The Peoples State Bank v. Benton Township of Monroe County, Indiana

Mar 25 2015, 10:03 am
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher S. Roberge Douglas A. Hoffman
Elizabeth A. Roberge Jeremy M. Dilts
Anelia T.N. Ray Carson Boxberger LLP
Roberge Law Bloomington, Indiana
Carmel, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
The Peoples State Bank, March 25, 2015
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
53A01-1409-PL-379
v. Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
Court
The Honorable E. Michael Hoff,
Benton Township of Monroe Judge
County, Indiana, Cause No. 53C01-1305-PL-910
Appellee-Defendant
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] The Peoples State Bank (“the Bank”) appeals the denial of its motion to correct
error, which challenged a grant of summary judgment in favor of Benton
Township of Monroe County, Indiana (“Benton Township”) upon the Bank’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 1 of 20
collection complaint. The Bank presents a single, consolidated issue for review:
whether summary judgment was improvidently granted to Benton Township as
opposed to the Bank, upon the trial court’s conclusion that a loan transaction
was void. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The relevant facts are not in dispute. In 2011, Benton Township Trustee
Heather Cohee (“Cohee”) secured a loan from the Bank to purchase a fire
truck. She acted without a prior appropriation of funds by Benton Township or
compliance with statutory procedures allowing taxpayers an opportunity to
remonstrate.1
[3] In order to procure the loan, Cohee produced paperwork including minutes of a
township board meeting held on October 24, 2011, at which the fire truck
replacement plan and need for bids was favorably discussed. Also included
were a notice of a public hearing regarding plans for a new fire truck, a notice to
bid, and minutes of a meeting where the successful bidder – Wynn Fire
Equipment, LLC (“Wynn”) – was selected.
[4] Benton Township part-time employee Danielle Coe executed a promissory note
for $335,295, signing as the Benton Township Trustee. The Bank then
deposited $335,295 into Benton Township’s checking account. Benton
1
However, there is no evidence that she acted contrary to the wishes of the Benton Township Board.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 2 of 20
Township paid Wynn $287,149 for a fire truck and $616.52 for some related
equipment. The excess loan proceeds of $47,529.48 that had been deposited
into Benton Township’s account were used for other township purposes.
[5] Benton Township did not pay the promissory note installments as they came
due. Cohee resigned amidst allegations of financial improprieties unrelated to
the fire truck acquisition. On January 28, 2012, the Indiana State Board of
Accounts issued its Independent Accountant’s Report based upon a review of
Benton Township records. The report contained the conclusion that the fire
truck purchase was made “with proceeds of a loan that was not properly
approved by the Township Board.” (App. 307.) The report further indicated
that neither the Trustee nor the Township Board had signed the promissory
note.
[6] The Bank seized Benton Township checking account funds and applied those
funds in setoff to sums due under the promissory note. On December 21, 2012,
the Bank and Benton Township entered into a Partial Settlement & Dispute
Resolution Agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Benton
Township surrendered the fire truck, and the Bank sold it for $212,866.00 and
applied the funds to the outstanding loan. The Bank restored the funds it had
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 3 of 20
previously taken as an offset, except for $30,000, which was by agreement
applied to the loan. Benton Township also made a $37,529.48 payment. 2
[7] After the sale proceeds and payments were applied, the Bank sought
$102,273.90 in principal and interest, plus attorney’s fees and costs of
$45,757.65. On May 8, 2013, the Bank filed a complaint against Benton
Township. Benton Township answered the complaint, denying that the Bank
was entitled to any additional recovery.
[8] On February 27, 2014, the Bank filed a motion for summary judgment. On
March 25, 2014, Benton Township filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
A hearing on those motions was conducted on June 12, 2014. On July 2, 2014,
the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment to Benton
Township, concluding that the loan transaction was void because of the failure
to provide taxpayers with statutorily-required notice and an opportunity for
remonstrance. The Bank filed a motion to correct error, which was denied.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
2
As such, Benton Township made payments equal to the excess loan proceeds of $47,529.48 and $20,000.00
on the underlying debt.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 4 of 20
Standard of Review
[9] The Bank contends that the trial court erred when it denied the Bank’s motion
to correct error following the grant of summary judgment in favor of Benton
Township. We generally review the denial of a motion to correct error for an
abuse of discretion. Kornelik v. Mittal Steel USA, Inc., 952 N.E.2d 320, 324 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial
court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Hawkins v. Cannon,
826 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Questions of law are
reviewed de novo and we owe no deference to the trial court’s legal
conclusions. In re Guardianship of Phillips, 926 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010).
[10] Here, the Bank’s motion to correct error sought to set aside a grant of summary
judgment. A trial court’s grant of summary judgment on appeal to this Court is
‘“clothed with a presumption of validity,”’ and an appellant has the burden of
demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Williams v.
Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 762 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Rosi v. Bus. Furniture Corp., 615
N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind. 1993)). The standard of review is not altered by the fact
that the parties made cross-motions for summary judgment. Ind. Farmers Mut.
Ins. Grp. v. Blaskie, 727 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Instead, we
consider each motion separately according to our well established standard of
review:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 5 of 20
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our standard of review
is the same as that of the trial court. Considering only those facts that
the parties designated to the trial court, we must determine whether
there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and whether “the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In
answering these questions, the reviewing court construes all factual
inferences in the non-moving party’s favor and resolves all doubts as to
the existence of a material issue against the moving party. The moving
party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are
no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law; and once the movant satisfies the burden,
the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate and
produce evidence of facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact.
Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ind. 2009)
(internal citations omitted).
[11] In moving for summary judgment, the Bank contended that it has a valid
promissory note and that it is equitably entitled to payment for that which
Benton Township has received and enjoyed. In support of its cross-motion for
summary judgment, Benton Township argued that the purported contract for
debt is void because it was not incurred in a statutorily-prescribed manner. The
trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions in response to these
arguments. While a trial court’s annunciation of findings of fact and
conclusions on such matters may aid our review and reveal the reasoning of the
trial court, they are not required and are not binding upon appeal. New Albany
Historic Pres. Comm’n v. Bradford Realty, Inc., 965 N.E.2d 79, 84 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012). The role of the trial court at summary judgment is not to act as a trier of
fact, but rather to determine whether the movant established, prima facie, either
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 6 of 20
that there is insufficient evidence to proceed to trial, or that the movant is
otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kader v. State Dept. of
Correction, 1 N.E.3d 717, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Witness credibility and the
relative apparent weight of evidence are not relevant considerations at summary
judgment. Id.Analysis
[12] In asserting its entitlement to summary judgment, the Bank primarily relies
upon the fact that it holds a promissory note evidencing the indebtedness.
Generally, construction of written contracts is a question of law for which
summary judgment is particularly appropriate. Stelko Elec. v. Taylor Comm.
Schls, 826 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). When terms of a contract are
clear and unambiguous, the terms are conclusive, and the court will not
construe the contract or look at extrinsic evidence, but will simply apply the
contract provisions. Id. at 156.
[13] However, the instant promissory note does not give rise to claims of ambiguity
or competing interpretations of its terms. Rather, it is alleged to be
unenforceable against the Township Board because neither the Trustee nor a
board member executed it. Moreover, because of statutory enactments, the
Benton Township taxpayers must essentially be made parties to a valid contract
for indebtedness for which they will ultimately be liable.
[14] The parties agree that Indiana Code section 36-8-13-6.5 affords taxpayers a
right of judicial review of township expenditures. Benton Township contends –
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 7 of 20
and the trial court agreed – that the instant claim is barred because the
taxpayers were not given notice and opportunity for objection or judicial
review. The Bank, while recognizing that taxpayers have a right of
remonstrance, argues that the omission does not render a township loan
obligation invalid, because a township is authorized to borrow funds for
equipment and an obligation of the township is binding notwithstanding other
law.
[15] Thus, the dispute between the parties distills to one of statutory interpretation.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, to be reviewed de novo.
Porter Dev., LLC v. First Nat’l Bank of Valparaiso, 866 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ind.
2007). An unambiguous statute will not be subject to interpretation but rather
the words and phrases will be read in the plain, ordinary, and usual sense.
Butler v. Ind. Dep’t of Ins., 904 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ind. 2009). When a statute is
susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is deemed ambiguous and the
well-established rules of statutory construction are applicable. Barrett v. City of
Brazil, 919 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. One such rule
is that the primary goal of statutory construction is to determine, give effect to,
and implement the intent of our Legislature. Id. Additionally, statutes
concerning the same subject matter must be read together in an attempt to
harmonize and give effect to each. Id. Where provisions of a statute are in
conflict, the specific provision will take priority over the general provision. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 8 of 20
[16] Both parties direct our attention to Indiana Code section 36-8-13-6, entitled
“Purchase of firefighting apparatus and equipment; loans; tax levy,” which
provides:
(a) Subject to section 6.5 of this chapter, the executive and
legislative body, on behalf of the township, may also borrow
the necessary money from a financial institution in Indiana to
make the purchase on the same terms. They shall, on behalf of
the township, execute and deliver to the institution the
negotiable note or bond of the township for the sum borrowed.
The note or bond must bear interest, with both principal and
interest payable in equal or approximately equal installments
on January 1 and July 1 each year over a period not exceeding
six (6) years.
(b) The first installment of principal and interest on a contract,
chattel mortgage, note, or bond is due on the next January 1 or
July 1 following the first tax collection for which it is possible
for the township to levy a tax. The executive and legislative
body shall appropriate and levy a tax each year sufficient to pay
the obligation according to its terms. An obligation of the
township executed under this chapter is a valid and binding
obligation of the township, notwithstanding any tax limitation,
debt limitation, bonding, borrowing, or other statute to the
contrary.
[17] Indiana Code section 36-8-13-6.5, entitled “Taxpayers’ objections; judicial
review,” provides in relevant part:
(a) If the executive and the legislative body determine that money
should be borrowed under section 6 of this chapter, not less than
ten (10) taxpayers in the township who disagree with the
determination may file a petition in the office of the county auditor
not more than thirty (30) days after notice of the determination is
given. The petition must state the taxpayers’ objections and the
reasons why the taxpayers believe the borrowing to be unnecessary
or unwise.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 9 of 20
(b) The county auditor shall immediately certify a copy of the petition,
together with other data necessary to present the questions
involved, to the department of local government finance. Upon
receipt of the certified petition and other data, the department of
local government finance shall fix a time and place for the hearing
of the matter. . . .
[18] The Bank relies upon the language of Indiana Code section 36-8-13-6.5(b)
recognizing the valid and binding nature of a township obligation. The trial
court observed the inclusion of language describing binding debt as debt
incurred “subject to section 6.5 of this chapter.”
[19] The statute authorizing a purchase of firefighting apparatus first provides that
borrowing is “subject to section 6.5 of this chapter[.]” Ind. Code § 36-8-13-6(a).
In turn, section 6.5 provides for taxpayer remonstrance and judicial review,
with requisite notice and hearing. “The Court presumes that the legislature
intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent
with the statute’s underlying policy and goals.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184,
186 (Ind. 2007). Although a township board is empowered to borrow for
firefighting equipment, it must do so in compliance with statutory procedures.
A valid contract for purchase of firefighting equipment effectively binds the
taxpayers. The taxpayers are entitled to statutory protections including notice
and opportunity to object.
[20] The Bank does not deny the absence of a formal appropriation or statutory
compliance. Nor does the Bank dispute that it tendered a large sum of money
upon execution of a promissory note by a part-time employee, as Trustee,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 10 of 20
although she was not the Trustee. The Bank’s proposed remedy for its lack of
diligence is that statutory protections afforded the taxpayers be disregarded and
the Bank collect in full according to the stated terms of its promissory note.
[21] However, our Courts have not historically rewarded a lack of diligence on the
part of the lender by dispensing with taxpayer protections. A party dealing with
a municipality is bound to take notice of the limited powers of the municipality
and of the laws governing the municipality in making contracts. City of New
Albany v. New Albany St. Ry. Co., 172 Ind. 487, 490, 87 N.E. 1084 (1909).
[22] In Sunman-Dearborn Comm. Sch. Corp. v. Kral-Zepf-Freitag & Assoc., 338 N.E.2d
707, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), an architectural firm had initiated an action
against a school corporation, seeking to recover the value of architectural and
engineering services, although the trustee had not complied with the provisions
of the Township Reform Act [I.C. § 17-4-29-3 (1971) (repealed)]. At that time,
one provision of the Township Reform Act stated: “All contracts made in
violation of this act shall be null and void.” I.C. § 17-4-29-5. The Court
acknowledged the statutory language and additionally quoted the language of
our Indiana Supreme Court in Mitchelltree Sch. Twp. v. Hall, 163 Ind. 667, 72
N.E. 641 (1904):
It has been uniformly held that a township trustee is a special agent,
possessing only statutory powers, and can only bind the township
when authorized by statute and in the manner specified therein, and
that all who deal with him must, at their peril, take notice of the extent
of his authority, and the party seeking to enforce a contract against a
township for a debt contracted by the township trustee takes the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 11 of 20
burden of showing by allegation and proof that all the conditions
existed which conferred authority upon the trustee to contract the debt.
Sunman-Dearborn, 338 N.E.2d at 715. The Court concluded that the
architectural firm was required to prove statutory compliance as a condition to
enforcement of the contracts in question, and had failed to do so. Id.[23] Here, the lack of statutory compliance is undisputed. A single conclusion can
be drawn – the purported contract between Benton Township and the Bank is
invalid.
[24] The Bank alternatively contends that, even if its contract is unenforceable, it is
entitled to recover based upon common law or equitable theories. First, the
Bank claims that there is an “account stated” because Benton Township made
no objection to multiple monthly statements detailing sums advanced and
payments due. The Bank directs our attention to B.E.I., Inc. v. Newcomer Lumber
& Supply, 745 N.E.2d 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The B.E.I. court described an
account stated as “an agreement between the parties that all items of an account
and balance are correct, together with a promise, expressed or implied to pay
the balance.” Id. at 236. The Court then explained: “[i]t operates as a new
contract without the need for renewed consideration, and the plaintiff does not
need to plead and prove the creation and performance of each contract
underlying the account.” Id.[25] In accordance with B.E.I., the Bank asserts that a new contract was formed
when statements to Benton Township were received without protest. In effect,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 12 of 20
the Bank suggests that a township, although required to comply with statutory
procedures to incur debt, may circumvent those requirements by simply
acknowledging the existence of a debt. The Bank’s position is unavailing, in
that the parties are not simply a creditor and account debtor. Ultimately, it is
the taxpayers who must pay. Any “new contract” for firefighting equipment
could not be formed in disregard of the relevant statutory requirements. A
steward of public funds may not simply dispense with taxpayer protections by
accepting statements without complaint.
[26] The Bank also deems itself entitled to equitable remedies because of the conduct
of Benton Township after procedural errors came to light. According to the
Bank, Benton Township board members simply determined that a smaller truck
would be more desirable to maneuver on rural roads and thereafter deliberately
failed to cure defects in its acquisition of debt.
[27] The Bank suggests that appropriate equitable theories are “a theory of money
had and received” and quantum meruit – also referred to as unjust enrichment.
(Appellant’s Brief at 16-18.) The Bank insists that it conferred a measurable
benefit upon Benton Township under such circumstances that Benton
Township’s retention of the benefit would be unjust. See Bayh v. Sonnenburg,
573 N.E.2d 398, 408 (Ind. 1991) (describing quantum meruit as a legal fiction
to permit recovery where there is no contract but where the circumstances are
such that under the law of natural and immutable justice there should be a
recovery as though there had been a promise).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 13 of 20
[28] The Bank maintains that a lack of full statutory compliance in executing a
contract has been excused to permit payments for goods received and enjoyed.
See Boyd v. Black Sch. Twp., 123 Ind. 1, 23 N.E. 862 (1890). In Boyd, a school
township did not follow statutory procedures for incurring debt, but received
and used school furniture which was “suitable and necessary.” Id. at 863. On
appeal after the vendor was awarded less than the full contract price, the Court
acknowledged that “the contract was invalid for want of a compliance with the
statute,” and determined that the township was “only bound to pay the actual
value of what it received.” Id. Ultimately, the township paid $118.57 as
opposed to the contract price of $342.00. See also Schipper v. City of Aurora, 121
Ind. 154, 22 N.E. 878, 879 (1889):
Where a city or municipality receives the benefit of money, labor, or
property upon a contract made without due formality, or which it had
no authority to make, and which it refuses to execute, it will
nevertheless be liable to the person conferring the benefit to the extent
of the value of what has been received and appropriated, unless the
contract was prohibited by statute, or in violation of public policy.
In Schipper, the town was required to pay for “an appropriation of the plaintiff’s
work.” Id. at 880.
[29] Also with regard to the provision of services to a municipality, in Rieth-Riley
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Town of Indian Village, 138 Ind. App. 341, 348, 214 N.E.2d
208, 211 (1966), this Court noted that when certain salient facts are proven,
recovery is possible, even in the absence of a valid contract. The defendant
town had contracted for materials and labor necessary to improve streets but
had failed to comply with a statute regarding public works projects. See Id. On
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 14 of 20
appeal, the town argued that the contract was void and unenforceable but the
Court found “if the contract be invalid for want of compliance with a statute
but the town receives and enjoys the benefits, the town is nevertheless liable to
pay the actual value of what it received.” Id. at 138 Ind. App. 347-48; 214
N.E.2d at 211. According to the Court, “there is not one law for the state and
another for its subjects.” Id.[30] Likewise, in Heeter v. Western Boone Cnty. Comm. Sch. Corp., 147 Ind. Ct. App.
153, 259 N.E.2d 99, 100 (1970), the defendant school corporation could
ultimately be required to pay an architect for the value of his services. The facts
to be established to permit recovery of the reasonable value of services are:
Services were rendered in favor of the municipal corporation in
question;
Services were rendered with the full knowledge of the governing body
of such municipal corporation;
The governing body of such municipal corporation knowingly
accepted the benefits of such services; and
The purported contract for such services was not wholly beyond the
scope of the municipal corporation’s powers.
147 Ind. Ct. App. at 162; 259 N.E.2d at 104.
[31] Benton Township responds that, with rare exception, equitable remedies will
not be applied against a governmental entity. See Hannon v. Metro. Dev. Comm’n
of Marion Cnty., 685 N.E.2d 1075, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (acknowledging, in
discussing a claim of equitable estoppel and laches, that “equitable estoppel
cannot ordinarily be applied against government entities” and “the exception is
if the public interest would be threatened by the government’s conduct”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 15 of 20
Benton Township heavily relies upon the language of Cablevision of Chicago v.
Colby Cable Corp., 417 N.E.2d 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
[32] Cablevision involved facts dissimilar to those of the instant case. Cablevision
and a taxpayer sought a declaration that a purported cable television franchise
received by Colby was invalid, as the franchise was not preceded by a contract
with the Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety, as required by statute.
Id. at 351. In addressing the issue of whether the trial court abused its
discretion by denying Cablevision’s request for preliminary injunctive relief, the
Court addressed whether actions by a municipality in violation of controlling
statutes are subject to the equitable defenses of estoppel or laches. Id. at 354.
The Court acknowledged the general rule in Indiana, that is, “the public,
whether it be a state or local governmental body, cannot be estopped by the
unlawful acts of public officials.” Id. The reason underlying the rule is that ‘“if
laches, waiver or estoppel did apply against the public, a dishonest,
incompetent or negligent public official could wreck the interests of the
public.”’ Id. (quoting State v. Roberts, 226 Ind. 106, 134, 78 N.E.2d 440, 446
(1948), disapproved on other grounds by State ex rel. Indiana Dept. of Conservation v.
Pulaski Circuit Court, 231 Ind. 245 (1952)). Therefore, our courts have been
particularly unsolicitous of estoppel and laches arguments in cases where the
unauthorized acts of public officials on some level implicate government
spending powers. Id.[33] The Cablevision Court described as an example a contract for garbage collection
that was at issue in Mazac v. City of Michigan City, 98 Ind. App. 366, 189 N.E.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 16 of 20
400 (1934). The contract entered into by Mazac had not been submitted to the
city council as required by law, but Mazac alleged that the city was estopped
from denying liability under the contract because the contract had been partly
performed. See id. at 402. On appeal, the Court reasoned that a void contract
could not be ratified. “Since the contract is void, and cannot become effective,
there could be no estoppel.” Id.[34] Likewise, in Hamer v. City of Huntington, 215 Ind. 594, 21 N.E.2d 407 (1939), a
city was not contractually bound to pay for a fire truck where funds were not
appropriated until after the contract was entered into and Indiana law required
that funds be appropriated before the execution of the contract. Although the
fire truck had been delivered and accepted, the equitable doctrine of estoppel
was rejected:
If one dealing with the city could plead ignorance of the laws
governing the city or of the appropriated balance which the city has
and thereby make valid a contract made by the city contrary to § 48-
1507, … the effect of such statute and our budget laws would be
destroyed.
Id. at 603, 21 N.E.2d at 411.
[35] In City of Evansville v. Follis, 161 Ind. Ct. App. 396, 315 N.E.2d 724 (1974), the
building commissioner had issued a building permit without checking property
descriptions for a public easement. The homeowner attempted to raise the
defense of estoppel, but our Court concluded: “[i]t has been held that where the
facts are equally known or accessible to all parties concerned, as there were in
the case at bar, there can be no estoppel. … [S]ince this information was readily
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 17 of 20
accessible to both parties from public records, the requisite elements of estoppel
are missing.” Id. at 403, 315 N.E.2d at 728.
[36] After reviewing this authority, the Cablevision Court reiterated:
What is certain is that when our law clearly limits the authority of
government officials to act, or when the law clearly prescribes a
procedure to be followed, private parties must carefully take note of
that limitation or procedure before dealing with a governmental entity.
… Similarly, when the public record contains information relevant to
the individual’s circumstance, he must seek it out.
[37] 417 N.E.2d at 355-56. Nonetheless, the Court recognized that application of
equitable doctrines when dealing with a public entity is not absolutely
prohibited. Id. at 356. Observing that the case did not “involve the
unauthorized expenditure of taxpayers’ money as did Mazac and Hamer,” the
Court determined that there remained a question of fact on whether the
elements of estoppel or laches were present. Id. at 356-57.
[38] To synthesize, municipal corporations must exercise their powers in strict
compliance with statutory procedures and doctrines of estoppel or ratification
will not validate a contract formed outside statutory parameters. However, in
some instances, quantum meruit relief may be available to prevent the unfair
retention of benefits. As an over-arching principle, it is clear that those who
deal with taxpayer funds must be ever-vigilant to ascertain the public actor’s
authority. Cablevision, 417 N.E.2d at 355.
[39] “When the legislature enacts procedures and timetables which act as precedent
to the exercise of some right or remedy, those procedures cannot be
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 18 of 20
circumvented by the unauthorized acts and statements of officers, agents or staff
of the various departments of our state government.” Middleton Motors, Inc. v.
Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 269 Ind. 282, 285, 380 N.E.2d 79, 81 (1978). We
conclude that the promissory note at issue is not a proper basis for a grant of
equitable relief. First, the matter involves the unauthorized expenditure of
taxpayer funds. Second, the circumstances are such that the Bank was obliged
to seek out information of public record and failed to do so. Indeed, the Bank
prepared a promissory note for execution by a part-time township employee
rather than the Benton Township Trustee. Finally, Benton Township did not
retain property for which it refused to pay, and the parties essentially addressed
the equities surrounding the surrender by entering into a partial settlement.
Although the loan was invalid, the township nevertheless mitigated the Bank’s
damages by surrendering the fire truck and paying cash of $67,529.48. This is
not a situation involving “extreme unfairness” such that equity should step in
against a governmental entity. Thomas v. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 979
N.E.2d 169, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Equitable remedies are not available to
permit the Bank’s collection in full upon its faulty promissory note.
Conclusion
[40] The purported contract executed by a township employee in contravention of
statutory requirements is invalid. The Bank may not pursue additional
equitable remedies against Benton Township, beyond the partial settlement
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 19 of 20
agreement. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to
Benton Township as opposed to the Bank.
[41] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 53A01-1409-PL-379 | March 25, 2015 Page 20 of 20