Lawrence Mulry v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Aug 26 2014, 9:51 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KARL M. SCHARNBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
LAWRENCE MULRY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1312-CR-1035
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Linda Brown, Judge
Cause No. 49F10-1309-CM-61428
August 26, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Lawrence Mulry appeals his conviction of Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement.1 As the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 16, 2013, Officer Craig Anderson of the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department (IMPD) was off-duty but was in his marked patrol car with his daughter in
the drive-thru of a fast food restaurant in Indianapolis. He heard a woman scream and she
came running toward his car stating she was being held against her will. She identified
Mulry as the person who was holding her against her will, and she directed Officer Anderson
to Mulry’s location nearby. Officer Anderson stopped his vehicle behind Mulry, stepped out
of the vehicle, identified himself as a police officer, and ordered Mulry to stop. Mulry
ducked behind several cars, and Officer Anderson drove to the next aisle and got out of his
vehicle.
Officer Anderson began pursuing Mulry on foot. He identified himself multiple times
as a police officer and told Mulry to stop. Officer Anderson drew his firearm when Mulry
reached into his pocket, and he again told Mulry to stop. Mulry stopped and asked, “What
are you going to do? Shoot me?” (Tr. at 9.) Officer Anderson holstered the firearm and
directed Mulry to get on the ground, but Mulry refused. A struggle ensued and Officer
Anderson had to deliver a strike to take Mulry to the ground. Officer Anderson was in plain
clothes and exited his vehicle so quickly that he did not have his handcuffs or radio. He
asked a civilian to call 911 and waited for back-up to take Mulry into custody. While
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Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a) (2012).
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waiting, Mulry continued to struggle and tried to put a handful of pills into his mouth. After
back-up arrived, Mulry was handcuffed and taken into custody.
Mulry was convicted of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and
sentenced to 237 days of probation.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, we do not reweigh
evidence or judge credibility of witnesses. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).
We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.
Id. The evidence need not overcome every inference of innocence. Id. at 147. We affirm
the conviction “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.To convict Mulry of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mulry knowingly and forcibly resisted
Officer Anderson while Officer Anderson was lawfully engaged in the execution of his
duties as a police officer. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2012) (establishing the
elements of resisting law enforcement). Mulry argues on appeal he did not act knowingly
because he did not know Officer Anderson was a police officer until he had been subdued.
Mulry’s argument is a request to reweigh the evidence which we cannot do. See
Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146 (stating we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal). Mulry first
saw Officer Anderson in his marked police vehicle with a light bar on the roof, and Officer
Anderson verbally identified himself multiple times as a police officer. There is sufficient
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evidence that Mulry knew Officer Anderson was a police officer when he resisted arrest. See
Battle v. State, 818 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding Battle knew an officer in
plain clothes and in an unmarked police car was a police officer when she verbally identified
herself as a police officer and had a badge around her neck). Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
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