Kip Seidenstucker v. Linda Ferguson (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Nov 20 2018, 6:52 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael W. Phelps Charles S. Smith
Phelps Legal Group Jon L. Bucher
Bloomington, Indiana Schultz & Pogue, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kip Seidenstucker, November 20, 2018
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CT-962
v. Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
Linda Ferguson, The Honorable
Appellee-Defendant. Heather A. Welch, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49D01-1601-CT-4
Kirsch, Judge.
[1] This appeal arises from a negligence claim that resulted from an automobile
accident that occurred between Kip Seidenstucker (“Seidenstucker”) and Linda
Ferguson (“Ferguson”). Ferguson admitted fault at trial, and the case
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proceeded to a jury trial to determine damages. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Seidenstucker in the amount of $34,105.09. He appeals and raises the
following restated issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied, in part, Seidenstucker’s motion in limine regarding
the expert witness’s medical license suspension; and
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied Seidenstucker’s motion to correct error based on
Seidenstucker’s contention that the jury verdict was not
based on the evidence presented at trial.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On August 30, 2014, Ferguson made a left turn from Kingsley Drive onto
Kessler Boulevard in Indianapolis, Indiana and collided with Seidenstucker’s
vehicle. Tr. Vol. II at 138-39. Shortly after the accident, Seidenstucker felt back
pain and reported it to the police officer who had responded to the scene. Id. at
226-27. Seidenstucker did not seek medical attention at that time and refused
an ambulance, but he proceeded to seek medical attention at the Indianapolis
Veterans Administration Hospital later that day when the pain worsened. Id. at
232. Seidenstucker went to the emergency room where x-rays were taken. Id.
at 161. For five or six weeks after the accident, Seidenstucker’s pain improved;
however, he reached for something one day, and his pain worsened. Id. at 162,
233; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 25. Seidenstucker returned to the emergency
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room complaining that his back pain was radiating. Tr. Vol. II at 162. The
emergency room staff diagnosed him with sciatica, and he received steroids,
muscle relaxants, and hydrocodone and was told that he might need physical
therapy. Id. Several weeks later, Seidenstucker went to his primary care
physician and complained of back pain, and his doctor ordered physical
therapy. Id. Seidenstucker did not complete his course of physical therapy. Id.
at 162-63, 169, 188-89.
[4] On December 21, 2015, Seidenstucker filed his complaint for negligence against
Ferguson. Ferguson admitted fault, and the case proceeded to a jury trial on
damages on February 13-14, 2018. On February 8, 2018, Seidenstucker filed a
motion in limine regarding the admission of testimony about a criminal
conviction and suspension of the medical license of his expert witness, Dr.
Robert Gregori (“Dr. Gregori”), a pain management physician. The trial court
granted in part and denied in part the motion, ruling that evidence of Dr.
Gregori’s criminal conviction was not admissible, but that evidence of the
suspension of his medical license was admissible. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 12.
[5] At trial, Dr. Gregori testified that Seidenstucker had two issues that were
related to the accident: an aggravation of his degenerative disc condition and
lumbar strain with a sacroiliac (“SI”) injury on the right side. Id. at 28; Tr. Vol.
II at 173-78. Dr. Gregori opined that Seidenstucker would experience pain
indefinitely. Tr. Vol. II at 182. Dr. Gregori testified that Seidenstucker would
have benefited from more physical therapy and that patients who go through
their “prescribed physical therapy and all their scheduled visits tend to do
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better” than those who do not. Tr. Vol. II at 169, 188. Dr. Gregori opined that
Seidenstucker may need some additional treatment for the SI joint. Id. at 179.
Specifically, Dr. Gregori stated that SI injections with steroid numbing
medicine would serve two benefits: (1) diagnostic, in that if it helped
significantly with Seidenstucker’s pain, it would identify the origin of the pain;
and (2) lasting relief from pain. Id. Dr. Gregori stated that most patients
benefit from these SI injections after doing it “for two or three months” and
then repeating it. Id.
[6] Dr. Gregori also testified that Seidenstucker might benefit from neural ablation
therapy, a course of treatment where the doctor uses radio frequency to burn
the nerves. Id. Dr. Gregori also testified that the neural ablation therapy could
provide longer term relief, but that there could be some regeneration of the
nerves. Id. at 180. Such regeneration could require a patient “to have [the
neural ablation therapy] repeated in a couple of years.” Id. Dr. Gregori also
testified that he believed that physical therapy could benefit Seidenstucker and
could help with both the SI joint and his low back pain. Id. Evidence was
presented that the cost of the two SI injections would range from $3,000.00 to
$4,000.00 each (for a total of $6,000.00 to $8,000.00) and each subsequent
neural ablation therapy would range from $4,000.00 to $6,000.00. Appellant’s
App. Vol. 2 at 28. The cost for additional physical therapy would be between
$1,200.00 to $1,600.00. Id. The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that
Seidenstucker’s life expectancy was an additional fifty years. Tr. Vol. III at 23.
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[7] Dr. Gregori’s medical license was suspended in 2007. Tr. Vol. II at 185. His
license was reinstated with probationary status in 2009, and the probationary
status was removed in 2012. Id. at 185, 186. At the time of trial, Dr. Gregori
was still unable to prescribe opiate medications due to his lack of a Drug
Enforcement Agency number. Id. at 184-85. Dr. Gregori testified that he
provides independent medical examinations as 95% of his business, with the
other 5% involving the treatment of patients. Id. at 184.
[8] The jury returned a verdict in favor of Seidenstucker for a total amount of
$34,105.09. Tr. Vol. III at 96. The trial court entered judgment consistent with
that verdict on February 21, 2018. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 8-10. On March 12,
2018, Seidenstucker filed a motion to correct error, or in the alternative, a
motion for additur, contending that the jury’s “verdict did not take into account
the uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Gregori.” Id. at 13-17. The trial court
denied Seidenstucker’s motion to correct error. Seidenstucker now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Motion in Limine
[9] “The grant or denial of a motion in limine is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and is an adjunct of the power of trial courts to admit and exclude
evidence.” Terex-Telelect, Inc. v. Wade, 59 N.E.3d 298, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
(citing Hopper v. Carey, 716 N.E.2d 566, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied),
trans. denied. Therefore, when reviewing a grant or denial of a motion in limine,
we apply the standard of review for the admission of evidence, which is
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whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id at 302-03. We will find that a
trial court has abused its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic
and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. at 303 (citing
Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 871 N.E.2d 1038, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied).
[10] Seidenstucker argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the
part of his motion in limine regarding the suspension of Dr. Gregori’s medical
license. Seidenstucker asserts that the evidence of the doctor’s medical license
suspension should not have been admitted because it was not relevant, and it
was unfairly prejudicial. Seidenstucker further claims that it was error to admit
the evidence because it created a situation where he could only explain the
license suspension and rehabilitate his expert witness by delving into the
underlying facts of Dr. Gregori’s criminal conviction, which evidence is not
admissible.
[11] Prior to trial, Seidenstucker filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of both
Dr. Gregori’s prior criminal conviction and suspension of his medical license.
After hearing argument, the trial court granted the motion in limine in part and
denied it in part, ruling that evidence of Dr. Gregori’s criminal conviction was
inadmissible, but that evidence of the suspension of his medical license could be
admitted. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 12. The Indiana Medical Licensing Board
suspended Dr. Gregori’s license in 2007. Tr. Vol. II at 185. His license was
reinstated with probationary status in 2009, and the probationary status was
removed in 2012. Id. at 185, 186. At the time of trial, Dr. Gregori was still
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unable to prescribe opiate medications due to his lack of a Drug Enforcement
Agency number. Id. at 184-85. Dr. Gregori testified that he provides
independent medical examinations as 95% of his business, with the other 5%
involving the treatment of patients. Id. at 184.
[12] A panel of this court has found comparable evidence admissible for the purpose
of impeaching an expert in Fridono v. Chuman, 747 N.E.2d 610 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001), trans. denied. In that case, Fridono filed a medical malpractice action
against Dr. Chuman alleging that he failed to comply with the applicable
standard of care in performing a cervical laminectomy. Id. at 610. At trial,
Fridono presented the testimony of an expert witness in support of his theory
that the surgery performed by Dr. Chuman was unnecessary. Id. at 615. On
cross examination, Dr. Chuman asked the expert if his privileges at a medical
school had ever been restricted. Id. Dr. Chuman used a letter agreement
between the expert and the medical school that imposed restrictions on his
privileges as a result of the peer review process as a means of impeaching the
expert and challenging his qualifications as an expert. Id. On appeal, this court
found that, while the discussions of the peer review committee were protected
by the applicable peer review statute, and were therefore not discoverable, the
final action taken as a result of that peer review process was discoverable and
admissible in judicial proceedings to impeach the expert witness. Id. at 620.
[13] Likewise, in Linton v. Davis, 887 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied,
a defendant in a medical malpractice case was asked whether his conduct met
the applicable standard of care. Id. at 965. After the doctor said his treatment
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did meet the applicable standard of care, plaintiff’s counsel questioned him
about his medical license suspension. Id. On appeal, a panel of this court
found that Davis could properly question Dr. Linton as to the standard of care
and his opinion as to whether he met that standard. Id. at 968-69. Because he
was properly questioned as to the standard of care, he was testifying as an
expert and could therefore be impeached with his licensure status. Id. at p. 969.
[14] Here, Dr. Gregori was testifying as an expert witness in support of
Seidenstucker’s case against Ferguson. Because he was testifying as an expert,
Dr. Gregori could, therefore, be impeached with the status of his medical
license and the fact that it had been previously been suspended.
[15] Seidenstucker argues that the only purpose for introducing the evidence about
Dr. Gregori’s medical license suspension was to impeach him regarding his
character for truthfulness. We disagree. The actual purpose of introducing
such evidence was to question Dr. Gregori’s credentials as an expert.
Seidenstucker presented Dr. Gregori’s testimony as expert testimony to
establish his medical damages as a result of the automobile accident with
Ferguson. Therefore, Dr. Gregori’s board certification was relevant to this case
and, likewise, so was his medical license history. Dr. Gregori provided
opinions about Seidenstucker’s condition and his treatment as an expert
witness. And it was Dr. Gregori’s expert opinions that were impeached by his
testimony regarding the suspension of his medical license.
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[16] Seidenstucker also claims that the evidence of Dr. Gregori’s suspension was an
attempt to admit evidence of Dr. Gregori’s criminal conviction for self-
prescribing opioid medication because the license suspension was based on that
conviction. Seidenstucker says that the only way of explaining the license
suspension was to reveal the underlying facts of his criminal conviction.
However, no actual evidence was introduced at trial that Dr. Gregori was
convicted for self-prescribing medication, or that his license suspension resulted
from such action. At no point during the questioning of Dr. Gregori was it
suggested that his license suspension was the result of a criminal conviction,
and Ferguson’s counsel did not introduce evidence that Dr. Gregori was
suspended for the abuse of drugs or a conviction related to drugs. Instead,
Ferguson’s counsel only asked limited questions about Dr. Gregori’s licensure
status. Therefore, we conclude that Ferguson was not attempting to introduce
evidence of a crime or evidence regarding Dr. Gregori’s character for
truthfulness, but was only cross-examining an expert witness about the history
of the credentials on which the witness relied for the authority to provide his
expert opinion. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Seidenstucker’s motion in limine regarding the admission of the
suspension of Dr. Gregori’s medical license.
II. Motion to Correct Error
[17] Generally, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct error is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Watson, 70 N.E.3d 380, 384
(Ind. Ct. App. 2017). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s
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decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id.[18] Seidenstucker argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct
error, in which he requested additur or a new trial. He contends that, based on
the totality of the evidence presented at trial, the jury’s verdict was inadequate.
Specifically, Seidenstucker asserts that the testimony of Dr. Gregori established
that Seidenstucker suffered a permanent SI injury and that he would experience
pain indefinitely. Seidenstucker alleges that, because of this injury, he will need
SI injections followed by neural ablation therapy, which could be required
every one to two years for the rest of his life. Based on the cost of the SI
injection, the neural ablation therapy, and future physical therapy,
Seidenstucker maintains that the cost of his future treatment is likely between
$210,200.00 to $300,400.00, which does not include his past medical bills of
$8,105.09 or any pain and suffering. Seidenstucker claims that, therefore, the
jury’s verdict was inadequate and not supported by the evidence presented at
trial.
[19] When reviewing a jury’s damage award that the appellant claims is inadequate,
we apply a strict standard. Liter’s of Ind., Inc. v. Bennett, 51 N.E.3d 285, 299
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “Specifically, we ‘consider only the evidence
that supports the award together with the reasonable inferences therefrom.’” Id.If there is any evidence to support the amount of the award, even if it is
conflicting, this court will not reverse. Id. “This standard reflects the premise
that damages ‘are particularly a jury determination.’” Id. (quoting Sears Roebuck
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& Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 462 (Ind. 2001)). We, therefore, do not
substitute our idea of a proper damage award for that of the jury. Id. (citing
Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied)).
“Because appellate courts are unable ‘to actually look into the minds of the
jurors, . . . we will not reverse if the award falls within the bounds of the
evidence.’” Id. (quoting Sears Roebuck, 742 N.E.2d at 462).
[20] Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the jury’s damage award
was supported by the evidence presented. Evidence was presented that, at the
time of the trial, Seidenstucker had incurred past medical expenses in the
amount of $8,105.09. Tr. Vol. III at 23-24. Dr. Gregori testified that
Seidenstucker would benefit from further physical therapy and that the cost for
additional physical therapy would be between $1,200.00 and $1,600.00.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 28. Dr. Gregori also testified that Seidenstucker would
likely need two SI injections to assist with his pain and that the cost of these
two SI injections would range between $3,000.00 and $4,000.00 each for a total
of between $6,000.00 and $8,000.00. Id. Dr. Gregori testified that, after the SI
injections, Seidenstucker could receive neural ablation therapy, which could
provide longer term relief, but that there could be some regeneration of the
nerves that could cause a patient to “have to have [the neural ablation therapy]
repeated in a couple of years.” Tr. Vol. II at 180. Evidence was presented that
each subsequent neural ablation therapy would range from $4,000.00 to
$6,000.00. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 28. Although Dr. Gregori testified that
Seidenstucker may need subsequent rounds of neural ablation therapy
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indefinitely, his testimony was that it was only a possibility and not a definite
requirement. Tr. Vol. II at 180.
[21] Additionally, Seidenstucker requested damages for pain and suffering.
Although Dr. Gregori opined that Seidenstucker would experience pain
indefinitely, evidence was also presented that he was able to work full time as
an occupational therapist, was able to go to the gym four or five days a week,
and “[p]hysically . . . was able to do most things”. Tr. Vol. II at 182, 236, 240;
Tr. Vol. III at 17-18. Assessing the value of damages for pain and suffering,
because it involves the weighing of evidence and credibility of witnesses, is
particularly within the jury’s discretion. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Lardydell, 8
N.E.3d 241, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. The jury is in the best
position to award damages for pain and suffering. Id. We, therefore, conclude
that the jury’s award of damages was within the evidence presented at trial, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Seidenstucker’s
motion to correct error.
[22] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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