Elliott Tyson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jan 30 2017, 8:53 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as CLERK
precedent or cited before any court except for the Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elliott Tyson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Elliott Tyson, January 30, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1602-CR-280
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
The Honorable Peggy Ryan Hart,
State of Indiana, Master Commissioner.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49G21-9905-FC-81336
Friedlander, Senior Judge
[1] Elliott Tyson appeals the denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence.
We affirm.
[2] Tyson was convicted of four felonies related to dealing in controlled substances.
In addition, he was found to be an habitual offender. On appeal, the Indiana
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Supreme Court reversed two of his felony convictions on double jeopardy
grounds and remanded for resentencing. See Tyson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 715
(Ind. 2002). On remand, the trial court sentenced Tyson to eighty years.
[3] Next, Tyson filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction
court summarily denied his petition, and a panel of this Court affirmed the post-
conviction court’s judgment. See Tyson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 855 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007), trans. denied.
[4] Tyson has also filed four motions for permission to file a successive petition for
post-conviction relief, and this Court denied the motions. See Tyson v. State,
Cause No. 49A02-0809-SP-840 (Ind. Ct. App. October 10, 2008); Tyson v. State,
Cause No. 49A02-1001-SP-31 (Ind. Ct. App. February 2, 2010); Tyson v. State,
Cause No. 49A02-1201-SP-48 (Ind. Ct. App. February 24, 2012); Tyson v. State,
Cause No. 49A05-1210-SP-504 (Ind. Ct. App. November 2, 2012).
[5] The current case began when Tyson filed a motion to correct erroneous
sentence. He submitted the transcript from his original trial in support of his
motion. The court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
[6] Tyson argues the trial court should have granted his motion to correct
erroneous sentence because his sentence was the result of an inappropriate
double enhancement. The State responds that Tyson’s motion does not comply
with the standards that govern motions to correct erroneous sentence, and, as a
result, dismissal of this appeal or affirmance of the trial court’s ruling is
appropriate.
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[7] We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct erroneous sentence for
an abuse of discretion. Woodcox v. State, 30 N.E.3d 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the logic
and effects of the facts and circumstances before it. Davis v. State, 978 N.E.2d
470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[8] The statute that governs motions to correct erroneous sentences provides, in
relevant part:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake
does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be
corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person.
The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the
corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must
be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law
specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15 (1983).
[9] It is in the best interests of all parties that sentencing errors be immediately
discovered and corrected. Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. 2004). In
general, such errors are most appropriately presented in a motion to correct
error or in a direct appeal from the sentencing judgment. Id. In addition, a
defendant may raise certain sentencing errors in post-conviction proceedings.
See id. (citing Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1, § (1)(a)(3)).
[10] A defendant may file a motion to correct erroneous sentence under Indiana
Code section 35-38-1-15 as an alternative, narrower remedy. The Indiana
Supreme Court has clearly stated, “a motion to correct erroneous sentence may
only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the
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judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Robinson,
805 N.E.2d at 787. Stated slightly differently, a court considering a motion to
correct erroneous sentence may consider “only the face of the judgment and the
applicable statutory authority without reference to other matters in or extrinsic
to the record.” Id. at 787-88. Claims that require consideration of the
proceedings before, during or after trial may not be presented by way of a
motion to correct erroneous sentence. Id. at 787. Such claims must be raised
on direct appeal or post-conviction proceedings. Id.
[11] In Fulkrod v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), Fulkrod filed a
motion to correct erroneous sentence, claiming the trial court erroneously
enhanced his sentence based on aggravating factors that were not determined
by a jury. He did not prevail and appealed. A panel of this Court concluded
Fulkrod could not present his claim by way of a motion to correct erroneous
sentence because the court would be required to look beyond the face of the
judgment to the sentencing record.
[12] Similarly, in Godby v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), Godby
claimed via a motion to correct erroneous sentence that the trial court should
not have cited the evidence introduced at trial as an aggravating factor. On
appeal from the denial of the motion, a panel of this Court affirmed, concluding
the Court could not address Godby’s claim without examining documents
beyond the sentencing order.
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[13] By contrast, in Wilson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 759 (Ind. 2014), Wilson argued his
sentence violated the governing statutes because the trial court ordered him to
serve the sentence for one of his offenses partially concurrently and partially
consecutively with another sentence. The Indiana Supreme Court addressed
Wilson’s claim because it was a question of law.
[14] In the current case, Tyson initially asserts he is raising only “questions of law.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 15. He claims, in substance, that his aggregate sentence is
erroneous because the trial court inappropriately enhanced the sentence for one
of his offenses due to his criminal history and then also considered his criminal
history in sentencing him for the habitual offender determination. Addressing
this claim would require consideration of materials other than the sentencing
order, such as the evidence presented at trial and sentencing, to determine
whether the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors are valid. Tyson
effectively concedes this point by asking the Court to take judicial notice of the
transcript from the habitual offender and sentencing phases of his trial. He has
included those documents in his appellate filings and repeatedly cites to them in
his briefs.
[15] We agree with the State that Tyson is asking this Court to consider matters
beyond the face of the sentencing order. As a result, the circumstances of this
case more closely resemble those in Fulkrod and Godby than the circumstances
in Wilson, and, pursuant to the holding in Robinson, Tyson’s claim is not
appropriately raised in a motion to correct erroneous sentence.
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[16] Tyson argues the trial court and this Court may consider evidence beyond the
face of the sentencing order, but the cases he cites in support of his argument
are distinguishable. In Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249 (Ind. 2008), Neff sought to
challenge the calculation of his credit time but conceded on transfer that the
Department of Correction’s calculation was correct. As a result, it was not
necessary for the Indiana Supreme Court to address the claim he raised in his
motion to correct erroneous sentence. By contrast, Tyson’s claim of sentencing
error would require the Court to review the record to consider the factors that
were involved in sentencing.
[17] In Hardley v. State, 905 N.E.2d 399, 403 (Ind. 2009), another case cited by
Tyson, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the State of Indiana may “present
claims of illegal sentence on appeal when the issue is a pure question of law that
does not require resort to any evidence outside the appellate record.” Further,
the State is not limited to challenging “facially erroneous sentences” but may
raise any appropriate claim. Id. at 404. The Court distinguished the
circumstances of Hardley from the circumstances in Robinson, noting that a
“restrictive interpretation” of Indiana Code section § 35-38-1-15, as applied to
the defendant in Robinson, is appropriate because defendants may also present
sentencing claims by direct appeal or through post-conviction relief. Id. at 402.
Thus, the holding in Hardley may not reasonably be read as changing the
holding in Robinson that a defendant filing a motion to correct erroneous
sentence may present only claims that can be resolved by considering the
sentencing order and no other portions of the record.
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[18] Finally, Tyson argues the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson was
“abrogated” by the Indiana Supreme Court’s amendment of Indiana Evidence
Rule 201, which governs judicial notice. Appellant’s Br. p. 51. In 2009, the
Indiana Supreme Court amended Rule 201 to allow courts to take judicial
notice of court records. In re Paternity of P.R., 940 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010). Tyson claims Rule 201 now allows, if not requires, trial and appellate
courts to consider extrinsic evidence when addressing a motion to correct
erroneous sentence.
[19] Rule 201 is a rule of general applicability in all proceedings, civil and criminal,
in Indiana’s courts. Ind. Evid. Rule 101(b). There is no indication that the
Indiana Supreme Court intended for its amendment of Rule 201 to overrule its
specific interpretation of Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 as set forth in
Robinson. Further, the holding in Robinson applies to defendants, not to courts.
A defendant filing a motion to correct erroneous sentence remains barred from
raising claims that go beyond the face of the sentencing order, regardless of the
scope of a court’s discretion to take judicial notice of facts and law.
[20] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tyson’s motion to correct
erroneous sentence. We decline Tyson’s request to take judicial notice of the
transcripts from his original trial. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
[21] Judgment affirmed.
Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.
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