School City of Hammond District v. Chad Rueth

FILED
Feb 14 2017, 10:01 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Richard K. Shoultz Mark K. Leeman
Neal Bowling Logansport, Indiana
Lewis Wagner, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
School City of Hammond February 14, 2017
District, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant, 45A03-1603-CT-450
Appeal from the Lake Superior
v. Court
The Honorable Diane Kavadias
Chad Rueth, Schneider, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff Trial Court Cause No.
45D11-1304-CT-64
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, School City of Hammond District (the District), appeals
the trial court’s entry of judgment pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of
Appellee-Plaintiff, Chad M. Rueth (Rueth), on his claims of defamation and
blacklisting.
[2] We reverse.
ISSUES
[3] The District raises nine issues on appeal, two of which we find dispositive and
which we restate as follows:
(1) Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict against the
District for defamation; and
(2) Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict against the
District for blacklisting.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] In 2004, Rueth was hired as a middle school history teacher at Gavit
Middle/High School (Gavit), which is a school within the District in
Hammond, Lake County, Indiana. Rueth also served as the girls’ varsity
basketball coach for the high school side of Gavit. In 2007, Rueth was asked to
be the high school’s assistant athletic director in addition to his teaching duties.
That same year, the District hired Michelle Ondas (Principal Ondas) to serve as
the assistant principal of Gavit. For a brief period in 2008, Principal Ondas
acted as interim principal. During that time, she terminated the athletic
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director and offered the position to Rueth. The athletic director position at
Gavit was part time and based on a one-year contract, with a stipend of $9,182.
Thus, in addition to his athletic director duties, Rueth continued to teach a few
classes.
[5] When Rueth commenced his job as athletic director, he discovered that the
school’s athletic fund had been depleted. As such, he looked for ways to both
raise funds and cut costs without any sacrifice to the student-athletes. Despite
his success in restoring funds to the athletic account, Rueth had clashes with
(then-assistant principal) Principal Ondas regarding the proper channels of
communication and his conflicts with coaches and other faculty members. At
the end of each academic year, the then-principal renewed Rueth’s contract as
athletic director.
[6] In June of 2011, Principal Ondas was promoted to principal. Shortly after
assuming her new role, Principal Ondas met with Rueth to outline her
expectations of him for the upcoming school year. As part of this meeting,
Principal Ondas completed an evaluation form, noting several areas in which
Rueth needed to demonstrate improvement, such as his level of enthusiasm and
initiative, his relationship with students and colleagues, his respect for the
channels of authority, and his effectiveness in communication. Principal Ondas
also summarized goals for Rueth, which consisted of better promoting the
school, communication, and flexibility. A follow-up meeting was scheduled for
December 2011, but this meeting never occurred. Regardless, at that time,
Principal Ondas contacted the District’s central office to inform the necessary
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administrators that she wanted to open up the athletic director position to other
candidates at the expiration of Rueth’s contract in June of 2012. Principal
Ondas was advised to wait until the following spring to inform Rueth of this
decision, and this information was not otherwise made available to the public.
[7] In the fall of 2011, and prior to Principal Ondas’ decision to open up the
athletic director job, Rueth discovered that his high school alma mater, Bishop
Noll Institute (BNI)—a private, Catholic high school—was seeking candidates
for its full-time athletic director position. He applied. BNI assembled an eight-
person hiring committee (Hiring Committee), which included, in part: Colleen
McCoy-Cejka (Principal McCoy-Cejka), BNI’s principal; Andrew Trost (Trost),
a BNI faculty member; Michael Whelan (Whelan), the vice president of BNI’s
Board of Limited Jurisdiction and an alumnus; Karl Repay (Repay), a BNI
alumnus and sports coach; and Nora Kasprzycki (Kasprzycki), a member of the
BNI Board of Limited Jurisdiction. When Rueth applied for the position, he
requested that BNI not contact anyone at Gavit about his candidacy.
Nevertheless, Principal Ondas eventually learned from her brother-in-law, a
member of BNI’s Board of Limited Jurisdiction, that Rueth had applied for the
job at BNI. On one occasion thereafter, Principal Ondas inquired as to whether
Rueth had been chosen for the position, but because her brother-in-law was not
involved with the hiring process, he had no information to offer.
[8] BNI’s Hiring Committee received more than forty resumes, which it whittled
down to four potential candidates, including Rueth. The first round of
interviews was conducted on March 9, 2012. Although the majority of the
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Hiring Committee ranked Rueth within their top two choices for the position,
others were not impressed by his performance. Ultimately, the Hiring
Committee narrowed the field down to Rueth and one other candidate.
According to Whelan, Rueth’s alumnus status “probably got him the second
interview.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 343). The two finalists were instructed to create a
presentation for the Hiring Committee “as to what [they] saw the future of
[BNI] athletics being, and kind of highlighting the ten[-]year work that we were
going to do to bring [BNI] into [its] 100[-]year anniversary.” (Tr. Vol. I, p. 71).
The presentations were scheduled for April 19, 2012.
[9] In addition to his coaching duties at BNI, Repay was employed as a firefighter
for the City of Hammond. Principal Ondas’ husband, Chris Ondas (Chris), was
also a firefighter. Chris worked and socialized with Repay. At some point
during BNI’s hiring process, Repay casually asked for Chris’ opinion of Rueth.
Based on his personal observations of Rueth at various sporting events at Gavit,
Chris stated, “Well, I don’t think he’s a real ball of fire.” (Tr. Vol. I, p. 198).
On a subsequent occasion, Chris mentioned to Repay that Rueth “was having
to reapply for his position at Gavit.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 253). According to Repay,
he shared this information with Principal McCoy-Cejka. Principal McCoy-
Cejka recalled that Repay informed her “that [Rueth] was being let go from his
current position.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 295). Principal McCoy-Cejka indicated that,
with the exception of Trost, she did not discuss Rueth’s status as Gavit’s
athletic director with the rest of the Hiring Committee. However, Trost stated
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that prior to the second interview, the Hiring Committee had discussions about
the fact that Rueth was no longer Gavit’s athletic director.
[10] On the morning of April 19, 2012, the same day that Rueth was scheduled to
make his presentation to the BNI Hiring Committee, Principal Ondas
summoned Rueth to her office. Rueth “had a strong inclination as to what was
going to happen,” so he used his cell phone to record the meeting. (Tr. Vol. I,
p. 81). Principal Ondas informed Rueth that she was “going to open up the
athletic director’s position” for the following school year because she “want[ed]
to take it in a different direction.” (Tr. Vol. I, p. 78). However, Principal
Ondas told Rueth that he was “more than welcome” to reapply for the job. (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 78). Later that evening, Rueth made his presentation to the BNI
Hiring Committee, but it did not go “as well as [he] would have liked it to have
gone” as he “was still reeling from what had happened earlier that day.” (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 84). Following his presentation, Rueth asked to speak privately with
Principal McCoy-Cejka and Trost, at which time he informed them that he had
just learned that he “was being let go from [his] position at Gavit as the athletic
director.” (Tr. Vol. I, p. 85).
[11] The following day, on April 20, 2012, Principal McCoy-Cejka sent the
following email to members of the Hiring Committee:
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION!!!!!!! He was put on
planned action last summer and was told he did not satisfactorily
fulfill the requirements that the administration was asking of him.
How did we all find out about it [two] weeks ago, and he just
learned about it yesterday? Can’t explain that one. It’s all fishy.
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I’m afraid too many people in the BNI community became
involved in advising us on choosing him and helping him to
prepare for us. I don’t know how a lot of information becomes
public, but it does, and it almost always causes damage. I don’t
know how else to try to get to the truth without causing more
damage for him at Gavit.
(Plaintiff’s Exh. 11). Also that day, Whelan emailed the rest of the Hiring
Committee as follows:
All,
I am troubled with trying to put a timeline together on the
[Rueth] [athletic director] situation at Gavit. Part of me feels that
our responsibility was to be confidential and maybe that was
blown. Now, maybe [Rueth] blew that himself because he
admitted he had people helping him so that could be the
situation.
I am confused as to what happened at Gavit and when it actually
happened. There definitely is a difference in [Rueth’s] story and
what we are hearing.
It is important to me to understand what really happened.
[Rueth] told [Principal McCoy-Cejka] and [another member of
the Hiring Committee] that he was told that the [athletic director]
job at Gavit would be advertised yesterday. I find the timing
very unusual.
The rumor is however that he was told this [two] or [three] weeks
ago??
Was he really?
Why would he lie?
Was he supposed to be told and then it didn’t happen?
Someone is going to have to sit with [Rueth] and explain why he
wasn’t chosen at some point soon.
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He is an alumn[us], his family will be influential in a capital
campaign. This doesn’t mean we had to hire him but it means
that we need to treat him very fairly and the story we tell him
needs to be very thought out.
We also all need to have the same story and be unanimous in our
decision. We can[’]t have people saying, well that wasn’t my
choice or that wasn’t my vote. This is way too important.
It appears to me that there is some real bad blood at Gavit for
sure.
(Plaintiff’s Exh. 28).
[12] The Hiring Committee voted to recommend the hiring of the other candidate.
Principal McCoy-Cejka was ultimately solely responsible for selecting the new
athletic director, and she accepted the recommendation of the Hiring
Committee. According to Principal McCoy-Cejka, the information about
Rueth’s position at Gavit did not influence her hiring decision, and he “was
given a fair opportunity all the way up to the end, and was still a contender with
another candidate up until the very end even though that gossip had been out
there.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 308). On April 27, 2012, Principal McCoy-Cejka
notified Rueth that he had not been selected as BNI’s athletic director.
Thereafter, in May of 2012, Rueth applied for the athletic director position at
Gavit, but he was not re-hired.
[13] According to Rueth, he had a phone conversation with Whelan following the
Hiring Committee’s decision, during which Whelan informed him that he was
not hired because of “the shit that [Principal Ondas] put out there about me.”
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(Tr. Vol. II, p. 433). Whelan also purportedly informed Rueth that Principal
Ondas
was in contact with the [H]iring [C]ommittee. [Whelan] told
[Rueth] that he was mad, he was upset. [Whelan] used a lot of
four letter words during the conversation. When [Whelan]
talked to [Rueth], he was angry because he felt like the entire
process was compromised. [Whelan] felt like they made an
uninformed decision, an unfair decision.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 433). Rueth further stated that Whelan explained that there was
a “cloud of suspicion about when . . . [he was] fired at Gavit as the athletic
director” and that Principal Ondas had advised the Hiring Committee that “you
should not hire him.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 434). 1 Conversely, Whelan denied that he
informed Rueth that the reason he did not get the job was based on information
that Principal Ondas had communicated to the Hiring Committee. Rather,
Whelan claimed that, although he acknowledged there were “a lot of rumors
flying around out there[,]” he told Rueth
that he didn’t get the job because he didn’t do a good job at his
interviews, and there was people that called me and said—put in
a good word for him and other people. And I said, “I’m just
going to tell you [that] you didn’t do a good job at the interview,
and that’s why I didn’t vote for you, and if I were you, and I was
going to go and get another job, this is some of the things I would
do.” That’s what I told him.
1
The District objected to the admission of Rueth’s testimony regarding his telephone conversation with
Whelan on grounds of hearsay. The trial court admitted the testimony only for the purpose of rebuttal.
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(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 360-61). Furthermore, Principal McCoy-Cejka, Trost, Repay,
and Kasprzycki all stated that there was no communication between the Hiring
Committee and Principal Ondas or any other District employee, and Whelan
indicated that he had never heard of Principal Ondas prior to the current
proceedings. Similarly, Principal Ondas stated that she had no knowledge as to
why anyone on the Hiring Committee would have had knowledge about the
Gavit athletic director position.
[14] In addition, it appears that the Hiring Committee’s decision to forego hiring
Rueth resulted in some backlash within the BNI community. Principal McCoy-
Cejka emailed members of the Hiring Committee, stating that
she [that is, Principal McCoy-Cejka,] feels like we need to issue a
public statement on what a crappy job [Rueth] did in his
interview. She says really no one’s putting two and two together.
He got fired from one job, did not get hired for another, he’s not
awesome, people. He’s also probably slandering [Principal
Ondas] all over Hammond. What he said to us was mild
compared to what he speaks freely and nonprofessional, I am
sure.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 363).
[15] On April 6, 2013, Rueth filed a Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury
Trial. In his Complaint, Rueth alleged claims of defamation and blacklisting
against the District. On May 28, 2013, the District filed its Answer, denying
Rueth’s allegations. On December 7 through 10, 2015, the trial court
conducted a jury trial. After Rueth rested his case-in-chief, the District moved
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for judgment on the evidence. Outside of the presence of the jury, the trial
court denied the District’s motion, stating that it was very clear that
there was information given to the [Hiring Committee] well in
advance of . . . Rueth even knowing that his contract as the
athletic director was not going to be renewed. It’s also interesting
that the very day of his second interview is when he found out
from the principal of this fact, just as he was going in for his
second interview. From that information, there’s enough
evidence where the jury can draw inferences if his employment
status was going to change, and the only people that knew that
were the central administration, principal, and the assistant
principal, it’s quite interesting that all of a sudden a group from
another school was aware of it. The inference that can be drawn
is either directly or indirectly that was communicated to those
individuals.
(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 446-47). At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a
general verdict in favor of Rueth and awarded him damages of $550,000.
Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict.
[16] On January 13, 2016, the District filed a Motion to Correct Error. The District
claimed, in part, that Rueth “failed to present evidence on essential elements of
his claim to support the judgment”; that Indiana’s blacklisting statute “is
inapplicable to any claim against the [District] as a matter of law and cannot
support the basis of the verdict”; and that Rueth “failed to present probative
evidence sufficient to support the jury’s damages award.” (Appellant’s App.
Vol. II, p. 35). On February 9, 2016, the trial court denied the District’s Motion
to Correct Error, finding that “[t]here was sufficient evidence presented to
support the verdict of the jury in this case.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 23).
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[17] The District now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[18] The District appeals from the trial court’s denial of its Motion to Correct Error.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of
discretion. Newland Resources, LLC v. Branham Corp., 918 N.E.2d 763, 772 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2009). It is an abuse of discretion if “the trial court’s action is against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and the inferences
which may be drawn therefrom.” Cox v. Matthews, 901 N.E.2d 14, 21 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009), trans. dismissed. “The trial court’s decision on a motion to correct
error comes to us cloaked with a presumption of correctness and the appellant
has the burden of showing an abuse of discretion.” Id.
[19] In its Motion to Correct Error, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rules 50 and 59, the
District requested that the trial court vacate its judgment in favor of Rueth “and
to enter judgment for [the District] on all claims.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. I, p.
35). Indiana’s trial rules allow a party to move for judgment on the evidence in
a motion to correct error. See Ind. Trial Rule 50(A)(4). When considering a
motion to correct error, if the court “determines that prejudicial or harmful
error has been committed,” it “shall take such action as will cure the error.”
T.R. 59(J). In particular,
[i]n reviewing the evidence, the court shall grant a new trial if it
determines that the verdict of a non-advisory jury is against the
weight of the evidence; and shall enter judgment, subject to the
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provisions herein, if the court determines that the verdict of a
non-advisory jury is clearly erroneous as contrary to or not
supported by the evidence.
T.R. 59(J)(7). Similarly, the rule concerning judgments on the evidence
provides:
Where all or some of the issues in a case tried before a jury or an
advisory jury are not supported by sufficient evidence or a verdict
thereon is clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence because
the evidence is insufficient to support it, the court shall withdraw
such issues from the jury and enter judgment thereon or shall
enter judgment thereon notwithstanding a verdict.
T.R. 50(A). Despite the differing language in the rules governing motions for
judgment on the evidence and motions to correct error, “both rules mandate
that the motion be granted when there is insufficient evidence under the law to
support a verdict.” Huff v. Travelers Indem. Co., 363 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Ind. 1977).
[20] When considering a motion for judgment on the evidence subsequent to a jury
verdict, the trial court may not weigh the evidence and
must view only the evidence favorable to the non-moving party
and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.
The trial court may enter judgment only if there is no substantial
evidence or reasonable inference to be adduced therefrom to
support an essential element of the claim, i.e., the evidence must
point unerringly to a conclusion not reached by the jury.
Id. (Italics added). If there is relevant evidence that supports the verdict, a
motion for judgment on the evidence is improper because the final
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determination must be left to the fact-finder. Id. “Judicial economy is served
by this view in that the trial court withdraws the case from the jury or enters a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict whenever an appellate court would be
compelled to find the evidence does not support a judgment.” Id.
II. Defamation
[21] “The law of defamation was created to protect individuals from reputational
attacks.” Hamilton v. Prewett, 860 N.E.2d 1234, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. Thus, defamation is defined as “that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish esteem, respect, good will, or confidence in the
plaintiff, or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.” Poyser
v. Peerless, 775 N.E.2d 1101, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In order to establish defamation, the plaintiff “must prove the
existence of ‘a communication with defamatory imputation, malice,
publication, and damages.’” Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., 929 N.E.2d 184,
186 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of N.W. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130,
136 (Ind. 2006)). A communication is “defamatory per se if it imputes: (1)
criminal conduct, (2) a loathsome disease, (3) misconduct in a person’s trade,
profession, office, or occupation, or (4) sexual misconduct.” Hamilton, 860
N.E.2d at 1243. When a communication is found to be defamatory per se,
“damages are presumed even without proof of actual harm to the plaintiff’s
reputation.” Id.
[22] In this case, the District claims that Rueth failed to present any evidence at trial
to support the essential elements of defamation. The District contends that the
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only information that was communicated between the District and the Hiring
Committee, albeit indirectly (i.e., through Principal Ondas’ husband, Chris),
was that Rueth was going to have to reapply for the position of Gavit’s athletic
director. The District argues that such a statement is not defamatory; it is true;
it was not published by the District; it was communicated to the Hiring
Committee by Rueth himself; and it did not cause any damage to Rueth.
[23] “Whether a communication is defamatory ‘depends, among other factors, upon
the temper of the times [and] the current of contemporary public opinion, with
the result that words, harmless in one age, in one community, may be highly
damaging to reputation at another time or in a different place.’” Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452
n.6 (Ind. 1999)). In general, whether a communication is considered
defamatory is a question of law for a court to decide. Id. However, it “becomes
a question of fact for the jury if the communication is reasonably susceptible to
either a defamatory or a non-defamatory interpretation.” Id. “To impose
liability for defamation, a false statement of fact is required.” Id. (emphasis
added) (citing Journal-Gazette Co., 712 N.E.2d at 457). “In determining whether
a defamatory meaning is possible, we test the effect that the statement is fairly
calculated to produce and the impression it would naturally engender in the
mind of the average person.” Id.
[24] Here, the evidence clearly established that Principal Ondas intended to open up
Gavit’s athletic director position to other candidates at the end of Rueth’s
contract term. She informed the District’s central administration office of her
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decision in December of 2011 and was instructed to inform Rueth of the same
the following spring (as Rueth’s contract was set to expire on June 15, 2012).
On April 19, 2012, Principal Ondas communicated to Rueth that his contract
for athletic director would not be renewed at the end of its term because she
“want[ed] to take it in a different direction” but that he was “more than
welcome” to reapply for the job. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 78). Based on the truthfulness
of this statement, it cannot support a defamation claim. See Gatto v. St. Richard
School, Inc., 774 N.E.2d 914, 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“[T]ruth is a complete
defense to defamation.”).
[25] Rueth, however, directs our attention to the April 20, 2012 email from Principal
McCoy-Cejka to the rest of the Hiring Committee, which stated:
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION!!!!!!! He was put on
planned action last summer and was told he did not satisfactorily
fulfill the requirements that the administration was asking of him.
How did we all find out about it [two] weeks ago, and he just
learned about it yesterday? Can’t explain that one. It’s all fishy.
I’m afraid too many people in the BNI community became
involved in advising us on choosing him and helping him to
prepare for us. I don’t know how a lot of information becomes
public, but it does, and it almost always causes damage. I don’t
know how else to try to get to the truth without causing more
damage for him at Gavit.
(Plaintiff’s Exh. 11). Rueth additionally cites the email sent by Whelan on the
same day, which points out the discrepancy between when Rueth learned that
he would no longer be Gavit’s athletic director and when the Hiring Committee
learned the same information. Whelan’s email to the Hiring Committee also
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noted that there was some “real bad blood at Gavit for sure.” (Plaintiff’s Exh.
28). Rueth contends that this information is false because there is no evidence
that he was “on some sort of performance improvement plan or planned
disciplinary action,” and
[t]here was no evidence [that] Rueth failed to meet the
requirements of a “planned action” during the course of the prior
school year. Rueth was never told that he failed to meet the
terms of some formal planned action, nor was he told prior to
April 19, 2015 [sic] that he was likely to lose his athletic director
position because he failed to meet the requirements of a planned
action.
(Appellee’s Br. p. 27). Furthermore, Rueth asserts that such a communication
is defamatory in nature because it “gave the distinct the [sic] impression to the
Hiring Committee that Rueth was a bad athletic director, who was placed on a
planned disciplinary action, failed to meet the requirements of the planned
action, and carried some real ‘bad blood’ with those he worked with.”
(Appellee’s Br. p. 28). Based on the fact that Whelan assumed there was “bad
blood” between Rueth and Gavit, Rueth now asserts that the “information
circulating among the Hiring Committee came directly from the District.”
(Appellee’s Br. p. 30).
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[26] We agree with Rueth that the email from Principal McCoy-Cejka includes
statements that could be construed by a jury as defamatory. 2 Nevertheless, the
District argues that “the record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever that
anyone affiliated with the District ever even made a statement to the effect that .
. . Rueth was on ‘planned action,’ let alone published such a statement to third
parties.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 8). As already mentioned, in order to prove
a claim of defamation, “the plaintiff must show that the defamatory matter was
‘published,’ that is, communicated to a third person or persons.” Bals v.
Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1354 (Ind. 1992). We agree with the District.
[27] We must first note that, although we “indulge every reasonable presumption in
favor of the legality of [a jury] verdict,” we will overturn the verdict “if it is
legally or logically inconsistent, contradictory, or repugnant.” Simon Prop. Grp.,
L.P. v. Brandt Const., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 981, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans.
denied. Here, we are unable to identify any evidence from which it could be
inferred that the District published any information to the BNI Hiring
Committee that Rueth was on a “planned action” and failed to fulfill the
administration’s requirements. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 11). Rueth argues that “[t]he
only plausible source of this information was from the District itself” because it
2
Although, as the District points out, “it is unclear from the single appearance of the phrase ‘planned action’
in the evidentiary record what [Principal] McCoy-Cejka intended the term to mean, or what the [Hiring
Committee] understood it to mean. The phrase has no commonly understood meaning.” (Appellant’s Reply
Br. p. 12). And although Rueth “suggests that the phrase is equivalent to ‘performance improvement plan,’
[which] implies that an employee has been disciplined[,]” there is no support for this interpretation in the
record. (Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 12).
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“was specific, detailed, and related directly to Rueth’s employment at the
District.” (Appellee’s Br. p. 30). 3 Thus, he insists that “[i]t would be bizarre for
such detailed and specific information about Rueth’s employment to have been
completely manufactured by an individual unaffiliated with the District.”
(Appellee’s Br. p. 31).
[28] In turn, the District postulates that “[i]t is just as plausible that [Principal]
McCoy-Cejka heard true information, that is, that . . . Rueth would have to
reapply for the Gavit athletic director position, and added the ‘planned action’
comment herself, either through exaggeration or misunderstanding.”
(Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 11). Similarly, emails circulated among the Hiring
Committee members from Principal McCoy-Cejka and Whelan also suggest
that information could have come from a number of other sources because “too
many people in the BNI community became involved in advising us on
choosing him and helping him to prepare for us” and that “maybe [Rueth] blew
that [confidentiality] himself because he admitted he had people helping him so
that could be the situation.” (Plaintiff’s Exhs. 11, 28).
3
As to Rueth’s contention that “Principal Ondas conceded that the only plausible source of the information
that the Hiring Committee had received was an employee of the District[,]” we find that this is a
mischaracterization of the evidence. (Appellee’s Br. pp. 30-31). Principal Ondas testified that she informed
the District’s central administration office in December of 2011 that she wanted to open up the athletic
director position to other candidates at the expiration of Rueth’s contract. This is the only information that
Principal Ondas conceded could have been communicated by an employee of the District, and, as established
above, it is a factual statement and therefore not defamatory.
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[29] The only evidence in the record regarding information about Rueth being
transmitted from the District to the Hiring Committee is the factual statement
that Repay learned from Principal Ondas’ husband, Chris, that Rueth “was
having to reapply for his position at Gavit.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 253). Repay
testified that he shared this fact with Principal McCoy-Cejka and, thereafter, the
remainder of the Hiring Committee also learned of it before even Rueth himself
had been notified. Furthermore, all of the members of the Hiring Committee
who testified, as well as Principal Ondas, indicated that there was no
communication between the District and the Hiring Committee regarding
Rueth. Absent some indicia of evidence that the District was informing third
parties that Rueth was on a “planned action,” the jury’s verdict is based on
speculation. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 11). 4 Our court has previously stated that “[t]he
failure of inference may occur as a matter of law when the intended inference
can rest on no more than speculation or conjecture.” Northrop Corp. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 807 N.E.2d 70, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Hartford Steam
Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. White, 775 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),
trans. denied), trans. denied. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to support
a verdict for defamation.
4
Rueth further contends that it could be inferred that Chris overheard phone conversations during which
Principal Ondas “shared false information about Rueth with other administrators,” which he subsequently
shared with the Hiring Committee. (Appellee’s Br. p. 32). This, too, is speculation in light of the fact that
there is no evidence that Principal Ondas shared false information with any administrators, and the record
indicates that the only information that Chris relayed to Repay was that Rueth was not a “real ball of fire”
(based on Chris’ personal observation rather than an opinion of the District) and that Rueth “was having to
reapply for his position at Gavit.” (Tr. Vol. I, p. 198; Tr. Vol. II, p. 253).
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III. Blacklisting
[30] The District also claims that Rueth failed to present evidence on the essential
elements of his blacklisting claim. The relevant portion of the blacklisting
statute, Indiana Code section 22-5-3-2, “create[s] a cause of action for damages
resulting from a former employer engaging in blacklisting” and provides as
follows:
If any . . . company, partnership, limited liability company, or
corporation in this state shall authorize, allow or permit any of its
or their agents to black-list any discharged employees, or attempt
by words or writing, or any other means whatever, to prevent
such discharged employee, or any employee who may have
voluntarily left said company’s service, from obtaining
employment with any other person, or company, said company
shall be liable to such employee in such sum as will fully
compensate him, to which may be added exemplary damages.
Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Techs., LLC, 964 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2012). 5
[31] On appeal, both parties agree that the blacklisting statute provides relief to
discharged employees who have been blacklisted from obtaining new
employment by their former employer. The District contends that Rueth was
not a “discharged employee” within the meaning of the blacklisting statute
because his position as Gavit athletic director “was pursuant to a year-to-year
5
Indiana Code section 22-5-3-1 of the blacklisting statute “addresses criminal penalties, provides qualified
civil immunity for employers who disclose information about [current and] former employees unless that
information was known to be false, and requires prospective employers to provide copies of the disclosures
made by former employers. [Indiana Code section] 22-5-3-2 contains the civil cause of action at issue here.”
Loparex, LLC, 964 N.E.2d at 815.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A03-1603-CT-450 | February 14, 2017 Page 21 of 24
contract, and [Rueth] completed the term in the spring of 2012.” (Appellant’s
Br. p. 30). The District also notes that Rueth maintained his teaching position
with the District even at the time of trial. In turn, Rueth insists that he was, in
fact, a “discharged employee” because he “was formally released from his
service as an athletic director at the District by . . . Principal Ondas.”
(Appellee’s Br. p. 47).
[32] In considering whether Rueth was discharged as required by the blacklisting
statute, we look to the dictionary to ascertain the plain meaning of the word.
See Koppin v. Strode, 761 N.E.2d 455, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that, for
statutory construction, “[w]hen the legislature has not defined a word, we give
the word its common and ordinary meaning”), trans. denied. According to
Black’s Law Dictionary, “discharge” means, in relevant part, “[t]he firing of an
employee.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 495 (8th ed. 2004). Similarly,
Meriam-Webster defines “discharge” as “to dismiss from employment” or “to
release from service or duty.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/discharge (last visited January 20, 2017).
[33] In this case, there is no dispute that Rueth’s position as Gavit’s athletic director
was based on a one-year contract. In fact, the term of his final “Contract for
Extracurricular Services” commenced on August 24, 2011, and ended on June
15, 2012. In previous years, under the authority of a former principal, Rueth
was automatically re-hired at the expiration of his athletic director contract
without having to go through the reapplication process. Following the 2011-
2012 school year, however, Principal Ondas determined that she “want[ed] to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A03-1603-CT-450 | February 14, 2017 Page 22 of 24
take [the athletic department] in a different direction.” (Tr. Vol. I., p. 78).
Thus, at the expiration of Rueth’s contract, Principal Ondas accepted
applications from other candidates. Rueth was also invited to apply, which he
did. A hiring committee was formed, which did not include Principal Ondas,
and at the recommendation of the hiring committee, Principal Ondas hired a
new athletic director. Based on the fact that Rueth had fulfilled the terms of his
contract, we find that he was not discharged within the meaning of the
blacklisting statute. Rueth was not fired from his teaching position at Gavit,
nor was he prematurely released from his obligations under the athletic director
contract. Rather, he served out the full term of the contract and, therefore,
“had no expectation of continued employment after the expiration of each one-
year contract.” Vincennes Univ. ex rel. Bd. of Tr. of Vincennes v. Sparks, 988 N.E.2d
1160, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The fact that his contract was not
renewed is not tantamount to a discharge. Thus, we find insufficient evidence
to support a verdict for blacklisting. 6
6
The District also raises issues concerning the trial court’s admission of hearsay into evidence, as well as the
insufficiency of evidence supporting the $550,000 in damages awarded by the jury. Because we have
concluded that there is insufficient evidence to support Rueth’s claims of defamation and blacklisting, we
need not address these other issues.
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CONCLUSION
[34] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to
support a verdict for defamation or blacklisting, and, as such, the trial court
abused its discretion by denying the District’s Motion to Correct Error.
[35] Reversed.
[36] Crone, J. and Altice, J. concur
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