William Hatfield v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Sep 14 2015, 8:32 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ryan W. Tanselle Gregory F. Zoeller
Capper Tulley & Reimondo Attorney General of Indiana
Brownsburg, Indiana
Karl M. Scharnberg
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William Hatfield, September 14, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
32A01-1411-CR-510
v.
Appeal from the Hendricks Superior
State of Indiana, Court
The Honorable Karen M. Love,
Appellee-Plaintiff, Judge
Case No. 32D03-1308-CM-1088
Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a bench trial, William Hatfield was found guilty of leaving the scene
of an accident resulting in injury, a Class A misdemeanor. He raises three
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issues for our review, namely: 1) whether the evidence sustains his conviction;
2) whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it ordered him to
pay restitution; and 3) whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of his offense and his character. Concluding that the State produced
sufficient evidence for the trial court to find Hatfield guilty, Hatfield invited any
error regarding the entry of the restitution order which, nevertheless, was
supported by adequate evidence, and Hatfield has failed to show that his
sentence is inappropriate, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 8, 2013, Hatfield drove a pickup truck westbound on East County
Road 675 South in Hendricks County. Asfahan Kahn was driving eastbound
on the same road with his wife and his brother-in-law in a sedan. The front of
Hatfield’s truck collided with the driver’s side of Kahn’s sedan, resulting in
damage. Upon impact, Hatfield felt as though his truck “stopped for a
moment.” Transcript at 70. The vehicles bounced off one another. Kahn’s
sedan hit a telephone pole and then came to rest in a bean field.
[3] After the accident, Hatfield stopped his truck, exited, and checked his cargo.
Hatfield, who had no insurance on his truck, drove away without providing
Kahn any identifying information. Hatfield did not check on the occupants of
Kahn’s sedan or provide them with other assistance. A citizen followed
Hatfield, who was driving at “high speed,” tr. at 46, for over three miles before
blocking Hatfield’s truck. Along the route there were multiple places where
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Hatfield could have turned around and returned to the site of the accident. The
citizen and Hatfield returned together to the scene of the accident, where
Hatfield was arrested. Kahn and his passengers were treated by first responders
and then were taken to Methodist Hospital.
[4] The State charged Hatfield with leaving the scene of an accident resulting in
injury. The trial court found Hatfield guilty and later sentenced him to 364
days of imprisonment in the county jail, with 362 days suspended to probation
and credit for time served. The trial court also entered an order of restitution as
a civil judgment in the amount of $14,852.67 in favor of Kahn’s insurer.
Hatfield had no objection to the entry of the order. Hatfield now appeals.
Additional facts will be added as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
[5] “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we
consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
verdict.” Oster v. State, 992 N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
We will not reweigh evidence or assess credibility of the witnesses. Glenn v.
State, 999 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “The conviction will be
affirmed unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
B. Leaving the Scene of an Accident
[6] The driver of a vehicle that is involved in an accident resulting in injury must
immediately stop his vehicle, remain there until he has provided identifying
information, and render reasonable assistance to those injured in the accident.
Ind. Code §§ 9-26-1-1(1)-(2) (2013). Failure to do so constitutes the criminal
offense of leaving the scene of an accident. Ind. Code § 9-26-1-8(a) (2013).
“The purpose of the statute is to provide prompt aid for persons who are injured
or whose property is damaged and to sufficiently establish the identity of the
parties so that they and police authorities may know with whom to deal in
matters growing out of the accident.” Hudson v. State, 20 N.E.3d 900, 904 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted).
[7] In order to convict Hatfield of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in
injury as charged, the State was required to show that Hatfield,
being the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident that resulted in
injury to [Kahn and his passengers], did fail to remain at the accident
scene until the driver had provided name, address, and vehicle
registration number and determined the need for and rendered
reasonable assistance to the injured.
Appellant’s Appendix at 10. The evidence at trial showed that, after initially
stopping to check on the status of his cargo, Hatfield drove at a high rate of
speed over three miles away from the location of the accident. Before leaving,
Hatfield did not provide anyone at the accident scene with his identifying
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information, nor did he check on the occupants of the vehicle he had struck.
Hatfield did not have any insurance on the truck, a fact that supplied a possible
motive for the offense. The evidence at trial also showed that Hatfield had
multiple opportunities to stop and return to the scene of the accident but did not
until his truck was blocked by another citizen. The trial court reasonably
concluded from this evidence that Hatfield did not comply with the statute’s
requirements.
[8] On appeal, Hatfield offers explanations for why it was necessary for him to
leave the scene of the accident. However, Hatfield testified at trial, and, thus,
the trial court heard his version of what occurred after the accident. The trial
court rejected those explanations. Hatfield essentially requests that we reweigh
the evidence and reassess the credibility of the witnesses, which we do not do.
Glenn, 999 N.E.2d at 861.
[9] In addition, Hatfield’s argument that he returned to the scene and cooperated
with authorities is unpersuasive. The statute required that Hatfield remain at the
scene of the accident. I.C. § 9-26-1-1(1). The offense was complete when
Hatfield drove away from the scene. The fact that Hatfield returned and
cooperated with the authorities does not change the fact that he initially left the
scene of the accident.
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II. Restitution Order
A. Standard of Review
[10] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-5-3, a trial court may order restitution
to the victim of a crime. An order of restitution is a matter within the trial
court’s discretion, and we will only reverse the trial court’s order upon a
showing of abuse of that discretion. M.C. v. State, 817 N.E.2d 606, 608 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s
determination is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. at 609.
B. Entry of Restitution Order
[11] Hatfield argues that the trial court committed fundamental error when it
ordered him to pay restitution for damages not stemming from his conviction.
However, at sentencing Hatfield, through his counsel, affirmatively stated that
he had no challenge to the claim for restitution. Thus, to the extent that the
trial court committed any error, it was invited by Hatfield. Invited error is not
reversible error. Mitchell v. State, 730 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(upholding restitution order where Mitchell agreed to pay counseling expenses
up to a certain dollar amount). See also C.H. v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1086, 1096-97
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (following Mitchell and finding invited error despite
defendant’s fundamental error argument, while acknowledging the contrary
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precedent of Bennett v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1281, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)), trans.
denied.
[12] On appeal, Hatfield does not address the effect of his statements at sentencing.
Moreover, the case he cites in support of addressing his claim as one of
fundamental error, Lohmiller v. State, 884 N.E.2d 903, 916 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008),
is unpersuasive as that case did not involve invited error. Although the result
may have been different had Hatfield objected to the entry of the restitution
order, we decline to address his fundamental error argument based upon the
facts of this case.
C. Sufficiency of Order
[13] Hatfield also argues that the trial court’s restitution order was not supported by
adequate evidence. As a general matter, the evidence supporting a restitution
order is sufficient if it provides the trier of fact with a reasonable basis for
estimating loss and does not merely provide a basis for speculation or
conjecture. Guzman v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1125, 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
[14] Here, the State provided Hatfield with a claim for restitution from Kahn’s
insurer in the amount of $14,852.67. The claim itself was not admitted into
evidence, although the trial court, the State, and Hatfield’s counsel discussed it
in open court without objection. The insurer’s claim detailed that the total
included “injury settlements for the three occupants of the vehicle that the
victims were in, medical payment coverage for all three of them, rental costs
and the totaled vehicle as well as the insurance deductible.” Tr. at 83. This
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itemization, coupled with Hatfield’s lack of objection, was sufficiently detailed
to provide a reasonable basis for determining the amount of damages. See
Morris v. State, 2 N.E.3d 7, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (order upheld despite the fact
that supporting documentation was not admitted into evidence where trial court
and the State referred to it without objection); Ladd v. State, 710 N.E.2d 188,
192 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding restitution order based upon an affidavit
that stated total amount of costs for law enforcement and litigation which was
admitted without objection).
III. Inappropriate Sentence
A. Standard of Review
[15] This court has the authority to revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind.
Appellate Rule 7(B). Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on
“the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to
others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The defendant bears the burden of
persuading this court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State,
848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). The trial court imposed upon Hatfield a
364-day sentence, with 362 days suspended to probation and credit for time
served. When the assessing the appropriateness of a sentence, we may consider
both the executed and suspended portions of that sentence. Davidson v. State,
926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).
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B. Nature of Offense
[16] Hatfield was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident involving three
people. The impact of the accident was such that it felt to Hatfield that his
truck “stopped for a moment.” Tr. at 70. Kahn’s sedan was propelled first into
a telephone pole and then into a bean field. The chance of injury to property
and person of such a collision was apparent. Hatfield, despite having the time
to check on the status of the cargo in his truck, did not check on the people in
Kahn’s car. Hatfield, who was not insured, left the scene at a high rate of speed
and did not turn around until he was over three miles away from the accident,
despite the fact that he had multiple opportunities to do so. In light of these
facts, we do not find Hatfield’s sentence to be inappropriate on the basis of the
nature of his offense.
C. Character of the Offender
[17] Hatfield directs our attention to a number of positive character traits which he
contends render his sentence inappropriate. At his sentencing hearing, Hatfield
and his counsel placed these same factors before the trial court who fashioned a
sentence that took those factors into account. The trial court declined to place
Hatfield on community service, evidently to allow Hatfield to concentrate his
efforts on fulfilling his restitution obligation. Hatfield has failed to meet his
burden on appeal to show us that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of his offense and his character. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1080.
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Conclusion
[18] We conclude that sufficient evidence supports Hatfield’s conviction, that
Hatfield invited any error as to the entry trial court’s restitution order which
was supported by sufficient evidence, and that Hatfield’s sentence is not
inappropriate.
[19] Affirmed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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