Jennifer Rose v. William D. Bozeman, Sr.

FILED
Nov 07 2018, 9:22 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Stephen R. Lewis Jack M. Freedman
Indianapolis, Indiana Fishers, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jennifer Rose, November 7, 2018
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-DN-1085
v. Appeal from the Hamilton
Superior Court
William D. Bozeman, Sr., The Honorable J. Richard
Appellee-Petitioner. Campbell, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29D04-1708-DN-7220
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-DN-1085 | November 7, 2018 Page 1 of 9
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Respondent, Jennifer L. Rose (Rose), appeals the trial court’s Order
on Appellee-Plaintiff’s, William D. Bozeman, Sr. (Bozeman), motion to correct
error with respect to the division of marital property in the parties’ decree of
dissolution of marriage.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[3] Rose presents us with two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting Bozeman’s
motion to correct error without specifying its reasons; and
(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by adjusting the division of
the marital estate.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Bozeman and Rose married on July 7, 2017. They closed on the purchase of
the marital residence located in Fishers in the amount of $499,900 on July 19,
2017, and moved into the marital residence on July 28, 2017. Although Rose
did not contribute any money towards the purchase of the residence, the house
was titled in both parties’ names. The parties separated on July 31, 2017, and
Bozeman petitioned for a decree of dissolution on August 1, 2017, after twenty-
four days of marriage. When the parties separated, Bozeman gave Rose
$30,000. Rose continued to live in the marital residence rent-free while the case
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was pending; Bozeman paid the taxes on the residence and the cost of painting
necessary to sell the residence.
[5] Including the money used to purchase the marital residence, Bozeman brought
more than three million dollars of assets into the marriage. Other than the
marital residence and the increase in value of assets during the marriage,
Bozeman was awarded all the assets he brought into the marriage upon its
dissolution.
[6] On February 28, 2018, the trial court conducted a final hearing. On March 15,
2018, the trial court issued its decree of dissolution of marriage, concluding in
pertinent part that
21. Within seven (7) days after this Decree has been file marked
by the Clerk of Hamilton County, Indiana, [Bozeman] shall pay
twenty thousand, four hundred four dollars ($20,404) to [Rose]
as her share of the increase in value of the marital assets that took
place prior to the date of final separation.
22. With regard to the marital residence, although [Bozeman]
brought the purchase money into the marriage, Indiana law is
clear that once he put [Rose’s] name on the deed it is just as
much hers as his. Even though the marriage was short, once
[Rose’s] name was put on the real estate, it is half hers.
Therefore, [Bozeman] and [Rose] shall each receive fifty percent
(50%) of the “net proceeds” from the sale of the house. “Net
proceeds” shall mean the amount that is paid to the parties by the
closing agent after all contractual amounts, taxes, closing costs
and expenses, and broker’s fees have been paid. [Bozeman] shall
pay the costs of any repairs or improvements to the home that
were made in preparation for sale.
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23. [Rose] shall vacate the marital residence as required by the
closing on the sale.
24. [Bozeman] shall continue to pay the utility costs and other
expenses of the marital residence until ownership is transferred.
25. [Rose] shall have sole ownership of all personal property
remaining in the marital residence that is not contractually
required to go to the buyers.
26. Each party shall have sole ownership of all other personal
property in his or her possession.
(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 40-41).
[7] On April 12, 2018, Bozeman filed his motion to correct error, requesting the
trial court to correct the equal division of the net proceeds from the sale of the
marital residence because Bozeman had “put up all the money for the purchase
just two (2) weeks before the divorce case was filed.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II,
p. 54). On April 23, 2018, the trial court granted Bozeman’s motion, holding:
Paragraph 22 of the Decree is deleted and replaced with the
following language:
[Rose] shall receive $35,000 and [Bozeman] shall receive the
balance of the “net proceeds” from the sale of the marital
residence[.] “Net proceeds” means the amount that is paid to the
parties by the closing agent after all contractual amounts, taxes,
closing costs, expenses, and broker’s fees have been paid.
(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 11).
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[8] Rose now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Articulation of General Reasons
[9] Rose appeals from the grant of Bozeman’s motion to correct error. We review
a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion.
Santelli v. Rahmatullah, 993 N.E.2d 167, 173 (Ind. 2013). In so doing, we afford
the trial court’s decision “a strong presumption of correctness.” Id.[10] Rose contends that because Bozeman filed his motion to correct error pursuant
to Indiana Trial Rule 59(J) and corrective relief was granted, the trial court was
required to “specify the general reasons therefor.” See Ind. Trial Rule 59(J).
Because these general reasons are absent in the trial court’s order, Rose requests
this court to reverse the trial court’s grant of Bozeman’s motion. In support of
her argument, Rose relies on Riggen v. Riggen, 71 N.E.3d 420, 423 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2017) in which we concluded that the trial court’s failure to provide an
explanation for its decision to grant Wife’s motion to correct error in
accordance with T.R. 59(J) could not be considered harmless error. In Riggen,
appellee failed to submit an appellee’s brief, and we cautioned that “[w]ere this
case before us with an appellee’s brief, we might conclude that the error was
harmless.” Id.[11] We reached the opposite result in Pickett v. Pickett, 470 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984), where the trial court similarly failed to specify the general
reasons for its decision to grant Wife’s motion to correct error. Based on “other
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evidence in the record,” we were able to infer the trial court’s general reason for
correcting its original decree and noted that Husband failed to demonstrate “on
appeal how the trial court’s failure ha[d] prevented him from formulating his
appeal.” Id. Concluding that “[w]ithout a showing of prejudice, the trial
court’s error was harmless,” we noted that “[t]o remand to the trial court for the
sole purpose of stating such reasons in this case we believe would violate the
principle of judicial economy, the mere honoring of form over substance.” Id.[12] Bozeman initially petitioned for an unequal division of the marital estate based
on the short duration of the marriage, and the assets of the respective parties
prior to the marriage. During the dissolution hearing, he requested the court to
award him the marital residence and allocate to him the loss on the sale of the
residence. In its dissolution decree, the trial court awarded Rose half of the net
proceeds of the sale of the residence. Bozeman filed a motion to correct error,
requesting in his memorandum to award him the net proceeds of the sale of the
marital residence based on the duration of the marriage, the respective assets
the parties brought into the marriage, and the windfall Rose reaped by being
awarded half of the net proceeds of the sale. Rose responded to this
memorandum. Even though the trial court omitted to specify its reasons for
granting Bozeman’s motion, Rose fails to show how she was prejudiced by the
lack of general reasons as there is sufficient evidence in the record from which
to infer the basis of the trial court’s grant. Therefore, as in Pickett, we conclude
that this error was harmless. See id.II. Adjustment of Division of Marital Estate
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[13] Turning to the merits of the case, Rose contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by adjusting the division of the net proceeds of the sale of the marital
residence. She maintains that under “the facts and circumstances of this case,
specifically those surrounding the trial court’s granting of [Bozeman’s] [m]otion
to [c]orrect [e]rror, this [c]ourt cannot reasonably infer that the trial court
considered all the factors set out in Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5.” (Appellant’s Br. p.
15).
[14] In dividing marital property, the trial court shall presume that an equal division
of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. I.C. § 31-15-
7-5. This presumption may be rebutted however, by evidence that an equal
division would not be just and reasonable. Id. This rebuttal may include
evidence of the following factors:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
property, regardless of whether the contribution was income
producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
spouse:
(A) Before the marriage; or
(B) Through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
disposition of the property is to become effective, including
the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to
dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court
considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to
the disposition or dissipation of their property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
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(A) a final division of property; and
(B) a final determination of the property rights of the
parties.
I.C. § 31-15-7-5. In dividing marital property, the trial court must consider all
of these factors, but it is not required to explicitly address all of the factors in
every case. Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[15] Rose argues that the trial court, in considering Bozeman’s motion to correct
error, only emphasized the first two statutory factors, without considering any
of the others. However, “[w]hen a party challenges the trial court’s division of
marital property, [she] must overcome a strong presumption that the trial court
considered and complied with the applicable statute, and that presumption is
one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal.”
Hatten v. Hatten, 825 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
[16] The extremely short duration of the marriage, the substantial property and
financial contribution by Bozeman to the marriage versus the very limited assets
of Rose only speak to the first two statutory factors of I.C. § 31-15-7-5. The
twenty-four-day term of married life is simply too short to even evaluate the
other factors as the economic circumstances and earning abilities of the parties
would not yet have been impacted. Rose, however, contends that the trial
court’s grant of the motion to correct error must be based on a decision to
allocate fault for the failed marriage as Bozeman alluded to in his motion that
the marriage had never been consummated. In light of the presumption that the
trial court considered all statutory factors and in the absence of any evidence
supporting Rose’s allegation, we must conclude that the trial court applied the
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law and Rose’s claim amounts to nothing more than speculation. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s grant of Bozeman’s motion to correct error.
CONCLUSION
[17] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in granting Bozeman’s motion to correct error.
[18] Affirmed.
[19] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur
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