In re the Marriage of: Brian Crump v. Angela Grannan (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Apr 15 2019, 9:23 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Erik H. Carter William P. Means
Carter Legal Services LLC Roberts Means, LLC
Noblesville, Indiana Carmel, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re the Marriage of: April 15, 2019
Brian Crump, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-DR-1924
Appellant-Respondent,
Appeal from the Hamilton
v. Superior Court
The Honorable David K. Najjar,
Angela Grannan, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Petitioner
29D01-1404-DR-3879
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Brian Crump (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order modifying physical
custody of his two children. He also argues that the trial court erred by failing
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to impute income to Mother when determining the parties’ child-support
obligations. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and Angela Grannan (“Mother”) were divorced in Hamilton Superior
Court in July 2014. They have two children: A.C., who was born in 2007, and
M.C., who was born in 2010 (collectively “Children”). The parties reached an
agreement on child custody and parenting time in which they would share legal
and physical custody of Children. Father agreed to pay child support to Mother
in the amount of $350.00 per week. This amount was a deviation from the
child-support worksheet based on Father’s anticipated partial loss of his income
and on the uncertainty of Mother’s income while she started her own
environmental-consulting business. The parties also agreed to “divide equally
the costs of all agreed upon extracurricular activities” for Children. Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 33. Two months after the divorce was finalized, Mother
married Chad Grannan (“Stepfather”).
[3] In 2015, Mother filed a notice of intent to relocate to Florida, where she
currently resides with Stepfather. Mother requested primary physical custody
of Children when she relocated. Father objected and requested that he be given
primary physical custody of Children. The trial court found that relocation to
Florida was not in Children’s best interests and granted Father primary physical
custody of Children “subject to Mother’s parenting time pursuant to the
Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines when distance is a major factor.” Id. at 47.
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Mother was also ordered to pay child support to Father in the amount of
$283.00 per week. The parties continued to share legal custody and to divide
equally the costs of Children’s extracurricular activities. After moving to
Florida, Mother traveled to Indiana “[a]t least once a month” to exercise
parenting time with Children in addition to her holiday and summer parenting
time. Tr. Vol. II p. 51. Mother also Skyped with Children “[e]very day.
Sometimes more than once a day.” Id. at 56.
[4] On the evening of December 13, 2017, Mother received a Skype message from
A.C. that contained a recording. When Mother played the recording, she heard
Father “screaming” and seven-year-old M.C. “crying in the background.” Id. at
58. As Mother continued to listen to the audio, she began “shaking
uncontrollably” and crying. Id. Mother could not believe “what [she] was
hearing and what was happening to [M.C.].” Id. at 59. Mother thought the
recording was live, so she called Father’s phone to try to “interrupt the
situation.” Id. at 58. She spoke with A.C. and decided to book a flight to
Indiana.
[5] Mother arrived in Indiana the following evening. The next day, she went to
M.C.’s school and disclosed the recording. M.C.’s principal told Mother to
report the recording to the police, which she did, and after playing the recording
for Carmel Police Department officers, they contacted the Department of Child
Services (DCS). DCS spoke with Children at school regarding an allegation
that physical abuse could also be heard on the recording. The allegation of
physical abuse was unsubstantiated, and DCS closed its investigation. See Ex. 1
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p. 40. After the school day ended, Mother arranged to have parenting time
with Children over the weekend. On Monday, Mother returned Children to
Father. When saying goodbye, Mother mentioned that she would see M.C. at
basketball practice that evening. Father said that Mother “wouldn’t be seeing
[Children] at basketball practice” and told M.C. that “he didn’t want Mommy
at basketball practice.” Tr. Vol II pp. 62-63. Mother responded that she
wanted to be there, and Father “immediately became irate and started
screaming at [Mother] and slammed the door in [her] face.” Id. at 63. Father
yelled that Mother does not “pay for [Children’s] extracurricular activities” so
she “need[ed] to stay out of their li[ves].” Id. By that point, Children were
crying and Mother “didn’t know what to do” and “was worried about [Father]
taking his anger for [Mother] out on [Children],” so she called the police. Id. at
63-64. The police came, spoke with everyone, and left once the situation had
deescalated.
[6] Mother returned to Florida, and in January 2018 she filed a petition to modify
physical custody, legal custody, and child support. The trial court appointed
Catherine Brownson as the guardian ad litem (GAL), and she evaluated
Mother, Father, and Children. After the GAL completed her evaluations, she
drafted a report recommending that physical custody be modified so that
Children can live with Mother in Florida. See id. at 24-25. The GAL stated
that she did not make this recommendation “lightly” because a change in
physical custody would mean that Children “would need to relocate a distance
from Father, a distance from friends, and from their current environment.” Id.
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at 25. However, the GAL concluded that she “simply cannot in good
conscience recommend [Children] remain in Father’s care and custody, as it is
not in their best interests.” Ex. 1 p. 45.
[7] A hearing on Mother’s petition was held in June 2018. The GAL testified and
stated that she determined that, in addition to the December 13 incident, Father
had engaged in other instances of yelling and cursing at Children—for not
flushing the toilet or tying shoelaces properly. See id. at 20. The GAL also said
that Children told her that they wanted to live with Mother. During the GAL’s
testimony, Mother’s attorney played the recording of the December 13 incident
for the trial court. On the recording, M.C. can be heard crying while Father
yells, in relevant part:
God! God d*mn it. I f*cking worked so f*cking hard on it and
you just f*cking do that to it. Like a dumb a**. God d*mn it.
F*ck. . . . What the f*ck were you f*cking thinking? God d*mn
it, dude. I could -- you just f*cked up your f*cking grade. F*ck,
you’re going to get a bad f*cking grade on there for f*cking doing
that. F*cking dumb a**. God. I f*cking work my a** off so you
can f*cking get a good grade on that and that’s what you f*cking
do? You come in and write like f*cking shit like that? You
deserve to get the f*cking grade that you get, you know that? I
hope you get a f*cking bad grade on it. You know why? ‘Cause
you only get what you deserve. You deserve a sh*t grade for that
sh*t a** writing. You can f*cking do better than that. I know
you can f*cking do better than that. You better f*cking do better
than that for the rest of your life. Or I’m gonna take away your
f*cking Play Station. I’m gonna take away all your f*cking toys.
I’m gonna pull you out of basketball and sit you’re a** on the
bench. Everything you like to do, I’m gonna f*cking take it away
if you don’t start f*cking working harder in school. You got me?
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You f*cking better get me, because I am f*cking serious. Look at
me. I’m really f*cking pissed off right now if you can’t tell that.
I am really pissed off. I did all that f*cking work and you just
come home and just do that like that. That is unacceptable.
Unacceptable. You don’t do that sh*t in my house. You work
f*cking hard in school.
Tr. p. 23. When asked what she thought about the recording, the GAL said
that it “is a reflection of what [Children] are experiencing on a regular basis
with Father while in his care.” Id. at 24.
[8] To rebut the GAL’s report, Father called three witnesses who testified that they
had never seen Father get angry, upset, or frustrated with Children. See id. at
140, 143, 147-48. Father also testified and stated that after the December 13
recording ended, he apologized to M.C. On cross-examination, when asked if
he believed that the recording constituted verbal abuse, Father responded:
A I was cursing at him.
Q I asked you does that not constitute verbal abuse to you?
A No.
*****
Q [W]hat to you constitutes verbal abuse if that does not?
A I would constitute verbal abuse as something being
repetitively, coming at somebody and berating them
repetitively. I would consider that verbal abuse.
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Id. at 210-11. When asked about the incident when Mother said she was
coming to M.C.’s basketball practice, Father responded that Mother had
“provoked [him]” by “pushing [his] buttons” and that “it was an ongoing
thing,” her “not assisting to pay for some activities, and [Mother] knew that.”
Id. at 206-07. Father also stated that he questioned the accuracy of the GAL’s
report because he believed that Mother “asked [Children] to say certain things
and to give certain responses to” the GAL. Id. at 214.
[9] Mother testified at the hearing regarding her request to modify child support.
Mother said that after she moved to Florida in July 2015, she had a job making
$70,000 per year for nine months. See id. at 74. Mother stated that she lost that
job in June 2016 and now owns her own environmental-consulting business
and works as a realtor. Mother said that she has worked as an environmental
consultant “since about 2007” and that her current income is $733 per week, or
approximately $38,000 per year, which is “what [she] made in the past,” except
during her first nine months in Florida. Id. at 44. Mother also said that her
expenses are $1647.55 per week. See id. at 83. When asked how she makes up
the difference between her income and expenses, Mother responded, “My
husband.” Id. at 84.
[10] At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court found that it is in the best
interests of Children that custody be modified so that Mother has primary
physical custody of Children with Father to have parenting time “as the parties
may agree, but not less than the parenting time guidelines where distance is a
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major factor.” Id. at 243-44. The trial court explained its reasons for modifying
physical custody, stating in part:
[R]eading a transcript is one thing; hearing it is another. I don’t
think that there is anyone with an objective mind that can hear
the recording of what happened on December 13, 2017 and come
away with a different conclusion other than it was a horrifying
and egregious display of abuse. . . . That incident presented a
clear threat to [Children]. . . . [That] was by all estimates a
display of emotional and verbal, mental abuse to [Children]. . . .
[December 13th] was a traumatic incident and you have
minimized it and failed to acknowledge it. You have. You have
failed to acknowledge it for the effect that it has had on
[Children]. Your response to that has been to minimize and
move on. . . . I believe that this is part of what I have seen in the
evidence here today and that is overall a lack of self-awareness on
your part. There is a lack of self-awareness with regard to the
severity and effects of that incident.
Id. at 240-42. The trial court also ordered Father to pay Mother child support
in the amount of $270.00 per week. The trial court did not modify legal
custody or the parties’ agreement to divide equally Children’s extracurricular
expenses. However, the trial court did admonish both parties to follow the
court’s order regarding extracurricular expenses.
[11] Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[12] Father raises two arguments on appeal. He contends that the trial court erred
by granting Mother primary physical custody of Children and by failing to
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impute income to Mother when determining the parties’ child-support
obligations.
[13] The issues Father raises are all decisions that rest within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and we will reverse only upon a showing that the trial court has
abused its discretion. See In re Paternity of Snyder, 26 N.E.3d 996, 998 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015) (“We review custody modifications for abuse of discretion, with a
preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law
matters.”); In re Paternity of C.B., 112 N.E.3d 746, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)
(“We will reverse a trial court’s decision regarding imputation of income only
for an abuse of discretion.”), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs “when
the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
that were before the trial court, including any reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom.” Mertz v. Mertz, 971 N.E.2d 189, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.
denied.
I. Custody Modification
[14] Father first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted
Mother primary physical custody of Children. The trial court may not modify
an existing custody order unless the modification is in the best interests of the
child and there has been a substantial change in one or more statutory factors.
Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21. Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 lists the statutory
factors for a modification of physical custody, including: the age and sex of the
child; the wishes of the child’s parents; the wishes of the child (with more
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consideration given to a child at least fourteen years old); the child’s
interactions and relationships with any person who may significantly affect the
child’s best interests; the child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and
community; the mental and physical health of all individuals involved in the
case; and evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.
A change in circumstances “must be judged in the context of the whole
environment, and the effect on the child is what renders a change substantial or
inconsequential.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2016). Mother,
as the party petitioning for modification, “bears the burden of demonstrating
that the existing custody [arrangement] should be altered.” In re Paternity of
Snyder, 26 N.E.3d at 998.
[15] Father specifically argues that the trial court’s conclusion that a substantial
change in circumstances had occurred was based on a “single instance of
yelling at [M.C.]” that has not had “any deleterious effect” on Children.1
Appellant’s Br. pp. 17, 20. Father further asserts that any other instances where
Children alleged that he yelled at them, “at worst,” can be “characterized as
1
After the trial court issued its order modifying physical custody, Father filed a motion to correct error
alleging that he had an expert conduct an analysis of the recording and that it was his expert’s opinion that
the recording could not have been sent to Mother in the way she testified it was. The trial court denied
Father’s motion to correct error. On appeal, Father also contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to correct error. See Appellant’s Br. p. 21. Generally, a party may not raise an issue for the first time
in a motion to correct error. Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied. Because Father
did not raise this issue at trial, we consider this argument waived.
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isolated acts of misconduct by the custodial parent which is insufficient to
modify custody.” Appellant’s Reply Br. pp. 7-8. We disagree.
[16] Here, Mother has shown more than isolated acts of misconduct by Father. Cf.
Wallin v. Wallin, 668 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that,
generally, “the noncustodial parent must show something more than isolated
acts of misconduct to warrant a modification of child custody”). Rather, she
has shown evidence that Father has yelled at Children on other occasions when
they are in his care—for not flushing the toilet or tying shoelaces properly. See
Tr. p. 20. The evidence also shows that shortly after the December 13 incident,
Father yelled at Mother, in front of Children, for telling M.C. that she would
see him at basketball practice. Father testified that he got mad during that
incident because Mother “push[ed] [his] buttons.” Id. at 206.
[17] Furthermore, we agree with Mother that the recording is sufficient grounds for
the trial court to modify custody. See Appellee’s Br. p. 14. For over two
minutes, Father screamed, cursed, insulted, and berated his seven-year-old son,
who continuously cried in the background. When explaining why it was
modifying physical custody, the trial court stated, “I don’t think there’s anyone
with an objective mind that can hear the recording of what happened on
December 13, 2017 and come away with a different conclusion other than it
was a horrifying and egregious display of abuse.” Tr. p. 240-41. Having
listened to the recording ourselves, we come away with the same conclusion—
that it was a shocking display of verbal abuse. Additionally, when the GAL
was asked her opinion of the recording, she testified that the recording “is a
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reflection of what [Children] are experiencing on a regular basis with Father
while in his care.” Tr. p. 24. Evidently, everyone involved in this case—except
Father—recognizes that the recording constitutes verbal abuse and is concerned
about the emotional harm it has caused Children. As the trial court aptly
concluded, Father’s response—to minimize the recording—shows a remarkable
“lack of self-awareness with regard to the severity and effects” of the incident.
Id. at 242.
[18] Moreover, the statute specifically authorizes the trial court to consider “all
relevant factors,” including the wishes of the child, with more consideration
given to the child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen years old. Ind. Code §
31-17-2-8(3). Here, Children told the GAL that they wished to live with
Mother. See Tr. p. 13; see also Collyear-Bell v. Bell, 105 N.E.3d 176, 186 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2018) (“That a child’s wishes are to be given more consideration if the
child is at least fourteen years old does not mean that the wishes of a child who
is not yet fourteen cannot be considered.”). Given all this evidence, we find
that the trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in modifying
physical custody of Children.2
2
Father also argues that the trial court should “have used a remedy less traumatic to [Children], such as
referring this matter to [DCS] for an investigation and services.” Appellant’s Br. p. 25. This argument starts
from the premise that remaining in Father’s custody and care and participating in a DCS investigation would
be “less traumatic” for Children than the modification of custody. Father has given us no reason to think
that is true. Ultimately, the same evidence that would support a referral to DCS also amply supports the trial
court’s decision to modify custody.
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II. Imputed Income
[19] Father next contends that Mother “explicitly rel[ies] on [Stepfather’s] income to
pay for expenses that would have been covered had she maintained her prior
level of income” and that the trial court erred by failing to impute this income
to Mother when determining the parties’ child-support obligations. Appellant’s
Br. p. 24. The first step in establishing a child-support award is to determine the
weekly gross income of each parent. In re Paternity of C.B., 112 N.E.3d at 757.
Indiana Child Support Guideline 3(A)(1) defines weekly gross income as
“actual weekly gross income of the parent if employed to full capacity, potential
income if unemployed or underemployed, and imputed income based upon ‘in-
kind’ benefits.” The Guideline’s commentary states, “[w]hether or not income
should be imputed to a parent whose living expenses have been substantially
reduced due to financial resources other than the parent’s own earning
capabilities is . . . a fact-sensitive situation requiring careful consideration of the
evidence in each case.” Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A) cmt. d. The
commentary further states:
[R]egular and continuing payments made by a . . . subsequent
spouse . . . that reduce the parent’s costs for rent, utilities, or
groceries, may be the basis for imputing income. If there were
specific living expenses being paid by a parent which are now
being regularly and continually paid by that parent’s current
spouse or third party, the assumed expenses may be considered
imputed income to the parent receiving the benefit.
Id. (emphases added).
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[20] Father acknowledges that when Mother moved to Florida in July 2015 she
accepted a job “earning $70,000 per year,” that in February 2016 Mother was
laid off from that job, and that now her income is approximately $38,000 per
year and her expenses are $1647.44 per week. Appellant’s Br. p. 23.
Nonetheless, Father argues that Mother relies on Stepfather to “make-up the
gap” between her weekly income and expenses and that the trial court erred by
failing to impute Mother’s income in an amount equivalent to her expenses
when determining her child-support obligation.
[21] Mother contends that there is “no evidence that [she] is underemployed to
avoid paying a higher amount of child support, or that she is underemployed
because of Stepfather’s income.” Appellee’s Br. p. 17. Mother reiterates that
since she was terminated from her salaried position in 2016, “she has
consistently been earning the same amount.” Id. That is true. See Tr. p. 74.
The evidence shows that Mother has been an environmental consultant “since
about 2007,” and that now she owns her own environmental-consulting
business and works as a realtor. Id. at 44-45; see also Miller v. Miller, 72 N.E.3d
952, 956-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (noting that whether a parent is
underemployed and imputing income to him or her is not simply determining
that a parent’s income level has “remained relatively constant for several
years,” but also involves finding that the parent made his or her “lifestyle and
career choice before or shortly after” they began the relationship and “worked
in that profession throughout the relationship” (citing In re the Paternity of
Buehler, 576 N.E.2d 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)). Furthermore, while it is also
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true that Mother testified that Stepfather “makes up the gap” between her
income and expenses, there is no evidence to support Father’s claim that
Mother is “deliberately suppressing her income” to “the financial detriment” of
Children. Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 10. We conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by declining to impute income to Mother.
[22] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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