Paris LaPriest Powell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 05 2017, 8:52 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
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estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Anthony C. Lawrence Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Larry D. Allen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Paris LaPriest Powell, April 5, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
48A04-1603-CR-691
v. Appeal from the
Madison Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Thomas L. Clem, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C05-1503-CM-336
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Paris LaPriest Powell (“Powell”) was convicted after a jury trial of battery 1 as a
Class A misdemeanor and conversion2 as a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial
court imposed a total sentence of one year with six months suspended and the
balance to be served on work release. He appeals raising several issues, which
we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in instructing
the jury;
II. Whether the State improperly withheld certain
exculpatory evidence from Powell in violation of Brady v.
Maryland;3
III. Whether the trial court erred because it did not allow
Powell to present witnesses and evidence on his behalf at
his sentencing hearing; and
IV. Whether Powell’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and character of the offender.
[2] We affirm.
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1), (c).
2
See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3(a).
3
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Facts and Procedural History
[3] In September 2014, Powell was living together with Jennifer Clary (“Clary”) in
a home located in Anderson, Indiana. On September 29, 2014, Clary had a
friend, Leah Vaughn (“Vaughn”), staying at the house; Vaughn had stayed
overnight the night before, and Clary and Vaughn spent the day together on
September 29 driving around town and visiting Vaughn’s mother. Clary and
Vaughn returned to the house late in the evening.
[4] When the women arrived at the house, Powell was waiting for them in the
living room. As soon as Clary and Vaughn came into the house, Powell
became angry because Clary had not returned his phone calls to her while she
was out with Vaughn. Powell then ordered Vaughn to leave the house
immediately. Vaughn stated that she wanted to retrieve her belongings, which
were located upstairs, before leaving. After Vaughn and Powell argued about
retrieving Vaughn’s overnight bag, Powell agreed to allow Vaughn to get her
bag. He then grabbed Vaughn by the arm and dragged her up the stairs. Powell
was physically larger than Vaughn, and as he quickly went up the stairs,
dragging Vaughn, he caused her to trip on the steps. They entered the bedroom
where Vaughn’s belongings were located, and Powell commanded Vaughn to
sit on the bed. Vaughn replied that she was leaving since she had retrieved her
overnight bag. Powell then snatched the bag out of Vaughn’s hands, and with
his other hand, he grabbed Vaughn by her hair and dragged her back down the
stairs. Powell’s actions of grabbing Vaughn by the arm and hair and dragging
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her through the house caused her pain and resulted in some of her hair falling
out.
[5] When Powell and Vaughn reached the living room, Powell demanded that
Vaughn give him her cell phone and snatched the phone out of her hand.
Powell, still grabbing Vaughn by the hair, then shoved her out the front door.
He threw her bag and belongings out the door too, and the contents were
strewn all over the front yard. Powell kept Vaughn’s cell phone.
[6] After Vaughn attempted to gather up all of her things, she began walking down
the street toward another friend’s house. Vaughn was very upset and crying.
As she walked down the street, Vaughn spotted a passing patrol car and waved
at the officer to get him to pull over. At that time, it was about 2:00 a.m. on
September 30, 2014. Anderson Police Department Officer David Reed
(“Officer Reed”) observed Vaughn and stopped to assist her. Vaughn recounted
to Officer Reed what had transpired and what Powell had done. Officer Reed
reported what had occurred on his police radio, and shortly thereafter,
Anderson Police Department Officers Michael Lee and Chaz Willis, who were
riding together in a separate patrol car, arrived at Officer Reed’s location as
backup. Vaugh told the officers that she wanted to get her cell phone back from
Powell and that she was afraid of him.
[7] The officers accompanied Vaughn back to the house and knocked on the front
door. Powell answered the door and denied that anything had happened and
stated that he did not have Vaughn’s cell phone. At that time, Officer Reed
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dialed Vaughn’s cell phone number, and the officers could hear the phone
ringing from the sofa, where Powell had been sitting before answering the door.
Although Powell claimed he was not aware of the phone’s location, he went
directly to the sofa to retrieve the phone and handed it to the officers. During
this time, Vaughn retrieved more of her belongings that were scattered in the
front yard. The officers drove Vaughn to a motel so she had a place to stay for
the night. While Vaughn had been reluctant to pursue criminal charges against
Powell when she first encountered the police, she changed her mind on the way
to the motel. The officers recorded a video statement from her.
[8] The State charged Powell with Class A misdemeanor battery and Class A
misdemeanor conversion. A jury trial was held, at which Powell represented
himself with standby counsel assisting. Prior to trial, Powell filed a notice that
he intended to present a defense of justifiable reasonable force, and he also
requested a preliminary instruction on the use of reasonable force as a defense.
Tr. at 93, 167. The trial court informed Powell that “if that becomes an issue,
I’m going to let ya give [the instruction],” but warned that “it has to become an
issue in the case, before it’s given.” Id. at 168. After the parties concluded their
presentation of evidence at trial, Powell asked the trial court to give a final
instruction on the use of reasonable force in defense of property. Id. at 356.
The trial court requested to see Powell’s proposed instruction, but Powell did
not have a prepared instruction. Powell’s standby counsel asked the trial court
to give the pattern jury instruction, but ultimately, the trial court refused to give
the instruction on the basis that it was not supported by the evidence presented
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at trial and because the pattern jury instruction mentioned the use of deadly
force. Id. at 358-60.
[9] Powell then stated that he was ready to make his closing argument and agreed
that the trial court’s instructions were satisfactory. Id. at 360-61. Powell’s
standby counsel objected on his behalf as to the trial court’s refusal to give a
defense of property instruction, which the trial court overruled. Id. at 367-68.
When Powell made his closing argument, he did not argue that he acted in
defense of his property; instead, he argued that he never grabbed Vaughn’s hair
or took her cell phone and only escorted her out of the house. Id. at 374-92. At
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Powell guilty as charged.
[10] During the sentencing hearing on December 22, 2015, Powell argued that there
were no injuries to Vaughn. The State responded, “as far as there not being
evidence of bruising[,] I saw the pictures Your Honor, there was a lot of
bruising on that young lady.” Id. at 440. Powell inquired as to why such
pictures were not offered, and the State responded, “Because I knew what you
were going to say if she got on the witness stand and said that.” Id. at 441.
Powell did not raise any objection to these statements by the State or request to
review the pictures mentioned by the State.
[11] In his argument to the trial court at sentencing, Powell stated that he had
witnesses available to testify if necessary. After Powell made his argument at
sentencing, the trial court inquired as to whether Powell had anything else to
present, and Powell responded that he did not. Id. at 440, 448. Powell did not
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attempt to present any witnesses during the sentencing hearing, and no
objections were raised in reference to his witnesses. After hearing the argument
of the parties, the trial court sentenced Powell to a one-year sentence for each of
his Class A misdemeanor convictions, with the sentences to run concurrently.
Of his aggregate one-year sentence, six months were to be served on work
release and six months on probation. Powell now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Jury Instruction
[12] Powell argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to give
his proposed jury instruction on the use of force to protect person or property
defense. However, Powell has waived this claim because he failed to tender a
proposed jury instruction in writing. An oral request for a jury instruction is
not enough and failure to tender the jury instruction in writing waives the claim
on appeal. Ketcham v. State, 780 N.E.2d 1171, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans.
denied.
[13] Waiver notwithstanding, Powell’s claim fails on the merits. The manner of
instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Albores v. State,
987 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. On appeal, we review the
trial court’s decision only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. In reviewing a
trial court’s decision to refuse a proposed jury instruction, we consider whether
the instruction (1) correctly stated the law, (2) was supported by the evidence,
and (3) was covered in substance by other instructions that are given. Id.
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[14] Here, although Powell did not tender a proposed instruction in writing, his
standby counsel orally requested that the trial court give the pattern jury
instruction. Indiana Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 10.04, which was the
pattern jury instruction orally proposed by standby counsel and reviewed by the
trial court, states in pertinent part:
A person may use reasonable force, including deadly force,
against another person, and does not have a duty to retreat, if
he/she reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent
or terminate the other person’s unlawful entry of or attack on
his/her dwelling.
[15] In the present case, the evidence did not support giving this instruction as to use
of force to protect person or property defense. The evidence presented showed
that Vaughn was an invited guest of Clary when she entered the house. Vaughn
had stayed overnight at the house the night before, and her belongings were still
inside of the house. Shortly after Vaughn arrived at the house, Powell
demanded that she leave, and Vaughn responded that she wanted to get her
belongings first. Tr. at 195-96. Powell then grabbed her by the arm and
dragged her up the stairs to get her bag. After obtaining her bag, Vaughn told
Powell, “I’m leaving,” but he snatched the bag from her and grabbed her by the
hair and pulled her down the stairs and out the front door. Id. at 199-200. This
evidence did not support that an unlawful entry by Vaughn or an attack on
Powell’s dwelling occurred, which must be present to trigger the defense of
reasonable force. We conclude that the evidence presented at trial did not
support giving the pattern jury instruction on the use of force to protect a
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person’s dwelling. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give
the jury instruction.
II. Brady Violation
[16] Powell argues that the State committed a violation of Brady v. Maryland because
it failed to disclose photographs of Vaughn that he claims were exculpatory.
Initially, the State contends that Powell has waived his Brady claim for failing to
follow the proper procedural steps. We agree. The procedural steps for raising
a Brady issue are controlled by Criminal Rule 16 and Trial Rules 59 and 61.
Prewitt v. State, 819 N.E.2d 393, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. A Brady
violation is almost always based on evidence that comes to light after trial, and
if so, it is raised by a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence, or a motion to correct error. Id. Pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule
16(A), the defendant must file a motion to correct error in order to address
“newly discovered material evidence, including alleged jury misconduct,
capable of production within thirty (30) days of sentencing which, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered and produced at trial.”
See also Ind. Trial Rule 59(A). “A motion to correct error addressing newly
discovered evidence is a mandatory prerequisite for an appeal, and a failure to
file such a motion will result in a waiver of the issue unless the provisions of
Trial Rule 60(B)(2) for late discovered evidence apply.” Prewitt, 819 N.E.2d at
400 (internal quotations omitted).
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[17] Here, Powell learned of the photographs that he alleges were exculpatory
during sentencing. In order to allow the trial court an opportunity to rule on his
allegations of a Brady violation, Powell was required to raise the issue in a
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence or in a motion to
correct error. Prewitt, 819 N.E.2d at 400. Because he did not do so, Powell has
waived his claim on appeal. Therefore, he must raise his issue as fundamental
error. See Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1239 (Ind. 2012) (“The
fundamental error doctrine provides a vehicle for the review of error not
properly preserved for appeal.”). However, Powell does not allege fundamental
error in his brief. He has, thus, waived his argument for failure to make a
cogent argument. See Absher v. State, 866 N.E.2d 350, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that appellant failed to successfully invoke doctrine of fundamental
error when he failed to provide cogent argument).
[18] Waiver notwithstanding, Powell’s Brady argument fails on the merits. In Brady
v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). “‘To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must establish: (1) that the
prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the
defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial.’” Bunch v.
State, 964 N.E.2d 274, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Minnick v. State, 698
N.E.2d 745, 755 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1006 (1999)), trans. denied.
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Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. (citing United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). The State will not be found to have suppressed material
evidence if it was available to a defendant through the exercise of reasonable
diligence. Id. (citing Conner v. State, 711 N.E.2d 1238, 1246 (Ind. 1999), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 829 (2000)). Favorable evidence includes both exculpatory
evidence and impeachment evidence. Id. at 297-98.
[19] Powell argues that the photographs of Vaughn could have been exculpatory
because they demonstrated that someone else had inflicted injury to Vaughn or
they could have impeached Vaughn’s credibility and other witnesses who had
stated an absence of injury. Powell has not shown how photographs depicting
“a lot of bruising” to Vaughn would have been favorable to his defense or
material to an issue at trial. Tr. at 440. The only information that is known
about the photographs is that they depicted Vaughn after the battery, and they
showed “a lot of bruising.” Id. There is no evidence that these photographs
would have been helpful to Powell’s defense. Powell has failed to indicate that
there is a reasonable probability that, had these photographs of Vaughn been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Bunch, 964 N.E.2d at 298. We, therefore, conclude that Powell has not shown
that a Brady violation occurred.
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III. Evidence at Sentencing
[20] Powell claims that the trial court erred because it failed to allow him to present
evidence and witnesses on his behalf at sentencing. Powell specifically asserts
that the trial court violated his due process rights when it denied him an
opportunity to introduce evidence and have witnesses testify at his sentencing
hearing. He alleges that he had several witnesses available at his sentencing
hearing who would have testified to his positive contributions to the community
and supported his request for a lenient sentence.
[21] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” “[T]he purpose of the sentencing hearing is to give the trial
court the opportunity to consider the facts and circumstances relevant to the
sentencing of the individual defendant before it.” Page v. State, 424 N.E.2d
1021, 1022 (Ind. 1981).
[22] Here, the record does not reflect that Powell was prevented from calling any
witnesses to testify on his behalf. The record simply shows that Powell
informed the trial court that he had witnesses that were potentially available to
speak on his behalf if they were needed. Tr. at 435-37. When the trial court
asked Powell after his allocution if he had anything else to present, Powell just
offered more argument and did not attempt to actually call any witnesses. Id. at
440, 448. We conclude that the trial court did not violate Powell’s due process
rights because nowhere in the record did it exclude any of Powell’s witnesses or
prevent him from presenting witnesses to testify on his behalf. Powell has failed
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to show error because he did not attempt to call any witnesses and was,
therefore, not prevented from presenting evidence on his behalf at sentencing.
IV. Inappropriate Sentence
[23] Powell contends that his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B). He claims that, based on the nature of the offense and the character
of the offender, his sentence of six months executed on work release followed
by six months on probation is inappropriate. The State counters that Powell’s
argument is moot because he has already served his sentence. We agree.
[24] “An issue is deemed moot when it is no longer ‘live’ or when the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome of its resolution.” Larkin v. State, 43
N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Jones v. State, 847 N.E.2d 190,
200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied). When a defendant has already served
his sentence, “the issue of the validity of the sentence is rendered moot.” Irwin
v. State, 744 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “[W]hen we are unable to
provide effective relief upon an issue, the issue is deemed moot, and we will not
reverse the trial court’s determination ‘where absolutely no change in the status
quo will result.’” Jones, 847 N.E.2d at 200 (quoting In re Utley, 565 N.E.2d
1152, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)). However, we note that although moot cases
are usually dismissed, “Indiana courts have long recognized that a case may be
decided on its merits under an exception to the general rule when the case
involves questions of ‘great public interest.’” Moore v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1241,
1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind.
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1991)). Cases involving questions of great public interest typically raise
important policy concerns and present issues that are likely to recur. Mosley v.
State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 603 (Ind. 2009).
[25] Here, Powell was sentenced on December 22, 2015 to six months executed on
work release followed by six months on probation. Appellant’s App. at 58. He
was given credit of twenty-nine days for time served prior to trial plus twenty-
nine days of credit time for a total of fifty-eight days of credit toward his
executed sentence. Id. Therefore, the latest date that Powell would have
completed his sentence was December 22, 2016. Accordingly, Powell’s
sentencing argument is moot. Further, the present case does not present an
important policy question. Instead, Powell’s contention is merely review of
alleged error. We, thus, conclude that Powell’s claim that his sentence is
inappropriate is moot, and we decline to review his claim of error.
[26] Affirmed.
[27] Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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