
State, 743 N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Such “special
2
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution contains a nearly identical guarantee, but a state
constitutional claim requires a separate and independent analysis from a Fourth Amendment claim. See State
v. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 2010), reh’g denied. Although Shelton briefly references the State’s
constitutional provision, he relies entirely on cases concerning federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Accordingly, we address this case on Fourth Amendment grounds and express no opinion on whether the
result would be the same under the Indiana Constitution. See id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 71A03-1408-CR-309 | February 27, 2015 Page 7 of 11
needs” have frequently been found in situations relating to the supervision and
rehabilitation of criminal offenders who are on probation. See Purdy v. State,
708 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). In these cases, a warrantless search
may be justified because “probationers do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled.’” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119
(2001) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
[18] In the present case, Shelton was not on probation at the time of the search.
Rather, he was executing his sentence through his direct placement in
Community Corrections’ day reporting program, which consisted of
electronically-monitored home detention. See I.C. §§ 35-38-2.6-2; -5. As our
court has previously found,
[i]n-home detention, like probation or incarceration, is a form of
criminal punishment. Like probation, in-home detention is one point
“on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary
confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of
mandatory community service.” In-home detention is likewise a
conditional liberty dependent on the observance of special restrictions
that are meant to assure that the detention serves as a period of
genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the
detainee’s having frequent contact with the public. These same goals
require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that the
restrictions are in fact observed.
Kopkey, 743 N.E.2d at 337 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)). Accordingly, because the search of an
offender on home detention invokes the same “special needs” as that of a
probationer, “a lesser degree” than probable cause will satisfy the Fourth
Amendment. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
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[19] The United States Supreme Court has established that “[w]hen an officer has
reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged
in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is
occurring that an intrusion on the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy
interests is reasonable.” Id. Thus, as succinctly stated by our own supreme
court, the questions before our court “are whether the officers had reasonable
suspicion to believe that [Shelton] was engaged in criminal activity and whether
there was a search condition included in his terms of [Community Corrections
placement].” Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d at 6. Shelton concedes that he consented to
have his house, property, and person searched as a condition to serving his
sentence through Community Corrections. However, he posits that “the State
failed to show that the search was reasonable.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8).
[20] We first note that there is a distinction “between the ‘reasonableness’ of a
search under the Fourth Amendment and whether there was ‘reasonable
suspicion’ to support a particular search.” Kopkey, 743 N.E.2d at 336.
Notwithstanding the specific terms of a conditional release, all government
searches must be reasonable. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d at 6. As such, the Fourth
Amendment would not support “the indiscriminate ransacking of a
probationer’s home at all hours, or the pumping of his or her stomach, simply
because a probation term included a search condition.” Id. at 6-7. Here, we
find nothing unreasonable in the search of Shelton’s property. By escorting K-9
Dixie through the house and garage to sniff for the presence of illicit drugs,
Officer Flanagan’s search was completed in a timely manner and was not
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overly intrusive. Thus, the issue before our court is whether there was
reasonable suspicion to believe that Shelton had engaged in criminal activity.
[21] “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, but it
still requires at least a minimal level of objective justification and more than an
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.” Id. at
7 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000)). While a trial
court’s admissibility determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, “the
ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion is reviewed de novo.” Nowling,
955 N.E.2d at 860. In deciding whether the officer had reasonable suspicion,
we consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer
had “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”
Segar v. State, 937 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Reasonable suspicion
“is dependent upon both the content of the information possessed by police and
its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
[22] In this case, Officer Flanagan’s investigation was initiated by an anonymous tip
via Crime Stoppers. As a general rule, an anonymous tip, by itself, is
insufficient to create reasonable suspicion. Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268,
1271 (Ind. 1997), clarified on reh’g on other grounds. However, reasonable
suspicion may be established if “significant aspects of the tip are corroborated
by the police.” Id. “Such corroboration requires that an anonymous tip give
the police something more than details regarding facts easily obtainable by the
general public to verify its credibility.” Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358, 361
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(Ind. 2006). Furthermore, in order to be considered reliable, the anonymous tip
“must also demonstrate an intimate familiarity with the suspect’s affairs and be
able to predict future behavior.” Id.[23] The informant reported that Shelton had been bragging about stealing
marijuana out of a police vehicle. Despite the anonymity, we find that the
informant’s reliability is bolstered by the fact that he or she provided accurate
information that had not been publicly disclosed. In fact, very few police
officers were even aware of the theft incident. Moreover, the informant
identified Shelton by name and further specified that he was on house arrest
through DuComb Community Corrections. These specific details—which were
independently corroborated by Officer Flanagan—indicate a personal
familiarity with Shelton and his activities. Accordingly, we find that the
anonymous tip exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to create reasonable
suspicion for the search in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
[24] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted within its
discretion in admitting the evidence seized from Shelton’s property because
Officer Flanagan’s search was justified by the combination of a reasonable
suspicion that Shelton engaged in criminal activity and a search condition
contained in his agreement with Community Corrections.
[25] Affirmed.
[26] Vaidik, C.J. and Baker, J. concur
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