Jefferson Jean-Baptiste v. State of Indiana

FILED
Feb 24 2017, 8:45 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Suzy St. John Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jefferson Jean-Baptiste, February 24, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1608-CR-1798
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Rebekah F.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Pierson-Treacy, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G19-1604-CM-12899
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Jefferson Jean-Baptiste appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, for
resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor. Jean-Baptiste raises a
single issue for our review, but we address two issues on appeal:
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1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
Jean-Baptiste’s conviction.
2. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error
when it denied Jean-Baptiste his right to a jury trial
without first securing his personal waiver of that right on
the record.
[2] The undisputed evidence demonstrates that a law enforcement officer, while
attempting to serve a “civil arrest warrant”1 on Jean-Baptiste at his home,
unlawfully entered Jean-Baptiste’s home. In light of that unlawful entry, Jean-
Baptiste had the right, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(i), to
reasonably resist the law enforcement officer. As that lawful resistance was the
only basis for Jean-Baptiste’s conviction, the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to support his conviction and, thus, we reverse. We also hold, sua
sponte, that the record unmistakably shows that the trial court failed to secure
Jean-Baptiste’s personal waiver of his right to a jury trial on the record.
Accordingly, the trial court committed fundamental error under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution when it denied Jean-Baptiste’s
jury’s trial request. As such, for that additional reason we also reverse.
1
The officer who served the warrant repeatedly identified it as a “civil arrest warrant,” and the parties on
appeal also use that terminology. We surmise that a “civil arrest warrant” is either a bench warrant or a writ
of body attachment issued in a civil proceeding.
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Facts and Procedural History
[3] On April 5, 2016, Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy James Russo went to Jean-
Baptiste’s residence to serve an arrest warrant stemming from a civil action
against Jean-Baptiste. Deputy Russo drove his official vehicle to Jean-
Baptiste’s residence and wore his law enforcement uniform and badge. He
approached Jean-Baptiste’s front door and knocked loudly on it. Upon Jean-
Baptiste opening the door, Deputy Russo identified himself as a law
enforcement officer. Deputy Russo then explained that he had a civil arrest
warrant for Jean-Baptiste, which Deputy Russo showed to Jean-Baptiste, and
that he needed Jean-Baptiste to “turn around and place his hands behind his
back.” Tr. Vol. II at 11. Jean-Baptiste impolitely refused. Deputy Russo
repeated his request “[n]umerous times,” to no avail. Id.
[4] During their exchange, Deputy Russo stood “outside of the threshold to the
doorway.” Id. at 19. Jean-Baptiste, however, “was in the threshold of his
doorway.” Id. That is, as Deputy Russo later explained, during their exchange
Deputy Russo was “outside of the residence” while Jean-Baptiste “was inside
the residence.” Id.
[5] In light of Jean-Baptiste’s noncompliance, Deputy Russo told Jean-Baptiste that
if Jean-Baptiste did not comply “he would . . . be tased.” Id. at 12. Rather than
comply, Jean-Baptiste “stood there.” Id. Deputy Russo then reached across the
threshold of the doorway “to grab [Jean-Baptiste’s] right arm to place him into
custody,” but Jean-Baptiste “yanked” his arm away “forcefully.” Id. Jean-
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Baptiste then backed away from the door and into his residence. Asserting
probable cause that Jean-Baptiste had just resisted arrest, Deputy Russo then
fully entered Jean-Baptiste’s residence and, thereafter, placed Jean-Baptiste into
custody.
[6] The State charged Jean-Baptiste with resisting law enforcement, as a Class A
misdemeanor, and disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor. 2 After a
bench trial, the court found Jean-Baptiste guilty of resisting law enforcement
and not guilty of disorderly conduct. The court then sentenced Jean-Baptiste
accordingly. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence
[7] Jean-Baptiste contends on appeal that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to support his conviction for resisting law enforcement. In our review
of such claims, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most
favorable to the conviction[,] neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing
witness credibility.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). “We
affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant
guilty.” Id.
2
The facts underlying the disorderly conduct charge arose after Deputy Russo had placed Jean-Baptiste into
custody.
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[8] To prove that Jean-Baptiste committed Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement, the State was required to show that he knowingly or intentionally
forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered with a law enforcement officer “while
the officer [wa]s lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties.” Ind.
Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2015) (emphasis added). The only question in this appeal is
whether a law enforcement officer who attempts to effect a civil arrest warrant
is lawfully engaged in that duty when he crosses the threshold of the
defendant’s residence without permission or other legal justification and grabs
the defendant. We hold he is not.
[9] The instant appeal is on all fours with this court’s opinion in Casselman v. State,
472 N.E.2d 1310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). In Casselman, a sheriff’s deputy
appeared at the front door of Casselman’s residence with a civil body
attachment order for Casselman to appear before the court. The deputy
knocked on the door, Casselman answered, and the deputy explained who he
was and why he was there. Casselman impolitely refused to cooperate, and he
then “tried to close the door” on the deputy. Id. at 1312. The deputy attempted
to physically prevent the door from closing, and Casselman “pushed” the
deputy away. Id. The two then engaged in “a shoving and grabbing match”
before Casselman retreated into his home. Id. The deputy followed him inside
and placed him into custody. The trial court convicted Casselman of resisting
law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor.
[10] We reversed on appeal. We initially noted that a writ of body attachment or
civil arrest warrant “is not a criminal arrest warrant.” Id. We noted that “[t]his
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distinction is important as we view the confrontation on the doorstep of
Casselman’s house.” Id. at 1313. Acknowledging the vitality of the Castle
Doctrine in Indiana,3 see I.C. § 35-41-3-2, we stated that, “in matters concerning
merely civil process, the courts of this land have been zealous in protecting
against the authority of the government to force entry into a private dwelling.”
Casselman, 472 N.E.2d at 1314.
[11] Accordingly, we held that the deputy in Casselman
was not lawfully engaged in the execution of civil process when,
while attempting to effect service of the writ, he prevented
Casselman from closing the door to his home. Casselman had
the right to close the door; he engaged in no resistance,
obstruction[,] or interference other than to attempt to assert that
right. The scuffle between Casselman and [the deputy] arose
only after [the deputy] unlawfully entered Casselman’s doorway
to prevent Casselman from closing the door.
Id. (citations omitted). Further, we expressly rejected the State’s argument that,
the lawfulness of the deputy’s actions aside, Casselman had no right to resist.
Id. at 1316. Specifically, we stated that, “assuming Casselman knew that civil
arrest was intended, . . . where the arrest is attempted by means of a forceful
and unlawful entry into a citizen’s home . . . such an entry represents the use of
excessive force.” Id.
3
“The Castle Doctrine arises out of ‘the common law rule that a man’s home is his castle, which gives him
the right to reasonably resist unlawful entry.’” Cupello v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1122, 1124 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
(quoting Barnes v. State, 953 N.E.2d 473, 474 (Ind. 2011), superseded by statute, I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a)).
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[12] We also recognize that the Indiana General Assembly recently reaffirmed its
commitment to Castle Doctrine as the policy in Indiana. See I.C. § 35-41-3-
2(a); see also Cupello v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1122, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (noting
that recent amendments to Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2 “reaffirmed . . . the
Castle Doctrine”). In particular, Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(i) provides
that “[a] person is justified in using reasonable force against a public servant if
the person reasonably believes the force is necessary to . . . prevent or terminate
the public servant’s unlawful entry of . . . the person’s dwelling . . . .”
[13] In light of Casselman and Section 35-41-3-2, we hold that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence to support Jean-Baptiste’s conviction for resisting
law enforcement. The undisputed evidence shows that Deputy Russo was
“outside of the residence” while Jean-Baptiste was “inside the residence” when
Deputy Russo, without permission or other legal justification, reached across
the threshold and grabbed Jean-Baptiste. Tr. Vol. II at 19. As a matter of law,
Deputy Russo unlawfully entered into Jean-Baptiste’s residence. Casselman, 472
N.E.2d at 1316. Thus, Deputy Russo was not lawfully engaged in the exercise
of his duties, which permitted Russo, under Section 35-41-3-2(i), to use
reasonable force to prevent or terminate Deputy Russo’s entry. And that is
what Jean-Baptiste did when he “yanked” his arm away “forcefully” from
Deputy Russo’s grasp. Tr. Vol. II at 12.
[14] Nonetheless, the State argues that Casselman is inapposite because “Deputy
Russo did not focibl[y] enter [Jean-Baptiste’s] residence . . . .” Appellee’s Br. at
12. We cannot agree that Deputy Russo acted without force when he reached
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across the threshold and, by his own admission, “grab[bed]” Jean-Baptiste’s
right arm. Tr. Vol. II at 12. And insofar as the State’s argument is that an
officer may not stick his foot in the doorway to prevent the resident from
closing the door, see Cupello, 27 N.E.3d at 1130, but the officer may nonetheless
grab a resident in the threshold of his doorway, we reject that distinction.
[15] The State also argues that the threshold “is essentially . . . a public place.”
Appellee’s Br. at 12. The Indiana Supreme Court thinks not:
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, . . . the threshold of a
home is the line that law enforcement officers cannot transgress
without judicial authorization. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent
exigent circumstances, that threshold may not be reasonably
crossed without a warrant.
Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (Ind. 1999) (quotation marks
omitted); see also Cupello, 27 N.E.3d at 1130 (“Constable Webb unlawfully
entered Cupello’s dwelling by placing his foot within the threshold of the
apartment door without lawful justification.”). The State’s argument on this
issue is without merit.
[16] Finally, the State argues that the most factually analogous case to Jean-
Baptiste’s is not Casselman but, rather, Johnson v. State, 747 N.E.2d 623 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001). We cannot agree. In Johnson, an officer went to Johnson’s
residence “to issue . . . a dog restraint violation.” Id. at 626. While engaging
with Johnson’s wife on the porch of the residence, Johnson engaged in
disorderly conduct directed at the officer from “the doorway” of the residence.
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Id. The officer then “grabbed [Johnson’s] arm in order to arrest him,” but
Johnson pulled his arm back and retreated into his residence. Id. The officer
followed and arrested Johnson.
[17] We affirmed his convictions for resisting law enforcement and disorderly
conduct. In analyzing whether the officer had acted lawfully for the resisting
law enforcement charge, we stated that “Johnson was in the doorway,
not . . . in the house . . . .” Id. at 632. We also relied on the fact that “Johnson
was engaged in a public confrontation” with the officer prior to his resisting
arrest. Id. And we noted that Johnson’s wife had “invited [the officer] onto the
porch . . . .” Id.
[18] None of those facts are present here. Unlike in Johnson, the undisputed
evidence here unequivocally shows that Jean-Baptiste was “inside the
residence.” Tr. Vol. II at 19. Further, there is no evidence that Jean-Baptiste
had engaged in disorderly conduct prior to or contemporaneous with the facts
underlying his resisting law enforcement conviction. And neither did Jean-
Baptiste or any other resident affirmatively invite Deputy Russo onto the
property. As such, we reject the State’s argument that Johnson rather than
Casselman is the more analogous authority here.
[19] In sum, we hold that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support
Jean-Baptiste’s conviction for resisting law enforcement, as a Class A
misdemeanor. The undisputed evidence inescapably demonstrates that Deputy
Russo was not lawfully engaged in the exercise of his duties when he reached
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across the threshold of Jean-Baptiste’s residence without permission or other
legal justification and grabbed him. As Deputy Russo was not lawfully engaged
in the exercise of his duties, as a matter of law Jean-Baptiste had the right to
reasonably resist Deputy Russo, which Jean-Baptiste did.4 Thus, we reverse
Jean-Baptiste’s conviction.
Issue Two: Jury Trial Waiver
[20] Even if we were to agree that the State presented sufficient evidence to support
Jean-Baptiste’s conviction, we would still be obliged to reverse, sua sponte,
because the trial court committed fundamental error when it denied Jean-
Baptiste’s right to a jury trial without first eliciting a personal waiver from him
on the record. As we explained in Casselman:
Criminal Rule 22 provides:
A defendant charged with a misdemeanor may demand a
trial by jury by filing a written demand therefor not later
than ten (10) days before his scheduled trial date. The
failure of a defendant to demand a trial by jury as required
by this rule shall constitute a waiver by him of trial by jury
unless the defendant has not had at least fifteen (15) days
advance notice of his scheduled trial date and of the
consequences of his failure to demand a trial by jury.
The state urges that since Casselman failed to demand a jury as
provided by the rule, no error was committed. The argument is
4
In light of our holding, we need not reach the State’s further argument that Deputy Russo was permitted to
enter Jean-Baptiste’s residence under a theory of hot pursuit.
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specious. If the rule is, itself, to pass constitutional muster it
must meet the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S.
238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 that waiver of such a
fundamental right cannot be presumed from a silent record. . . .
472 N.E.2d 1310, 1311 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added); see also
Fiandt v. State, 996 N.E.2d 421, 425-28 (Najam, J., dissenting), trans. not sought.
Further, it is beyond dispute that the Sixth Amendment requires the waiver of
the right to a jury trial to be made personally by the defendant. Doughty v. State,
470 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ind. 1984).
[21] Here, the record shows that Jean-Baptiste had been advised of Criminal Rule 22
and had not complied with it. Rather than complying with Rule 22, on the day
of his bench trial Jean-Baptiste requested a trial by jury. The trial court denied
his request solely on the basis of Jean-Baptiste’s noncompliance with Rule 22.
Tr. Vol. II at 7. That was fundamental error. Absent his personal waiver of his
right to a jury trial on the record, the court was required under the Sixth
Amendment to presume that a defendant charged with a Class A misdemeanor
desired a jury trial, not a bench trial. See Fiandt, 996 N.E.2d at 425-28 (Najam,
J., dissenting); see also Holly v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1176, 1177-78 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (Rucker, J.) (“Sentences exceeding six months may not be imposed
absent a jury trial or [a constitutionally sufficient] waiver thereof.”). Only after
that personal waiver on the record is secured may the trial court then operate
under Rule 22. As that did not happen here, the trial court committed
fundamental error when it denied Jean-Baptiste his right to a jury trial, and for
that additional reason we reverse his conviction.
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[22] Reversed.
Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.
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