Edward Lay v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 18 2019, 8:28 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stephen T. Owens Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Borahm Kim Caroline G. Templeton
Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Edward Lay, April 18, 2019
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PC-1598
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle,
Appellee-Respondent. Judge
The Honorable Stanley Kroh,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G03-1407-PC-34413
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-1598 | April 18, 2019 Page 1 of 25
Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a jury trial, Edward Lay was found guilty of two counts of murder, a
felony, and one count of attempted murder, a Class A felony. The trial court
sentenced Lay to an aggregate sentence of 140 years executed in the Indiana
Department of Correction. On direct appeal, we affirmed Lay’s convictions.
Lay v. State, No. 49A05-1208-CR-387 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013), trans.
denied. Thereafter, Lay filed a petition for post-conviction relief wherein he
alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, which the post-
conviction court denied. Lay now appeals, raising two issues for our review:
(1) whether the post-conviction court erred in concluding Lay’s trial counsel
was not ineffective, and (2) whether the post-conviction court erred in
concluding Lay’s appellate counsel was not ineffective. Concluding Lay did
not receive ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] We summarized the facts and procedural history of this case in Lay’s direct
appeal:
In August 2011, Lay, estranged from his wife, was dating Mary
Swift. Lay had recently moved into Mary’s Fountain Square
home in Indianapolis, in which Mary’s nine-year-old daughter
Alley, Mary’s twenty-year-old daughter Brittany Swift, Brittany’s
one-year-old son, and Brittany’s boyfriend Joshua Edenfield also
lived.
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On the evening of Thursday, August 11, 2011, Lay’s longtime
friend Ron Kortz and his fiancee Kelly Jinks went to Mary’s
house to celebrate their new home and Ron’s acceptance back
into college. Ron and Kelly arrived around 8:00 p.m. with a
bottle of Patron tequila. They went to Mary and Lay’s bedroom,
which was the normal place to “hang out.” Brittany joined the
party while Josh was at work. After the Patron tequila was gone,
Lay and Ron went to a friend’s house to get more tequila. After
the second bottle of tequila was gone, Ron went with Josh, who
had just returned home from work, to the liquor store and bought
two bottles of Bambitos tequila. Josh did not drink any alcohol
that night.
Sometime during the night, nine-year-old Alley was awakened by
Lynyrd Skynyrd’s “Sweet Home Alabama” coming from the
bedroom. She went downstairs to complain because she had
school in the morning. Mary and Brittany asked Lay to turn
down the music, but he refused. An argument ensued, and Mary
and Brittany told Lay to leave. Lay refused, calling Mary and
Brittany “fuc*ing bit* *es,” “who*es,” and “cun*s who “couldn't
tell him what to do.” A shoving match ensued between Mary
and Brittany and Lay. As Mary and Brittany inched Lay out the
door, he grabbed a black bag that was inside a box. At the time,
no one knew what was inside the black bag.
The arguing continued in the kitchen and then spilled out onto
the back porch, where Lay continued to yell that Mary and
Brittany could not make him leave. Brittany responded that Lay
was being “disrespectful” and “need[ed] to go for the night” but
“c[ould] come back tomorrow.” Lay responded, “Well I got my
40, bit* *.” Lay then backed down the ramp from the back porch
toward the area where the cars were parked. Josh tried to calm
Lay down; however, Lay put a gun to Josh’s face and said
something that Josh could not understand. Josh swatted the gun
away, saying, “Hey, I’m not down here to fight.” Lay turned
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around and went to the passenger side of Kelly’s car, where Ron
and Kelly tried to get him inside.
The situation did not diffuse; rather, it escalated. Lay began
threatening Brittany, so she swung at him and missed. Lay then
hit Brittany in the face four or five times, which prompted her
mother Mary to join the melee. Ron pulled Brittany away and
brought her to where Josh was standing at the bottom of the
ramp. Josh tried to corral Mary and bring her back toward the
house, but he failed. Josh managed to move Brittany farther up
the ramp as Mary yelled at Lay and hit him in retribution for
hitting her daughter.
As Josh turned back toward the cars, he heard three or four
gunshots that happened “so fast” and then saw Lay running
away. He also saw Ron asking Kelly if she had been hit.
Brittany, however, saw Lay push Mary down to her hands and
knees, point the gun at her from behind, and then she heard gun
shots. Brittany did not see Lay pull the trigger because she fell
through a loose board on the ramp. Brittany ran to her mother.
When Brittany realized her mother was not able to talk, she ran
back to her sister, Alley, who was screaming on the back porch.
Lay shot Mary, Kelly, and Ron. Josh called 911 to report the
shootings.
Ron suffered a gunshot wound to his right shoulder. According
to Ron, Lay shot him as he confronted Lay for shooting Kelly.
Ron took a few steps and collapsed in the alley by Kelly. When
Ron landed, he saw Mary on the ground near the car.
Ron was taken to the hospital where he underwent surgery and
was released a week later. He now has no feeling in his right arm
and cannot hold a coffee cup in his right hand.
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Mary and Kelly, however, suffered fatal wounds. Mary was
dead when emergency personnel arrived. Mary suffered a
gunshot wound to the top of her head. The bullet traveled
downward and exited the right side of her forehead, lacerating
her brain and fracturing her skull. Kelly was taken to the hospital
but was pronounced dead a couple hours later. Kelly suffered a
gunshot wound to her chest and left buttock. The gunshot
wound to Kelly’s chest perforated her diaphragm and lacerated
her liver, causing blood accumulation in her right chest cavity.
The other gunshot wound traveled across Kelly’s pelvic cavity
and landed in her right hip. Kelly died as a result of blood loss
from both gunshot wounds.
The police apprehended Lay within a few blocks of the scene.
Four spent shell casings were found at the scene.
The State charged Lay with the murders of Mary and Kelly and
the attempted murder of Ron. A two-day jury trial was held in
June 2012, during which Lay argued self-defense.
Id. at *1-3 (citations and footnote omitted).
[3] At trial, Dr. Ken Obenson, a forensic pathologist, testified that the gunshot
wound to Mary entered at the top of her head on the left side, travelled
downward, and exited above her right brow. He further testified that exit
wounds tend to be smaller than entrance wounds and that entrance wounds
generally have abrasion collars caused by the bullet rubbing the skin around it.
[4] During trial, Lay’s counsel tendered instructions for the lesser-included offenses
of voluntary manslaughter for Count I, involuntary manslaughter and reckless
homicide for Count II, and criminal recklessness for Count III. The trial court
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granted Lay’s request for voluntary manslaughter instructions to be given on
Count I. Trial counsel then withdrew the tendered instruction on involuntary
manslaughter for Count II and proceeded with an instruction on reckless
homicide in order “to keep it clean.” [Trial] Transcript, Volume II at 303. The
trial court also gave the State’s requested instruction on transferred intent.
[5] On June 26, 2012, the jury found Lay guilty as charged, i.e., guilty of two
counts of murder, both felonies, and one count of attempted murder, a Class A
felony. On July 19, 2012, the trial court sentenced Lay to an aggregate term of
140 years.
[6] On direct appeal, Lay’s appellate counsel raised three issues: (1) whether the
trial court committed fundamental error by allowing the parties to make
additional argument to the jury in response to the jury’s question about
transferred intent during deliberations; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient
to sustain his convictions; and (3) whether his 140–year sentence was
inappropriate. Lay, No. 49A05-1208-CR-387 at *3. A panel of this court
affirmed the trial court in all respects. Id. at *1.
[7] On July 7, 2014, Lay filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, later
amended by counsel, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel. Evidentiary hearings were held on August 16, 2016, January 17, 2017,
and March 20, 2018. On June 8, 2018, the post-conviction court issued written
findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Lay’s petition. Lay now
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appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Additional facts will be supplied as
necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[8] Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and the petitioner must therefore
establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction
Rule 1(5). These proceedings, however, are not an opportunity for a super-
appeal. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind. 2001), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 839 (2002). “The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.” Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208,
1210 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 861 (1999). Thus, we may not reweigh
the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses and we consider only the
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Hall v. State, 849
N.E.2d 466, 468-69 (Ind. 2006). The petitioner must show that the evidence is
without conflict and leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion
opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Strowmatt v. State, 779
N.E.2d 971, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
[9] Where, as here, the post-conviction court makes findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6), we
cannot affirm the judgment on any legal basis, but rather, we must determine if
the court’s findings are sufficient to support its judgment. Graham v. State, 941
N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 947 N.E.2d 962. We
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accept the post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s conclusions of
law.1 Wilson v. State, 799 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel
A. Standard of Review
[10] Lay claims the post-conviction court erred in concluding his trial and appellate
counsel were not ineffective. Specifically, he claims he was denied the effective
assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to object to final jury instructions
30 and 31, failed to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction for the killing
of Kelly, and failed to call an expert witness to rebut the testimony of the State’s
pathologist. Lay also claims he was denied the effective assistance of appellate
counsel when appellate counsel failed to argue that the error in final jury
instructions 30 and 31 was fundamental error.
[11] The standard for ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel is the
same. Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013). We review claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on such a claim, the petitioner
must show 1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, and 2) the lack of
reasonable representation prejudiced him. Id. at 687. These two prongs are
1
Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law, we commend the post-
conviction court for its thorough and well-reasoned Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Denying Post-
Conviction Relief, which has aided our review of this case.
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separate and independent inquiries. Manzano v. State, 12 N.E.3d 321, 326 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 2376 (2015). Therefore, “if it
is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on one of the grounds instead of
the other, that course should be followed.” Talley v. State, 736 N.E.2d 766, 769
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
[12] The first prong requires that the petitioner show counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel committed
errors so serious that petitioner did not have “counsel” as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Garrett, 992 N.E.2d at
718-19. To satisfy the second prong, the petitioner must show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Id. at 719. “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694.
[13] We afford counsel “considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and
we will accord those decisions deference.” Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 603. We
also recognize a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate legal
assistance. Id. The defendant must offer “strong and convincing evidence to
overcome this presumption.” Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005), trans. denied.
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B. Trial Counsel
[14] Lay argues the post-conviction court erred in concluding his trial counsel was
not ineffective because his trial counsel failed to object to final jury instructions
30 and 31, failed to request an instruction, and failed to call an expert witness.
1. Instructional Error
[15] First, Lay alleges that his trial counsel should have objected to final jury
instructions 30 and 31. Relevant here, the trial court provided the following
final jury instructions:
[Final Jury Instruction 30]
The defendant is charged with murder a felony. Voluntary
manslaughter a Class A felony, is included in Count I, murder a
felony. If the State proves the defendant guilty of murder a felony, you
need not consider the included crime. However, if the State fails to
prove the defendant committed murder a felony, you may
consider whether the defendant committed voluntary
manslaughter a Class A felony, which the court will define for
you.
You must not find the defendant guilty of more than one
crime for each count.
[Final Jury Instruction 31]
The crime of murder is defined by law as follows:
A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another
human being, commits murder, a felony. Included in the charge
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in this case is the crime of voluntary manslaughter, which is
defined by the law as follows: A person who knowingly or
intentionally kills another human being while acting under
sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter, a Class B felony.
The offense is a Class A felony if it is committed by means of a
deadly weapon.
Sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what
otherwise would be murder to voluntary manslaughter. The
State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was not acting under sudden heat.
Before you may convict the defendant, the State must have
proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. The defendant, Edward L. Lay
2. knowingly or intentionally
3. killed
4. another human being, namely: Mary Swift, by
shooting a deadly weapon, that is: a gun, at and
against the person of Mary Swift, thereby inflicting
mortal injuries upon Mary Swift, causing Mary
Swift to die
5. and the defendant was not acting under sudden heat
6. and the defendant killed by means of a deadly
weapon.
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If the State failed to prove each of these elements 1
through 4 beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty of murder as charged in Count I.
If the State did prove each of these elements 1 through 4
and element 6 beyond a reasonable doubt, but the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt element 5, you may find the
defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a Class A felony, a
lesser included offense of Count I.
If the State did prove each of these elements 1 through 5
beyond a reasonable doubt, you may find the defendant guilty of
murder, a felony as charged in Count I.
[Direct Appeal] Appellant’s Appendix at 209-11 (capitalization omitted and
emphasis added).
[16] Lay’s argument regarding the failure to object to the jury instructions is
twofold. He first alleges there was a sequencing error regarding the sentence in
final jury instruction 30 that provides, “If the State proves the defendant guilty
of Murder a felony, you need not consider the included crime.” Id. at 209.
Specifically, Lay contends that the sentence “erroneously precluded the jury
from considering voluntary manslaughter if they found Lay committed a
knowing killing even though voluntary manslaughter (Ind. Code 35-42-1-3) and
murder (Ind. Code 35-42-1-1(1)) have the same elements—a knowing or
intentional killing of another person.” Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 17. Lay
further alleges that although “[t]rial counsel did not see the error at the time of
trial . . . [s]he now agrees the instruction was erroneous and the failure to object
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to it was a glaring error.” Id. at 18. This failure to object, Lay contends,
constituted deficient performance.
[17] Second, Lay alleges that final jury instruction 31 “incorrectly lists sudden heat
as an element” when, in fact, it is a “mitigating factor that reduces what would
otherwise be murder to voluntary manslaughter.” Id. at 19. Specifically, Lay
contends that “[a]lthough final instruction 31 does in one place correctly
address sudden heat as a mitigating factor, the error of additionally addressing
it as an element[,] coupled with the sequencing error in final instruction 30,
precluded the jury from properly considering voluntary manslaughter.” Id. at
19-20.
[18] Assuming for the purposes of this appeal that trial counsel’s failure to object to
final jury instructions 30 and 31 constituted deficient performance, Lay fails to
carry his burden to show that but for counsel’s failure to object, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different.
See Benefield v. State, 945 N.E.2d 791, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Our supreme
court has previously explained:
When determining whether a defendant suffered a due process
violation based on an incorrect jury instruction, we look not to
the erroneous instruction in isolation, but in the context of all
relevant information given to the jury, including closing
argument, and other instructions. There is no resulting due
process violation where all such information, considered as a
whole, does not mislead the jury as to a correct understanding of
the law.
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Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted).
[19] Here, although one sentence in final jury instruction 30 is potentially confusing,
we conclude that all the information provided to the jury, considered as a
whole, did not mislead the jury as to a correct understanding of the law. First,
the trial court expressly informed the jury that “in considering any one
instruction[,] you should construe it in connection with, and in light of, every
other instruction given.” [Direct Appeal] Appellant’s App. at 199. Second,
final jury instruction 31, the instruction that immediately followed final jury
instruction 30, correctly explained the relevant law:
Included in the charge in this case is the crime of voluntary
manslaughter, which is defined by the law as follows: A person
who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being while
acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter, a
Class B felony. The offense is a Class A felony if it is committed
by means of a deadly weapon.
Sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise
would be murder to voluntary manslaughter. The State has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
acting under sudden heat.
Id. at 210 (emphasis added). And third, in the words of the post-conviction
court, the deputy prosecutor “in his closing argument in Lay’s case, also
explained that the State had to disprove sudden heat.” Appealed Order at 14.
Whether counsel properly stated the law in closing argument can impact
whether an instructional error is harmless. Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 16 (Ind.
2015).
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[20] In light of all of the information provided to the jury, we conclude that Lay was
not denied fundamental due process. That, however, does not end our inquiry
into whether Lay was prejudiced by trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. In
Boesch, upon which we rely for the foregoing standard, the petitioner claimed
that an erroneous jury instruction rose to the level of fundamental error. 778
N.E.2d at 1279. The “fundamental error” rule is extremely narrow, and applies
only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm
or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant
fundamental due process. Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002).
But, we have explained that although the standards for fundamental error and
prejudice for ineffective assistance of trial counsel “may frequently lead to the
same result, the analyses are different” and present “two substantively different
questions.” Benefield, 945 N.E.2d at 803, 805. Thus, we must consider whether
counsel’s failure to object to final jury instructions 30 and 31 prejudiced Lay—
rather than simply deeming the error insufficient to constitute fundamental
error.
[21] On appeal, Lay relies upon Roberson v. State, where we found ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, for the proposition that the erroneous jury instruction
rendered trial counsel’s performance deficient and that he suffered resulting
prejudice. 982 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In Roberson, the petitioner
argued:
the murder and voluntary manslaughter instructions were
erroneous both because they effectively precluded the jury from
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considering whether [the petitioner] committed voluntary
manslaughter if the State proved the basic elements of murder,
i.e. knowingly killing [the victim], and because they erroneously
placed the burden on the State of proving the existence of sudden
heat beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 455-56. We, as did the post-conviction court, find Roberson easily
distinguishable.
[22] First, the jury in Roberson was twice incorrectly informed by the trial court’s jury
instructions that sudden heat was an element of voluntary manslaughter and
that the State bore the burden of proving the existence of sudden heat. Id. at
459. Here, the jury was correctly informed that sudden heat was a mitigating
factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder to voluntary manslaughter
and that the State bore the burden of disproving its existence. [Direct Appeal]
Appellant’s App. at 210. Second, the trial court in Roberson instructed the jury,
“If the State proves the Defendant guilty of Murder, you must not consider the
included crimes[,]” 982 N.E.2d at 458, rather than the “need not consider”
language present here. [Direct Appeal] Appellant’s App. at 209. Although at
first glance this appears to make no meaningful difference, the former expressly
prohibits the jury from proceeding to consider voluntary manslaughter, having
already been incorrectly informed regarding sudden heat and its relation to a
murder conviction. Here, because the jury was correctly instructed, we share
no such dilemma. And thirdly, in Roberson, “neither party explained the proper
burden of proof to the jury during their closing arguments.” Roberson, 982
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N.E.2d at 461. Whereas here, as discussed above, the deputy prosecutor
“explained that the State had to disprove sudden heat.” Appealed Order at 14.
[23] Lay’s reliance on McWhorter v. State, 970 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012),
trans. granted, summarily aff’d in relevant part, 993 N.E.2d 1141 (Ind. 2013), is
likewise misplaced. In McWhorter, the defendant claimed that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s instruction on voluntary
manslaughter, which informed the jury that if the State failed to prove the
elements of murder, it must find the defendant not guilty of murder. Id. at 777.
Immediately after this, however, it stated, “[y]ou may then consider any included
crime[,]” and set forth the elements of voluntary manslaughter. Id. We
determined:
A finding that less than all the elements of Murder were proven
is, in these circumstances, necessarily a finding that the requisite
intent was not established. We find that the instruction to
proceed to consider Voluntary Manslaughter only upon a failure
of proof of Murder invites inconsistency and renders the result of
the trial unreliable.
Id. at 778. We, therefore, held that trial counsel’s failure to object to this
improper instruction was deficient performance. Id. We concluded that
McWhorter was prejudiced because he was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter, which, according to the jury instructions, could only be proved
on a failure to find all the elements of murder, yet a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter requires proof of all the elements of murder. Id.
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[24] Here however, unlike in McWhorter, the jury was properly instructed (though in
an inartful manner) that if the State failed to prove that Lay knowingly or
intentionally killed Mary, it was to find him not guilty of murder, but that if the
State did prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed Mary while acting in
sudden heat (which the State had the burden to disprove), it should find him
guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
[25] Considering the totality of the final jury instructions, and trial counsel’s closing
argument, we cannot say that Lay showed a reasonable probability that, but for
trial counsel’s errors, the result of his trial would have been different. Garrett,
992 N.E.2d at 719. “Generally, errors in the giving or refusing of instructions
are harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the
jury could not properly have found otherwise.” Matheny v. State, 983 N.E.2d
672, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. We therefore
conclude the post-conviction court did not err in finding trial counsel was not
ineffective with respect to the jury instructions.
2. Failure to Request Instruction
[26] Next, Lay claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the
jury be instructed with regard to the lesser-included offense of voluntary
manslaughter for the killing of Kelly Jinks. Lay argues, “It makes no rationale
[sic] sense to not request a voluntary manslaughter instruction for Kelly once
counsel obtained one for Mary because the [sic] whatever intent the jury
ascribed to Mary, it would then transfer to Kelly by the State’s own argument.”
Br. of Petitioner-Appellant at 23. According to Lay, “[b]y not requesting the
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voluntary manslaughter instruction for Kelly, if the jury were to conclude Lay
knowingly killed Mary but acted in sudden heat, it would convict him of
voluntary manslaughter for Mary but then be forced to convict him of murder
for Kelly which is not rationale [sic].” Id.[27] While our Supreme Court has previously held that voluntary manslaughter is a
lesser included offense to murder, it has also determined that “a tactical
decision not to tender a lesser included offense does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel, even where the lesser included offense is inherently
included in the greater offense.” Autrey v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind.
1998). Here, Lay’s counsel made the decision to withdraw a tendered
instruction on involuntary manslaughter for the killing of Kelly and proceed
with an instruction on reckless homicide in order “to keep it clean.” [Trial] Tr.,
Vol. II at 303. She also, presumably, made the decision to not tender an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter, which, arguably, could have
undermined the reckless homicide theory of defense. See Sarwacinski v.
State, 564 N.E.2d 950, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no ineffectiveness
where counsel pursued a self-defense strategy and did not tender an instruction
on voluntary manslaughter which “would have weakened the self-defense case
and diminished appellant’s chances of acquittal”). We cannot say that trial
counsel’s decision not to seek an instruction on voluntary manslaughter
warranted post-conviction relief.
[28] Furthermore, the evidence before the post-conviction court was that this
decision was strategic. The post-conviction court noted that “the focus of [trial
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counsel’s] defense regarding Kelly Jinks was recklessness” and then quoted the
following portion of trial counsel’s closing argument:
Kelly’s a no-brainer. They did not put on evidence that he
knowingly killed Kelly. Nobody, not one of the three people that
were out there can tell you where she was when she got shot.
You’ll be given an instruction on reckless homicide. You
cannot find him guilty, based on the evidence, not guessing and
speculation -- and I’ll go over what the instructions are. And
you’ll hear what reckless homicide is. Did what he do [sic] was
reckless and it caused her death? If that’s what you think
happened, find him guilty of reckless homicide.
Appealed Order at 16; [Trial] Tr., Vol. II at 359. We will not second-guess
counsel’s strategy “through the distortions of hindsight.” Autrey, 700 N.E.2d at
1141.
[29] Moreover, at the post-conviction hearing, Lay did not ask trial counsel why she
did not tender a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Absent evidence in
support of a petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a court
can infer that counsel would not corroborate the allegations. See Dickson v.
State, 533 N.E.2d 586, 589 (Ind. 1989).
[30] Lay has failed to establish that a different outcome was reasonably likely if the
jury instruction had been given. Thus, it follows that the post-conviction court
properly found that Lay failed to prove that he was denied the effective
assistance of trial counsel with respect to failure to request that the jury be
instructed on voluntary manslaughter for the killing of Kelly.
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3. Failure to Call Witness
[31] Next, Lay claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert
witness to challenge the testimony of the State’s pathologist that the wound to
the back of Mary’s head was an entrance wound and not an exit wound. Lay
argues that his “alternative narratives” of self-defense and sudden heat “were all
severely compromised . . . in the face of the pathologist’s incorrect but
unchallenged testimony[,]” and that there is a reasonable probability that the
jury would have reached a different result “[h]ad the jury been able to hear an
expert explain why Mary’s wound in the back of her head had to have been the
exit wound while the wound in front, just above the eyebrow, must have been
the entrance wound[.]” Br. of Petitioner-Appellant at 25.
[32] “A decision regarding what witnesses to call is a matter of trial strategy which
an appellate court will not second-guess, although a failure to call a useful
witness can constitute deficient performance.” Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438,
447 (Ind. 1998) (citation omitted). Choosing which witnesses to call “is the
epitome of a strategic decision.” Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23, 48 n.26 (Ind.
1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1040 (1999). And we will not find counsel
ineffective for failure to call a particular witness absent a clear showing of
prejudice. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 108 (Ind. 2000), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 830 (2001).
[33] When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleges the failure to present
witnesses, the petitioner must offer evidence as to who the witnesses were and
what their testimony would have been. Lee v. State, 694 N.E.2d 719, 722 (Ind.
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1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1023 (1998). At trial, Dr. Obenson, a forensic
pathologist who testified for the State, testified that the wound in the back of
Mary’s head was the entrance wound. At the post-conviction hearing, Lay
presented the testimony of Dr. George Nichols, a forensic pathologist, who
testified that certain language in the autopsy report, specifically, “[e]xternal
beveling,” indicated that the wound in question was an exit wound, not an
entrance wound. [Post-Conviction] Transcript, Volume 2 at 41. On cross-
examination, however, he explained that, in preparing to testify, he had
“reviewed the autopsy report and two color photographs showing only the
external injuries that were described in the autopsy report[,]” and that he
“gladly would have examined [any additional photographs] to see what the
boney wound actually looked like rather than what it was described[.]” Id. at
44. He further testified that his opinion regarding the wound path would
change if the word “external” in the autopsy report was determined to be a
typographical error that should have read “internal.” Id. at 45.
[34] Trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that Lay had told her that
he did not shoot Mary in the back of the head. Counsel further testified that “it
would have been helpful” to challenge the location of the entry wound and that
her failure to do so was not a strategic decision. Id. at 15. However, on cross-
examination, she also testified that she “did not have any reason at the time to
doubt what [Dr. Obenson] had said” other than the counter-narrative that Lay
provided. Id. at 18.
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[35] The post-conviction court concluded that trial counsel’s performance was
“reasonable and not deficient[,]” that testimony regarding the wound path did
not invalidate Lay’s claim of self-defense, that trial counsel’s cross-examination
of Dr. Obenson “downplayed the significance of his description of the wound
path,” and that Lay failed to show “a reasonable probability of a more
favorable outcome at trial had counsel presented an independent pathologist to
testify.” Appealed Order at 16-18. Our review of the record does not lead us to
an opposite conclusion. See Badelle v. State, 754 N.E.2d 510, 539 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (deciding in relevant part that, when trial counsel’s efforts were “more
than adequate” to support a chosen defense, counsel’s decision not to seek out
additional witnesses was a judgment call within the wide range of reasonable
assistance), trans. denied. The post-conviction court did not err in denying Lay’s
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to call an expert
witness.
C. Appellate Counsel
[36] Finally, Lay alleges that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel
because counsel failed to argue that final jury instructions 30 and 31 were
fundamental error on direct appeal. Because of our resolution of Lay’s claims
involving trial counsel, however, we easily dispense with this claim and
conclude that Lay has failed to demonstrate prejudice.
[37] In Benefield, we explained:
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As with trial counsel, to establish that appellate counsel rendered
ineffective assistance, a petitioner must show appellate counsel
was deficient in performance and that the deficiency resulted in
prejudice. Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 723 (Ind. 2007).
However, appellate and trial counsel have different tasks, which
result in different kinds of deficient performance and prejudice.
Thus, when the alleged error is that appellate counsel failed to
raise issues, prejudice is based on “whether the issues appellate
counsel failed to raise would have been clearly more likely to
result in reversal or an order for a new trial.” Id. at 724.
Accordingly, there is no prejudice created by appellate counsel’s
failure to raise an unpreserved issue that does not result in
fundamental error because the issue would not have been clearly
more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. Put
another way, if an unpreserved error is found not to be
fundamental, then appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for
failing to raise it.
945 N.E.2d at 802-03.
[38] Above, in the context of Lay’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for
failing to object to final jury instructions 30 and 31, we concluded that Lay
failed to establish prejudice. As we held in Benefield,
the bar establishing fundamental error is higher than that for
prejudice of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Therefore,
where an appellant has failed to prove ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, our holding would exclude a finding of
fundamental error.
Id. at 805. Accordingly, because Lay failed to prove ineffective assistance of
trial counsel with respect to final jury instructions 30 and 31, he has failed to
show fundamental error, and in turn, has failed to demonstrate prejudice
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resulting from appellate counsel’s alleged deficient performance in failing to
raise the issue.
Conclusion
[39] Lay failed to demonstrate both ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel. Therefore, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err
when it denied Lay’s petition for post-conviction relief.
[40] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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