Todd A. Stigleman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Apr 27 2017, 10:13 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
regarded as precedent or cited before any and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Nicole Rutter-Hirth Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Rion, Rion & Rion, LPA, Inc. Attorney General of Indiana
Dayton, Ohio
J.T. Whitehead
Jennifer Lukemeyer Deputy Attorney General
Voyles, Zahn & Paul Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Todd Stigleman, April 27, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
89A01-1608-CR-1783
v. Appeal from the Wayne Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Charles Todd,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
89D01-1405-FA-11
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a jury trial, Todd Stigleman was convicted of four counts of
kidnapping as Class A felonies, eight counts of criminal confinement as Class C
felonies, and two counts of stalking as Class C felonies. Todd also admitted to
being an habitual offender. The trial court later vacated all convictions of
criminal confinement and sentenced Todd to seventy-six years in the Indiana
Department of Correction. Todd now appeals, raising three issues for our
review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Todd’s
motion to sever, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence, and (3) whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offenses and his character. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Todd’s motion to sever or in admitting evidence and that
Todd’s sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
Facts and Procedural History 1
[2] Todd and Kelli Stigleman were married in 2004 and had one child, Joshua,
during their relationship. Kelli has another son, Joseph, from a prior
relationship. Kelli has worked for Cracker Barrel for sixteen years; Todd did
not work during their marriage, but received social security disability payments.
Todd and Kelli lived together in their marital residence in Cambridge City,
1
We held oral argument at Valparaiso University Law School on April 7, 2017. We thank counsel for their
oral advocacy and extend our appreciation to the faculty, staff, and students for their hospitality.
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Indiana, which Kelli purchased from her parents pursuant to an installment
contract.
[3] In early February of 2014, Kelli left Todd and moved in with her parents. She
offered Josh the option to live with her at her parents’ house, but he declined
because he wished to live with his father. Josh was homeschooled and very
close to his father. Shortly after Kelli left, Todd attempted to reconcile their
relationship several times, but with no luck. On February 21, 2014, Todd filed
for divorce in the Wayne County Superior Court. Thereafter, events quickly
escalated.
[4] In March of 2014, Kelli filed an emergency motion to amend the parties’
provisional orders seeking to stop Todd from contacting her, as he had started
“harassing [her], [making] several phone calls to [her] cell phone, to [her]
parents’ house, to [her] work and just was non-stop showing up everywhere
[she] seemed to be . . . .” Transcript, Volume II at 69. The trial court granted
Kelli’s motion and ordered parenting time exchanges with Josh to occur at the
Cambridge City Police Station.
[5] On March 19, 2014, Kelli attended an appointment at the Wayne County
Health Department after work. While she was filling out paperwork following
her appointment, Josh unexpectedly appeared at the Health Department. Kelli
and Todd were supposed to have a parenting time exchange that evening and
she thought it strange Josh showed up at that time. Josh asked Kelli for the
keys to her van so he could wait outside, and she complied. As she walked to
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her van, she saw Todd walking toward her. Todd grabbed her arm and pushed
her into her van and said, “we’re going to talk.” Id. at 74. Kelli resisted and
said she would take Josh and leave, and Todd responded, “no, we’re going to
talk.” Id. Todd pushed Kelli into the passenger’s seat, started the car, and
drove to their marital residence in Cambridge City. Josh was on his cellphone
in the backseat and it appeared to Kelli that he was giving someone directions
to follow the van. The lock on the passenger door was broken at the time, so
Kelli could not escape. At the marital residence, Todd took Kelli’s phone and
kept her keys. He told her, “I’m sorry, I want you to come back, why are you
doing this to me, I don’t understand why you’re doing this . . . .” Id. at 77. At
one point while Kelli was sitting on the couch, she reiterated her position she
did not want to talk to him. Todd became very upset and towered over her
while wielding a knife. He pushed her back onto the couch, put the knife to her
throat, and said “if you tell anybody about this, you’ll find out what the
consequences are . . . .” Id. at 80. Todd gave Kelli the knife and told her to
stab him in his abdomen; she declined. Josh then came downstairs to ask his
parents to stop yelling, made eye contact with Kelli, and silently indicated to
her that Todd “[was] faking.” Id.
[6] Several hours later, Kelli was able to obtain her keys and phone; she drove
straight to her parents’ house where her father called the police and filed a
police report. A few days after filing the report, Kelli made an appointment for
Josh to speak to the police. Todd began following her in his car as she drove
Josh to the police station. As she parked at the police station, Todd yanked
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Josh from the car and said “he’s not talking to the cops . . . .” Id. at 83. Josh
never gave a statement to the police.
[7] On April 4, 2014,2 Kelli finished work at Cracker Barrel around 8:00 p.m. She
walked to her van and noticed her van door had been opened but not shut
properly, as it was slightly ajar. As she went to close it, Todd, dressed in all
black, jumped out from behind her van, put his hand over her mouth, and said,
“what are you trying to do, get me put in jail?” Id. at 110. A struggle ensued
and Todd and Kelli fell to the ground. Kelli attempted to yell for help but could
not because Todd’s hand was covering her mouth. Todd then told her Josh was
injured and in the hospital, so she stopped struggling and yelling for help. Kelli
told Todd she would meet him at the hospital, and as she began backing out of
her parking spot, Todd opened the door and jumped in her van. He told her
that he lied to her, Josh was not hurt, and they “were going to talk.” Id. at 112.
Todd then forced her out of the driver’s seat and drove them to the marital
residence. When they arrived at the marital residence, Todd parked her van
near the back of the house so it could not be seen from the street. Todd forced
her into the home and kept her phone and her keys. Todd followed her from
room to room, not letting her out of his sight, and begging her to get back
together. Eventually, she obtained her keys and phone and left.
2
Kelli’s testimony refers to this day as April 14 and April 4. See Tr., Vol. II at 109, 143. Because the State
uses April 4, and Todd uses “Date unknown,” Corrected Appellant’s Brief at 11, we opt to use April 4.
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[8] A similar incident occurred on April 18, 2014, when Kelli and Todd met in the
parking lot of a carwash across from the police station to exchange custody of
Josh. As Josh approached Kelli’s van, Todd walked behind him and pushed
him out of the way while holding a knife at waist level. Todd again told Kelli,
“we’re going to talk.” Id. at 117. He forced his way into her van, pushed her
into the passenger’s seat, and drove around Cambridge City until they stopped
in the Cambridge City Public Library’s parking lot. Todd told Josh to get out
and walk to the Dollar Store, which was a couple blocks away. Kelli felt as
though she could not leave the vehicle because Todd had the knife lying on his
leg. A short while later, Josh returned and informed Todd he saw Kelli’s father
driving around town, presumably looking for her. Todd became agitated and
drove the van back to the marital residence. At the house, Todd forced Kelli to
call her father and tell him everything was fine and she was going to spend the
night at the house to help Josh with his homework. Kelli spent the night at the
house because Todd kept her keys and phone and refused to let her leave.
[9] When she awoke the next morning, she saw Todd outside tampering under the
hood of her van, “pulling wires and stuff.” Id. at 120. She said she needed to
get to work and Todd gave her the keys to her van; the van would not start so
Todd volunteered to take her to work. But Kelli needed her work clothes, so
Todd drove her to her parents’ house to retrieve them. Kelli went inside her
parents’ house and did not come back out. Kelli’s father again called the police.
This time, Kelli met with Officer Chad Wissler at the Cambridge City Police
Department. As they were completing the interview, Kelli noticed Todd in the
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parking lot outside the police department. Officer Wissler stepped outside and
had a brief conversation with Todd; he then noticed Todd was holding a yellow
“Post-It” note and a pen. After Todd left, Officer Wissler removed a note from
the window of Kelli’s van. The note read, “you lied, I know you were here.”
Tr., Vol. III at 148.
[10] On April 24, 2014, as Kelli was driving on the I-70 exit ramp to Cambridge
City, Todd’s car approached her from behind at a high rate of speed. Kelli was
speaking to her brother, David Moore, on her cell phone at the time. As she
drove onto the exit ramp, she stopped at the stoplight and prepared to make a
left turn; there were cars behind her and directly to her right. Todd drove his
vehicle in between the cars in the left and right hand lanes, stopping in front of
Kelli’s van and blocking her from driving. Todd exited his vehicle and walked
to the driver’s side door of Kelli’s van and reached in and took her phone. He
then proceeded to get in Kelli’s van and forced her from the driver’s seat. Todd
drove the van a short distance away, parked, exited the van, and walked back to
his car to move it and parked it on the edge of the interstate overpass. Todd
then drove the van to a rural, isolated area a few minutes away.
[11] Along the way, Todd was “irate, . . . shouting and hollering and getting kind of
up in [her] face . . . .” Tr., Vol. II at 130. Todd pulled off the side of the road
and began yelling at Kelli, asking why she involved the police and child
protective services. After several minutes of yelling, Todd grabbed Kelli’s arm
and pulled her to the back of the van, telling her, “we’re going to have sex . . . .”
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Id. at 135. Todd then forced Kelli to have sex with him. Shortly thereafter, the
police arrived after receiving a call from Kelli’s brother and arrested Todd.
[12] A little after midnight on April 25, Todd demanded Kelli return Josh to him, as
it was his day to have custody. The Cambridge City Police Department
arranged for Officer Stephen Foster to be present at the exchange. At the
exchange, Officer Foster heard Todd tell Kelli, “you need to watch your back,
bitch.” Tr., Vol. III at 78.
[13] On May 2, 2014, the State charged Todd with fourteen counts: Counts I-IV,
kidnapping, as Class A felonies; Counts V-XII, criminal confinement, as Class
C felonies; and Counts XIII and XIV, stalking, as Class C felonies. The State
also alleged Todd was an habitual offender. On March 21, 2016, Todd filed a
motion for severance of the counts alleging they were joined because they are of
the same or similar character. The trial court denied Todd’s motion.
[14] At trial, the State presented and the trial court admitted into evidence other
“bad acts” committed by Todd. Specifically, Officer Wissler testified that on
May 1, 2014, he received a call from Lincoln High School to investigate an
incident involving Kelli’s van. The van, which was driven to school by her son,
Joe, had the driver’s side front and rear tires deflated. Officer Wissler obtained
surveillance footage and observed a man enter the parking lot carrying a red
and white umbrella. The man then kneeled down next to and tampered with
each tire. Kelli told Officer Wissler the umbrella was one she recognized from
the marital residence. Officer Wissler also stated other surveillance footage
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caught a vehicle matching Todd’s driving around the school near that time.
Further, on October 24, 2014, Officer Wissler responded to a complaint from
Josh Stigleman. The complaint alleged drugs and a firearm were left on the
front porch of Kelli’s home. At this time, Kelli was again living in the marital
residence, as Todd had been evicted. Officer Wissler arrived at the home,
spoke to Kelli, and noticed a yellow shoebox on the front porch. A search of
the shoebox revealed marijuana, heroin, and a handgun. After speaking with
Josh and obtaining a search warrant for his cell phone, Officer Wissler
discovered text messages from Todd instructing Josh on how to plant the
incriminating evidence. Josh stated Todd told him to do it because “[h]e didn’t
want to go to jail.” Tr., Vol. IV at 40. The trial court also admitted into
evidence letters written by Todd from prison asking his new girlfriend to testify
she was with him on April 4 and April 18, 2014, even though they had not yet
met at that point.
[15] A jury found Todd guilty as charged and the trial court entered judgment of
conviction on all counts. At sentencing, the trial court vacated all counts of
criminal confinement and amended its judgment of conviction to reflect only
Todd’s convictions for kidnapping and stalking. The trial court sentenced Todd
to forty years for each count of kidnapping, to run concurrently; six years for
each count of stalking, to run concurrently with one another and consecutively
to the kidnapping counts; and an additional thirty years for the habitual
offender enhancement. Todd’s total aggregate sentence is seventy-six years
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with no time suspended. Todd now appeals. Additional facts will be added as
necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Motion to Sever
[16] Todd contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
sever the counts. Specifically, Todd alleges a separate trial should have been
afforded to him for the counts related to each date on which he committed a
crime. Todd makes two arguments to support his claim: (1) he was entitled to
severance as a matter of right because the crimes were joined solely because
they are of the same or similar character, and (2) severance was appropriate
under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a).
A. Standard of Review
[17] The basis for joinder determines the amount of deference owed to a trial court’s
ruling on a motion for severance. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1264 (Ind.
2015). A defendant is entitled to severance as a matter of right where the
offenses have been joined solely because they are of the same or similar
character. Id. Because a trial court has no discretion to deny such a motion, we
review its decision de novo. Id. But where the offenses have been joined
because the defendant’s underlying acts are connected together, we review the
trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. Likewise, a trial court’s
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refusal to sever counts under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a) is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Craig v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ind. 2000).
B. Stigleman Was Not Entitled to Severance
[18] Stigleman argues he was entitled to a separate trial for each date on which he
committed a crime; therefore, he alleges the trial court erred in denying his
motion to sever the counts. Indiana Code section 35-34-1-9(a) permits the
joinder of offenses when the offenses:
(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a
single scheme or plan; or
(2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts
connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or
plan.
However, when “two (2) or more offenses have been joined for trial in the same
indictment or information solely on the ground that they are of the same or
similar character, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the
offenses.” Ind. Code § 35-34-1-11(a). In other words, Todd is not entitled to
severance as of right if section 35-34-1-9(a)(2) is met. See Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at
1265.
[19] In Pierce, our supreme court succinctly summarized the law in regards to
severance.
[Indiana Code subsection 35-34-1-9(a)(1)] refers to the nature of
the charged offenses; subsection (9)(a)(2) refers to the operative
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facts underlying those charges. These two subsections are not
coextensive: offenses that are of the same or similar character
may be premised on totally unrelated circumstances and
evidence. For example, although a defendant may be charged
with multiple burglaries (the same statutory offense), if the
burglaries are factually distinct in terms of their timing, victims,
method of entry, transport vehicle, and types of items taken, they
fit squarely under subsection (9)(a)(1) but not (9)(a)(2), and
severance is available as a matter of right. Maymon v. State, 870
N.E.2d 523, 526-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875
N.E.2d 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In some instances, of course,
crimes that are of the same or similar character may also be based
[on] a series of connected acts. See, e.g., Jameison v. State, 268
Ind. 599, 601, 377 N.E.2d 404, 406 (1978) (“In the case at bar the
burglaries were of service stations on I-74 in Shelby County. In
both entry was gained by breaking a window and radios were
stolen. Thus the crimes charged undoubtedly constituted a series
of connected acts.”), abrogated on other grounds, Mitchell v. State,
535 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 1989).
To determine whether offenses warrant joinder under subsection
(9)(a)(2), we ask whether the operative facts establish a pattern of
activity beyond mere satisfaction of the statutory elements. It is
well-settled that a common modus operandi and motive can
sufficiently link crimes committed on different victims. In Craig
v. State, the defendant molested two young girls in a strikingly
similar way, by asking them to take a “taste test,” covering their
eyes with tape, inserting his penis into their mouths, and
instructing them to suck on it. 730 N.E.2d at 1264-65. And his
common motive—“to satisfy [his] sexual desires”—further tied
the crimes. Id. at 1265. Because “[those] similarities [were]
sufficient to establish that the molestation of each victim was the
handiwork of the same person,” the defendant had no absolute
right to severance. Id.
Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1265-66 (some internal citations omitted).
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[20] Todd cites to two cases to support his assertion the offenses were joined only
because of their similar character. Specifically, Todd cites to Wilkerson v. State,
728 N.E.2d 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), and Maymon v. State, 870 N.E.2d 523(Ind. Ct. App. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. In Wilkerson, the defendant was charged with raping two separate
victims in Anderson, Indiana. In each offense, the defendant broke into a
residence through a window and forced each victim to submit to oral sex
followed by vaginal intercourse. The charges were joined for trial and the
defendant was found guilty as charged. On appeal following the denial of
defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief, this court held his counsel was
ineffective for failing to move for a severance of the charges, as they were joined
solely based on their similar character. This court noted the crimes occurred
three weeks apart, at different times of day, at different locations, to different
victims. Moreover, the defendant used different weapons and one victim was
robbed while the other was not. Wilkerson, 728 N.E.2d at 246-47.
[21] In Maymon, this court again found the defendant received ineffective assistance
of counsel for failing to move for a severance when the charges were joined
solely for their similar character. 870 N.E.2d at 528-29. There, the defendant
committed four burglaries over the course of three months. Different types of
items were stolen from each residence and the defendant was only successful in
two of the four burglaries, as he was confronted by the homeowners in the other
two attempts. Witnesses of the events in two of the burglaries observed a blue
car at the scene, while the witnesses in the other two burglaries observed a red
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car. This court held the “facts of each charge do not demonstrate that [the
defendant] committed a series of connected acts or that the incidents were part
of a single scheme or plan.” Id. at 528.
[22] Notwithstanding the cases cited by Todd, his argument that his crimes were
joined solely on the basis of their same or similar character fails. As previously
noted, to determine whether joinder is appropriate under subsection 9(a)(2),
“we ask whether the operative facts establish a pattern of activity beyond mere
satisfaction of the statutory elements.” Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1266. Here, as
argued by the State, the incidents share much more than their criminal
category. Todd’s actions were connected by his victim, his method, and his
motive. Kelli was the victim of each crime, with Todd showing up
unexpectedly at her place of work or somewhere he knew she would be. Each
time, Todd would force himself into Kelli’s van by intimidation, threat, or trick,
and tell her they needed to talk. Three of the four kidnappings resulted in Todd
forcing Kelli back to their marital residence, yelling at her, and/or attempting to
discuss their marriage. Regarding his motive, it appears as if at first Todd
desired to reconcile their marriage; however, factoring in the incidents that
occurred in May and October of 2014, it is clear his original motive eventually
transformed into harassment and retaliation. In sum, Todd committed the
same crimes multiple times, in substantially the same way, and against the
same victim. See id. at 1267. Because the operative facts of Todd’s crimes
establish a pattern of activity beyond the satisfaction of the statutory elements,
subsection 9(a)(2) is satisfied and Todd is not entitled to severance as of right.
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[23] Todd next argues the trial court abused its discretion because severance was
appropriate under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a). Indiana Code section
35-34-1-11(a) provides, in relevant part,
In all other cases the court, upon motion of the defendant or the
prosecutor, shall grant a severance of offenses whenever the court
determines that severance is appropriate to promote a fair
determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each
offense considering:
(1) the number of offenses charged;
(2) the complexity of the evidence to be offered; and
(3) whether the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the
evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense.
[24] Thus, Section 35-34-1-11(a) mandates that a trial court, after considering the
number of offenses, the complexity of the evidence, and whether the trier of fact
will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently, sever the
charges when necessary to promote a fair trial. Here, although there were
fourteen counts, only three different crimes were charged. Moreover, there was
only one victim of each count charged, and the State presented Kelli’s
testimony of the events in chronological order. The offenses were easily
distinguishable and largely based solely on Kelli’s testimony with corroborating
evidence provided by law enforcement officers and Kelli’s family. Finally,
Todd fails to discuss or point out how the jury would have been unable to
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distinguish the evidence and intelligently apply the law in this case.3 Therefore,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance pursuant to
Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a).4
II. Admission of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
[25] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.
Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011). We review its rulings for
abuse of discretion, which occurs only if the decision was clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.B. Other Bad Acts
[26] Todd argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior
bad acts, which he asserts should have been excluded pursuant to Indiana Rule
of Evidence 404(b). Specifically, Todd challenges the admission of (1) evidence
he attempted to frame Kelli with drugs and a firearm, (2) evidence he tampered
3
The only errors Todd discusses are (1) Kelli’s error stating the second kidnapping occurred on April 4 and
April 14, 2014, and (2) Kelli’s misstatement (which she later corrected) that she spent the night at the marital
residence on April 4.
4
Todd also contends the trial court was required to consider Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b) in determining
whether severance was appropriate. Todd claims “the Indiana Supreme Court held it is necessary to consider
Evid. R. 404(b) considerations in analyzing severance[,]” and cites to Wells v. State, 983 N.E.2d 132 (Ind.
2013). Corrected Appellant’s Br. at 26. Our supreme court heard oral argument in Wells, but ultimately
vacated its order granting transfer and reinstated the memorandum decision of this court. Further, the
portion of Wells cited to by Todd is a dissent from the denial of transfer. See Wells, 983 N.E.2d at 132-40
(Rucker, J., dissenting from the denial of transfer). Therefore, Wells is not appropriately considered precedent
for the point Todd advocates.
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with the tires on Kelli’s van, (3) evidence he tried to entice his new girlfriend to
lie at trial, (4) testimony from the guardian ad litem and child protective
services agent, and (5) testimony of other acts involving Kelli’s family and
Todd.5
[27] Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b) states, in relevant part,
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on
a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
Rule 404(b) prohibits the State from presenting evidence of a person’s “crime,
wrong, or other act” to the extent it is used to prove a person’s character and
demonstrate on a particular occasion a person acted in accordance with that
character. Thompson v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1097, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The
purpose of the rule is to protect against the “forbidden inference—that the
defendant acted badly in the past, and that the defendant’s present, charged
actions conform with those past bad acts . . . .” Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d
5Todd did not object at trial to the testimony of the guardian ad litem, the child protective services agent, or
any of the other acts involving Kelli’s family and Todd. Failure to object at trial results in the waiver of the
claim of error on appeal. See Lashbrook v. State, 762 N.E.2d 756, 759 (Ind. 2002).
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1096, 1099-1100 (Ind. 2012) (citation omitted). However, evidence of crimes,
wrongs, or other acts are admissible if offered for another purpose, such as to
prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2).
[28] In assessing the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence, we (1) determine whether
the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue
other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act; and (2)
balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect
pursuant to Rule 403.6 Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997).
1. Evidence Todd tampered with Kelli’s van and tried to frame her with drugs
and a firearm
[29] Todd first alleges it was improper for the jury to hear evidence concerning his
tampering with Kelli’s van’s tires on May 1, 2014, and his attempt to frame
Kelli on October 24, 2014, by having Josh place drugs and a weapon on her
front porch. Todd asserts the charges for his actions on October 24th are
pending, and the “proper forum for a jury to hear evidence of that act is in the
trial for that cause.” Corrected Appellant’s Br. at 19. In rebuttal, the State
argues these acts are admissible as evidence of Todd’s guilty knowledge.
6
Indiana Rule of Evidence 403 permits the trial court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
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[30] In Matthews v. State, 866 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied, we
reviewed the admission of testimony that the defendant confessed his crime to,
threatened, and then shot at a witness for the prosecution. Like Todd, the
defendant argued the statements were inadmissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), but
we held:
Threats by the accused against prosecution witnesses are
considered attempts to conceal or suppress implicating evidence
and are relevant and admissible into evidence. Such threats are
viewed as admissions of guilt and therefore are relevant to
demonstrate an accused’s guilty knowledge. Accordingly,
evidence of [the defendant’s] threatening and intimidating
actions against [witnesses] were admissible for a purpose other
than to merely show his propensity to engage in wrongful acts.
Id. at 825 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Todd’s attempt to frame
Kelli with drugs and guns on October 24, 2014 is fairly straightforward. Todd
instructed Josh on how and when to plant this incriminating evidence hoping
Kelli would be arrested. Josh testified Todd wanted him to do this because
“[h]e didn’t want to go to jail.” Tr., Vol. IV at 40. Todd’s attempt to frame
Kelli was an attempt to attack the credibility of or suppress her testimony and is
highly probative of his consciousness of guilt. See Larry v. State, 716 N.E.2d 79,
81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding evidence that the defendant beat up a
prosecution witness is evidence of guilty knowledge and properly admissible
under the knowledge exception of Rule 404(b)).
[31] Similarly, Todd’s deflating of Kelli’s tires on May 1, 2014 is also relevant as
consciousness of guilt. This event occurred several days after Todd was finally
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arrested for his continuing offenses against Kelli. Following his arrest on April
24, Todd told Kelli, “you need to watch your back, bitch.” Tr., Vol. III at 78.
Six days later, this incident occurred. As we previously noted, “[t]hreats by the
accused against prosecution witnesses are considered attempts to conceal or
suppress implicating evidence and are relevant and admissible into evidence.”
Matthews, 866 N.E.2d at 825 (citation and quotation omitted).
[32] As to whether the probative value of this evidence is substantially outweighed
by a danger of unfair prejudice to Todd, we note Todd’s theory at trial was that
Kelli also wanted to reconcile their marriage and often willingly accepted his
attempts to do so, but was blocked by her family. See Corrected Appellant’s Br.
at 19. Given Todd’s theory of the case, we cannot say evidence of Todd’s
guilty knowledge of the criminality of his acts was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice to him. Therefore, we conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence Todd tampered with Kelli’s
van’s tires and instructed Josh to plant incriminating evidence on her porch.
2. Evidence Todd tried to entice his new girlfriend to give false testimony
[33] The trial court also admitted into evidence the testimony of Nicole Miller,
Todd’s new girlfriend, and letters written by Todd asking her to give false
testimony. Todd asserts this evidence was highly prejudicial with no probative
value. The State again counters that the testimony and letters were offered to
prove Todd’s guilty knowledge, not his propensity to commit bad acts.
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[34] In Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174 (Ind. 2016), the trial court admitted into
evidence letters written by the defendant while in prison seeking to secure
beneficial testimony from two witnesses. Most of the testimony requested by
the defendant was patently false. Our supreme court affirmed the trial court’s
ruling the letters were admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b)(2) as evidence of a
guilty mind. Id. at 1180-81.
[35] Similarly, the trial court admitted Miller’s testimony and the letters sent to her
as evidence of “[Todd’s] . . . knowledge.” Tr., Vol. IV at 192. The letters
reveal Todd asking for favorable testimony and for her to testify she was with
him on two of the dates he committed his crimes; Miller had not yet met Todd
on those dates and did not meet Todd in person until May 2 or May 3, 2014.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
[36] Finally, we note any error in the admission of evidence concerning Todd’s
other acts is harmless. “[E]rrors in the admission of evidence are to be
disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a
party.” VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 267 (Ind. 2013) (citation omitted).
In determining whether a defendant’s substantial rights have been affected, a
reviewing court must assess the probable impact of the evidence upon the jury.
Id. The improper admission of evidence is deemed harmless if there is
substantial independent evidence of guilt supporting a conviction such that we
can say there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence
contributed to the conviction. Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind.
2012). Here, there was substantial independent evidence of Todd’s guilt
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beyond that of his other crimes and wrongs. Kelli testified at length about each
incident in chronological order. Kelli’s testimony was corroborated by
members of her family and they detailed her relationship struggles with Todd as
well as her fear of what he may have been capable of doing. Multiple law
enforcement officers testified about each incident and corroborated Kelli’s
testimony. In addition, the trial court gave multiple limiting instructions
ordering the jury to consider the challenged evidence only for the purpose of
“[Todd’s] intent, motive and/or knowledge.” Tr., Vol. III at 156. In sum,
there is not a substantial likelihood the jury convicted Todd because of his
propensity to commit crimes.
III. Inappropriate Sentence
[37] Todd’s final argument requests we exercise our constitutional authority to
review and revise his sentence. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, “The
Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The
defendant bears the burden of persuading this court his or her sentence is
inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether a
sentence is inappropriate turns on “the culpability of the defendant, the severity
of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to
light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The
principal role of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers,” not achieve the
perceived “correct” result in each case. Id. at 1225.
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[38] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature selected as an
appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d
482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). Here, Todd
was convicted and sentenced on four counts of kidnapping, as Class A felonies,
and two counts of stalking, as Class C felonies. A person convicted of a Class
A felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term between twenty and fifty years,
with the advisory sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a). A
person convicted of a Class C felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term
between two and eight years, with the advisory sentence being four years. Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-6(a). Todd received forty years for each count of kidnapping, to
run concurrently with each other, and received six years for each count of
stalking, to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to his kidnapping
sentences. Todd also received an additional thirty years for being an habitual
offender. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(a), (h) (2005).7 Todd’s aggregate sentence
is seventy-six years.
7
Under the criminal code in effect when Todd committed these crimes, the trial court was obligated to
sentence Todd to a minimum of thirty additional years for being an habitual offender. Under the criminal
code now in effect, the trial court has discretion to sentence an habitual offender convicted of a Level 1
through Level 4 felony to an additional term between six and twenty years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1)
(2014). Todd alleges the doctrine of amelioration should apply, allowing him to be sentenced under the
current and more lenient statute. See Lunsford v. State, 640 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Vicory v.
State, 272 Ind. 683, 400 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-82 (1980)). However, the doctrine of amelioration does not apply
where the legislature, in a specific saving clause, expressly states that crimes committed before the effective
date of the ameliorative amendment should be prosecuted under prior law. Turner v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1083,
1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Here, the General Assembly, in enacting the new criminal code, specifically
enacted savings clauses. Both Indiana Code section 1-1-5.5-21 and section 1-1-5.5-22 state that the new
criminal code “does not affect: (1) penalties incurred; (2) crimes committed; or (3) proceedings begun” before
the effective date of the new criminal code sections. The effective date of the new criminal code as it pertains
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[39] As to the nature of the offenses, Todd harassed his wife over a period of two
months and kidnapped her four times. In one instance, Todd told Kelli to stab
him in the abdomen with a knife; in another, Todd intimidated Kelli with a
knife. Kelli received scratches to her face during the second kidnapping and
was forced to have sex with Todd resulting in a torn hymen during the fourth
kidnapping. Moreover, Todd utilized his fourteen-year-old son in several of the
kidnappings, often using him as leverage to come in contact with Kelli. Todd
also persuaded his son to plant drugs and a weapon on Kelli’s porch in an
attempt to have her arrested. Nothing about the nature of the offenses
persuades us Todd’s sentence is inappropriate.
[40] Regarding Todd’s character, Todd has a criminal history beyond that used for
the habitual offender enhancement which supports an above-advisory sentence.
Todd has been convicted of four felonies, including a prior stalking offense.
Although only the prior stalking offense relates to his current offense, see Harris
v. State, 897 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. 2008) (noting the significance of a
defendant’s criminal history varies based upon the gravity, nature, and number
of prior offenses in relation to the current offense), his consistent contacts with
law enforcement and the judicial system exhibit a disregard for the law and an
to the habitual offender enhancement is July 1, 2014. Todd committed his offenses in March and April of
2014. Moreover, these sections provide that “Those penalties, crimes, and proceedings continue and shall be
imposed and enforced under prior law as if [the new criminal code] had not been enacted.” Id. These
sections affirmatively state: “The general assembly does not intend the doctrine of amelioration (see Vicory v.
State [272 Ind. 683], 400 N.E.2d 1380 (1980)) to apply to any SECTION [of the new criminal code].” Id.Therefore, the doctrine of amelioration cannot be applied to Todd’s sentencing.
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inability or unwillingness to abide by it. Todd also violated a protective order
and has pending criminal causes relating to his other actions. We also note
Todd’s repeated attempts to undermine the criminal justice system by taking
Kelli’s phone so she could not call the police, leaving a note on her van after
she spoke with a police officer, threatening Kelli with violence if she told
anyone about his actions, keeping Josh from speaking with police, deflating
Kelli’s van’s tires, having Josh plant incriminating evidence in an attempt to
have her arrested, and attempting to have his new girlfriend give false testimony
in his favor. Simply put, nothing about the nature of the offenses or Todd’s
character persuades us his sentence is inappropriate.
Conclusion
[41] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Todd’s motion to sever
the counts or in admitting evidence and his sentence is not inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Accordingly, we affirm
Todd’s convictions and sentence.
[42] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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