In the Matter of the Adoption of L.M.Q., C.Q. v. J.G. and M.G. (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
May 13 2015, 10:19 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Patrick A. Duff Allyson R. Breeden
Evansville, Indiana Ziemer Stayman Weitzel & Shoulders,
LLP
Evansville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Adoption of May 13, 2015
L.M.Q., Court of Appeals Case No.
82A01-1409-AD-391
C. Q.,
Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Appellant-Respondent, Superior Court.
The Honorable Renee Ferguson,
v. Magistrate.
Cause No. 82D07-1211-AD-167
J. G. and M. G.,
Appellees-Petitioners.
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Respondent, C.Q. (Father), appeals the adoption of his minor son,
L.Q. (Child), by Appellees-Petitioners, J.G. and M.G. (collectively, Adoptive
Parents).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Father raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the
following single issue: Whether the trial court erred in determining that
Father’s consent to the Child’s adoption was not required.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On February 8, 2010, the Child was born to J.F. (Mother)1 and Father in
Newburgh, Warrick County, Indiana. Father was not present for the Child’s
birth as he was serving an eighteen-month sentence in the Indiana Department
of Correction (DOC) for a Class C felony conviction of stalking. While
incarcerated, on March 12, 2010, Father executed a paternity affidavit claiming
to be the Child’s biological father. No order for child support was ever entered.
[5] At birth, the Child was diagnosed with microcephaly, a neurological disorder
that results in abnormal brain development. As a result of his condition, the
1
On November 27, 2013, the trial court entered a default judgment against Mother, finding that her consent
was not necessary for the Child’s adoption. Mother is not a party to this appeal, but relevant facts with
respect to her are included where appropriate.
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Child suffers from a number of developmental, cognitive, and behavioral issues
for which he requires constant supervision, medication, and various types of
therapy, among other special needs. For the first six months of his life, Mother
was the Child’s sole custodian. During this time, Mother and the Child, along
with the Child’s half-sister, C.F., lived with various relatives, including Father’s
mother, D.S. (Paternal Grandmother). In May of 2010, Mother, C.F., and the
Child moved in with Mother’s father and step-mother—i.e., Adoptive Parents.
[6] At some point, Mother left the Child in the care of Paternal Grandmother.
Then, on August 8, 2010, Father was released from prison, and he moved in
with Paternal Grandmother and the Child, eventually taking over the role of the
Child’s primary caretaker. Three months later, on November 20, 2010,
Mother—accompanied by several police officers—appeared at the Child’s
doctor’s appointment and removed the Child from Father’s custody. When
Mother subsequently moved out of Adoptive Parents’ home, she left the Child
in Adoptive Parents’ care.
[7] Adoptive Parents filed a petition for guardianship over the Child, and on July 1,
2011, the trial court appointed them as temporary guardians. On July 6, 2011,
Father appeared at a hearing on the guardianship, but he did not object to the
Adoptive Parents’ appointment or request parenting time. On October 4, 2011,
the trial court appointed Adoptive Parents as the Child’s permanent co-
guardians. For six months thereafter, per an informal agreement with Adoptive
Parents, Father exercised parenting time with the Child every other weekend.
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[8] In March of 2012, Father was charged with battery with a deadly weapon.
Before he could be arrested, Father absconded and remained “on the run” until
he was apprehended in August of 2012 and confined to the Vanderburgh
County Jail. (Appellant’s App. p. 43). At the end of October of 2012, Father
posted a $2,000 bond and was released from jail. During the seven-month
period that Father was either a fugitive or incarcerated, he did not have any
contact with the Child. Although he called Adoptive Parents a few times,
Father did not speak to or inquire about the Child; rather, he demanded that
Adoptive Parents pay him half of the tax refund that they received as the
Child’s guardians.
[9] Shortly after bonding out of jail—just a few days prior to Halloween 2012—
Father appeared at Adoptive Parents’ apartment and waited until they brought
the Child outside. Father spent about twenty minutes visiting with the Child
and requested that he be able to resume his prior parenting time schedule.
Adoptive Parents informed him that they would have to discuss the matter with
their attorney, and at their counsel’s advice, Adoptive Parents notified Father
that he could no longer have overnight visits with the Child. In response,
Father became belligerent and shouted obscenities at Adoptive Father. Over
the next few weeks, Father called Adoptive Parents between two and four times
to argue about the Child’s custody. Ultimately, Adoptive Parents indicated that
the matter would have to be resolved in court, and Father stated that he would
hire an attorney to sue for custody. Following these conversations, Adoptive
Parents changed their home phone number; however, they maintained the same
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cell phone number, which is the number that Father used to contact them.
Since his brief visit in October of 2012, Father has not requested parenting time
or otherwise attempted to visit or communicate with the Child by any means.
[10] On November 8, 2012, Adoptive Parents filed a verified petition to adopt the
Child. In their petition, Adoptive Parents alleged that Father’s consent to the
adoption was unnecessary based on his abandonment of the Child and his
failure to communicate with or provide any support for the Child for more than
one year. On November 28, 2012, Father filed his objection to the adoption.
[11] On December 9, 2013, and January 3, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing
on the matter of Father’s consent to Adoptive Parents’ adoption of the Child.
On March 6, 2014, the trial court ruled that Father’s consent was not required
because Father “failed to communicate significantly with [the Child] for a
period of at least one year[,]” and he “knowingly and voluntarily failed to
provide for the care and support of [the Child] despite his ability to do so.”
(Appellant’s App. pp. 49, 51). On August 28, 2014, the trial court granted
Adoptive Parents’ petition to adopt the Child.
[12] Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[13] In matters of family law, Indiana courts have long recognized that the trial
court “is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get
a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their
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relationship with the children.” E.W. v. J.W., 20 N.E.3d 889, 894 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014), trans. denied. Accordingly, in an adoption case, our court will not
disturb the trial court’s ruling “unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion
and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion.” In re Adoption of T.L., 4
N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). On review, we do not reweigh the evidence, and
we consider the evidence and all inferences reasonably derived therefrom in a
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. In re Adoption of K.S., 980 N.E.2d
385, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We presume that the trial court made the correct
decision, and the appellant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.
In re Adoption of S.W., 979 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[14] In addition, because the trial court issued special findings of fact and
conclusions thereon, our review is further governed by Indiana Trial Rule
52(A), which provides that “the court on appeal shall not set aside the findings
or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Thus,
“we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and
second, whether the findings support the judgment.” In re Adoption of T.L., 4
N.E.3d at 662. Findings of fact “are clearly erroneous if the record lacks any
evidence or reasonable inferences to support them [and] . . . a judgment is
clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and the
conclusions relying on those findings.” Id. (alterations in original).
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II. Father’s Consent to the Adoption
[15] Father claims that the trial court erred when it determined that his consent to
the Child’s adoption was not required. Indiana’s adoption statute provides, in
pertinent part, that upon the finding that adoption would be in the best interest
of a child and that “proper consent, if consent is necessary, to the adoption has
been given[,]” the trial court shall grant a petition for adoption. Ind. Code § 31-
19-11-1(a)(1),(7). In any adoption proceeding, the natural parent is entitled to
the most protected status. In re Adoption of K.S., 980 N.E.2d at 387. As such, if
paternity has been established, both parents must execute written consent for
the adoption to proceed. See I.C. § 31-19-9-1(a)(2)(B). However, consent is not
required from the
parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a period of at
least one (1) year the parent:
(A) fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with
the child when able to do so; or
(B) knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the child
when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree.
I.C. § 31-19-9-8(a)(2). The party petitioning for adoption bears the burden of
proving that the parent’s consent to the adoption is unnecessary by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Adoption of M.B., 944 N.E.2d 73, 77 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011).2
2
We note that both parties indicated that Adoptive Parents’ burden of proof in this case is that of clear,
cogent, and indubitable evidence. However, our court has previously determined that the clear, cogent, and
indubitable evidence standard “creates inconsistent burdens across the different statutory bases for adoption.”
In re Adoption of M.B., 944 N.E.2d at 77. We have resolved “that the burden of proof for an adoption without
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A. Failure to Communicate with the Child
[16] First, Father contends that the trial court erroneously found that he failed to
communicate significantly with the Child for a period of at least one year. In
order to dispense with parental consent, the petitioner for adoption must prove
both a lack of communication for the statutory period and that the parent had
an ability to communicate during that time. See Rust v. Lawson, 714 N.E.2d
769, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. On appeal, we must consider the
facts and circumstances of the particular case, including, for example, “the
custodial parent’s willingness to permit visitation as well as the natural parent’s
financial and physical means to accomplish his obligations.” Id. Furthermore,
any efforts by the custodial party “to hamper or thwart communication between
parent and child are relevant in determining the ability to communicate.” Id.
The “significance of the communication is not measured in terms of units of
visits[,]” so the natural parent must have made “more than ‘token efforts’” to
communicate with his child. E.W., 20 N.E.3d at 896; Rust, 714 N.E.2d at 772
(quoting I.C. § 31-19-9-8(b)). The purpose of this provision “is to encourage
non-custodial parents to maintain communication with their children and to
discourage non-custodial parents from visiting their children just often enough
to thwart the adoptive parents’ efforts to provide a settled environment for the
children.” In re Adoption of C.E.N., 847 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
consent, under any of the subsections in [Indiana Code] section 31-19-9-8, is that of ‘clear and convincing
evidence.’” In re Adoption of S.W., 979 N.E.2d at 640.
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[17] In this case, Father argues that the trial court failed to consider the fact that
Adoptive Parents “acted as a road block to dismantle all communication
between [him] and [the Child].” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11). In turn, Adoptive
Parents assert that the trial court properly ruled that Father’s consent was not
required because his “last meaningful communication and visit with [the Child]
was sometime [in] March 2012 before he went ‘on the run’ seeking to avoid
arrest on a felony charge.” (Appellees’ Br. p. 6) (footnote omitted). We find it
unnecessary to address whether Adoptive Parents thwarted Father’s efforts to
communicate with the Child because the evidence and findings do not support
the trial court’s determination that Father failed to communicate for the
requisite period of time.
[18] The trial court acknowledged—and the parties agree—that Father exercised
parenting time with the Child on alternating weekends from October of 2011
through March of 2012. Thereafter, Father’s sole communication with the
Child was a twenty-minute visit after he was released from jail. As the trial
court found, “[t]he undisputed evidence demonstrates . . . that [Father] has
failed to communicate significantly with [the Child] since March of 2012.”
(Appellant’s App. p. 10).
[19] In determining whether a parent has failed to significantly communicate with
his child for the statutory one-year period, our court has previously noted that a
“parent’s conduct after the petition to adopt was filed is wholly irrelevant.” In re
Adoption of S.W., 979 N.E.2d at 640 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Adoptive Parents filed the petition for adoption on November 8, 2012—
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i.e., only eight months after Father’s last meaningful interaction with the Child.
Therefore, the trial court erroneously concluded that Father failed to
significantly communicate with the Child for at least one year. Nevertheless,
because Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(2) is “framed in the disjunctive[,]”
Adoptive Parents may still satisfy their burden by establishing that Father failed
to provide for the Child’s care and support. In re Adoption of J.P., 713 N.E.2d
873, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
B. Failure to Provide for the Child’s Care and Support
[20] Father next contends that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to
provide for the Child’s care and support for at least one year. Indiana law
imposes a duty upon a parent to support his children, and “[t]his duty exists
apart from any court order or statute.” Irvin v. Hood, 712 N.E.2d 1012, 1014
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Approximately one month after the Child was born,
Father signed a paternity affidavit acknowledging that he is the Child’s
biological father, thereby establishing his legal duty to support the Child. See
I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1(j)(2) (stating that the execution of a paternity affidavit “gives
rise to parental rights and responsibilities[,]” including child support).
[21] The evidence reveals that Father has never paid any monetary support on
behalf of the Child. Nonetheless, our court has previously found “that a
parent’s nonmonetary contribution to a child’s care may be counted as
support.” E.W., 20 N.E.3d at 897. In accordance with his parenting time
arrangement with Adoptive Parents, Father provided food, diapers, and other
necessary items while the Child was in Father’s care. Accordingly, Father now
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insists that “[t]he record is clear that [he] was providing a constant and
continuous means of both financial and emotional support for the [Child] up to
the point that [Adoptive Parents] ended all contact [that Father] would have
with the [Child].” (Appellant’s Br. p. 13). Because Adoptive Parents denied his
weekend parenting time following his release from jail, Father posits that “he
was not given the opportunity to continue providing support by the means that
the parties[] had previously agreed upon.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 14). We
disagree.
[22] Regarding the matter of child support, the trial court specifically found:
60. Since [the Child] has been in the care and custody of [Adoptive
Parents], [Father] has never provided [Adoptive Parents] with any
monetary support or other tangible property to help support [the
Child].
61. Although [Father] testified that he provided [the Child] with food,
diapers, and wipes during his parenting time when he was getting
parenting time with [the Child] every other weekend, this parenting
time schedule stopped in March 2012 and since then [Father] has
provided no financial support to [Adoptive Parents] in any form for
their care of [the Child].
62. Although [Father] claimed to have bought [the Child] a Christmas
present in 2012 and to have prepared an Easter basket for him in 2013,
neither of those gifts were ever given to [Adoptive Parents] to give to
[the Child].
(Appellant’s App. pp. 46-47). Notwithstanding whether Father’s provision of
food and diapers during his parenting time was sufficient to satisfy his support
obligation, the trial court clearly found that Father did nothing to financially or
emotionally support the Child since at least March of 2012.
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[23] Adoptive Parents must demonstrate that Father “had the ability to provide for
the support of the [C]hild and did not do so.” McElvain v. Hite, 800 N.E.2d 947,
950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added). Proof of income, standing alone, is
insufficient to establish an ability to provide support. See In re Adoption of
M.A.S., 815 N.E.2d 216, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Instead, “it is necessary to
consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. In addition to income, factors to
consider include “whether that income is steady or sporadic and what the non-
custodial parent’s necessary and reasonable expenses were during the period in
question.” In re Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d 1272, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[24] Here, the trial court found that, since he was a child, Father has received Social
Security-disability income based on his diagnosis of attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, for which he currently receives $710 per month.
Father’s benefits were suspended for the duration of his incarceration in the
DOC, but he continued to receive payments while he was held in the
Vanderburgh County Jail. Relying on his disability income, Father has been
unemployed for the majority of his adult life even though he is “allowed to
work . . . [fifteen] to [twenty] hours a week” and still maintain eligibility for his
disability benefits. (Tr. p. 14). In the summer of 2013, Father began a part-
time, seasonal job earning $10.00 per hour, but he stated that he rarely worked
more than ten hours per week. The trial court found that Father never offered
any portion of his disability benefits or wages to Adoptive Parents for the
Child’s support and further found that all of Father’s “earnings were not
required to sustain” the residence he shares with his wife. (Appellant’s App. p.
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50). Moreover, there is no evidence that Father sought any other employment
in order to supplement his income so as to assist with the many special needs of
his Child, yet he testified that he was able to pay $2,000 in cash for bail in
October of 2012. From the evidence, it is apparent that Father’s “priority was
not the support of [the Child].” (Appellant’s App. p. 51).
[25] According to Father, “[t]here was no evidence presented to the trial court that
the parties ever[] had any other arrangement pertaining to . . . support.”
(Appellant’s Br. p. 16). Additionally, Father asserts that Adoptive Parents
never requested any support, and they were receiving the disability benefits paid
on behalf of the Child. We find little merit in these contentions. First, the fact
that Adoptive Parents did not demand child support does not negate Father’s
legal duty to provide for his Child. In fact, our supreme court has declared that
private agreements between parties are insufficient to nullify a child support
obligation. See In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 663. Second, the trial court
found that Father never applied for the Child to receive Social Security benefits
as the child of a parent with a disability; rather, Adoptive Parents took the
initiative to apply for financial assistance on behalf of the Child.
[26] The relevant time period for determining whether a non-custodial parent has
supported his or her child is “any year in which the parent had an obligation and
the ability to provide support, but failed to do so.” In re Adoption of J.L.J., 4
N.E.3d 1189, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (emphasis added), trans. denied.
Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-15-1(b), Father’s obligation to support
the Child “continue[d] until the entry of the adoption decree” on August 28,
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2014. Because Father did not pay any child support between March of 2012
and August 28, 2014, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that
Father voluntarily failed to provide for the care and support of the Child for at
least one year.
CONCLUSION
[27] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erroneously found that
Father failed to significantly communicate with the Child for at least one year;
however, the evidence and findings clearly support the trial court’s
determination that Father voluntarily failed to provide for the care and support
of the Child for at least one year. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s
conclusion that Father’s consent to the Child’s adoption was not required.
[28] Affirmed.
[29] Barnes, J. concurs
[30] Bailey, J. concurs in result without separate opinion
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