City of Indianapolis v. Ginger Tichy

FILED
Apr 16 2019, 8:55 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Deborah L. Law Jeff Cardella
Traci Marie Cosby The Law Office of Jeff Cardella,
Office of Corporation Counsel LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
City of Indianapolis, April 16, 2019
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-OV-2202
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
Ginger Tichy, The Honorable Travis G. Sandifur,
Appellee-Defendant. Magistrate
Trial Court Cause Nos.
49D04-1701-OV-4141
49D04-1703-OV-12165
49D04-1704-OV-14006
49D04-1704-OV-14340
49D04-1704-OV-14994
49D04-1704-OV-15972
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] The City of Indianapolis (“the City”) appeals the trial court’s order to grant
relief from judgment to Ginger Tichy under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). The City
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raises three issues for our review, and Tichy raises an additional issue. We
consolidate the issues and restate them as the following dispositive question:
whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted relief to Tichy
under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). We hold that the trial court abused its
discretion. Accordingly, we reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 10, 2017, following a bench trial in six consolidated cause numbers,
the trial court permanently enjoined Tichy from acting in a manner that would
violate Section 431-702 of the City’s municipal code.1 As relevant here, Section
431-702 prohibits pedestrians from soliciting or conversing with the occupant of
a vehicle in a roadway if the pedestrian is in the median of the roadway or
within fifty feet of an intersection. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 193. Tichy did
not appeal the injunction and at no point has she disputed that she acted in
violation of Section 431-702 prior to the issuance of the injunction. Shortly
after the court entered the injunction, the City moved to have Tichy found in
contempt as she had allegedly continued to solicit or converse with the
occupants of motor vehicles in the roadway in a manner contrary to Section
431-702.
1
The six separately entered permanent injunctions simply stated that Tichy shall not “have any further
violations of [Section] 431-702” and that she “is bound by Section 431-702 . . . .” E.g., Appellant’s App. Vol.
2 at 118.
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[3] In response, Tichy moved for relief from the injunction under Indiana Trial
Rule 60(B). In her motion, she argued:
22. Ms. Tichy is entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(7)
because it is no longer equitable that the order permanently
enjoining her from engaging in conduct prohibited by Municipal
Code Section 431-702 [have] prospective application.
***
24. The permanent injunction is overbroad because it fails to
provide for Ms. Tichy’s acting within the boundary [of] the
activities specifically declared unlawful by Indiana’s penal statute
on panhandling[,] Ind. Code § 35-45-17-1(c).[2] The City has no
power to regulate Ms. Tichy’s act . . . [in] an area preempted by
our legislature . . . .
25. The injunction imposes a serious burden on Ms. Tichy’s
ability to engage in lawful, passive panhandling—an activity vital
to her survival—by banning such constitutionally protected
expressive activity . . . .
***
29. Granting the equitable remedy of modifying or dissolving
the injunction to protect Ms. Tichy from punishment for
2
This statute provides in relevant part that “panhandling . . . does not include an act of passively
standing . . . : (1) while displaying a sign or other indication that a donation is being sought; and (2) without
making an oral request other than in response to an inquiry by another person.” Ind. Code § 35-45-17-1(c)
(2018).
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engaging in free expression in a manner declared lawful by our
General Assembly is legally and factually appropriate.
30. If this Court finds (B)(7) inapplicable, it should grant Ms.
Tichy relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) for “any reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment.” . . .
31. In Ms. Tichy’s case, principles of Due Process and
fundamental fairness necessitate setting aside the permanent
injunction. The injunction was issued [at] a hearing where Ms.
Tichy was not represented by counsel because she could not
afford counsel. The nature of the civil ordinance action did not
require the Court to appoint counsel for Ms. Tichy. When the
Court issued the permanent injunction it was under the mistaken
impression Ms. Tichy’s displaying a sign indicating she is
homeless and seeking donation[s] near the roadway violates the
[state’s] criminal panhandling statute and believed Ms. Tichy was
fortunate to not be arrested. Ms. Tichy’s conduct is expressly
exempt from the definition of panhandling in the penal code, but
she did not possess the legal knowledge to correct the Court’s
impression, had no lawyer to correct it, and [the City] did not
correct it.
32. Ms. Tichy’s prior written arguments have alleged a
meritorious defense to enforcing the permanent injunction order
because [the order] prohibits legal and life-sustaining conduct by
Ms. Tichy . . . .
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 136-39 (citation omitted). In response, the City
argued that relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(7) “require[d] a change in law or fact,”
which was absent here, and that “lack of counsel and knowledge of legal rights”
did not justify relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8). Id. at 167, 169 (capitalization
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and bold removed). The City further argued that Section 431-702 “is broader”
than the state statutory prohibition on panhandling. Tr. Vol. II at 22.
[4] In December, the court held a fact-finding hearing on Tichy’s Rule 60(B)
motion. During that hearing, Tichy testified that she was homeless and she
frequently walked along the raised medians of various roadways in Indianapolis
with a sign that indicated that she would accept donations. If the occupants of
nearby motor vehicles offered her money, she would “go and get it.” Id. at 39.
And if they did not, she would “just keep walking.” Id. She also testified that,
on “windy” days, she might “fall[] off the median into the road,” but she had
never been “hit by any cars.” Id. at 40.
[5] Following the hearing, the trial court granted Tichy’s Rule 60(B) motion on the
ground that the City’s ordinance had been preempted by the Indiana Code. On
August 15, 2018, the court granted the City’s motion to correct error and made
technical revisions to the court’s judgment on Tichy’s Rule 60(B) motion but
otherwise affirmed that judgment. On September 13, the City filed its notice of
appeal, and this appeal ensued.3
3
Following the City’s notice of appeal, Tichy moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the City’s
notice of appeal was not timely filed. Our motions panel denied Tichy’s motion to dismiss on October 19,
2018, and she raises the issue again in her appellee’s brief. Although a writing panel of this Court has
“inherent authority to reconsider any decision while an appeal remains in fieri,” we are “reluctant to overrule
orders decided by the motions panel.” John C. & Maureen G. Osborne Revocable Family Trust v. Town of Long
Beach, 78 N.E.3d 680, 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied; see also Moriarity v. Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 113
N.E.3d 614, 623 (Ind. 2019) (noting that Indiana’s appellate courts prefer to resolve cases on their merits).
Moreover, according to the CCS, the trial court entered its final judgment in this matter on August 15, 2018,
and the City filed its notice of appeal less than thirty days later on September 13, 2018. Accordingly, we
decline Tichy’s request to reconsider our motions panel’s judgment on this issue.
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Discussion and Decision
[6] The City appeals the trial court’s grant of Tichy’s motion for relief from
judgment under Trial Rule 60(B). As our Supreme Court has held:
the propriety of relief under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) is a matter
entrusted to the trial court’s equitable discretion. We review the
exercise of that discretion only for abuse, which may occur if the
trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has
misinterpreted the law. . . .
Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Ind. 2012) (citations omitted).
“Trial Rule 60(B) motions address only the procedural, equitable grounds
justifying relief from the legal finality of a final judgment, not the legal merits of
the judgment.” Smith v. Smith (In re Paternity of P.S.S.), 934 N.E.2d 737, 740
(Ind. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
[7] Tichy moved for relief from judgment first under Trial Rule 60(B)(7), and the
trial court granted her motion under that provision. Trial Rule 60(B)(7)
provides that a court may relieve a party from a judgment when “the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application.” In essence, Tichy asserted
that the injunction was no longer equitable, and, as such, the court should
vacate the injunction.
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[8] We have long held that, to establish that it is no longer equitable for a final
judgment to have prospective application under Rule 60(B)(7), the movant must
show that there has been a change in circumstances since the entry of the
original judgment and that the change of circumstances was not reasonably
foreseeable at the time of entry of the original judgment. Jones v. Jones (In re
Marriage of Jones), 180 Ind. App. 496, 499, 389 N.E.2d 338, 341 (1979); State v.
Martinsville Dev. Co., 174 Ind. App. 157, 161, 366 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1977);
Warner v. The Young Am. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 164 Ind. App. 140, 150, 326
N.E.2d 831, 837 (1975). This is because Trial Rule 60(B) “is not a substitute for
a belated appeal, nor can it be used to revive an expired attempt to appeal. . . .
Trial Rules 60(B)(7) and (8)” in particular “are concerned only with exceptional
circumstances.” Masterson v. State, 511 N.E.2d 499, 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
[9] Nothing at all about Tichy’s testimony on her motion for relief from judgment
under Trial Rule 60(B)(7) demonstrates exceptional circumstances that were not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the entry of the injunction. Indeed, the
circumstances to which she testified at the hearing on her Rule 60(B) motion
were the exact same circumstances that were the factual predicate for the
injunction in the first instance. In effect, then, her motion under Rule 60(B)(7)
simply sought to relitigate the merits of the original judgment, which is not an
appropriate basis for relief under Trial Rule 60(B). See In re Paternity of P.S.S.,
934 N.E.2d at 740.
[10] Alternatively, Tichy also sought relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) on the ground
that her lack of representation during the original proceedings on the injunction
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was a basis for subsequent relief from the injunction. Rule 60(B)(8) provides
that a court may relieve a party from a judgment for “any reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment” other than those reasons set forth
elsewhere in Rule 60(B). A motion under Rule 60(B)(8) must be filed within a
reasonable time of the original judgment and must allege a meritorious claim or
defense.
[11] The trial court did not grant Tichy relief under Rule 60(B)(8), nor could it have.
We have previously rejected attempts to rely on Rule 60(B)(8) on the ground
that the moving party previously had been “not represented by
counsel; . . . unaware of his legal rights; and . . . misled as to his legal rights.”
Summit Account & Comput. Serv. v. Hogge, 608 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993). Such arguments, insofar as they are even proper under Rule 60(B)(8)
instead of being raised under Rule 60(B)(1),4 “fail[] to demonstrate
extraordinary circumstances as required by subdivision (8).” Id.[12] Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred when it granted Tichy’s motion
for relief from the injunction under Trial Rule 60(B). Although the parties go
on to discuss the merits of Tichy’s arguments against the original injunction, we
4
Trial Rule 60(B)(1) permits relief from a judgment on the basis of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect.
In Levin v. Levin, our Supreme Court stated that a moving party’s argument that “he was not represented by
counsel and was thus unaware of his legal rights” is “more appropriately characterized . . . under Trial Rule
60(B)(1)” than under Rule 60(B)(8). 645 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ind. 1994).
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need not consider them. We reverse the trial court’s grant of Tichy’s motion for
relief from judgment.
[13] Reversed.
Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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