K.C. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 09 2019, 9:16 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Deborah Markisohn Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Samantha M. Sumcad
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
K.C., September 9, 2019
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JV-341
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark Jones, Judge
Appellee-Petitioner. The Honorable Gary Chavers,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D15-1811-JD-1292
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] K.C. was adjudicated a delinquent for committing burglary, a Level 4 felony if
committed by an adult. K.C. appeals his adjudication, raising one issue for our
review: whether the State’s evidence is sufficient to prove his identity as the
perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Concluding K.C.’s identity
was proved by sufficient evidence, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The facts most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment are that Lori Radford
and her children, including fifteen-year-old L.S. and sixteen-year-old D.S.,
returned to their home in Indianapolis around noon on August 24, 2018, after
having been gone for several hours. L.S. and D.S. went to the backyard and
saw two people inside the house: K.C., whom L.S. has known since
kindergarten, and another man, later identified as Brendan Bodie, whom L.S.
and D.S. had met before through K.C. Bodie was holding a television. K.C.
and Bodie started to run when D.S. yelled, “Hey!” Transcript of Evidence,
Volume II at 24.
[3] As Radford was getting her baby out of the car, L.S. came running back to the
front of the house yelling, “Mom there’s someone robbing us. Somebody’s in
the house.” Id. at 7. Radford called 911. As she stood facing the front of her
house so she could describe to the 911 operator what was happening, she saw
“[K.C.] come out [a] side window” and another man run out the front door. Id.
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at 8. L.S. and D.S., who had also returned to the front of the house, also saw
K.C. climbing out a window on the side of their house. See id. at 17, 24. Both
men ran toward Radford in order to get to a car parked in the cul-de-sac. As
K.C. ran past Radford, she said, “Oh my God, twin, really? You gonna break
in my house?” Id. at 8. K.C. was able to get into the waiting car despite L.S.
and D.S.’s efforts to stop him. Bodie was not so lucky, as the car drove away
before he could get to it, and L.S. and D.S. fought with him until police arrived.
[4] Once officers arrived and Radford was able to hang up with 911, she called
K.C.’s mother to let her know what was going on. L.S., D.S., and K.C. “used
to be cool . . . used to hang out all the time.” Id. at 25. K.C. had visited the
Radford home as recently as four or five days before this incident, but he had
not been invited or given permission to be in the house on this day. K.C. has a
twin brother, K’S.C., who “look[s] like him[.]” Id. at 19. K’S.C. was on house
arrest on August 24, 2018.
[5] When Radford was allowed back into her house, she noticed that bedroom
doors and at least one window that had been closed when she left home that
morning were now open, a television had been unplugged and moved from the
fireplace to the floor by the patio door, and “everything was just a mess.” Id. at
20. Radford later discovered that an old cell phone was missing.
[6] The State filed a delinquency petition alleging K.C. had committed an act that
would constitute burglary, a Level 4 felony if committed by an adult. A fact-
finding hearing was held on December 3, 2018, at which time Radford, L.S.,
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and D.S. all testified that K.C. was the person they had seen climbing out a
window of their house on the day in question and identified him in court as the
perpetrator. K.C. denied he was involved in the burglary. The juvenile court
entered a true finding, and K.C. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[7] When reviewing claims of insufficient evidence in a juvenile adjudication, we
apply the same sufficiency standard as in other criminal cases. K.W. v. State,
984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013). We consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the juvenile court’s judgment. Drane v. State,
867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge
witness credibility and will affirm the adjudication unless no reasonable fact
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. Evidence is sufficient if an inference may be reasonably drawn from it to
support the judgment. Id. at 147.
II. Evidence of Identity
[8] K.C. concedes the Radfords’ home was burglarized on August 24, 2018, and he
further concedes the evidence establishes either he or his twin brother was
involved. See Brief of Appellant at 11, 15. At the fact-finding hearing, K.C.
denied he had anything to do with the burglary. See Tr., Vol. II at 31. K.C.
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argues there is insufficient evidence to support the true finding because the State
failed to prove he, rather than his identical twin, committed the act in question.
[9] First, K.C. points to instances during the fact-finding hearing when K’S.C.’s
name was used, instances K.C. alleges show Radford, L.S., D.S., and even the
State may have confused the twins. For instance, when questioning L.S. about
the incident, the prosecutor asked, “[D]o you remember what [K’S.C.] was
wearing?” Tr., Vol. II at 19. However, it is clear from context and from the
ensuing questions that K.C. was the intended reference. See id. (State asking,
“[H]ow do you know it was [K.C.] and not his brother?”). Even K.C.
acknowledges that he and his brother “have names which are very similar and
sound alike.” Br. of Appellant at 12. K.C. also points out that when Radford
was asked if she remembered giving police K’S.C.’s name during the
investigation, Radford testified that she told the police that K.C.’s mother told
her “to be sure that I said it’s [K.C.], because [K’S.C.’s] on house arrest already
in enough trouble.” Tr., Vol. II at 13.1 K.C. posits this request “may have
prompted Radford to select K.C. over K’S.C. Radford’s decision in turn, may
have prompted L.S. and D.S. to identify K.C. rather than K’S.C.” Br. of
1
In its brief, the State characterizes this conversation as follows: “K.C.’s mother asked which son Radford
saw, because she knew that her other son, K.S.C., was at home on house arrest. Radford confirmed that it
was K.C.” Brief of Appellee at 6. Although this testimony was not crucial to our decision, K.C.’s point in
his reply brief that the State mis-characterized this conversation to make it seem as though K.C.’s mother
confirmed K’S.C. was in fact at home at the time of the incident is well-taken.
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Appellant at 14. However, Radford, L.S., and D.S. were all unequivocal in
identifying K.C. during the fact-finding hearing as the person they saw that day.
[10] Second, K.C. identifies evidence the State could have introduced that would
have “more definitively” established his identity, such as fingerprints from the
window frame. Id. But consideration of other evidence the State could have
offered is not relevant to our review of whether the evidence the State did offer
was sufficient. And we conclude that it was.
[11] Identification testimony need not necessarily be unequivocal to sustain a
conviction. Heeter v. State, 661 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Identity
of the perpetrator may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence and
logical inferences therefrom. Bustamante v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (Ind.
1990). Evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence
to be sufficient to support a conviction. Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind.
2016). Radford, L.S., and D.S. all positively identified K.C. as the person they
saw exiting their home through a window. L.S. and D.S. were with K.C. just a
few days before the burglary, and each testified they were close enough to the
perpetrator to see his face during this incident. See Tr., Vol. II at 19, 25. We
agree with the State that this is ample evidence from which the juvenile court
could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that K.C. committed the
charged act.
[12] K.C.’s arguments on appeal are merely requests for this court to disregard the
evidence most favorable to the verdict and instead reweigh the evidence in his
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favor. This we cannot do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. The fact-finder is the
sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the
evidence. Id. at 146-47. The State presented sufficient evidence that K.C. was
one of the men who broke into and entered the Radfords’ house with the intent
to commit theft, and we affirm his adjudication as a delinquent for committing
an act that would have been burglary if committed by an adult.
Conclusion
[13] Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that K.C. committed
the charged act. Accordingly, the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
[14] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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