Kevin Dowdy v. State of Indiana

FILED
Sep 07 2017, 7:39 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Deborah Markisohn Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana Eric P. Babbs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kevin Dowdy, September 7, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1612-CR-2679
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John Christ,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Commissioner
Trial Court Cause No.
49G14-1510-F6-37975
Brown, Judge.
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[1] In this interlocutory appeal, Kevin Dowdy appeals the trial court’s order
denying his motion to suppress evidence. He raises two issues which we
consolidate and restate as whether the court erred in denying his motion to
suppress. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 21, 2015, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Cameron
Taylor was conducting traffic patrol and “just running license plates” while he
was driving. Transcript Volume II at 8. He ran a license plate on a vehicle and
the status for the registration plate “came up expired” on his mobile data
terminal. Id. at 12. The return for information from the BMV included three or
four pages, and Officer Taylor’s computer terminal screen showed that the issue
date was October 21, 2014, and the expiration date was October 21, 2015. He
activated his lights and initiated a traffic stop because of the expired
registration.
[3] Officer Taylor approached the vehicle and spoke to the occupants including
Dowdy who was in the front passenger seat. Officer Taylor explained the
reason for the stop, asked the driver for her driver’s license and the vehicle
registration, and also asked Dowdy if he “wouldn’t mind giving [him] his
identification.” Id. at 14. Officer Taylor received their identifications or wrote
down their names and dates of birth, ran the occupants’ information, and
discovered that there were warrants for Dowdy’s arrest. He conducted a search
of Dowdy and discovered a “receipt with pills in it” in his pocket. Id. at 16.
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[4] On October 26, 2015, the State charged Dowdy with possession of a narcotic
drug as a level 6 felony. On May 2, 2016, Dowdy filed a motion to suppress
evidence and argued that the stop, detention, arrest, and seizure of the
contraband was illegal.
[5] On July 26, 2016, the court held a suppression hearing. Officer Taylor testified
that the return for information from the BMV is four pages and that:
[T]here’s a status that – it says status and then it will say active,
inactive, suspended, or expired. I just look for that spot because
I’m just – you know, I’m not trying to read every little detail
about – I don’t care when the plate was issued. I don’t
necessarily care when it was expired. I just look to see that it’s
expired according to the BMV because that’s where I get my
returns from.
Id. at 10-11. When asked if at any point it came to his attention that the license
plate’s expiration date was the same as the date of the actual traffic stop, he
answered: “Somebody – I thought of it. I think it stood out to me obviously
when I went to write the report.” Id. at 15. He also indicated that someone
who has a warrant takes priority over an expired registration. On cross-
examination, Officer Taylor testified that his computer terminal screen showed
that the issue date was October 21, 2014, and the expiration date was October
21, 2015. On redirect examination, he testified that the status for the vehicle
registration was expired.
[6] On September 15, 2016, the court held a hearing and denied Dowdy’s motion
to suppress. The court stated:
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After reviewing the case law and the facts, I do find that the
officer’s behavior was reasonable; that he did rely upon the
computer transmission from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles that
indicated that the license plate and registration . . . were expired.
What I’m seeing – what my recollection that the officer relied on
was not just the dates but the submission from the Bureau of
Motor Vehicles that the license was, in fact – that the registration
was, in fact, expired.
I don’t know if was [sic] a mistake of law on his part, but I think
that there’s a difficulty interpretation – of interpreting that law.
I tried to find what the code would state as to the expiration date
and when that would – when that would happen and when
registrations would expire, and the only statute is the statute
submitted by Defense that, you know, speaks to when the
expiration date is on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday time when
the license branches would be closed.
I think it would require the officer to make some sort of legal
interpretation. I don’t know that it’s automatically clear of what
the expiration date would be based on that statute when it
happened in this case on a Wednesday.
I think the officer’s behavior was reasonable. I don’t think that it
is inherently unreasonable. I don’t think it was a mistake of law
or ignorance of the law. I think he relied reasonably upon the
Bureau of Motor Vehicle’s communication that the license plates
and registration were expired on that vehicle.
Mr. Dowdy had a warrant for his arrest. And I think everything
found thereafter flows from the warrant and the search once he’s
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taken into custody on that warrant. So I find the officer’s
behavior reasonable.
Id. at 32-33. Dowdy now brings this interlocutory appeal.
Discussion
[7] The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Dowdy’s motion to
suppress. The admission of evidence is entrusted to the trial court’s sound
discretion. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014). See also Kelly v.
State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013) (addressing a denial of a motion to
suppress and holding that the admission of evidence is a matter entrusted to the
trial court’s sound discretion). “We review a trial court’s denial of a
defendant’s motion to suppress deferentially, construing conflicting evidence in
the light most favorable to the ruling, but we will also consider any substantial
and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at
365. “We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, and we will not reweigh the evidence.” Id. “When the trial court’s
denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress concerns the constitutionality of a
search or seizure, however, it presents a question of law, and we address that
question de novo.” Id.
[8] Dowdy argues that the registration was valid until midnight on October 21,
2015, and that his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution were
violated.
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A. Fourth Amendment
[9] The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
[10] A law enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct
in order to justify a traffic stop, which is a “seizure” for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. Clarke v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1114, 1118 (Ind. 2007) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). See also Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d
332, 335 (Ind. 2013) (“[A] traffic stop . . . is permissible where an officer has at
least reasonable suspicion that a traffic law, or other law, has been violated.”),
reh’g denied. We make reasonable-suspicion determinations by looking at the
totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer
has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.
Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 2009). In assessing the whole
picture, we must examine the facts as known to the officer at the moment of the
stop. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 264 (Ind. 2013). We review findings of
reasonable suspicion de novo. Id. This is necessarily a fact-sensitive inquiry.
Id.
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[11] Dowdy argues that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because
Officer Taylor’s justification for the stop was a mistake of law. He contends
that, where there is no vehicular violation, a stop is not constitutionally
permissible, that Officer Taylor simply relied on the designation of expired that
appeared as part of the BMV records check, and that he failed to fully examine
the BMV record to learn the date the registration was issued and the date it
expired.
[12] The State asserts that it does not and that it need not take a position regarding
whether a vehicle registration issued by the BMV remains valid until midnight
following the expiration date. It argues that Officer Taylor’s on-the-spot
evaluation was reasonable and that he could not have found the BMV return to
be in error by a cursory review. It asserts that, before finding the BMV return to
be incorrect, Officer Taylor would have had to notice a discrepancy between the
status of expired and the math revealed by the issue and expiration dates and
adopt the most-driver friendly resolution of a legal issue that, as Dowdy admits
on appeal, has no clear answer in Indiana statutes. The State also contends that
in any event the evidence found on Dowdy’s person is admissible because the
pre-existing arrest warrants sufficiently attenuated any taint, citing Utah v.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).1
1
Because we decide that the stop was reasonable, we need not address the attenuation doctrine which can be
applied under certain circumstances when an officer makes an unconstitutional investigative stop, learns
during the stop that the suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant, and proceeds to arrest the suspect and
seize incriminating evidence during a search incident to that arrest. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059-2064.
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[13] The State cites to Heien v. North Carolina, in which the United States Supreme
Court addressed whether a police officer’s mistake of law can give rise to the
reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014). In that case, a police officer initiated
a traffic stop after observing only the left brake light illuminate when a vehicle
braked. Id. Heien, a passenger of the stopped vehicle, consented to a search,
and police discovered cocaine. Id. The State charged Heien with attempted
trafficking of cocaine. Id. at 535. Heien moved to suppress the evidence seized
from the car, contending that the stop and search violated the Fourth
Amendment, and the trial court denied the motion. Id. Heien pled guilty but
reserved the right to appeal the suppression decision. Id.
[14] The relevant provision of the vehicle code in Heien provided that a car must be:
equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. The stop
lamp shall display a red or amber light visible from a distance of
not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal sunlight, and shall be
actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake. The stop
lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear
lamps.
Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-129(g) (2007)). The North Carolina
Court of Appeals reversed and held that the initial stop was not valid because
driving with only one working brake light was not actually a violation of North
Carolina law. Id. (citing 214 N.C. App. 515, 714 S.E.2d 827 (2011)).
[15] The State of North Carolina appealed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed. Id. (citing 366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d 351). Noting that the State had
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chosen not to seek review of the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the vehicle
code, the Court assumed for purposes of its decision that the faulty brake light
was not a violation. Id. It concluded that, for several reasons, the police officer
could have reasonably, even if mistakenly, read the vehicle code to require that
both brake lights be in good working order, and noted that a nearby code
provision required that all originally equipped rear lamps be functional. Id.
(citing 366 N.C. at 282-283, 737 S.E.2d at 358-359).
[16] The United States Supreme Court observed that the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Id. at 536. “To be reasonable is not to
be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part
of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community’s protection.’” Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176, 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949)). The Court observed that searches and seizures
based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable and held:
But reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such
mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable
suspicion. Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of
an officer’s understanding of the facts and his understanding of
the relevant law. The officer may be reasonably mistaken on
either ground. Whether the facts turn out to be not what was
thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the
result is the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law.
There is no reason, under the text of the Fourth Amendment or
our precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when
reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when
reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.
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Id. The Court also stated:
Heien also contends that the reasons the Fourth Amendment
allows some errors of fact do not extend to errors of law. Officers
in the field must make factual assessments on the fly, Heien
notes, and so deserve a margin of error. In Heien’s view, no such
margin is appropriate for questions of law: The statute here either
requires one working brake light or two, and the answer does not
turn on anything “an officer might suddenly confront in the
field.” Brief for Petitioner 21. But Heien’s point does not
consider the reality that an officer may “suddenly confront” a
situation in the field as to which the application of a statute is
unclear—however clear it may later become. A law prohibiting
“vehicles” in the park either covers Segways or not, see A. Scalia
& B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 36-
38 (2012), but an officer will nevertheless have to make a quick
decision on the law the first time one whizzes by.
Contrary to the suggestion of Heien and amici, our decision does
not discourage officers from learning the law. The Fourth
Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those
mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively
reasonable. We do not examine the subjective understanding of
the particular officer involved. Cf. Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996). And the
inquiry is not as forgiving as the one employed in the distinct
context of deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified
immunity for a constitutional or statutory violation. Thus, an
officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a
sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.
Id. at 539-540. In applying the test of whether the mistake of law was
reasonable to the facts, the Court stated:
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Here we have little difficulty concluding that the officer’s error of
law was reasonable. Although the North Carolina statute at
issue refers to “a stop lamp,” suggesting the need for only a single
working brake light, it also provides that “[t]he stop lamp may be
incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-129(g) (emphasis added). The use of
“other” suggests to the everyday reader of English that a “stop
lamp” is a type of “rear lamp.” And another subsection of the
same provision requires that vehicles “have all originally
equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in good working order,” §
20-129(d), arguably indicating that if a vehicle has multiple “stop
lamp[s],” all must be functional.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that the “rear
lamps” discussed in subsection (d) do not include brake lights,
but, given the “other,” it would at least have been reasonable to
think they did. Both the majority and the dissent in the North
Carolina Supreme Court so concluded, and we agree. See 366
N.C., at 282-283, 737 S.E.2d, at 358-359; id., at 283, 737 S.E.2d,
at 359 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (calling the Court of Appeals’
decision “surprising”). This “stop lamp” provision, moreover,
had never been previously construed by North Carolina’s
appellate courts. See id., at 283, 737 S.E.2d, at 359 (majority
opinion). It was thus objectively reasonable for an officer in
Sergeant Darisse’s position to think that Heien’s faulty right
brake light was a violation of North Carolina law. And because
the mistake of law was reasonable, there was reasonable
suspicion justifying the stop.
Id. at 540.
[17] Dowdy states that there does not appear to be a single statute in the motor
vehicle code which definitively controls the interpretation of when a vehicle’s
registration expires and does not point to a case addressing when a registration
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expires. He points to Ind. Code § 9-18-2-50 and asserts that this statute
indicates a vehicle’s registration remains valid until midnight on the last day of
the term of registration. Ind. Code § 9-18-2-50 is titled “Expiration date of
registration; closure of license branch” and provides:
If the date on which the registration of a vehicle expires is a day
on which all license branches located in the county in which the
vehicle is registered are closed, including:
(1) a Sunday; or
(2) a legal holiday listed in IC 1-1-9-1;
the registration expires at midnight on the date following the next
day on which a license branch located in the county in which the
vehicle is registered is open for business.[2]
[18] Even assuming that Officer Taylor was ultimately mistaken in his belief that a
violation occurred, the traffic stop was based upon a good faith, reasonable
belief that a statutory infraction had occurred. No case has cited Ind. Code § 9-
18-2-50. Officer Taylor testified that he was driving and running license plates,
ran the plate, received three or four pages of information, and that the status for
the registration came back as expired. He also testified that he looks to see if
the registration is “expired according to the BMV because that’s where I get my
returns from.” Transcript Volume II at 11. Under these circumstances, we
2
The day Officer Taylor stopped Dowdy, October 21, 2015, was a Wednesday.
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conclude that the totality of the circumstances presented a particularized and
objective basis for a stop and that the stop was reasonable and did not violate
Dowdy’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.3 See Sanders, 989 N.E.2d at 336
(holding that the apparent infraction for which the defendant’s vehicle was
initially stopped did in fact exist at law, and although the officer was ultimately
mistaken in his belief that a violation occurred, the traffic stop was based upon
a good faith, reasonable belief that a statutory infraction had occurred and thus
the Court was unable to say that the traffic stop was not lawful); Croom v. State,
996 N.E.2d 436, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Sanders and concluding that an
officer was concerned that the defendant was breaking the law, reasonably
stopped the defendant in order to obtain more information, and that the
officer’s good-faith reasonable belief that a violation occurred was sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment), reh’g denied,
trans. denied.4
3
Dowdy cites Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), and asserts that Officer Taylor lacked
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop because his belief that the registration was expired was a mistake of
law. In Gunn, an officer believed that turning left into a lane other than the lane in the right half of the
roadway closest to the center line was a traffic infraction, observed a vehicle make such a turn, and initiated a
traffic stop. 956 N.E.2d at 138. We examined Ind. Code § 9-21-8-21, which governs the manner in which to
make a turn at an intersection, and held that the statute does not specify which lane the driver must enter if
there is more than one lane for traffic in that direction and that the only requirement was that the driver must
enter a lane to the right of the center lane. Id. at 140. We held that “although an officer’s good faith belief
that a person has committed a violation will justify a traffic stop, an officer’s mistaken belief about what
constitutes a violation does not amount to good faith.” Id. Here, unlike in Gunn, the infraction for which
Officer Taylor initially stopped the vehicle does in fact exist in law.
4
Upon discovering that Dowdy had warrants for his arrest, Officer Taylor conducted a search of his person.
Dowdy does not argue that the search that revealed the pills did not constitute a valid search incident to
arrest.
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[19] To the extent Dowdy argues that, even if the registration had expired, Officer
Taylor exceeded his authority in detaining the individuals and running their
identifications, we disagree. Ind. Code § 9-18-2-7 governs the registration of
vehicles and provides that a person that operates a vehicle with an expired
license plate commits a class C infraction.5 Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3 provides:
(a) Whenever a law enforcement officer believes in good faith
that a person has committed an infraction or ordinance violation,
the law enforcement officer may detain that person for a time
sufficient to:
(1) inform the person of the allegation;
(2) obtain the person’s:
(A) name, address, and date of birth; or
(B) driver’s license, if in the person’s possession; and
(3) allow the person to execute a notice to appear.
5
Specifically, Ind. Code § 9-18-2-7 provides in part:
(b) Except as provided in IC 9-18-12-2.5, a person that owns or operates a vehicle may
not operate or permit the operation of a vehicle that:
(1) is required to be registered under this chapter; and
(2) has expired license plates.
*****
(h) A person that operates or permits the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of subsection (b)
commits a Class C infraction.
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[20] In Starr v. State, we addressed an officer’s interactions with a passenger of a
vehicle following a traffic stop. 928 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),
trans. denied. Specifically, we addressed whether a vehicular passenger is subject
to the same criminal penalties by refusing to identify himself when, unlike the
driver of the vehicle, there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed
an infraction or violated an ordinance. We discussed Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3.5
which provides:
A person who knowingly or intentionally refuses to provide
either the person’s:
(1) name, address, and date of birth; or
(2) driver’s license, if in the person’s possession;
to a law enforcement officer who has stopped the person for an
infraction or ordinance violation commits a Class C
misdemeanor.
[21] We held that “[t]here was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an
infraction or ordinance violation, giving rise to an obligation to identify himself
upon threat of criminal prosecution,” and we reversed the conviction. Starr,
928 N.E.2d 876 at 880. However, we also stated:
Certainly, a police officer is free to request identification without
implicating the Fourth Amendment. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292
(2004). As such, we do not suggest that an officer is constrained
to request only the driver’s identification during a traffic stop. In
the vast majority of cases, a person will choose to comply when
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identification is requested. Nonetheless, as a general proposition,
“[c]itizens are not required to interact with police officers.”
Greeno v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145
L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000)).
Id. at 879-880.
[22] We conclude that Officer Taylor’s asking Dowdy if he “wouldn’t mind giving
[him] his identification,” Transcript Volume II at 14, did not violate Dowdy’s
rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Starr, 928 N.E.2d at 879-880; United
States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that passengers may
be questioned without reasonable suspicion).
B. Article 1, Section 11
[23] Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
[24] Although its text mirrors the federal Fourth Amendment, we interpret Article 1,
§ 11 of our Indiana Constitution separately and independently. Robinson, 5
N.E.3d at 368. “When a defendant raises a Section 11 claim, the State must
show the police conduct ‘was reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances.’” Id. (quoting State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1205-1206
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(Ind. 2008), reh’g denied). “The focus of the exclusionary rule under the Indiana
Constitution is the reasonableness of police conduct.” Hardister v. State, 849
N.E.2d 563, 573 (Ind. 2006). “We consider three factors when evaluating
reasonableness: ‘1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a
violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or
seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law
enforcement needs.’” Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 368 (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824
N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005)).
[25] With respect to the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation
has occurred, the BMV report listed the vehicle registration as expired and
operating a vehicle with an expired registration is an infraction that exists. As
for the degree of intrusion, we cannot say that Starr, which is relied upon by
Dowdy and discussed above, warrants a finding that the degree of intrusion was
high. The record reveals that Officer Taylor asked Dowdy if he “wouldn’t
mind giving [him] his identification” and that Officer Taylor either received his
identification or wrote down his name and date of birth. Transcript Volume II
at 14. With respect to the extent of law enforcement needs, we observe that a
police officer’s ability to search for outstanding warrants is important for
officers to ensure the safety of the public. Further, upon discovering that
Dowdy had warrants for his arrest, Officer Taylor conducted a search of
Dowdy’s person. As noted, Dowdy does not argue that the search that revealed
the pills did not constitute a valid search incident to arrest. Under the totality of
the circumstances, we conclude that the stop and search was reasonable and did
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not violate Dowdy’s rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution.6 See Croom, 996 N.E.2d at 442-443 (observing that the lack of
registration information made an officer suspicious that the defendant’s car was
not validly registered, balancing the high degree of concern, suspicion, or
knowledge that a violation occurred and the needs of law enforcement against
the low degree of intrusion, and concluding that the officer had reasonable
suspicion under Article 1, Section 11).
Conclusion
[26] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Dowdy’s motion to suppress.
[27] Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
6
Dowdy argues that, once Officer Taylor verified the registration was still valid, nothing in the record
justified any further inquiry as the reason for the traffic stop no longer existed. The record reveals, that when
asked if at any point it came to his attention that the license plate’s expiration date was the same as the date
of the actual traffic stop, Officer Taylor answered: “Somebody – I thought of it. I think it stood out to me
obviously when I went to write the report.” Transcript Volume II at 15. However, Dowdy does not point to
the record to suggest that Officer Taylor determined that the registration was valid prior to requesting his
identification or discovering that there were warrants for his arrest.
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