Marvin Crussel v. State of Indiana

Mar 26 2015, 10:23 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
G. Allen Lidy Gregory F. Zoeller
Roscoe Stovall, Jr., & Associates Attorney General of Indiana
Mooresville, Indiana
Eric P. Babbs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Marvin Crussel, March 26, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
16A01-1407-CR-304
v. Appeal from the Decatur Superior
Court
State of Indiana, Lower Court Cause No.
16D01-1310-CM-698
Appellee-Plaintiff.
The Honorable Matthew D. Bailey,
Judge
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Marvin Crussel (“Crussel”) appeals, following a bench trial, his conviction for
Class B misdemeanor reckless driving.1 Crussel concedes that he drove at an
unreasonably high rate of speed but argues that we should reverse his
conviction because the evidence presented was insufficient to show
endangerment. Concluding that the trial court, acting as factfinder, could have
reasonably inferred that Crussel’s act of driving ninety-one miles per hour in a
fifty-five mile-per-hour zone at around 10:30 p.m. in the dark of night on a
portion of a country road that had houses and cross streets endangered the
safety and property of others, we affirm his conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
[3] Whether sufficient evidence supports Crussel’s conviction.
Facts
[4] During the evening of October 16, 2013, Decatur County Sheriff’s Deputy Rob
Goodfellow (“Deputy Goodfellow”) was parked, in his marked police car,
alongside and perpendicular to County Road 1100 South. The deputy was
parked on a portion of the county road west of Westport. Main Street in
1
IND. CODE § 9-21-8-52(a)(1)(A). We note that this statute was amended, effective July 1, 2015, and that the
amendment was to a different subsection. Because Crussel committed his offense in 2013, we will apply the
statute in effect at that time.
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Westport turns into County Road 1100 South. This county road is “fairly
straight” but also has “some hills in it.” (Tr. 6, 7). The portion of County Road
1100 South where the deputy parked was located in a “rural” part of Decatur
County, but there were houses present and there were three roads intersecting
the county road. These three roads had two-way stop signs, while County
Road 1100 South had no stop signs.
[5] As the deputy was parked along the county road, it was “dark” outside, there
was “[v]ery light traffic[,]” and “there was no rain and it wasn’t snowing.” (Tr.
6). At around 10:39 p.m., Deputy Goodfellow saw a car—later identified as
Crussel’s car—that was traveling westbound on County Road 1100 South from
the direction of Westport. The deputy noted that the car “appeared to be at a
higher rate of speed than fifty five” miles per hour, which was the speed limit
for that road. (Tr. 8). Deputy Goodfellow saw Crussel’s car from
approximately one-half mile away on “a straight portion” of the road. (Tr. 7).
There were no other cars traveling in that area at that time. The deputy had a
radar device and clocked Crussel’s speed at ninety-one miles per hour. Deputy
Goodfellow then activated his lights and stopped Crussel.
[6] Thereafter, the State charged Crussel with Class B misdemeanor reckless
driving and speeding, a Class C infraction. The trial court held a bench trial on
May 5, 2014. Deputy Goodfellow testified to the facts above. On cross
examination, the deputy confirmed that there were no pedestrians, bicyclists, or
schools in the area. After the State rested, Crussel moved for a directed verdict,
arguing that, under the circumstances presented, the State had failed to present
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evidence on the element of endangerment of property or people. The State
argued that “evidence of the extreme speed would constitute evidence in and of
itself of endangerment to the safety and property of others.” (Tr. 17). The trial
court denied Crussel’s motion.
[7] Thereafter, Crussel testified that he was going from home to work when the
deputy pulled him over for speeding. Additionally, he testified that the road
condition was “dry[,]” that there was “no fog[,]” and that he could see clearly
that night. (Tr. 21). Crussel also testified that he had lived in the area for
thirteen years and that his car was generally in an operational condition.
[8] When presenting its closing argument to the trial court, the State cited to Taylor
v. State, 457 N.E.2d 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), to support of its argument that
“speed alone can support a reckless driving conviction.” (Tr. 23). Crussel, on
the other hand, cited to Jackson v. State, 576 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), to
support his argument that there was insufficient evidence of endangerment to
support a conviction for reckless driving. The trial court took the matter under
advisement to review the parties’ cases.
[9] Subsequently, on May 13, 2014, the trial court entered a written order, in which
it discussed the cases submitted by the parties and determined that “Crussel’s
operation of his vehicle at 91 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour speed zone
was reckless and endangered the safety and property of others.” (App. 10).
The trial court found Crussel guilty of the reckless driving and speeding, merged
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the speeding infraction into the reckless driving conviction, and imposed a
$100.00 fine and court costs. Crussel now appeals his conviction.
Decision
[10] Crussel argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his Class B
misdemeanor reckless driving conviction.
[11] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
[12] To sustain Crussel’s conviction for Class B misdemeanor reckless driving, the
State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Crussel “operate[d]
a motor vehicle and . . . recklessly . . . dr[ove] at such an unreasonably high rate
of speed . . . under the circumstances as to . . . endanger the safety or property
of others[.]” I.C. § 9-21-8-52(a)(1)(A). The reckless driving statute does not
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require a showing of personal injury or damage to property by a driver in order
to commit the offense. See State v. Seymour, 379 N.E.2d 535, 346 (Ind. Ct. App.
1978) (analyzing a different subsection of prior version of the reckless driving
statute).
[13] Crussel does not challenge the elements that he recklessly drove his car at an
unreasonably high rate of speed. Indeed, he acknowledges that he was driving
“at a high rate of speed well in excess of the speed limits.” (Crussel’s Br. 6).
He, however, contends that “driving 91 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour
zone does not support a finding that he endangered the property or safety of
others.” (Crussel’s Br. 8). He contends that this Court should reverse his
conviction because the “State did not present any evidence of endangerment
other than excessive speed.” (Crussel’s Br. 8). In support of his argument, he
cites to Jackson, in which another panel of this Court reversed the defendant’s
reckless driving conviction based on insufficient evidence of endangerment.
[14] The State, as the prosecutor did below, cites to Taylor to support its argument
that “driving at an unreasonably high speed may suffice to support a
conviction” for reckless driving. (State’s Br. 4). The State also asserts that,
under the circumstances presented, the trial court could have concluded that
Crussel’s unreasonably high speed endangered the safety and property of others
and that Crussel’s arguments are merely a request to reweigh the evidence.
[15] In Taylor, the defendant was convicted of reckless homicide after he drove
seventy miles per hour in a thirty mile-per-hour zone, ran a stop sign, and
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collided with another car, killing the two people inside. Taylor, 457 N.E.2d at
596-97. On appeal, Taylor challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction. Id. at 597. Another panel of this Court reviewed the
reckless driving statute when considering whether the defendant acted
recklessly when he drove forty miles over the speed limit. Id. at 598. When
discussing the reckless driving statute, the Taylor Court stated:
Initially, it would appear the Reckless Driving statute is of
minimal assistance in resolving the issue before us, given the use
therein of the word “recklessly.” We believe, however, that the
adverb “recklessly” was employed to lend flexibility to the
operation of the statute. As we interpret the statute, Reckless
Driving may be based on any one of the enumerated acts, but
proof thereof creates a presumption of recklessness which the
defendant may rebut. Therefore, in certain circumstances,
operating a motor vehicle at an “unreasonably high rate of
speed” may be sufficient to support a conviction of Reckless
Driving.
Although the legislature elected not to define “unreasonably high
rate of speed,” it is clear that driving forty miles per hour in
excess of the speed limit is unreasonable and reckless. The
dangerousness of Taylor’s speeding vehicle was exacerbated by
the fact that the pavement was wet and by the fact that he was
unfamiliar with the area.
*****
The circumstances of this case reveal the dangerous nature of
Taylor’s actions. Speed limits are regulated for the protection of
public safety and are assessed with regard to particular road
conditions. Failure to adhere to the speed limit, however, does
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not necessarily constitute recklessness. A slight deviation from
the limit does not thereby create a great risk of danger and,
alternatively, it is conceivable that some violations are due to
inadvertence. We cannot state that either is true in Taylor’s case,
given the substantial differential between the speed of his vehicle
and the speed limit.
Id. The Taylor Court concluded that, in the “absence of any rebuttal evidence,”
the evidence was sufficient to show that Taylor had acted recklessly and to
support his conviction. Id.[16] In Jackson, the defendant, at 1:00 a.m., skidded in a semi-circle on his
motorcycle in the middle of North Keystone Avenue in Indianapolis, spun his
rear tires in his own yard, and then drove approximately forty-five miles per
hour toward an alley. Jackson, 576 N.E.2d at 608. Jackson was convicted of
Class B misdemeanor reckless driving and appealed the sufficiency of his
conviction. Id. at 608-09. On appeal, another panel of this Court noted that the
evidence showed that the pavement was dry and there was no indication that
there were any other motorist or pedestrian in the area at that early morning
hour. Id. at 610. We did not, however, indicate what the speed limit was or
how much the defendant had exceeded the speed limit. We held that,
considering the circumstances surrounding Jackson’s conduct, there was “not
sufficient evidence of probative value to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he drove at such an unreasonably high rate of speed so as to endanger the safety
or property of others[,]” and we reversed his conviction for reckless driving. Id.
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[17] After analyzing these cases, we note that neither one explicitly controls our
analysis of whether there was sufficient evidence of endangerment to support
Crussel’s reckless driving conviction.2 While the Taylor Court reviewed the
reckless driving statute and concluded that, “in certain circumstances, operating
a motor vehicle at an ‘unreasonably high rate of speed’ may be sufficient to
support a conviction of Reckless Driving[,]” the main focus of its analysis was
on the element of recklessness. Taylor, 457 N.E.2d at 598. Additionally, while
the Jackson Court evaluated whether there was sufficient evidence of
endangerment, its analysis did not involve a discussion of the defendant’s
speed, in conjunction with other circumstances, when making that
determination.
[18] Instead, we focus on the language of the reckless driving statute and our
standard of review as set forth by our Indiana Supreme Court. The statute at
issue required that the State prove that Crussel operated a motor vehicle and
“recklessly . . . dr[ove] at such an unreasonably high rate of speed . . . under the
circumstances as to . . . endanger the safety or property of others[.]” I.C. § 9-
21-8-52(a)(1)(A).
[19] Again, Crussel does not dispute that he drove recklessly at an unreasonably
high rate of speed. Crussel asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support
his reckless driving conviction, contending that the only evidence of
2
We note that both Jackson and Taylor addressed a prior version of the reckless driving statute, Indiana Code
§ 9-4-1-56.1, but that the relevant language at issue in this case was contained in that version of the statute as
well. Compare I.C. § 9-4-1-56.1 to I.C. § 9-21-8-52.
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endangerment was his excessive speed. We agree, in part, with Crussel’s
assertion. We generally agree that a defendant’s unreasonably high rate of
speed, in and of itself, would not be the sole determining factor when analyzing
whether the element of endangerment has been satisfied. Instead, a defendant’s
speed, in conjunction with the other attending “circumstances” surrounding a
defendant’s act of recklessly driving at an unreasonably high rate of speed, will
serve to determine whether a defendant has endangered the safety or property
of others. See I.C. § 9-21-8-52(a)(1)(A). We, however, disagree that the
evidence was insufficient to support Crussel’s conviction.
[20] Here, there was evidence regarding the attending “circumstances” under which
Crussel recklessly drove at an unreasonably high rate of speed from which the
trial court could have inferred that he endangered the safety or property of
others. The evidence reveals that Deputy Goodfellow was parked alongside a
portion of County Road 1100 South at 10:39 p.m. when he saw Crussel driving
ninety-one miles per hour. Deputy Goodfellow saw Crussel’s car from
approximately one-half mile away on “a straight portion” of the county road.
(Tr. 7). At the time the deputy stopped Crussel, it was dark, there was no rain
or snow, and there were no other motorists, bicyclists, or pedestrians present.
The part of the county road where the deputy saw Crussel driving was located
in a “rural” part of Decatur County, but there were houses present and there
were three roads intersecting the county road. Crussel testified that the road
condition was “dry[,]” that there was “no fog[,]” and that he could see clearly
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that night. (Tr. 21). Crussel also testified that he had lived in the area for
thirteen years and that his car was generally in an operational condition.
Crussel points to certain circumstances and argues that they “clearly cut against
a finding of endangerment[.]” (Crussel’s Br. 6). However, the trial court, faced
with the evidence of all the circumstances surrounding Crussel’s speeding on
the county road, weighed that evidence and determined that “Crussel’s
operation of his vehicle at 91 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour speed zone
was reckless and endangered the safety and property of others.” (App. 10).
Based on the evidence presented, it was reasonable for the trial court, as
factfinder, to have drawn an inference that Crussel endangered the safety and
property of others from the evidence that Crussel drove his car ninety-one miles
per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone in the dark of night on a country road
that had houses and cross streets in the area. See Tin Thang v. State, 10 N.E.3d
1256, 1260 (Ind. 2014) (explaining that “when determining whether the
elements of an offense are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a fact-finder may
consider both the evidence and the resulting reasonable inferences”) (emphasis in
original). See also Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146 (explaining that when we “must
consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
verdict”) (emphasis in original).
[21] Crussel’s argument—which in essence challenges the significance applied to the
evidence of the circumstances surrounding his act of recklessly driving at an
unreasonably high rate of speed—is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh
the evidence, which we will not do. See id. Because there was probative
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evidence from which the factfinder could have found Crussel guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of Class B misdemeanor reckless driving, we affirm his
conviction. See id. at 147 n.4 (stating that “appellate courts must affirm ‘if the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence could
have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt’”) (quoting McHenry, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005)
(quoting Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ind. 2000)) (emphasis in original).
[22] Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and May, J., concur.
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