Levi Booker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 09 2019, 10:18 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Small Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Levi Booker, September 9, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-276
v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John T. Roach,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
84D01-1404-FA-993
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Levi Booker (“Booker”) pleaded guilty in the Vigo Circuit Court to Class A
felony child molesting. He received a twenty-year sentence to be served in the
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Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). A condition of Booker’s sentence
permitted him to petition for direct placement to Vigo County Community
Corrections (“VCCC”) after twelve years. Booker appeals his sentence, arguing
that its imposition was inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his
character as an offender.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] R.S. was four years old when Booker, aged twenty-five, subjected her to
unlawful sexual conduct on April 4 and April 5, 2014.
[4] On April 14, 2014, Booker was charged with two counts: Class A felony child
molesting and Class C felony child molesting. Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Booker pleaded guilty to Class A felony child molesting on November 24,
2015.1 As part of the plea agreement, the Class C felony charge against Booker
was dismissed, and the State agreed to recommend that Booker receive the
minimum twenty-year sentence. The plea agreement left open where Booker’s
sentence would be served. Tr. p. 50. The trial court accepted the plea agreement
1
Booker committed and was charged with this offense in April 2014, before revisions to relevant sections of
the Indiana Criminal Code took effect on July 1, 2014. A court must generally sentence a defendant under
the statute in effect at the time the offense was committed. White v. State, 849 N.E.2d 735, 741 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006), trans. denied. Thus, although Booker’s guilty plea was accepted by the trial court after July 1, 2014, the
pre-July 1, 2014, sentencing classes and ranges apply. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.
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and convicted Booker of Class A child molesting on November 24, 2015. Tr. p.
54.
[5] Prior to Booker’s sentencing hearing, the Vigo County probation department
compiled a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report. Appellant’s Conf. App.
Vol. 4, pp. 2–8. The PSI report indicated that a community corrections agency
had been consulted “regarding services and programs available to the defendant
for this case.” Id. at 7. The report stated that the agency, VCCC, “will not
provide service for twenty years.” Id.
[6] A sentencing hearing was held on December 22, 2015. The trial court accepted
the PSI report without objection from Booker or his counsel. Tr. pp. 58–59.
During the hearing, R.S.’s mother testified to the long-term consequences of
R.S.’s molestation. Tr. pp. 62–63. The State recommended that Booker’s entire
twenty-year sentence be served in the DOC. Tr. p. 72. Booker’s counsel urged
the court to consider a “split sentence that will allow [Booker] to participate in
[VCCC] at some point in time. . . that [the DOC time] be combined with some
[VCCC] time.” Tr. p. 73–74. In support, Booker’s mother testified that she was
willing to bear the cost of Booker’s home detention should his sentence include
direct commitment to VCCC. Tr. p. 71.
[7] The trial court sentenced Booker to twenty years in the DOC, subject to the
condition that Booker could seek modification of the sentence after twelve
years. Tr. p. 75. No mitigating or aggravating factors were identified or used to
modify the twenty-year sentence. After Booker served twelve years, and
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dependent on his “performance and compliance with DOC programming,” the
trial court ruled that Booker could petition for direct placement to VCCC for
the remaining eight years of his sentence. Id. Booker did not file a Notice of
Appeal following the sentencing decision.
[8] On May 23, 2017, Booker filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.2 On
January 31, 2019, that petition was withdrawn without prejudice when Booker
filed a Motion for Leave to File a Belated Notice of Appeal. Ind. Post-
Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). Booker filed his Belated Notice of Appeal on February
6, 2019, in accordance with P-C.R. 2(1).
Discussion and Decision
[9] Though Booker does not express his argument in these terms, what he seeks is
review and revision of his sentence based on its inappropriateness in light of the
nature of his offense and his character as an offender. See Ind. Appellate Rule
7(B). Booker’s request is made before he has served the agreed-upon twelve
years in the DOC, at which time, under his plea agreement, he will be able to
petition for placement at VCCC for the remaining eight years of his sentence.
Because Booker has not presented a cogent argument regarding the
inappropriateness of his sentence in light of the nature of his offense and his
character as an offender, he has waived our review of this claim. See App. R.
2
Booker’s Petition for PCR was docketed under cause number 84D03-1705-PC-003634.
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46(A)(8)(a). Waiver notwithstanding, we proceed to explain why Booker’s
argument is without merit.
I. Abuse of Discretion Review Inapplicable
[10] Under the pre-July 1, 2014, sentencing scheme, “A person who commits a
Class A felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and
fifty years (50), with the advisory sentence being thirty years.” Ind. Code § 35-
50-2-4. The trial court sentenced Booker to twenty years for Class A felony
child molesting, pursuant to a plea agreement.
[11] The determination of a defendant’s sentence is within the trial court’s
discretion, and we review sentencing only for an abuse of that discretion.
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d
218 (Ind. 2007). On appeal, claims of inappropriate sentence and claims of
abuse of discretion must be analyzed separately. Id. at 491. There are two
reasons why abuse of discretion review is not available in Booker’s case.
[12] First, the plea agreement Booker entered was for a specific term of years:
twenty. After the trial court accepted the agreement, the court no longer had the
discretion to impose any sentence other than the one for twenty years upon
which the parties had agreed. “If the court accepts a plea agreement, it shall be
bound by its terms.” Ind. Code § 35-35-3-3(e). See also Badger v. State, 637
N.E.2d 800, 802 (Ind. 1994) (“[I]f the court accepts the agreement, it becomes
bound by the terms of the agreement.”); Blackburn v. State, 493 N.E.2d 437, 439
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(Ind. 1986) (“Although not a party to the agreement, once the court accepts a
plea agreement, it is bound by the terms of that agreement.”).
[13] Furthermore, Booker’s twenty-year sentence was non-suspendible. Non-
suspendible sentences are those where no portion of the sentence exceeds the
statutory minimum for the class of offense committed, and thus no portion of
the sentence may be suspended. Because twenty years was the minimum
penalty for Class A felony child molesting,3 and because twenty years is the
sentence the trial court accepted as part of the plea agreement, the trial court
could not suspend any part of the sentence it imposed. I.C. § 35-50-2-2(b)(4)
(2012).
[14] The second reason we decline to review Booker’s sentence for abuse of
discretion is because Booker appeals the location of the execution of his
sentence. Where a trial court orders a sentence to be served is not subject to
appellate review for abuse of discretion. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008). The trial court’s options were to “split” Booker’s twenty-year
sentence between the DOC and direct commitment to VCCC, or to order the
entire sentence served in the DOC. Tr. p. 74. Those options represented a
choice between sentencing locations, and as such the trial court’s decision is not
subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion.
3
See supra, note 2.
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II. Inappropriate Sentence
[15] We are, however, empowered by Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) to review and
revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender. Even when a defendant acquiesces to a sentence of a
particular term of years in a plea agreement, as Booker did, he does not lose the
right on appeal to challenge the appropriateness of that sentence. Childress v.
State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Our Appellate Rule 7(B) review
properly includes consideration of whether the ordered location of a sentence is
appropriate. Biddinger v. State, 868 N.E.2d 407, 414 (Ind. 2007). But as we have
previously explained, “[a]s a practical matter, trial courts know the feasibility of
alternative placements in particular counties or communities. For example, a
trial court is aware of the availability, costs, and entrance requirements of
community corrections placements in a specific locale.” Fonner v. State, 876
N.E.2d 340, 343–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We will not revise a sentence simply
because another sentence would be more appropriate. Id. at 344.
[16] In reviewing the appropriateness of Booker’s sentence, we may look to any
factors appearing in the record. Roney v. State, 872 N.E.2d 192, 206 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007), trans. denied, abrogated on other grounds by Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d
1134 (Ind. 2013). These factors include Booker’s culpability, the severity of his
offense, the damage done to others, and any other factor bearing on Booker’s
offense or nature as an offender. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind.
2008).
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[17] Booker does not address why his sentence is inappropriate based on the nature
of his offense except to argue that the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The trial court judge stated that his hands were tied [in ordering
Booker’s sentence executed in the DOC]. If the reason for [the
trial court’s] order. . . was based on arbitrary policy of [VCCC],
the reason had nothing to do with reformation of Booker or
protection of the community. As such, the sentence constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment.
Appellant’s Br. at 18 (internal citation omitted).
[18] A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or a
community corrections program. Bass v. State, 974 N.E.2d 482, 488 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012). Commitment to either serves as an alternative to commitment to
the DOC and may be made at the sole discretion of the trial court. Cox v. State,
706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999). Here, the trial court appropriately considered
the feasibility and cost of directly committing Booker to the VCCC for the
duration of Booker’s twenty-year sentence and rejected it as an option. Tr. p.
74.
[19] Booker pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the sexual molestation of four-
year-old R.S., a crime of impulse and opportunity that negatively affected his
family. Tr. pp. 62, 72–73. Statements by R.S.’s mother and counsel for both
parties reveal that R.S. was the younger sister of Booker’s wife. Tr. pp. 62, 72.
In pleading guilty, Booker received the relative benefit of a term of years at the
lowest end of the sentencing range permitted by statute for those convicted of
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Class A felonies. In addition, a condition of his sentence allowed him to
petition the court for modification of the sentence after twelve years, making
possible a substantially shorter term of years served in the DOC. Tr. p. 75.
[20] Considering the nature of the offense and Booker’s character as an offender, we
conclude that Booker has not carried his burden of persuasion that the location
of his sentence is inappropriate.
III. Invited Error
[21] Finally, even if the trial court did inappropriately sentence Booker – which we
do not believe it did – the doctrine of invited error precludes Booker from
prevailing in this appeal. “Th[e] doctrine. . . forbids a party from taking
advantage of an error that []he commits, invites, or which is the natural
consequence of h[is] own neglect or misconduct.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d
645, 651 (Ind. 2018). During sentencing, Booker made a location of sentence
claim. Tr. p. 73. Specifically, Booker’s counsel requested that the trial court
order a portion of Booker’s twenty-year sentence be served with the VCCC:
[W]hat we are asking for [] is that the court take into
consideration some type of split sentence that will allow [Booker]
to participate in Community Corrections at some point in time, []
either through in-home detention, work release or a combination
thereof, or whatever Department of Corrections time the court
sees fit to give[.]
Id.
[22] The trial court responded and issued its sentence as follows:
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[T]o a certain extent this court’s hands are tied; you have a
twenty (20) year non-suspendible sentence, and I’ve got [VCCC]
telling me that twenty years is too long for their programming. []
[T]he result of that is the [] DOC time is mandatory in this case.
[T]he question is whether I split that sentence or not, and allow
you some time in Community Corrections. . . [W]hat I’m going
to do is order that you execute a minimum of twelve years in the
[DOC]. I will allow you to ask this court to modify the last eight
(8) to Community Corrections based on your performance and
compliance with DOC programming.
Tr. pp. 74–75. Booker did not request direct commitment to the VCCC during
his sentencing hearing, nor did he object to the court’s ruling when it was made.
When the failure to object accompanies the party’s affirmative requests of the
court, the invited error doctrine applies and prevents a party from “crying foul”
on appeal. Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 651. Notably, in Booker’s case, the trial court’s
sentencing decision was closer to what Booker himself requested – a sentence
split between the DOC and VCCC – than to what the State and PSI report
recommended – for all twenty years to be served in the DOC.
[23] Booker concedes that he waived the trial court’s sentencing decision for
appellate review when he failed to object at the time of the decision. Appellant’s
Br. at 12. Nevertheless, Booker argues that the trial court’s decision is available
for review under the fundamental error exception. Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d
670, 678 (Ind. 2013). The fundamental error exception applies when an error
amounts to a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for
harm of which is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant
fundamental due process. Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006).
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Apparently to this end, Booker makes several arguments under the United
States and Indiana constitutions about the alleged error in his sentencing. These
we decline to address, for all the reasons stated above, and because the trial
court’s sentencing decision was not fundamental error. The sentence was not
inappropriate based on Booker’s character and the nature of his offense.
[24] Accordingly, we affirm.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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