In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: D.U.H. and E.U. (Minor Children) and P.U.R. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 31 2018, 9:09 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Daniel G. Foote Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Frances Barrow
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re the Termination of the October 31, 2018
Parent-Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JT-1348
D.U.H. and E.U. (Minor Children) Appeal from the Marion Superior
and Court
P.U.R. (Father), The Honorable Gary Chavers,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge Pro Tem
v. The Honorable Larry Bradley,
Magistrate
The Indiana Department of
Trial Court Cause No.
Child Services, 49D09-1710-JT-913
Appellee-Petitioner, 49D09-1710-JT-911
and
Child Advocates, Inc.,
Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.
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Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issues
[1] P.U.R. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights
to D.U.H. and E.U. (collectively, the “Children”), raising three issues which we
consolidate and restate as two: (1) whether the juvenile court’s termination
order is supported by clear and convincing evidence and (2) whether Father was
denied a fair hearing. Concluding the termination order is not clearly
erroneous and the hearing was not unfair, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and M.H. (“Mother”) are the parents of the Children, who were born on
July 13, 2011, and December 29, 2013.1 In February 2016, while the Children
were residing with Mother, Father witnessed Mother smoking
methamphetamine from a pipe as he returned the Children to her home. The
next day, Father returned to Mother’s home and recorded her smoking
methamphetamine while the Children were elsewhere in the home. Father then
reported these incidents to the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”).
1
Mother’s parental rights were also terminated but she does not participate in this appeal. Accordingly, we
limit our recitation of the facts to those applicable to Father.
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The Children were taken into custody without a court order on February 21,
2016.
[3] On February 23, 2016, DCS filed a petition alleging the Children were children
in need of services (“CHINS”) because of the parents’ inability to provide
Children “with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment free from
substance abuse.” Exhibits, Volume I at 18. DCS alleged that despite being
offered services in the past, Mother continued to use methamphetamine and her
whereabouts were currently unknown and further alleged that Father was
unable to ensure the Children’s safety and well-being while in the care of
Mother. At the conclusion of the initial hearing, the juvenile court ordered
Children removed from Mother’s care and placed with Father.
[4] At a fact-finding hearing on June 8, Father admitted the Children were CHINS.
The juvenile court entered a dispositional order on July 20, which placed the
Children in a temporary trial home visit with Father, who was ordered to
engage in home-based case management and to submit to random drug and
alcohol screening. However, on September 30, the guardian ad litem expressed
concerns with Father’s ability to care for the Children because he was not
cooperative with DCS, the guardian ad litem, or providers, and he refused to
allow service providers to access his home. Thereafter, the juvenile court ended
the temporary trial visit and ordered the Children removed from Father’s care
due to alleged educational and therapeutic neglect, as well as Father’s positive
drug test.
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[5] At a modification hearing on October 26, the Children’s therapist stated that
Father exhibited concerning and aggressive behavior during visits with the
Children. On November 9, the juvenile court conducted a periodic review
hearing and DCS presented evidence that Father twice tested positive for illicit
substances, had been aggressive toward the foster parents and visitation
supervisor, was at times combative, and that the Children were traumatized
after Father’s parenting time sessions. D.U.H. had begun engaging in self-
harming behavior and both Children began to wet their beds. The juvenile
court ordered Father’s parenting time be therapeutically supervised and
modified Father’s disposition to include anger management, substance abuse
treatment, and home-based therapy.
[6] By the time of a permanency hearing on February 8, 2017, Father had been
incarcerated on drug charges and placed on an immigration hold. DCS
presented evidence that Father had screened positive for marijuana and refused
screening for an additional two week period. Father’s home-based therapist
testified that Father had broken the rules of visitation by bringing his cell phone
and hiding candy in the Children’s boots. The therapist also stated that, during
the most recent visit, Father grabbed D.U.H. in a “dangerous way by her head”
when playing and that Father laughed when the Children were upset. Id. at
100.
[7] DCS filed a petition to terminate parental rights on October 5, 2017, and the
juvenile court conducted a termination hearing on April 5 and 24, 2018. Father
was not present at the hearing because he had been deported to the Dominican
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Republic. Father was, however, provided counsel, an interpreter, and was
allowed to listen to, and participate in, the hearing via telephone. On May 9,
2018, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Father’s parental rights,
finding and concluding the following:
2. Child in Need of Services Petitions “CHINS” were filed
on [Children] on February 23, 2016, . . . on allegations
that [Mother] used methamphetamine and her
whereabouts was unknown. Allegations against [Father]
was [sic] that he was unable to ensure the safety of the
children while in their [M]other’s care.
3. The CHINS Petitions also included allegations that the
parents had an extensive history with [DCS]. They were
involved in a CHINS case in 2014, and two cases to
compel their behavior in 2015.
4. The [C]hildren were placed with their [F]ather at the
February 23, 2016, initial hearing. However, on
September 30, 2016, they were ordered detained and
placed outside the home due to educational and
therapeutic neglect, and [Father] testing positive for THC.
The [C]hildren have remained out of home.
5. The [C]hildren were found to be in need of services as to
their [F]ather on June 8, 2016, and as to their [M]other on
June 29, 2016.
***
16. [Father] was ordered to engage in case management and
random drug screens. His disposition was modified when
he tested positive for THC, and he was also required to
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undergo a substance abuse assessment and follow
recommendations, engage in therapy, and complete anger
management.
17. [Father] did a domestic violence assessment which
recommended a twenty-six week batterers intervention
program. [Father] completed three sessions.
18. [Father] minimized his role in domestic violence, and
blamed the system and past partners. He has exhibited his
anger and aggression at child and family team meetings
[sic] and during parenting time.
19. Providers observed [Father’s] behavior as combative,
aggressive, and threatening.
20. [Father] did not make progress in his approximate fifteen
sessions of home based therapy to address anger, coping
skills, and parenting skills do [sic] to his venting during
therapy sessions.
21. [Father] was mainly consistent in parenting time between
October of 2016 until early 2017, although he would be
significantly late. He has not seen the [C]hildren since
being deported, well over one year ago.
22. [Father’s] visitation supervisor did not think he appeared
to have the capacity to parent and had concerns whether
the [C]hildren would be supervised with him. He
relinquished [E.U.] to his paramour to take care of on
every visit, and treated [D.U.H.] inappropriately for her
age and sex. His mannerisms and language were
inappropriate. Other concerns included [Father] not
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assuming a parenting role, lack of discipline, and not
following rules.
23. [Father] was incarcerated on drug charges and he
contacted [DCS] in August of 2017 to inform the family
case manager that he had been deported to the Dominican
Republic due to being in the United States illegally.
24. Although the CHINS cases have been pending for over
two years, and this termination action has been pending
for over six months, [Father] testified he was still planning
to start services to address his aggression the Saturday after
trial in this matter.
25. On September 6, 2017, the plan for the [C]hildren’s
permanency was changed from reunification to adoption,
with the Court finding, in-part, that before being deported,
[Father] was inconsistent with services, was uncooperative
with the [DCS], and when he screened, he tested positive
for THC, and [Father] was aggressive during parenting
time with the [C]hildren being traumatized. The Court
further found that [Mother] was in agreement with the
permanency plan changing to adoption.
26. The [C]hildren have been placed in the care of their
paternal great-aunt. The [C]hildren’s grandmother also
resides in the home. This placement is preadoptive.
27. The [C]hildren have suffered trauma, have had many
residential moves, and have behavioral issues which are
getting better.
28. The [C]hildren’s therapist believes the stability of their
placement is a positive for the [C]hildren, and it was
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traumatic for the [C]hildren when they moved. The
therapist believes that stability and permanency would
greatly benefit the [C]hildren, and that they are in need of
a forever home sooner than later.
29. The great-aunt is committed to providing a structured
home for the [C]hildren and is working on parenting skills
to address the [C]hildren’s special needs.
***
31. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the [C]hildren’s removal and continued
placement outside the home will not be remedied by their
[F]ather. From his demeanor and history, [Father] would
need therapy and anger management as well as domestic
violence classes to make sure a cycle of violence does not
take place. From his actions at parenting time sessions
and the neglect alleged when the [C]hildren were detained,
he would not be an appropriate parent without parenting
education. Substance abuse is still a concern and would
need addressed. Considering [Father’s] defiant mindset,
these many conditions would not be remedied if he is
given more time.
32. There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of
the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
children’s well-being. Without addressing substance
abuse, instability, lack of parenting skills, anger, parents
cannot provide a safe and stable environment or meet the
[C]hildren’s needs. More importantly, these [C]hildren are
in need of permanency at this time and another move for
the [C]hildren could be devastating.
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33. Wendy Claxton has been the [C]hildren’s Guardian ad
Litem for two years. Based on the length of time the
CHINS case has been pending, the lack of parents’
progress, Ms. Claxton agrees with adoption being the
permanency plan in the [C]hildren’s best interests. She
believes that it would not be in the [C]hildren’s best
interests to give the parents additional time.
34. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best
interests of the [C]hildren. Termination would allow them
to be adopted into a stable and permanent home where
their needs will be safely met.
35. There exists a satisfactory plan for the future care and
treatment of the [C]hildren, that being adoption.
Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 24-26. Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of their children is “perhaps
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests[,]” Bester v. Lake Cty. OFC, 839
N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005), and these rights are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. These rights are not without limitation,
however, as the law provides for the termination of the parent-child relationship
when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In
re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
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I. Standard of Review
[9] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265.
We only consider the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom most
favorable to the judgment. Id. And we only set aside a juvenile court’s
judgment terminating a parent-child relationship when it is clearly erroneous.
In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1161 (2002). A judgment is “clearly erroneous if the findings do not
support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the
judgment.” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147.
[10] As required by statute, the juvenile court entered findings of fact and
conclusions thereon when terminating Father’s parental rights. Ind. Code § 31-
35-2-8 (providing “if the court finds the allegations in a petition . . . are true, the
court shall terminate the parent-child relationship” and “shall enter findings of
fact that support the entry of the conclusions”). Accordingly, we apply a two-
tiered standard of review. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. We must first determine
whether the evidence supports the findings; then we determine whether the
findings support the judgment. Id. Findings will only be set aside if they are
clearly erroneous and findings are clearly erroneous only “when the record
contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Yanoff v.
Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997).
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II. Termination of Parental Rights
[11] To terminate parental rights, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires the
State to prove, in relevant part:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
***
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
[12] The State must prove the foregoing elements by clear and convincing evidence.
Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2; In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016). However,
“[b]ecause subsection (b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, . . . the [juvenile]
court need only find one of the two elements by clear and convincing
evidence.” Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 373 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted), trans. denied.
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[13] Here, the juvenile court found that the State proved all of the statutory elements
by clear and convincing evidence. Father now challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support each finding.
A. Remedy of Conditions
[14] Father first contends the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
the conditions resulting in Children’s removal will not be remedied. The
juvenile court concluded:
There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted
in the [C]hildren’s removal and continued placement outside the
home will not be remedied by their [F]ather. From his demeanor
and history, [Father] would need therapy and anger management
as well as domestic violence classes to make sure a cycle of
violence does not take place. From his actions at parenting time
sessions and the neglect alleged when the [C]hildren were
detained, he would not be an appropriate parent without
parenting education. Substance abuse is still a concern and
would need addressed. Considering [Father’s] defiant mindset,
these many conditions would not be remedied if he is given more
time.
Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 26, ¶ 31.
[15] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the children’s removal
will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis:
First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second,
we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those
conditions will not be remedied. In the second step, the trial
court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the
termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of
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changed conditions—balancing a parent’s recent improvements
against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is
a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. We
entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has
discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than
efforts made only shortly before termination. Requiring trial
courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude
them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor
of their future behavior.
In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (citations, quotations, and footnote
omitted).
[16] Here, the Children were initially removed from their parents due to their
inability to provide Children “with a safe, stable, and appropriate living
environment free from substance abuse.” Exhibits, Vol. I at 18. As it pertains
to Father, DCS alleged he was unable to ensure the Children’s safety and well-
being while in their Mother’s care. DCS also alleged that both parents had an
extensive history with DCS and were offered services through previous CHINS
actions. Children were placed with Father on a temporary trial visit but
removed from Father’s care “due to educational and therapeutic neglect, and
[Father] testing positive for THC.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 24, ¶ 4. When
balancing the conditions that led the Children’s removal against Father’s recent
improvements, we cannot conclude the juvenile court judgment was clearly
erroneous for three primary concerns.
[17] First and foremost, Father has failed to adequately address his anger,
aggression, and propensity for domestic violence. After Father completed a
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domestic violence assessment, it was recommended that he complete a twenty-
six-week batterers intervention program of which he only completed only three
weeks. Father routinely displayed disturbing behavior during parenting time,
which traumatized the Children. Notably, the juvenile court found Father’s
potential to remedy this condition is particularly unlikely given his “defiant
mindset,” id. at 26, ¶ 31, and how Father has “minimized his role in domestic
violence, and blamed the system and past partners.” Id. at 25, ¶ 18.
[18] Second, Father’s significant history of substance abuse shows no sign of
improvement. During the CHINS case, Father tested positive for illicit
substances and, at other times, refused drug screens entirely. Father missed the
permanency hearing due to his incarceration on drug possession charges 2 and
the record is otherwise absent of any significant effort on Father’s part to
effectively deal with his substance abuse issues.
[19] Third and finally, Father’s capacity to parent has shown no signs of
improvement. Father did not make progress in home-based therapy sessions
due to “his venting during therapy sessions.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 25,
¶ 20. And during visitation sessions, Father routinely relinquished the Children
to others, behaved inappropriately, and failed to assume a parenting rule.
2
Father testified at the termination hearing that he had never been convicted of a crime but had been arrested
“several times” and “beat both cases[.]” Transcript, Volume II at 133.
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[20] On appeal, Father complains that DCS terminated its efforts when he was
deported through no fault of his own. However, it is well established that:
the law concerning termination of parental rights does not
require [DCS] to offer services to the parent to correct the
deficiencies in childcare . . . . Rather, while a participation plan
serves as a useful tool in assisting parents in meeting their
obligations, and while [DCS] routinely offer[s] services to assist
parents in regaining custody of their children, termination of
parental rights may occur independently of them, as long as the
elements of Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted); see
also In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“A failure to provide
services, or the provision of services in an allegedly discriminatory manner,
does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as
contrary to law.”). In any event, Father’s response to services has been minimal
at best. During the two-years of the underlying CHINS action, Father failed to
take substantial steps at self-improvement, failing to avail himself of some
services while failing to complete others. We therefore conclude allowing time
for additional services would likely be fruitless and that Father’s argument on
this issue is unconvincing. See Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family & Children, 861
N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that a court may consider a
parent’s response, or lack thereof, to services offered the parent), trans. denied; In
re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding parental rights
may be terminated when parties are unable or unwilling to meet their
responsibilities), trans. denied.
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[21] Father also alleges he has continued to work toward reunification through local
services since being deported to the Dominican Republic. But we view this
argument as nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence as it is
well within the juvenile court’s discretion to “disregard the efforts [a parent]
made only shortly before termination and to weigh more heavily [a parent’s]
history of conduct prior to those efforts.” K.T.K. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs.,
989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013).
[22] Despite evidence of substance abuse, anger, aggression, a propensity for
domestic violence, and an overall lack of parenting skills, Father has failed to
take substantial steps to remedy these conditions. Therefore, we conclude the
record clearly and convincingly supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that the
conditions resulting in the Children’s removal are unlikely to be remedied.3
B. Best Interests
[23] Next, Father contends the State did not establish by clear and convincing
evidence that involuntary termination of his parental rights was in the
Children’s best interests as required by Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C).
Specifically, Father argues that “[i]n light of recent case law,” the State failed to
demonstrate termination was in the Children’s best interest because “there
3
Father also contends the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s well-being. Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-
4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, however, we need not address Father’s argument. See In re I.A., 903
N.E.2d 146, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
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remain options short of termination, including continued wardship under the
CHINS matter, ongoing services under the supervision of Dominican
authorities, and ultimate reunification with Father.” Brief of Appellant at 26.
[24] In determining the best interests of a child, the juvenile court evaluates the
totality of the evidence and need not wait until the child is “irreversibly
harmed” before terminating parental rights. A.D.S. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child
Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In addition to
evidence that the conditions that led to a child’s removal will not be remedied, a
case manager and child advocate’s recommendation to terminate the parent-
child relationship is sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 1158-59.
Furthermore, we have held that a parent’s non-remedied substance abuse and
domestic violence issues alone are sufficient to support a juvenile court’s
conclusion that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests
although permanency is a “central consideration” in determining a child’s best
interests. Id. at 1159 (internal quotation omitted).
[25] Here, the State presented evidence that after visitations with Father, the
Children displayed signs of trauma and their behavior worsened. The guardian
ad litem testified that termination is in the Children’s best interests. Father has
not seen the Children in well over a year since being deported, and instability
has had a further traumatic effect on the Children. The Children’s therapist
believes the stability of their current placement has had a positive effect on the
Children and that “they are in need of a forever home sooner than later.”
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Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 26, ¶ 28. The juvenile court also found that
“another move for the [C]hildren could be devastating.” Id. at ¶ 32.
[26] On appeal, Father relies on three cases, In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. 2009);
In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 2009); and H.G. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs.,
959 N.E.2d 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, in support of his argument
that the State failed to demonstrate termination was in the Children’s best
interests. However, aside from describing the facts of these cases, Father never
makes a cogent argument as to why they are applicable here. In any event, all
three cases involve substantial improvement on the part of the parent—a fact
not present here. See In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d at 195 (noting “parents have fully
cooperated with the services required of them while incarcerated”); In re G.Y.,
904 N.E.2d at 1263 (noting “the record shows that Mother took positive steps
and made a good-faith effort to better herself as a person and as a parent”); and
H.G., 959 N.E.2d at 292 (noting the “record also shows improvements in
H.H.G.’s parenting”). Thus, we believe Father’s reliance on those cases is
misplaced, and the record presents clear and convincing evidence that
termination is in the Children’s best interests.
C. Satisfactory Plan
[27] Father next argues the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
adoption is a satisfactory plan for the Children pursuant to Indiana Code
section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D). The juvenile court concluded that “[t]here exists a
satisfactory plan for the future care and treatment of the [C]hildren, that being
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adoption.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 26, ¶ 35. The permanency plan is for
the Children to be adopted by their great-aunt, with whom their grandmother
also resides, and the great-aunt has been taking parenting classes to better deal
with the Children’s special needs.
[28] Father argues the “the facts here simply do not warrant the ‘extreme measure’
of termination under the law outlined above.” Br. of Appellant at 28.
However, Father’s argument is merely cumulative of those presented above,
and, just as those arguments failed, so too must this.
III. Due Process
[29] Finally, Father argues the termination hearing was not fundamentally fair.
Specifically, Father complains that his telephone connection with the hearing
was repeatedly disrupted, his counsel failed to object to hearsay testimony or
the admission of exhibits, and his counsel failed to call any witnesses on his
behalf. As an example of what he contends was his counsel’s poor presentation
of his case, Father points to the fact that his own testimony constituted only
four pages out of the 136-page transcript.
[30] In termination proceedings, parents have certain due process rights and the
proceeding must adhere to the requirements of the due process clause. Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982). Although due process has never been
precisely defined, the phrase embodies a requirement of “fundamental
fairness.” In re D.P., 27 N.E.3d 1162, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). In
termination proceedings, due process turns on a balancing of three factors: (1)
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the private interests affected by the proceeding, (2) the risk of error created by
the State’s chosen procedure, and (3) the countervailing governmental interest
supporting use of the challenged procedure. A.P. v. Porter Cty. Office of Family &
Children, 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
[31] Father’s claims regarding fundamental fairness deal almost exclusively with the
performance of his counsel. Earlier opinions from this court measured
counsel’s performance using the two-part Strickland test applicable in criminal
cases. Baker v. Marion Cty. Office of Family & Children, 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1039
(Ind. 2004). However, in Baker, our supreme court discussed the proper
analysis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at a termination hearing
as follows:
Where parents whose rights were terminated upon trial claim on
appeal that their lawyer underperformed, we deem the focus of
the inquiry to be whether it appears that the parents received a
fundamentally fair trial whose facts demonstrate an accurate
determination. The question is not whether the lawyer might
have objected to this or that, but whether the lawyer’s overall
performance was so defective that the appellate court cannot say
with confidence that the conditions leading to the removal of the
children from parental care are unlikely to be remedied and that
termination is in the child’s best interest.
Id. at 1041 (footnote omitted). Therefore, to determine whether Father’s
hearing was fundamentally unfair because he received ineffective assistance of
counsel, we do not focus on the particular actions of counsel, but whether
counsel’s performance was so defective as to undermine our confidence in the
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juvenile court’s termination decision. In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 808 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding counsel did not provide ineffective assistance where parent
received a fundamentally fair trial because the facts demonstrated an accurate
determination and the court could say with confidence that DCS adequately
proved its case). To conduct such a review, we “must also examine the
evidence supporting the termination of his parental rights.” Id. at 806.
[32] As concluded above, the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
conditions resulting in the Children’s removal will not be remedied,4
termination was in the Children’s best interests, and there exists a satisfactory
plan for adoption. As such, we conclude the “facts demonstrate an accurate
determination[,]” Baker, 810 N.E.2d at 1041, sufficient to overcome a challenge
to the effectiveness of counsel. In the interest of thoroughness, however, we
endeavor to address each of Father’s contentions.
[33] We turn first to Father’s argument that he was deprived of a fair hearing
because his telephone connection was repeatedly disconnected. The record
reflects Father’s telephone connection was disconnected on several occasions
and that, as a result, Father was unable to hear substantial portions of the
State’s testimony or the admission of numerous exhibits. Besides ample
citations to the record, however, Father fails to advance a cogent argument or
4
Again, because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we needed not address
Father’s argument regarding whether a continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the
well-being of the Children. See supra, ¶ 22, n.2.
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provide citation to authority explaining why these facts rendered Father’s
proceeding fundamentally unfair. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) (providing
that the argument section of the appellants brief must “contain the contentions
of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning[,]”
along with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied
upon, and a clear showing of how the issues and contentions in support thereof
relate to the particular facts under review). Therefore, Father has waived this
argument on appeal. D.H. by A.M.J. v. Whipple, 103 N.E.3d 1119, 1127 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2018).
[34] Waiver notwithstanding, the record shows the juvenile court made numerous
attempts to accommodate Father’s presence at the hearing, Father was provided
with an interpreter, Father’s counsel was present throughout, and Father was
able to testify on his own behalf. A parent does not necessarily have a
constitutional right to be present at a termination hearing. See In re E.E., 853
N.E.2d 1037, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (determining that the trial court did not
deprive a parent of due process by proceeding with a termination hearing in the
parent’s absence where the parent’s counsel participated in the hearing), trans.
denied. Under these circumstances and with a lack of cogent argument to the
contrary, we cannot conclude repeated disconnections rendered Father’s
termination proceedings fundamentally unfair.
[35] Second, Father claims his counsel “permitted a number of witnesses to provide
testimony adverse to Father without interposing possible foundational or
hearsay objections.” Br. of Appellant at 21. In support thereof, Father lists
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three brief examples of the State’s testimony which he claims should have been
contested on the basis of hearsay. Father is correct in that the Rules of
Evidence regulating the admission of hearsay are applicable in a termination
proceeding. See D.B.M. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 20 N.E.3d 174, 178-80
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing applicability of hearsay rules in a termination
proceeding), trans. denied. However, even if the examples that Father provides
constitute inadmissible hearsay, they are either cumulative of other evidence or
are unlikely to have contributed to the juvenile court’s judgment. B.H. v.
Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 355, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting
that an error is harmless if a judgment is supported by independent evidence
such that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence
contributed to the judgment).
[36] Father also argues the State offered a total of sixty-seven exhibits which went
unchallenged by his counsel. According to Father, Exhibits 1-27 were
produced by the juvenile court in the underlying CHINS case and “many of
those documents may have contained hearsay or other unfounded evidence[,]”
and Exhibits 28-67 were documentation from service referrals, “many of which
contained narratives and other material that would have been objectionable on
foundational or other grounds.” Br. of Appellant at 22. It is possible that the
documents did indeed contain hearsay. However, there are a number of
exceptions to the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, including the business
records and public records exceptions, which may apply to CHINS reports and
filings. See D.B.M., 20 N.E.3d at 179-80 (citing Indiana Evidence Rules 803(6)
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and 803(8)). Furthermore, Indiana Rule of Evidence 201 permits courts to take
judicial notice of “records of a court of this state[.]” In light of these exceptions,
and Father’s failure to provide specific examples of inadmissible hearsay, it is
unclear what result, if any, such objections would have obtained.
[37] Finally, Father argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit specific
testimony about his recent engagement in services or his housing or
employment situation in the Dominican Republic. The record reflects that
Father testified regarding the services he planned to begin—a fact reflected in
the juvenile court’s findings. Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 25, ¶ 24 (“[Father]
testified he was still planning to start services to address his aggression the
Saturday after trial in this matter.”). As discussed above however, a juvenile
court is at liberty to disregard efforts made only shortly before termination. See
id. at ¶ 21; K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234. Thus, again, it is unclear what effect, if
any, Father’s additional testimony would have had on the result.
[38] For the reasons outlined above, we can say with confidence the record
demonstrates an accurate determination that the conditions leading to the
Children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of Father are
unlikely to be remedied and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the
Children’s best interests. Accordingly, we conclude Father’s counsel was not
ineffective and Father received a fundamentally fair hearing. Baker, 810 N.E.2d
at 1041.
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Conclusion
[39] The juvenile court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights was not
clearly erroneous and Father received a fundamentally fair hearing. Therefore,
we affirm.
[40] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and May, J., concur.
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