Deborah S. Pridemore v. State of Indiana

FILED
Feb 24 2017, 9:41 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Debra S. Andry Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lawrence County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Agency
Bedford, Indiana J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Public Defender
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Deborah S. Pridemore, February 24, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
47A01-1607-CR-1652
v. Appeal from the Lawrence
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William G. Sleva,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
47D02-1512-F6-1496
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Deborah S. Pridemore brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s
denial of her motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. On
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appeal, she raises one issue for our review, namely, whether law enforcement
officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On December 22, 2015, Officer Anthony Wray of the narcotics division of the
Bedford Police Department spoke with an anonymous telephone caller who
informed him that the caller “was receiving texts” from Pridemore about
dealing methamphetamine to the caller. Tr. at 11. Officer Wray instructed the
anonymous caller to arrange a deal with Pridemore.
[3] Officer Wray had not previously worked with that anonymous caller, although
Officer Wray was aware of numerous calls on the police tip line over the past
several months that had informed police that Pridemore was involved in drug-
related activity. The information the anonymous caller provided to the police
on December 22 matched the information from the calls on the police tip line
over the last several months. The December 22 anonymous caller described
Pridemore’s vehicle, a dark blue Oldsmobile Alero, and knew where Pridemore
lived.
[4] Officer Wray had already conducted a background check on Pridemore and
knew where she lived and that she had prior convictions which included
possession of a controlled substance. After asking the December 22 anonymous
caller to arrange the drug deal with Pridemore, Officer Wray and Officer Chris
Roberts each drove separately to Pridemore’s residence and confirmed that
Pridemore’s vehicle was still there. While Office Wray was observing
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Pridemore’s home and vehicle, he received another call from the anonymous
caller that predicted that Pridemore would be leaving her home within the next
two minutes. About thirty seconds later, Pridemore left her residence and
pulled out of her driveway. The anonymous caller also predicted the direction
in which Pridemore would drive. Specifically, the caller stated that Pridemore
would drive south towards the Mitchell area, off of West U.S. 50. Officer Wray
followed Pridemore as she drove in the direction the caller had indicated.
[5] At the area where Mitchell Road meets Sandpit Road, Mitchell Road is a four
lane, two way road; it consists of two lanes heading southbound and two lanes
heading northbound. There is a double yellow line separating the north and
south bound lanes. There is also a small “median or division” in between the
two yellow lines that is one to two feet wide. Id. at 14-15. Around the area of
Mitchell and Sandpit Roads, Officer Wray observed Pridemore’s vehicle cross
over the yellow line separating the southbound lane from the median.
Specifically, he observed a “good portion of her front left tire” go into the
median between the north- and southbound lanes. Id. at 15. However, he did
not observe Pridemore cross the other yellow line and enter into the
northbound lane.
[6] Officer Wray did not pull Pridemore’s vehicle over at that time because he was
working as a detective in an unmarked car and was not wearing a police
uniform. Instead, Officer Wray radioed Officer David Booth of the Bedford
Police Department who was on patrol that day in uniform and in a marked
police vehicle. As part of the investigation of Pridemore, Officer Wray had
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asked Officer Booth to set up at a location in the area of southbound State Road
37 and the river bridge, “just south of the city limits,” to watch for a dark blue
Oldsmobile Alero that was possibly involved in a drug case. Id. at 23. After
observing Pridemore cross the center southbound yellow line, Officer Wray
radioed Booth and informed him that the driver of the dark blue Oldsmobile
Alero had just committed a traffic violation—specifically, driving “left of
center”—and he asked Officer Booth to stop the vehicle. Id. When Officer
Booth saw Pridemore’s vehicle and Officer Wray’s vehicle pass him, heading
south on 37, Officer Booth pulled out onto State Road 37 and followed
Pridemore’s vehicle.
[7] Officer Booth pulled Pridemore over just north of the State Road 37-U.S. 50
junction, and he approached her driver’s side window. Meanwhile, Officers
Roberts and Wray had each also pulled up and stopped at the scene, and
Officer Wray approached Pridemore’s vehicle at the passenger’s side window.
Officer Booth requested Pridemore’s driver’s license and registration and, after
she provided those to him, Officer Wray told Pridemore that he had received
information indicating that “there [were] most likely drugs in [her] vehicle and
it would be best for her to give them to [him] now.” Id. at 11. Pridemore then
removed from her bra a “corner baggie” containing a white substance, and she
handed it to Officer Wray. Id. Based on his training and experience, Officer
Wray believed that the baggie contained methamphetamine. Officer Wray
immediately field tested the substance back at his car, and it tested positive for
methamphetamine. Officer Wray then arrested Pridemore.
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[8] The State charged Pridemore with possession of methamphetamine, as a Level
6 felony, and possession of marijuana,1 as a Class B misdemeanor. On
February 23, 2016, Pridemore filed a motion to suppress the evidence found as
a result of the search of her vehicle on December 22. Following an evidentiary
hearing and briefing on that motion, the trial court denied the motion on May
16. This interlocutory appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Pridemore contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress.
The State has the burden to show that the measures it used to
seize evidence were constitutional. State v. Sitts, 926 N.E.2d
1118, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Our standard of appellate
review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is similar
to other sufficiency issues. State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340
(Ind. 2006). The record must disclose substantial evidence of
probative value that supports the trial court’s decision. Id. We
do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting
evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id.
Kroft v. State, 992 N.E.2d 818, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
[10] Pridemore asserts that the Bedford police officers did not have reasonable
suspicion to initiate their traffic stop of her, and, therefore, they violated her
1
The record does not disclose when or how police discovered that Pridemore possessed marijuana.
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Fourth Amendment rights.2 The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
Our jurisprudence reflects two types of police encounters that
implicate Fourth Amendment protection: the investigatory stop
and the custodial arrest. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 261 (Ind.
2013). An investigatory stop is generally brief in duration and is
constitutionally permissible so long as the law enforcement
officer “has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts
that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968)). The custodial arrest constitutes a greater restriction
upon the subject’s liberty and requires a commensurately greater
justification: probable cause. Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 261.
State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Ind. 2014).
[11] Here, the question is whether the police had reasonable suspicion to support a
brief investigatory stop, i.e., a “Terry stop,” of Pridemore’s vehicle.
When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion
for a Terry stop, we consider whether “the totality of the
circumstances” presented “a particularized and objective basis”
for the officer’s belief that the subject was engaged in criminal
activity. Sellmer [v. State], 842 N.E.2d [358,] 360 [(Ind. 2006)]
(internal citations omitted). If an officer observes a driver
commit a traffic violation, he has probable cause—and thus also
2
Pridemore does not raise an issue under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
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the lesser included reasonable suspicion—to stop that driver.
[State v.] Quirk, 842 N.E.2d [334,] 340 [(Ind. 2006)].
Id. Moreover, reasonable suspicion, as required for a traffic stop or an
investigatory stop, can rest on a reasonable mistake of law. Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).3
[12] While the infraction in question here is often referred to as “driving left of
center,” those words do not appear in the statute. Rather, the statute requires
that, “[u]pon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the
right half of the roadway[,]” with some exceptions. Ind. Code § 9-21-8-2(a) (2015)
(emphasis added). Failure to drive on the right half of the road without legal
justification is a Class C traffic infraction. I.C. § 9-21-8-49. Officer Wray
testified that he had witnessed Pridemore “cross left of center,” meaning she
crossed the southbound yellow line and into the median between the north- and
southbound lanes, in violation of Section 9-21-8-29(a). Tr. at 15. Further,
Pridemore presented no evidence to show that her driving outside the right-
hand lane was justified under a statutory exception. Therefore, the State
presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Officers
Booth and Wray had conducted a lawful traffic stop based on reasonable
suspicion that Pridemore had committed a traffic violation by driving outside
3
Thus, Pridemore is incorrect when she asserts that a mistake of law cannot justify a search. Appellant’s Br.
at 13, citing Sitts, 926 N.E.2d at 1120. To the extent Sitts and other Indiana cases have held that an officer’s
reasonable mistaken belief about the law cannot justify a search under the Fourth Amendment, they have
been overruled by Heien. Regardless, as we hold below, there was no mistake of law in this case.
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the right-hand lane.4 See Combs v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008) (holding a traffic stop was justified under the Fourth Amendment where
the evidence showed the police officer had a good faith belief that defendant
had driven left of center).
[13] Nonetheless, Pridemore contends that this case is comparable to State v. Sitts,
926 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), where we held that an officer did
not have reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop when the motorist crossed
only the center line between two adjacent southbound lanes. We noted that
crossing a line between two lanes heading the same direction was not a
violation of Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-2(a). Id. But, unlike the motorist in
Sitts, Pridemore crossed the center line between opposite lanes of travel. And
Pridemore cites no authority for her assertion that the statute only applies when
a motorist crosses into the opposite lane of travel. Rather, the statute plainly
states that “a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway.” See,
e.g., Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016) (noting that “[t]o discern
[the legislature’s] intent, we look first to the statutory language itself and give
effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory terms.”). A motorist is not
“upon the right half of the roadway” if she is driving in the median between
4
Because we hold that the traffic stop was lawful due to the officer’s observation of a traffic violation, we do
not address the State’s argument that the stop was also justified based on other evidence, such as the
information provided by the anonymous caller.
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two opposite lanes of travel. I.C. § 9-21-8-2(a). Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s denial of Pridemore’s motion to suppress.
[14] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.
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