Derrick Charles Williams v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 29 2019, 6:56 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David W. Stone IV Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Derrick Charles Williams, August 29, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-137
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela G. Warner
Appellee-Plaintiff. Sims, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C01-1810-F6-2501
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-137 | August 29, 2019 Page 1 of 19
[1] Derrick Charles Williams appeals his convictions for resisting law enforcement
as a level 6 felony and driving while suspended as a class A misdemeanor. He
raises two issues which we revise and restate as:
I. Whether his decision to represent himself was knowingly
and voluntarily made; and
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
certain evidence.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On September 28, 2018, Edgewood Police Officer Shane Briggs was in full
uniform and on patrol in his fully-marked police vehicle when he observed a
white pickup truck pull into a driveway. Williams was the truck’s driver.
Officer Briggs had not seen the truck before, knew that it was a vehicle that did
not typically park in that driveway, and knew the person who lived at the home
worked out of town. Officer Briggs ran a BMV check of the truck’s license plate
and learned “there was a protective order for the registered owner of the
vehicle, and there was a warrant alert on that vehicle.” Transcript Volume I at
217. Officer Briggs parked his vehicle at a nearby church from where he could
observe the truck in the driveway and see if the occupant exited the truck. After
a short time, he observed the truck back out of the driveway, pause at a place
where the officer believed the driver could see his police vehicle, and then
continue to enter the road.
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[3] Officer Briggs observed the truck come to a stop at a stop sign and fail to signal
prior to turning right, pulled his police vehicle behind the truck to initiate a
traffic stop, and activated his overhead lights. Williams did not stop, and
Officer Briggs activated his siren for one or two seconds using a couple of
different tones to obtain Williams’s attention, but Williams did not stop.
Williams stopped at a stop sign and then turned left. Officer Briggs followed
Williams with his lights and siren activated, and he “cycled through [his] siren
tones along with the air horn.” Id. at 221. He observed that all the other
vehicles “were getting out of [the] way.” Id. at 222. There were multiple places
where Williams could have pulled over. Williams drove through a parking lot
and parked at a gas station.
[4] Officer Briggs blocked Williams’s truck with his police vehicle, opened his
door, drew his weapon, and gave Williams loud verbal commands to shut off
the truck, open the door, and show his hands and repeated those commands.
Williams did not respond. Meanwhile, Darren Sparks, a former police officer
and police chief, observed the pursuit and followed Williams’s truck and Officer
Briggs to the gas station’s parking lot. Sparks looked into the truck, which had
tinted windows, and saw that Williams was on a cell phone. Sparks also had
his weapon drawn. Anderson Police Officer Brandon Taylor and other officers
arrived at the scene. Officer Taylor used his intercom to command Williams to
exit the truck, and Williams did not respond. Officers approached the truck,
attempted to open a door, and found the door was locked. Officer Briggs used
a puncture device to break the driver’s window, reached in and unlocked the
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door, and opened the door and pulled Williams from the truck. Officers
ordered Williams to the ground, he refused and argued with the officers, the
officers performed a leg sweep to force him to the ground, and he was
handcuffed. Williams refused to identify himself. Officer Briggs located
Williams’s identification in the truck’s center console, and Williams still refused
to confirm his identity. Officer Briggs ran a check on Williams, and “dispatch
returned with his driver’s license that was in suspended, prior status, and he had
a warrant . . . for his arrest.” Id. at 233.
[5] On October 1, 2018, the State charged Williams with: Count I, resisting law
enforcement as a level 6 felony; and Count II, driving while suspended as a
class A misdemeanor. The State alleged that Williams was an habitual
offender. That same day, the court held an initial hearing. At the start of the
hearing, the court asked Williams to state his full name for the record, and
Williams replied “I object” and “I won’t be going by no names or labels today.”
Transcript Volume I at 4. The court explained it needed to identify him, and
Williams stated “it’s Charles DeAndre Gardez,” and objected to giving his date
of birth. Id. The court stated it did not know his grounds for objection, and
Williams stated “[t]he grounds for objection is not to be called by no names or
no labels” and “you trying to label me.” Id. at 6. The court found Williams in
contempt and that he could purge himself by providing some identifying
information.
[6] On October 15, 2018, the court held another hearing at which Williams
appeared and responded to his name. The court read Williams his rights.
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When asked if he was able to understand his rights, Williams stated “[n]o.” Id.
at 13. He stated he wanted to know the date and time the charges were filed,
the court said that it had not reached that part and needed to know if he
understood his rights. Williams stated “I do understand the right . . . to travel
and the . . . right to prove my innocence.” Id. The court asked if he understood
that he had a right to a public trial by jury, Williams responded “[n]o,” the
court noted that Williams had requested a speedy trial and asked “so what right
did you think you were invoking when you requested that,” and he replied “[t]o
prove my innocence.” Id. at 14. When asked if he understood his right to a
speedy trial and trial by jury, Williams replied “[o]kay,” and when told he
needed to say “yes or no, not okay,” he stated “I’m being really coerced into
this . . . I really don’t understand why I’m going through this process.” Id. at
14. The court said “if you don’t understand, I need you to say, no,” and “I’m
trying to understand what I can do to help you understand,” and Williams
replied “Um, release me. I mean . . . .” Id. at 14-15.
[7] The court asked “[t]hat will help you understand if I release you,” and Williams
stated “[y]es, because I’ve been put in like contempt of court for something, for
unjust reasons. I don’t even understand why I’m here. I don’t even understand
the charges. I mean, like, as far as um, the right to travel, I don’t understand
how I get a driving while suspended. And as far as, I mean, the um, resisting
law enforcement, there’s an I.C. code, under the I.C. code, . . . it states that I
have to been doing twenty (20) miles per hour over the speed limit in order to
have that resisting law enforcement uh, with a vehicle. So, I mean, . . . .” Id. at
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15. The court explained that it understood that Williams did not agree with the
charges and that he would have the right to present his argument at a trial
before a jury. Williams asked “what about the right to travel.” Id. at 16. The
court explained that was an issue for trial. Williams asked if he was innocent
until proven guilty, the court responded affirmatively and noted that it had
asked him if he understood that and he had said no, and Williams replied “I
don’t really because why am I locked up” and “it seems like it’s the courts is . . .
placing me into guilt.” Id. at 17-18. Williams asked about his fast and speedy
trial and said “I’d like a date for that.” Id. at 20.
[8] The court then noted that an attorney had been appointed to represent him, and
Williams said “I don’t need no lawyer . . . I can prove my own innocence.” Id.
The court asked if he wanted to represent himself, and Williams said “[y]es, I’d
rather prove my own innocence” and “[y]es, of course.” Id. at 20-21. The
court indicated that it would be asking him some questions so that it could be
satisfied that he was capable of representing himself. Williams said “I object.
I’m not a lawyer.” Id. at 21. The court responded that it was aware that
Williams was not a lawyer. Upon questioning by the court, Williams indicated
that he was not taking any medication or under the influence of any drugs or
alcohol. The court told Williams that he had the right to represent himself or to
have counsel represent him and to court-appointed counsel if he could not
afford an attorney. The court informed Williams that, before he made that
decision, it wanted him to understand what he was giving up. The court
explained that he may have a number of defenses which an attorney is trained
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to know, advised him of the penalties he was facing, and stated there are factors
the court can consider in increasing or decreasing his sentence within that range
and an attorney would know about the factors. It stated that an attorney has
developed skills to present a defense to the charges against him including
investigating his case, interrogating witnesses against him, and finding
favorable witnesses and obtaining their testimony. It explained that attorneys
can explain charges and any lesser included offenses, gather documents and
other written evidence, prepare and file motions before the trial such as motions
for discovery and to keep unfavorable information from being received as
evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses at trial, present favorable
opening and closing statements in jury trials, prepare appropriate written jury
instructions and select a jury, and properly preserve the record for purposes of
appeal. It also stated that an attorney can evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of a case and give him advice on seeking a plea agreement with the
State, that he would not receive any special treatment if he decided not to have
an attorney, that he would have to follow all the same rules and procedures,
and if it turns out badly he would not be able to complain that he was not an
effective attorney in his own defense.
[9] The court said that Williams had the right to decide against having an attorney,
but he must be aware that deciding not to have an attorney can turn out to be a
very bad decision and that experienced lawyers almost always decide to be
represented by another in a criminal case. The court asked what skills or
knowledge Williams had that would be helpful in representing himself, and he
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replied “[c]ommon sense” and that the State had to have evidence to prove him
guilty. Id. at 24. When asked if had ever studied criminal law, he said “I’m
familiar with it.” Id. at 25. When asked “have you had other cases that you’ve
represented yourself or been involved with . . . the legal system,” Williams
replied “[k]ind of,” the court asked “[d]id you represent yourself,” and he
replied “[i]t didn’t go that far, I mean, like as far as trial.” Id. at 26. When
asked if any of his cases had gone to jury trial, he replied “[y]es.” Id. Williams
said “I really don’t understand what this has to do with . . . ,” and the court
replied “[t]his has to do with whether or not you’re gonna represent yourself,”
“[t]o make sure you understand the pitfalls and the danger in you representing
yourself,” and “[a]s long as you understand that, then we’re gonna keep moving
forward.” Id. at 26-27. Williams confirmed that he had participated in a jury
trial before.
[10] When asked for his highest level of education, Williams answered “[a]gain, I
don’t understand, but I got my GED, like I said, I’ve got common sense and I
don’t understand what these questions have to do with the case.” Id. at 27.
Upon questioning by the court, Williams indicated that he was able to read and
write and considered himself to be a good speaker. When asked if he was able
to learn the rules of trial procedure and evidence, he replied “not with me being
confined at the jailhouse” and said that it had an old computer system and
charged two dollars a motion which deterred asking for motions like a motion
to suppress. Id. at 28. The court asked “[y]ou believe though if you had access
you could . . . become familiar with that,” and he replied “[o]f course I could.”
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Id. at 29. When asked if anyone had told him, “if you don’t have an attorney,
then you’ll get a lighter sentence or receive[d] special treatment,” he replied
“[n]o, I’ve been threatened. I’ve [sic] under duress and I’ve been coerced that if
I don’t have an attorney that I’m liable to get . . . canned.” Id. When asked if
anyone was telling him that he should have an attorney “and you think that is
threatening you,” Williams answered “[n]o, the courts, you just said that.” Id.
at 29-30. The court told Williams “I do think you should have an attorney.
But, you get to make that choice,” it asked “[d]o you still wish to proceed
without counsel,” and Williams replied “[y]es.” Id. at 30. The court permitted
Williams to represent himself. Williams filed a motion to suppress, which the
court denied after a hearing.
[11] At the jury trial, the State presented the testimony of Officer Briggs, Officer
Taylor, and Sparks. Officer Briggs testified that he observed the white pickup
truck pull into a driveway and believed the vehicle was suspicious. He testified
that he ran a BMV check of the license plate, at which point Williams stated “I
object” and the court overruled the objection. Id. at 216. Officer Briggs
testified that the results indicated that there was a protective order for the
registered owner of the vehicle and there was a warrant alert on the vehicle. At
that point, Williams objected, and the court overruled the objection. Officer
Briggs testified: “I watched the vehicle back out of the driveway . . . . [W]hen
he was backing out of the driveway, he stopped about the time where I believe
the driver would have seen my car parked. And he paused in the, in the
roadway, half in the roadway and half in the driveway, and then continued
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after a moment . . . .” Id. at 218. Officer Briggs testified regarding his attempt
to stop Williams by activating his vehicle’s lights and siren and how Williams
failed to stop his truck.
[12] Officer Briggs testified that, at the gas station, he blocked Williams’s truck,
opened his door, drew his weapon, and gave loud commands to shut the truck
off, open the door, and show his hands. The prosecutor asked “why did you
draw your service weapon,” Officer Briggs answered “[a]fter the vehicle had
fled for that amount of time, with a slow speed pursuit like that, we are trained
that that may be time for the driver to either call friends for an ambush . . . ,” at
which point Williams objected and the court overruled the objection, and
Officer Briggs continued “[s]et up a possible escape, a possible ambush or
possibly come up with some . . . plan to attach [sic] the officer. And that . . .
comes from all of our stops training and . . . other . . . patrol training.” Id. at
225-226. Williams again objected and stated “[s]peculation,” and the court
overruled the objection. Id. at 226. When asked “in your training, you’ve been
taught that those are possibilities,” Officer Briggs answered “[a]bsolutely,” and
when asked, “in your experience and [] seeing other officers . . . [h]ave you seen
that happen,” he replied “[t]hat does happen.” Id. at 226-227. Officer Briggs
testified that, after obtaining Williams’s identification, he ran a check on him
and learned that his driver’s license was suspended and that there was a warrant
for his arrest. Williams objected, and the court overruled the objection. On
cross-examination, Williams asked Officer Briggs “[d]id you say you was under
threat . . . [o]f the vehicle being turned on and backing out,” he answered, “[w]e
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consider everything from a fleeing suspect, so we will call it [a] threat until
proven otherwise. That’s what our training does. Through my experience,
anything in that vehicle, all unknowns are a threat to me.” Transcript Volume
II at 5-6.
[13] Officer Taylor testified that he had his service weapon drawn as he was giving
commands for Williams to exit his truck because he did not know if he had a
weapon or something that could hurt him. When asked if he had training based
on low-speed pursuits, Officer Taylor replied affirmatively, and when asked
“what does that training tell you to do after there’s been a low speed pursuit,”
he answered “[j]ust the same thing as a high speed pursuit. Take the same
precautions [], not knowing the subject had a weapon or something like that,
just more protect ourselves from the public.” Id. at 26. Sparks testified that he
noticed that Officer Briggs did not have any backup, “the officers don’t know
what’s going on at that point,” and “[t]here’s usually a reason why someone
doesn’t stop immediately.” Id. at 63. He testified, “[u]sually, a suspect is
formulating a plan,” “[t]hey’re doing something,” “they’re trying to either
figure a way out, they’re gonna run or they’re formulating a plan maybe to even
do something to the officer,” “[t]here wasn’t any officers there to back this
officer up,” “I still carry a handgun as a retired policeman,” “at that point [] my
concern was if I just drove off, what could happen to this officer,” and “[a] lot
of police officers are being ambushed and, literally, what came into my mind
was [] this going to be an ambush, [] because of where the suspect stopped his
vehicle.” Id. at 64. The jury found Williams guilty on Counts I and II and that
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he was an habitual offender. The court sentenced Williams to concurrent terms
of two years on Count I, which was enhanced by three years for being an
habitual offender, and one year on Count II.
Discussion
I.
[14] The first issue is whether Williams made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver of his right to counsel. Williams argues that his bizarre responses,
repeated statements that he was under duress, coercion, and threat, and
multiple statements that he did not understand show that his decision to
proceed pro se was not intelligently and knowingly made. He also argues that
he was not mentally competent to elect to represent himself. The State
responds that the dialogue between the court and Williams indicates that his
decision to proceed pro se was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. It
argues that the court thoroughly explained the dangers of self-representation,
inquired into Williams’s background, and contrasted for Williams what an
attorney could do that he might not be able to do for himself and that Williams
does not establish that he was incompetent to decide to represent himself.
[15] The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel before he
may be tried, convicted, and punished. Hopper v. State, 957 N.E.2d 613, 617
(Ind. 2011). This protection also encompasses an affirmative right for a
defendant to represent himself in a criminal case. Id. When a criminal
defendant waives his right to counsel and elects to proceed pro se, we must
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decide whether the trial court properly determined that the defendant’s waiver
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138
(Ind. 2003). Waiver of assistance of counsel may be established based upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Id. There are no
prescribed “talking points” the court is required to include in its advisement to
the defendant; it need only come to a considered determination that the
defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Poynter v.
State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. 2001). The defendant should be made aware
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.
Leonard v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1294, 1295 (Ind. 1991).
[16] In reviewing the adequacy of a waiver, we consider four factors: (1) the extent
of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision, (2) other evidence in the
record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and experience of the
defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se.
Kubsch v. State, 866 N.E.2d 726, 736 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 553
U.S. 1067, 128 S. Ct. 2501 (2008). The trial court is in the best position to
assess whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived counsel. See
Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1128 (citation omitted). Under the fourth factor, the
court considers whether the defendant’s decision appears tactical or strategic in
nature or seems manipulative and intending delay, inferring knowledge of the
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system and understanding of the risk and complexities of trial from more
deliberative conduct. Id. at 1128 n.6. We will most likely uphold the trial
judge’s decision to honor or deny the defendant’s request to represent himself
where the judge has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper
information, and reaches a reasoned conclusion about the defendant’s
understanding of his rights and voluntariness of his decision. See id. (citation
omitted).
[17] The record reveals that the trial court engaged in an extensive colloquy with
Williams regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The
court set forth in detail the possible disadvantages of Williams representing
himself. The court asked Williams about his education, his ability to read,
write, and speak, his skills and training, his ability to learn the rules of
procedure and evidence, and his prior experience in the legal system and with
jury trials. While Williams stated several times that he did not understand or
was being coerced, the statements related to his confinement pending trial, his
disagreement with the charges against him, and the court’s statements that it
believed he should have an attorney. The exchange between the court and
Williams shows that he understood that the court believed that he should be
represented by counsel and may be disadvantaged by not having an attorney.
The trial court did not make any indication that Williams demonstrated a level
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of mental illness which prevented him from representing himself. 1 The trial
court was in a position to observe Williams’s demeanor, the extent to which he
was recalcitrant or stated he did not understand or was coerced, his behavior,
his statements regarding his understanding of the charges against him and the
proceedings, and his responses and to assess his experience, whether he
understood the disadvantages of self-representation, and the extent to which his
decision and responses were tactical. Williams was adamant that he represent
himself when the court first raised the issue of representation and maintained
his position throughout the extensive exchange regarding his ability to represent
himself and the possible disadvantages of doing so. We conclude that the trial
court’s inquiry and Williams’s responses were sufficient to establish that he
made his decision to represent himself knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
II.
1
Williams cites Sturdivant v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. In that case, the
defendant argued the trial court should have found her to be severely mentally ill based on her bizarre
statements as well as incorrect and unusual legal arguments. 61 N.E.3d at 1224. At trial, the defendant
made a number of puzzling legal arguments, asked many puzzling questions of witnesses, and informed a
testifying officer that treason is punishable by death. Id. at 1225. We found that, while some of the
defendant’s statements were undeniably strange and that she clearly lacked the legal skills of an experienced
criminal defense attorney, there was no evidence the defendant had been evaluated by a mental health
professional or been diagnosed with a mental illness and that, to the extent there were some indicators of
mental illness, they were not sufficient to outweigh the defendant’s explicit and repeated requests to waive
counsel and represent herself. Id. We emphasized that trial courts are in the best position to assess the
competency of criminal defendants and the knowingness of waivers of the right to counsel, that the court had
numerous opportunities to converse with and observe the defendant, and that the court’s decision was not
clearly erroneous. Id. at 1226. Sturdivant does not require that we find Williams suffered from a mental
illness which prevented him from representing himself. To the extent there may have been some indicators
of mental illness, they were not sufficient to outweigh Williams’s explicit and repeated requests to waive
counsel and represent himself.
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[18] The next issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
certain evidence. The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the
admissibility of evidence. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). A
trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence is generally accorded a great
deal of deference on appeal. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh’g
denied. We do not reweigh the evidence; rather, we consider only evidence that
is either favorable to the ruling or unrefuted and favorable to the defendant.
Beasley v. State, 46 N.E.3d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 2016). We will not reverse an error
in the admission of evidence if the error was harmless. Turner v. State, 953
N.E.2d 1039, 1058 (Ind. 2011). In determining the effect of the evidentiary
ruling on a defendant’s substantial rights, we look to the probable effect on the
fact finder. Id. at 1059. An improper admission is harmless if the conviction is
supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing
court that there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed
to the conviction. Id.
[19] Williams first asserts that the trial court should not have allowed the State to
elicit testimony regarding the possibility of police being ambushed and argues
the concern of police ambushes was highly inflammatory and was not a fact of
any consequence in determining whether he had resisted law enforcement or
was driving with a suspended license. The State responds that Williams
objected at trial on the basis of speculation and that the officers were not
required to speculate about their training regarding how to respond as a matter
of course to a slow-speed pursuit of a suspect who refuses to pull over. It also
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argues that the challenged testimony simply recounted standard safeguarding
techniques and did not result in an unfair trial.
[20] Ind. Evidence Rule 401 provides that evidence is relevant if it has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and
the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Ind. Evidence Rule 403
provides that the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
[21] The record reveals that Officer Briggs, Officer Taylor, and Sparks testified
regarding the possible dangers following a slow-speed pursuit based on their
training and experience. The officers testified that these possible dangers were
the reason they drew their weapons, and Sparks testified as to his concerns and
why he remained at the scene. We cannot say the prosecutor’s questions called
for speculation. Moreover, the evidence establishes that, after Officer Briggs
activated his police vehicle’s lights and siren to initiate the stop, Williams did
not stop his vehicle for multiple blocks. After Williams stopped at a gas station,
law enforcement blocked his vehicle and issued loud commands for Williams to
exit his truck which had tinted windows, drew their weapons, and ultimately
punctured the truck’s window in order to remove Williams. The testimony
regarding the officers’ training and use of caution was minimal relative to all of
the testimony and evidence presented to the jury and did not substantially affect
Williams’s rights. There is no substantial likelihood that the challenged
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testimony contributed to the convictions, and any alleged error in its admission
does not warrant reversal.
[22] Williams further argues that the court should not have permitted the State to
introduce evidence of a warrant and cites Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b). The State
responds that the evidence was admissible to show motive, plan, or knowledge
and that its admission is at most harmless as the evidence of his guilt was
overwhelming.
[23] Ind. Trial Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. Rule
404(b)(2) provides that “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose,
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” The standard for assessing
the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence is: (1) the court must determine that
the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue
other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) the
court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial
effect pursuant to Rule 403. Whatley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 276, 281 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009), trans. denied. The evidence is inadmissible when the State offers it
only to produce the “forbidden inference” that the defendant has engaged in
other, uncharged misconduct and the charged conduct was in conformity with
the uncharged misconduct. Id. The court has wide latitude in weighing the
probative value of the evidence against the possible prejudice of its admission.
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Id. If evidence has some purpose besides behavior in conformity with a
character trait and the balancing test is favorable, the court can elect to admit
the evidence. Id. For instance, evidence which is necessary for the jury to
understand the relationships between the victim, various witnesses, and the
defendant may be admissible. Id.
[24] Officer Briggs testified that he watched Williams’s vehicle back out of a
driveway, that “when he was backing out of the driveway, he stopped about the
time where I believe the driver would have seen my car parked,” and “he
paused in the, in the roadway, half in the roadway and half in the driveway,
and then continued after a moment.” Transcript Volume I at 218. Williams
did not stop for multiple blocks while Officer Briggs followed him with his
overhead lights and siren activated and did not exit his truck when commanded
to do so. The jury heard from multiple eyewitnesses. The challenged evidence
was admissible to show motive, intent, plan, or absence of mistake. We cannot
say that the evidence violated Evidence Rule 404(b) or that its probative value
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Even assuming
evidence of a warrant was inadmissible, in light of the overall strength of the
State’s case and the context of the challenged evidence, we conclude that the
probable impact on the jury was minimal and that reversal is not required.
[25] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Williams’s convictions.
[26] Affirmed.
Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-137 | August 29, 2019 Page 19 of 19