Larenz Jordan v. State of Indiana

FILED
Jul 15 2016, 9:46 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David M. Payne Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion, Indiana Attorney General
Joe Keith Lewis Ellen H. Meilaender
Marion, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Larenz Jordan, July 15, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
27A02-1511-CR-1897
v. Appeal from the Grant Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark E. Spitzer,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
27C01-1501-F1-2
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Larenz Jordan (“Jordan”), at age fifteen, was waived into the Grant Circuit
Court and convicted after a jury trial of twelve counts of Rape1 and one count of
Conspiracy to Commit Rape,2 as Level 1 felonies; one count of Burglary, as a
Level 4 felony;3 and one count of Robbery, as a Level 5 felony. 4 He now
appeals.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
[3] Jordan raises two issues for our review, which we restate as:
I. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it
granted the State’s motion to waive jurisdiction over
Jordan’s case; and
II. Whether Jordan’s sentence was inappropriate and requires
revision under Appellate Rule 7(B).
1
Ind. Code §§ 35-42-4-1(a)(1) & (b).
2
I.C. §§ 35-42-4-1(a)(1) & (b), I.C. § 35-41-5-2.
3
I.C. §§ 35-43-2-1 & 35-43-2-1(1).
4
I.C. § 35-42-5-1(1).
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Facts and Procedural History
[4] On the night of July 15, 2014, in Marion, Jordan, then fifteen years old, along
with two friends, Jamar Greer (“Greer”), also fifteen years old, and Nytarian
Callahan (“Callahan”), then eighteen years old, broke into and entered the
home of R.H. and her family while R.H.’s husband was out of town. The
couple’s four children were asleep at the time. Greer had suggested that the
three burglarize the home with the intent to steal valuables from the residence.
Jordan, Greer, and Callahan observed the home for some time. Jordan saw
movement from inside the home during this period.
[5] Greer entered the home through a window and then opened a door to allow
Jordan and Callahan inside. Soon after the three entered the home, R.H.
approached them and asked what they wanted. The three demanded money,
and R.H. said she did not have any. R.H. begged the three not to harm or wake
up her children, and Greer forced R.H. into a guest bedroom while Jordan and
Callahan went upstairs to ensure the children were asleep.
[6] While Jordan and Callahan were upstairs, Greer forced R.H. to perform oral
sex upon him. When Jordan and Callahan returned, Greer told them they
could participate, as well. For the next several hours, the three repeatedly
forced R.H. to engage in vaginal and oral sex, and threatened her safety and
that of her children in order to force R.H. to comply and to persuade her not to
report the events. R.H. was compliant with the trio’s demands to prevent her
children from being awakened or harmed.
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[7] At one point during the events of that night, Jordan and Callahan took R.H.’s
van, which they drove to a nearby store to buy soda and a bag of chips as a
snack. Greer continued to engage in sex acts with R.H. while Jordan was gone.
After Jordan and Callahan returned, only Greer continued to engage in sex
acts. After this, the three forced R.H. to bathe in an effort to remove from her
body evidence of their offenses. Eventually the three left, taking with them
laptop computers and other electronics. As a result of Jordan’s, Callahan’s, and
Greer’s acts, R.H. suffered numerous injuries, including vaginal lacerations and
bruising and abrasions to other parts of her body. When they left, one member
of the trio told R.H. to have a “blessed day.” (Trial Tr. at 172.)
[8] Jordan was alleged to be a delinquent juvenile on August 27, 2014. The same
day, the State moved the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction over Jordan. A
hearing on the State’s motion was conducted on October 10, 2014, which
included testimony as to Jordan’s psychological and behavior status and
argument from the parties. On January 9, 2015, after briefing from the parties,
the juvenile court waived Jordan into the trial court to be tried as an adult in the
Grant Circuit Court. On January 15, 2015, the State charged Jordan with
twelve counts of Rape5 and one count each of Conspiracy to Commit Rape,
Burglary, and Robbery.
5
Some of these counts were based on principles of accomplice liability.
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[9] A jury trial was conducted from July 20, 2015 to July 23, 2015. At the
conclusion of the trial, the jury found Jordan guilty of all fifteen charged
offenses. After several hearings and a continuance, a sentencing hearing was
conducted on October 9, 2015. The trial court entered judgments of conviction
against Jordan, heard testimony from R.H. and her husband, and sentenced
Jordan to forty years imprisonment for each of the twelve counts of Rape, forty
years imprisonment for the single count of Conspiracy to Commit Rape, ten
years imprisonment for Burglary, and six years imprisonment for Robbery. The
trial court ran these sentences concurrent with one another, yielding an
aggregate term of imprisonment of forty years, with four years suspended to
probation. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Waiver of Jurisdiction
[10] Jordan’s first contention on appeal is that his conviction should be vacated
because the juvenile court abused its discretion when it waived jurisdiction over
his case to the trial court. Because the juvenile court abused its discretion,
Jordan argues, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Jordan’s
case.
[11] Juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over children who are
alleged to be delinquent under Indiana Code article 31-37. I.C. § 31-30-1-1(1).
“Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after full investigation and [a]
hearing,” a juvenile court may waive jurisdiction over a child alleged to be a
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delinquent. I.C. § 31-30-3-2. A juvenile court is within its discretion to waive
jurisdiction in this manner when it finds that:
(1) the child is charged with an act that is a felony:
(A) that is heinous or aggravated, with greater weight
given to acts against the person than to acts against
property; or
(B) that is a part of a repetitive pattern of delinquent acts,
even though less serious;
(2) the child was at least fourteen (14) years of age when the act
charged was allegedly committed;
(3) there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the
act;
(4) the child is beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile justice
system; and
(5) it is in the best interests of the safety and welfare of the
community that the child stand trial as an adult.
Id.
[12] Juvenile proceedings, unlike criminal proceedings, are civil in nature and the
burden is on the State to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
juvenile jurisdiction should be waived. Phelps v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1009, 1016
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. We review a juvenile court’s decision to
waive its jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. Id. The juvenile court is
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entitled to give the evidence whatever weight it deems appropriate. Id. To the
extent an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction, our review is conducted similarly
to other sufficiency cases. Id. We do not reweigh evidence or assess witness
credibility, and we look only to the evidence favorable to the State and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom considering both the record from
the waiver hearing and the court’s findings of fact. Id. A juvenile court’s
waiver order must include specific findings of fact to support the order. I.C. §
31-30-3-10.
[13] Here, the juvenile court found that all of the elements of Section 31-30-3-2 were
met, entered a detailed set of findings, and waived jurisdiction over Jordan’s
case to the Grant Circuit Court. Jordan’s challenge to the juvenile court’s order
centers only on whether the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that
Jordan was “beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile justice system.” I.C. § 31-
30-3-2(4). The determination of whether a juvenile is beyond rehabilitation of
the juvenile justice system is fact sensitive and can vary widely from individual
to individual and circumstance to circumstance. Hall v. State, 870 N.E.2d 449,
457 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
[14] Jordan’s specific allegation of error centers on the court’s use of the phrase
“criminal thinking” in its findings concerning the “beyond rehabilitation”
element of the waiver statute. Jordan contends that for the court to have
entered findings concerning “criminal thinking,” as used in the waiver order,
the record required evidence related to “criminogenic traits” as those are
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understood to apply within the context of evidence-based practices in
sentencing and rehabilitation. (Appellant’s Br. at 12.) Jordan notes that “no
data was presented regarding criminogenic traits, testing of said traits, or
criminal thinking as an area of relevant inquiry.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11.)
Absent such evidence, Jordan insists, “the juvenile court had no basis to
conclude that Jordan’s criminal thinking presented a bar to his successful
rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) Thus,
Jordan argues that the court’s waiver order was defective as a matter of law.
[15] To the extent Jordan would require the application, at the time of a waiver
hearing, of evidence-based practices each time the phrase “criminal thinking” is
invoked, he provides us with no legal authority to support that proposition.
Nor do we see any reason to impose such a requirement as a matter of law.
Jordan’s construction of the court’s order is excessively narrow and seeks to
impose requirements not stated in the juvenile waiver statute. The juvenile
court’s finding with respect to the “beyond rehabilitation” element states, “The
juvenile’s lack of any prospect of rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system is
demonstrated by his criminal thinking. The following factors are indicative of the
insufficiency of rehabilitative programs in the criminal justice system…” (App’x at 52,
emphasis added.) That is, even with invocation of the phrase “criminal
thinking,” the court’s order addresses the statutory “beyond rehabilitation”
element. And the court’s order goes on to recite numerous evidentiary matters
that are in the waiver hearing record, including Jordan’s minimization of his
part in the crime, his apparent lack of remorse, “his beliefs of [the victim’s]
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willingness to ‘go along’” being inconsistent with his actions, the decision to
move from a burglary of his victim’s home with a planned theft to rape upon
discovering little of value to steal, the alleged escalation of the rape, indifference
to the presence of the victim’s children in the home, and threats made on the
children in order to compel the victim’s compliance. (App’x at 52-54.) Jordan
does not challenge as insufficient the evidence underlying these findings.
[16] There is no error associated with the juvenile court’s use of the phrase “criminal
thinking” without reference to evidence-based measures of criminogenic
behavior where, as here, the elements of the waiver statute are otherwise
properly addressed and supported by evidence from the record of the waiver
hearing. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion where there was no
evidence related to criminal thinking as that term is used in evidence-based
practices assessing criminogenic behavior.
Inappropriateness of Sentence
[17] We turn to Jordan’s other contention on appeal, that his sentence is
inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).
[18] The authority granted to this Court by Article 7, § 6 of the Indiana Constitution
permitting appellate review and revision of criminal sentences is implemented
through Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides: “The Court may revise a
sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s
decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offense and the character of the offender.” Under this rule, and as
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interpreted by case law, appellate courts may revise sentences after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, if the sentence is found to be
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222-25 (Ind. 2008); Serino v. State,
798 N.E.2d 852, 856-57 (Ind. 2003). The principal role of such review is to
attempt to leaven the outliers. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225.
[19] In reviewing an inappropriateness challenge, the central inquiry is not whether
one sentence is more appropriate than another, but rather whether the sentence
in the challenged case is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008). Comparison of sentences for similar offenses can, then, be a
proper consideration in addressing an inappropriateness claim. Hunt v. State, 43
N.E.3d 588, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Comparison of sentences is
not, however, a requirement. Id.[20] Jordan was convicted of twelve counts of Rape and one count of Conspiracy to
Commit Rape, all as Level 1 felonies; Burglary, as a Level 4 felony; and
Robbery, as a Level 5 felony. For each Level 1 felony, Jordan faced a
sentencing range of between twenty and forty years imprisonment, with an
advisory term of thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b). For the single Level 4 felony
conviction, Jordan faced a sentencing range of between two and twelve years,
with an advisory term of six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. For the Level 5 felony
conviction, Jordan faced a sentencing range of between one and six years, with
an advisory term of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). The trial court imposed the
maximum terms of imprisonment for each offense, and ran the sentences
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concurrent with one another, yielding an aggregate term of imprisonment of
forty years, with four years suspended to probation.
[21] The nature of the Jordan’s offenses is, put simply, horrendous. As the State
observed in its brief, “‘[h]einous’ is too weak an adjective to accurately describe
the nature of these offenses.” (Appellee’s Br. at 31.) Jordan, along with two
others, broke into the victim’s home in the middle of the night, knowing that
the house was occupied. Jordan and his co-defendants, encountering a
frightened woman, proceeded to repeatedly rape R.H. while her children were
in the home, threatening injury to R.H. and to her children in order to obtain
her compliance. Jordan and his co-defendants looked for valuables to steal, and
took several items, including computers and other electronics. At some point,
Jordan, along with Callahan, stole the family’s van to buy snacks and returned
to the home. R.H. suffered considerable psychological harm, as well as
numerous physical injuries to her neck, shoulder, hips, abdomen, buttocks, and
vagina from the assault. The assault was prolonged and brutal, and does
nothing to suggest Jordan’s sentence was inappropriate in light of his offenses.
[22] Jordan’s character also does not militate in his favor. Jordan correctly notes
that he was less than sixteen years of age at the time of the offenses and that he
has no prior criminal history, though he was suspended from school for
“incorrigibility.” (App’x at 717.) Jordan also indicated that he was involved in
school sports and had above-average grades. However, even after having been
convicted of twelve counts of rape and a count of conspiracy to commit rape,
Jordan insisted to a probation officer not simply that he was innocent, but that
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his victim “did not protest” and that she “did not seem to be upset with the sex”
except for her concern that she would have “to explain to her husband about
the condom wrappers.” (App’x at 718.) Jordan stated that he experienced “joy
and thrill” when he took the victim’s car to leave the crime scene to buy snacks.
(App’x at 718.) Jordan testified at trial that while burglarizing the home was
disrespectful of R.H., he was otherwise respectful of her, despite having no
prior knowledge of or relationship with R.H. and acknowledging that under
similar circumstances, he would consider it disrespectful for someone to
commit the same acts upon women important in his own life. (Tr. at 603.)
When the State, on cross-examination, asked Jordan whether it was courageous
of him to break into a dark house at night and confront the homeowner without
backing down, Jordan responded that he thought he was courageous in doing
so. (Tr. at 618-19.) He also stated that he believed he was respectful of women
generally. A probation officer who observed Jordan’s trial testimony opined
that “the Defendant has no ‘moral compass and I don’t know how to fix that.’”
(App’x at 720.)
[23] Simply put, even given his age, Jordan’s character speaks poorly of him and of
the likelihood of rehabilitation. Recognizing this, Jordan argues that we should
determine his sentence inappropriate based largely upon the objective
measurements in the pre-sentencing investigation report. And, though he does
not challenge his sentence as unconstitutional, Jordan suggests that in light of
Supreme Court case law and psychological research his age should significantly
militate in favor of reducing his aggregate sentence to twenty years. He also
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compares his sentence to those of defendants in other cases that he contends are
similar in criminal history and charged offenses.
[24] We decline Jordan’s invitation to conclude that comparison to others and the
objective measures in the pre-sentencing investigation report render his sentence
inappropriate. The heinous nature of the offenses and his character militate
against it. We cannot conclude his sentence was inappropriate.
Conclusion
[25] The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it waived Jordan into the
Grant Circuit Court. Jordan’s sentence is not inappropriate.
[26] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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