William Harvey Ellis, Sr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 22 2017, 10:01 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William H. Ellis, Sr. Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William H. Ellis, Sr., March 22, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A05-1611-CR-2609
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John F. Surbeck,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D04-9505-CF-250
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Appellant-Defendant William H. Ellis, Sr. was convicted of murder, a felony,
in 1996. He was subsequently sentenced to a sixty-year term of imprisonment
in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). In October of 2016, Ellis filed a
motion to correct an erroneous sentence, alleging that the trial court’s 1996
judgment of conviction was facially deficient because it did not specify the
amount of “good time” credit to which Ellis was entitled for the time he spent
incarcerated prior to sentencing. The trial court denied Ellis’s motion in an
order dated October 21, 2016.
[2] Ellis appeals from the denial of his motion to correct an erroneous sentence.
Because we conclude that any error in the trial court’s 1996 judgment of
conviction is deemed to have been corrected by the presumption set forth by the
Indiana Supreme Court in Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. 2004), we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Ellis was charged with murder, a felony, on May 15, 1995. He was
subsequently found guilty and sentenced to a term of sixty years of
imprisonment. On June 27, 1996, the trial court entered a judgement of
conviction in which the trial court indicated that Ellis was “granted credit for
416 days served in jail.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 35. The judgment of
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conviction did not specify the amount of good time credit to which Ellis was
entitled for the time he spent incarcerated prior to sentencing.
[4] On October 17, 2016, Ellis filed a motion to correct an erroneous sentence. In
this motion, Ellis asserted that his sentence was erroneous because the
judgment of conviction entered by the trial court stated only that he was
granted credit for the 416 days spent incarcerated prior to sentencing and did
not specify the amount of good time credit to which he was entitled to receive
for the time he spent incarcerated prior to sentencing. The trial court denied
Ellis’s motion in an order dated October 21, 2016. This appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Ellis contends on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
correct an erroneous sentence, thus deferring the question of good time credit
earned to the DOC. Specifically, Ellis argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion because the judgment of conviction entered by the trial
court at the time of sentencing did not specify the amount of good time credit to
which he was entitled for time spent incarcerated prior to sentencing. We
disagree.
[6] It is undisputed that the version of Indiana Code section 35-38-3-2 that was in
effect at the time Ellis was sentenced required that a judgment of conviction
must include the amount of credit, including good time credit, earned for time
spent in confinement before sentencing. See Ind. Code § 35-38-3-2(b)(4) (1986).
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In an effort to facilitate the fair and expeditious resolution of appellate litigation
arising from sentencing judgments, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted the
following appellate presumption in Robinson:
Sentencing judgments that report only days spent in pre-sentence
confinement and fail to expressly designate credit time earned
shall be understood by courts and by the [DOC] automatically to
award the number of credit time days equal to the number of pre-
sentence confinement days. In the event of any pre-sentence
deprivation of credit time, the trial court must report it in the
sentencing judgment. Because the omission of designation of the
statutory credit time entitlement is thus corrected by this
presumption, such omission may not be raised as an erroneous
sentence.
805 N.E.2d at 792 (Ind. 2004) (footnote omitted).
[7] In this case, the trial court’s judgement of conviction indicated that Ellis was
“granted credit for 416 days served in jail.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 35. It
did not report any deprivation of credit time. As such, the trial court’s
judgment of conviction is entitled to the Robinson presumption and any error
contained therein is accordingly corrected by this presumption. See Robinson,
805 N.E.2d at 792; Pettiford v. State, 808 N.E.2d 134, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying Ellis’s motion to correct an
erroneous sentence.
[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.
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