Philip R. Davis v. State of Indiana

FILED
Apr 19 2017, 10:10 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Philip R. Davis Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Philip R. Davis, April 19, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A05-1609-IF-2026
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John F. Surbeck,
Appellee-Plaintiff Jr., Judge
The Honorable Jason C. Custer,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
02D06-1605-IF-7263
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Philip Davis appeals following a judgment against him for the civil infraction of
speeding. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
and that the trial court made erroneous evidentiary rulings. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] Around 6:00 p.m. on May 13, 2016, Fort Wayne Police Sergeant John Shank
was on duty and observing traffic in an area with a speed limit of thirty miles
per hour. Sergeant Shank noticed a red Cadillac driving southbound in the
middle lane. The vehicle was driving faster than the cars on either side of it and
had an expired license plate. Sergeant Shank’s handheld radar unit showed that
the vehicle was traveling at a speed of forty-nine miles per hour. He followed
the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop.
[3] Sergeant Shank approached Davis, the driver of the Cadillac, and asked him for
his license and registration. As for the expired license plate, Davis claimed that
he had paid his license registration fees but had not yet received the tag back
from the State. The sergeant gave Davis the benefit of the doubt on the expired
license and then issued an electronic speeding ticket. The ticket had Sergeant
Shank’s name, badge number, and police agency electronically printed on it.
[4] On May 18, 2016, the State filed a complaint and summons alleging that Davis
had committed the infraction of speeding. The complaint and summons also
had Sergeant Shank’s name, badge number, and police agency electronically
printed on them, as well as a signature by the deputy prosecutor.
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[5] On August 2, 2016, Davis filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case
should be dismissed because Sergeant Shank’s printed name on the ticket,
complaint, and summons did not constitute a signature. The trial court denied
the motion, finding that a non-electronic signature was not required by statute
and that if there was a defect, it was a mere technicality that did not have the
effect of preventing the reasonable objectives of the statutorily prescribed
requirements from being met.
[6] Davis’s jury trial was held on August 4, 2016. Before trial, Davis informed the
trial court that he intended to introduce records of his vehicle’s maintenance,
which were dated after May 14, 2016. The State objected on relevance
grounds, on grounds that the exhibit was not on any exhibit list, and on
foundational grounds because no witness would be called to support the
admission of the exhibit. The trial court sustained the State’s objection. Davis
did not attempt to introduce the exhibit at trial or make an offer of proof.
[7] At trial, Davis admitted that he was driving at a speed of forty-nine miles per
hour in an area with a speed limit of thirty miles per hour. He insisted that he
did this out of necessity because his vehicle was overheating at the time and he
was attempting to get the vehicle home or to a mechanic. To address Davis’s
necessity defense, the State sought to elicit testimony from Davis regarding the
type of specialty license plate he had. Davis wondered, “Can I ask the
relevance of this?” Tr. p. 35. The State responded that it was relevant to the
necessity defense, and the trial court permitted the question. Davis answered
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the question and did not object. The jury found Davis liable for the infraction
of speeding and did not order him to pay any damages. Davis now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Motion to Dismiss
[8] Davis first argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss
because the summons and complaint did not bear the sergeant’s signature. A
motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of
circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief.” Lockhart v.
State, 38 N.E.3d 215, 217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotations omitted).
We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a Trial Rule
12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Id.[9] Indiana Code section 9-30-3-6 governs the contents of a traffic infraction
summons and complaint. See also I.C. § 9-30-3-5.3 (stating that an electronic
traffic ticket must contain the same content required in section 6 but it may be
modified as necessary for the electronic format). Specifically with respect to
civil traffic cases, the complaint and summons—and, consequently, the
electronic traffic ticket—must include a variety of information, including the
“officer’s signature[.]” I.C. § 9-30-3-6(c). The statute does not specify what
form the signature must take.
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[10] Another statute, while not directly relevant, provides some elucidation on the
validity of electronic signatures. Indiana Code section 9-30-3-5.7(b) provides as
follows:
An electronic traffic ticket issued under this chapter that bears a
printed or digital signature of:
(1) the law enforcement officer who issued the
electronic traffic ticket; and
(2) the prosecuting attorney, or a representative of the
office of the prosecuting attorney, of the county in
which the electronic traffic ticket was issued;
is admissible in a court proceeding as if the signatures referred to
in subdivisions (1) and (2) were original signatures.
In this case, the admissibility of the ticket itself is not at issue, so section 5.7 is
not directly relevant. But this statute does suggest that the General Assembly
accepts that electronic signatures can constitute original signatures.
[11] Here, Davis seems to acknowledge that an electronic signature can be a valid
signature, but insists that it should be formatted in such a way that it is
differentiated from the rest of the text. According to Davis, “[t]he mere printing
of a name, in the same type as the rest of the complaint and summons, is not a
signature.” Reply Br. p. 5. We find no authority in statutes or caselaw
supporting this proposition.
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[12] Initially, we note that it is well established that an original, personally-signed
signature is not required under Indiana Code section 9-30-3-6. See Ford v. State,
650 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a mechanically stamped
signature complies with the statute because “requiring manual signing of every
record certified from the Drivers License Division” would be a “waste of time
and money”); James v. State ex rel. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 475 N.E.2d 1164,
1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (same, observing that “the law presumes the
certifying officer authorized the stamping of his signature unless the record
affirmatively contains evidence to the contrary”). We hold that the same policy
permitting the use of a mechanically stamped signature applies equally to the
use of an electronic signature, especially where it is uncontested that the signing
officer was the one who prepared, printed, and gave the ticket to the defendant.
[13] Furthermore, this Court has determined that, in the context of Indiana Code
section 9-30-3-6, “[s]ubstantial compliance with statutory requirements means
compliance to the extent necessary to assure the reasonable objectives of the
statute are met.” Hamill v. City of Carmel, 757 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001). And the reasonable objectives of this statute are to “inform the offender
of the nature of the traffic violation and to indicate to the offender when he is to
appear in court.” Id. Therefore, no technical defect, such as missing check
marks, the failure to obtain the defendant’s signature at the scene of the stop, or
the officer’s failure to sign the instrument in front of a deputy clerk had the
effect of preventing the reasonable objectives of the statute from being met. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A05-1609-IF-2026 | April 19, 2017 Page 6 of 11
[14] Here, it is undisputed that the ticket issued to Davis included all necessary
information regarding the nature of his offense and when and where he was to
appear in court to answer for it. The ticket also included Sergeant Shank’s
name, badge number, and police agency. While we do not find that Sergeant
Shank’s signature was required to take any certain form, even if there was such
a requirement, the failure to meet it would have been a mere technicality. The
electronic ticket here was in substantial compliance with statutory requirements
such that the reasonable objectives of the statute were met. The trial court
properly denied Davis’s motion to dismiss.
II. Evidentiary Rulings
[15] Next, Davis raises two evidentiary arguments: (1) the trial court erred by
excluding Davis’s vehicle repair records from evidence; and (2) the trial court
erred by permitting the State to question Davis about his specialty license plate.
The decision to admit or exclude evidence rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court. Griffith v. State, 31 N.E.3d 965, 969 (Ind. 2015). We will reverse
only if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before it or if the trial court has misapplied the law. Jimerson
v. State, 56 N.E.3d 117, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
A. Vehicle Repair Records
[16] Davis contends that the trial court should not have excluded his vehicle repair
records from evidence. Initially, we note that Davis has waived this argument
by failing to make an offer of proof. Indiana Evidence Rule 103(a)(2) provides
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that error may not be predicated on a ruling that excludes evidence unless “the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by a proper offer of
proof, or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.”
See also Tibbs v. State, 59 N.E.3d 1005, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (failure to
make an offer to prove results in a waiver of the asserted evidentiary error on
appeal), trans. denied. Here, because no offer to prove was made, we are unable
to evaluate the actual documents that Davis insists should have been admitted
and he has waived the argument.
[17] Davis has waived this argument in an additional way. At trial, when the State
objected to this evidence, Davis’s only response was that “I have no response
except just trying to provide evidence for the Court to consider.” Tr. Vol. II p.
4. On appeal, for the first time, Davis cites to the Rules of Evidence regarding
relevance and the business records exception to hearsay to contend that the
records were admissible. Because he failed to make these arguments to the trial
court, he has waived them. Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014).
[18] Waiver notwithstanding, Davis claims that the reason he was speeding on the
day in question was because his vehicle was overheating and he had to drive at
a high rate of speed to prevent the vehicle from reaching a higher temperature.
At trial, Davis claimed that the records would show that repairs were made to
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his vehicle “shortly after” or “days after” the traffic stop. Tr. Vol. II p. 4. 1
Consequently, the records would not be relevant to the condition of Davis’s
vehicle at the time of the traffic stop. Furthermore, there was no evidence
introduced to tie the alleged overheating problem to the need to drive above the
speed limit; thus, to the extent that the records did contain evidence that the
vehicle was overheating at the time of the traffic stop, the evidence was not
relevant in any event.2 As a result, the trial court did not err by excluding this
evidence.
B. Specialty License Plate
[19] Finally, Davis argues that the trial court erred by permitting the State to
question him about whether he has a specialty license plate. Specifically, the
State elicited evidence that Davis has a DePauw University license plate. The
State asserts that this evidence is relevant to rebut Davis’s reasonable necessity
defense to speeding.
[20] To establish a necessity defense, a defendant must show the following:
1
On appeal, Davis has included maintenance records in the appendix. Appellant’s App. p. 24. Because
these records were not before the trial court, we will not consider them on appeal. We note, however, that
the records were for maintenance dated August 2, 2016, nearly three months after the traffic stop occurred.
2
Because we find that this evidence was not relevant, we need not address Davis’s argument that it was
admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. We note briefly, however, that he did
not seek to introduce a witness, such as the mechanic who generated the records, to authenticate them or lay
a proper foundation for their admission. Consequently, the records would not have been admissible. Ind.
Evidence Rule 901(a); Ind. Evidence Rule 803(6).
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(1) the act charged as criminal was the result of an emergency
and was done to prevent a significant harm;
(2) there was no adequate alternative to the commission of the
act;
(3) the harm caused by the act was not disproportionate to the
harm avoided;
(4) the Defendant had a good-faith belief that his/her act was
necessary to prevent greater harm;
(5) the Defendant’s belief was objectively reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case; and
(6) the Defendant did not substantially contribute to the creation
of the emergency.
Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 377 (Ind. 2015) (citing Toops v. State, 643
N.E.2d 387, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). The State sought to rebut this defense,
in part, by showing that Davis is a college educated individual who is employed
full-time as a real estate broker and has the means to repair his vehicle.
Consequently, Davis should have known to maintain his vehicle in a safe
operable condition and, short of that, should have known not to drive it when it
was malfunctioning.
[21] We agree with Davis that the fact that he has a specialty license plate is not
probative of the allegations against him; in other words, it is irrelevant. Any
error in its admission, however, was harmless in light of the other evidence in
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the record supporting the jury’s finding. Davis admitted that he was driving
forty-nine miles per hour in an area with a speed limit of thirty miles per hour.
And even if we were to accept for argument’s sake that his vehicle was
overheating and needed to be driven at a high rate of speed to prevent the
temperature from getting even higher, that does not support his defense of
necessity. He could have called a tow truck to his residence. He could have
pulled over to the side of the road. He could have asked for assistance
following the traffic stop but he did not; he drove away. He did none of these
things even though he had the education, experience, and financial means to
know better and take smarter, safer actions. Under these circumstances, any
error in the admission of evidence regarding his specialty license plate was
harmless.
[22] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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