Ronald Lunsford, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 14 2019, 9:36 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
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estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ronald Lunsford Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ronald Lunsford, Jr., February 14, 2019
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PC-2168
v. Appeal from the Sullivan Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Hugh R. Hunt,
Appellee-Respondent Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
77D01-1607-PC-472
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2168 | February 14, 2019 Page 1 of 5
[1] Ronald Lunsford appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to move to dismiss the criminal charges when there was an
alleged double jeopardy violation. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] On June 30, 1995, a Wabash Valley Correctional Institution officer heard
noises coming from a nearby prisoner’s cell. He approached the cell and found
Lunsford and fellow inmate Robert Smith repeatedly stabbing another inmate,
Michael Wedmore, to death. On July 11, 1995, the State charged Lunsford with
one count of murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder.
[3] In September 1995, the Department of Correction (DOC) instituted a separate
administrative disciplinary proceeding against Lunsford for the murder of
Wedmore. On September 20, 1995, the DOC found that Lunsford had
committed murder and sanctioned him with disciplinary segregation for three
years, a demotion in credit-time class, and a loss in good-time credits.
[4] On August 23, 1996, the State filed an additional voluntary manslaughter
charge against Lunsford. On September 9, 1996, Lunsford pleaded guilty to the
voluntary manslaughter charge in exchange for the dismissal of the other
charges. Both Lunsford and his attorney signed the written agreement. The trial
court imposed a forty-year sentence.
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[5] On July 26, 2016, Lunsford filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming
that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to
dismiss the criminal charges. Lunsford argued that since he had already been
disciplined in the DOC’s administrative proceeding, it was inappropriate for his
trial counsel to recommend that he plead guilty in the supplemental criminal
prosecution because it would constitute a double jeopardy violation.
[6] The post-conviction court denied Lunsford’s petition, saying that “[p]etitioner’s
argument is wholly without merit as it is well settled law in this state that
administrative punishment by prison officials does not prohibit a subsequent
prosecution arising out of the same act.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 52.
Lunsford now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Lunsford appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing
that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to
dismiss his criminal charges.1 2
1
Additionally, Lunsford argues that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion to subpoena
his trial counsel and the corrections superintendent. We find this argument unavailing. The post-conviction
court held that Lunsford’s petition outright was without merit as a matter of law. Therefore, testimony from
Lunsford’s trial counsel and the corrections superintendent was unnecessary, and the post-conviction court
did not err in denying the motion to subpoena.
2
Lunsford also claims that because his trial counsel “misadvised” him to plead guilty, his guilty plea was not
knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Once again, this
argument is unavailing. Lunsford has proffered no evidence showing that his guilty plea was not knowing,
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[8] In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing
grounds for post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Helton v.
State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009). A petitioner must show that the
evidence unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that
reached by the trial court. Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993).
Furthermore, we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences
supporting the post-conviction court’s judgment. Id.[9] For a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we use a two-pronged test. To
satisfy the first prong, the defendant must show deficient performance:
representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the “counsel”
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682
(Ind. 2017); see generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To
satisfy the second prong, the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable
probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome) that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 682.
[10] Lunsford argues that his trial counsel should have moved to dismiss the
criminal charges because he had already been subject to disciplinary action for
the murder by the DOC in a separate proceeding. Consequently, he maintains
voluntary, and intelligent. The fact that Lunsford and his trial counsel both signed the agreement after due
consideration further undermines this argument.
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that the trial court violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because he
was being criminally punished twice for the same action. Mehidal v. State, 623
N.E.2d 428, 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (reiterating the principle of double
jeopardy wherein the State may not punish a criminal defendant twice for the
same offense).
[11] However, there is a clear difference between criminal punishment and
administrative sanctions:
[T]his constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy applies only to
criminal prosecutions. An administrative punishment by prison
officials does not preclude a subsequent prosecution arising out of
the same act. The Department of Correction is authorized to
administratively punish actions done within the prison walls by
imposing disciplinary sanctions.
State v. Mullins, 647 N.E.2d 676, 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations
omitted). With this standard in mind, we find Lunsford’s argument unavailing.
The DOC sanctions imposed against Lunsford constituted an administrative
punishment that, when paired with a subsequent prosecution, does not create a
double jeopardy violation. Therefore, counsel was not ineffective for declining
to file a motion to dismiss on this basis, and the post-conviction court did not
err by denying Lunsford’s petition.
[12] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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