Dannie Michelle Clark v. Elizabeth Spradlin (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Oct 22 2015, 6:30 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Kristen R. Willadsen Kyle D. Gobel
Willadsen * Neal, LLC Frankfort, Indiana
Muncie, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dannie Michelle Clark, October 22, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
05A02-1503-GU-174
v. Appeal from the Blackford Circuit
Court
The Honorable J. Nick Barry,
Elizabeth Spradlin, Special Judge
Appellee-Respondent Trial Court Cause No. 05C01-1310-
GU-19
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Appellant-Intervenor Dannie Michelle Clark (“Mother”) appeals from the trial
court’s order naming Appellee-Petitioner Elizabeth Spradlin as guardian of
A.C., Mother’s biological daughter. A.C. was born in September of 2012, the
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child of Mother and Edmund Wattis.1 In October of 2013, Daniel Lee Clark
(“Clark”)—Mother’s father, A.C.’s grandfather, and Spradlin’s ex-husband—
petitioned for guardianship of A.C. Mother consented to the guardianship. At
the time, A.C., Clark, Spradlin, Spradlin’s daughter Lisa Thompson, and
Mother lived together in Hartford City. In April of 2014, Spradlin and
Thompson moved with A.C. to Frankfort, Indiana due to concerns about
A.C.’s safety while living with Clark.
[2] In June of 2014, Spradlin petitioned to remove Clark as A.C.’s guardian and
name her successor guardian. In October, the trial court granted Spradlin’s
motion, after which Mother petitioned to terminate Spradlin’s guardianship of
A.C. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s petition to remove
Spradlin as A.C.’s guardian. Mother now appeals, contending that the trial
court applied the wrong standard of review and abused its discretion in finding
that there had been no substantial change in one or more of the child custody
factors and A.C.’s best interests were served by placement with Spradlin. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] A.C. was born on September 4, 2012, to Mother and Wattis. Within weeks,
Mother and A.C. moved into the home of Clark and Spradlin in Hartford City.
1
Wattis’s paternity of A.C. has seemingly not been legally established, and he takes no part in this appeal.
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The home was jointly owned by Clark and Spradlin, who were married for
approximately twenty years before divorcing in 2007. Despite the divorce,
Clark and Spradlin continued to live together in the home. Although A.C.’s
residence in the Hartford City home was continuous, Mother was generally
unemployed and would leave home for months at a time with neither Clark nor
Spradlin knowing her whereabouts. On two occasions in the summer of 2013,
Spradlin consulted with legal counsel in an effort to acquire guardianship over
A.C. for herself; in each case counsel demurred because Mother’s whereabouts
were unknown and her consent could not be obtained.
[4] On October 29, 2013, Clark moved to be appointed A.C.’s guardian, to which
Mother consented. In the months that followed, Spradlin had increasing
concerns regarding A.C.’s presence in the home. A.C. shared a queen-size bed
with Spradlin and Clark, and Clark would force Spradlin into sexual
intercourse with him while A.C. was in the bed with them. On March 29,
2014, Spradlin noticed that Clark and A.C. were spending an inordinate
amount of time in the bathroom with the door closed. Spradlin entered the
bathroom to find A.C. and Clark showering together, and Clark had an
erection.
[5] Spradlin separated from Clark and took A.C. to live with Thompson in
Frankfort. Spradlin’s understanding was that she was to have A.C. during the
week and return A.C. to Clark’s on the weekends so that Mother could have
parenting time. This arrangement did not occur as Spradlin anticipated, and,
on June 3, 2014, Spradlin moved to intervene and petitioned to remove Clark as
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A.C.’s guardian and appoint her successor guardian. On October 9, 2014, the
trial court held a hearing and entered an order removing Clark as A.C.’s
guardian and appointing Spradlin four days later.
[6] On October 20, 2014, Mother petitioned to terminate Spradlin’s guardianship.
On February 12, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on Mother’s petition to
terminate. At the hearing, Mother testified that she lived with Clark in in
Hartford City and planned to move out when she found a job, but admitted that
she had not been employed for a year. Mother originally consented to Clark’s
guardianship in October of 2013 because she was unable to financially support
A.C. Mother admitted that her financial situation had not changed since 2013.
Mother also expressed her belief that Spradlin was properly caring for A.C.,
although Mother was concerned that A.C. might be allergic to Spradlin’s cats.
[7] Spradlin testified that she, A.C., and Thompson lived in a three-bedroom
townhouse in Frankfort. A.C. had her own bedroom in the townhouse, and
there is a playground on the grounds. In the approximately four months since
being appointed guardian, Spradlin had taken A.C. to doctors to address
medical issues that had been neglected previously. Spradlin enrolled A.C. in
the Indiana First Step Program, which provided home-based speech therapy
and developmental therapy, and A.C. was taking swimming and tumbling
classes at the Y.M.C.A. Spradlin was receiving disability benefits, and
Thompson earned substantial income from her job at Frito-Lay. Spradlin
believed that she had the resources to continue as A.C.’s guardian.
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[8] Spradlin also testified that she had made A.C. fully available for visitation with
Mother, with the exception of one weekend where A.C.’s travel was restricted
due to a medical procedure. Spradlin, however, ensured that Mother had
make-up time for that weekend. Spradlin indicated that she had no desire to
cut Mother out of A.C.’s life and had repeatedly told Mother that she was
welcome in Spradlin’s home. Spradlin wanted the guardianship to continue,
expressing concern that, were A.C. to return to live with Clark and Mother, “I
don’t think she would be in a safe environment. I know that she wouldn’t be
taken care of properly.” Tr. p. 55.
[9] On February 26, 2015, the trial court issued an order denying Mother’s petition
to terminate Spradlin’s guardianship of A.C., which provides, in part, as
follows:
7. The Court finds that the guardian in this cause, Elizabeth
Spradlin, has developed a strong emotional bond with the
child. During those times that Spradlin resided with [Mother]
in Hartford City, Indiana, Spradlin provided the daily care for
the child. While [Mother] claims that she was excluded from
being able to provide care for the child, the Court finds this
difficult to believe. Further, Spradlin’s care for the child has
continued after receiving guardianship of the child. Spradlin
has provided a stable home for the child in Frankfort, Indiana
by enrolling the child in preschool classes, extra-activities
such as swimming and tumbling. The Court also notes that
the child’s health care needs have been addressed by the
guardian including follow-up treatments for the child’s eyes
regarding issues with the child’s tear ducts. The child’s
specific health needs were in existence during the time that
the child resided with [Mother] and could have been
addressed by [Mother], yet they were not. Spradlin has
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obtained health care for the child’s needs by obtaining
Hoosier Healthwise coverage, something [Mother] could have
obtained for the child well in advance of these proceedings.
8. The Court finds that [Mother] seems to be in a great transition
in life. [Mother] has not been employed since the last Court
hearing in this cause on October 13, 2014. While [Mother]
testified that she has submitted job applications at various
employers in the Hartford City area, the Court finds that,
even after taking into account the numerous contacts with
employers, [Mother]’s actions (or inactions) over the past 4
months since the last hearing seem minimal in light of
[Mother] being without work for over one year. Spradlin’s
daughter testified that she has informed [Mother] of a
potential job opportunity at Frito-Lay which [Mother]
declined to take any initiative in seeking employment. The
financial needs of the child are for the Court’s consideration
but will not be the sole determination on the issue before this
Court on the best interests of the child. In further concluding
that [Mother] is in transition in life, the Court notes the
numerous changes of address for [Mother]. As the Court
noted in the Order Removing Guardian and Appointment of
Successor Guardian filed on October 13, 2014, “[Mother] was
generally unemployed, and would leave the home for months
at a time with neither Daniel nor Elizabeth knowing her
whereabouts.” [Mother] continues to reside with her father,
Daniel. [Mother] testified that she intends to get her own
place upon becoming employed, however, for the present
time, [Mother] intends to reside with her father, in the event
the guardianship is terminated. [Mother]’s father was the
subject of concern for the Court due to an episode in which
Daniel was found showering with the child and having an
erection. The Court finds that to terminate the guardianship
and to return the child to [the] home of [Mother]’s would
cause the child’s life to be just as unstable and transitional as
her mother’s life. Stability in the household for a young child
at the age of [A.C.] is necessary for the security, physical
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growth and emotional well-being and development of a child.
“The party seeking the modification bears the burden of
demonstrating that the existing custody order is unreasonable
because, as a general proposition, stability and permanence
are considered best for the child.” Barger vs. Pate, 831
N.E.2d 758 (Ind. App. 2005). The Court finds that Spradlin
has shown, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is in the
best interests of the child, that placement of the child with
Spradlin is a significant advantage to the child. In short, the
child’s best interests are substantially and significantly served
by placement with Spradlin.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED, the request of [Mother] contained in the Verified
Petition For Request For P[er]missive Intervention and
Termination of Guardianship for the termination of the
guardianship on behalf of the child filed on October 20, 2014 is
denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
that all previous orders of the Court contained in the Court’s
Order Removing Guardian and Appointment of Successor
Guardian filed on October 13, 2014 remain in effect including the
limitation of contact between the child and Daniel Clark.
Appellant’s App. pp. 73-75.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[10] All findings and orders of the trial court in guardianship
proceedings are within the trial court’s discretion. Ind. Code §
29-3-2-4. Thus, we will review those findings under an abuse of
discretion standard. E.N. ex rel. Nesbitt v. Rising Sun-Ohio County
Community School Corp., 720 N.E.2d 447, 450 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied. In determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion, we look to the trial court’s findings of
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fact and conclusions thereon. We may not set aside the findings
or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Menard, Inc. v.
Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1210 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied.
In our review, we first consider whether the evidence supports
the factual findings. Id. Second, we consider whether the
findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly
erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support
them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671
N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous if it
relies on an incorrect legal standard. Menard, 726 N.E.2d at
1210. We give due regard to the trial court’s ability to assess the
credibility of witnesses. Id. While we defer substantially to
findings of fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law. Id. We
do not reweigh the evidence; rather we consider the evidence
most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences
drawn in favor of the judgment. Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265,
1268 (Ind. 1999).
In re Guardianship of J.K., 862 N.E.2d 686, 690-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in
Denying Mother’s Petition to Terminate Spradlin’s
Guardianship of A.C.
[11] As we have recently stated,
Guardianship proceedings are guided by statute. Indiana Code §
29-3-12-1(c)(4) provides that a trial court “may terminate any
guardianship if … the guardianship is no longer necessary.…”
However, “[i]n determining whether a guardianship should be
terminated, … we have generally applied a more detailed test
than required by the plain language of the [guardianship]
statute.” Roydes v. Cappy, 762 N.E.2d 1268, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002). Instead, we apply a standard similar to the one used in
child custody modifications, which takes into account parental
rights and the best interests of the child. Id.
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“Indiana courts have long held that ‘[e]ven when a parent
initiates an action to reobtain custody of a child that has been in
the custody of another, the burden of proof does not shift to the
parent … [r]ather, the burden of proof is always on the third
party.’” [K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ind. 2009)
(quoting In re Guardianship of J.K., 862 N.E.2d 686, 692 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007)]. (modifications in original). However, as in other
custody modification matters, a parent wishing to terminate a
guardianship has the burden of persuading the trial court that
termination is in the child’s best interests and that there is a
substantial change in one or more of the child-custody factors.
See id. (citing Indiana Code § 31-14-13-6) (relating to
modification of custody in a paternity action). These are
“modest requirements” where, as occurred here, the party
seeking to modify custody is the natural parent of a child who is
in the custody of a third party. Id. Indeed, there is a “‘strong
presumption that a child’s interests are best served by placement
with the natural parent.’” Id. (quoting In re Guardianship of B.H.,
770 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind. 2002), reh’g denied). “Hence, the first
statutory requirement is met from the outset” and, “as a practical
matter,” the natural parent’s burden of establishing a substantial
change in one or more of the enumerated statutory factors “is no
burden at all” or is, at the very least, “minimal.” Id.
Once the natural parent meets this “minimal” burden of
persuasion, the third party must prove “by clear and convincing
evidence ‘that the child’s best interests are substantially and
significantly served by placement with another person.’” Id. at
461 (quoting B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287). If the third party fails to
carry this burden, then custody of the child must be modified in
favor of the natural parent. Id.
In re Guardianship of M.N.S., 23 N.E.3d 759, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[12] Mother first contends that the trial court applied the wrong standard in
evaluating her petition, effectively shifting the burden of proof to her. The trial
court, however, clearly indicated in its order denying Mother’s petition to
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remove Spradlin as A.C.’s guardian that “the issue is whether the important
and strong presumption that a child’s best interest are best served by the
placement with the natural parent is clearly and convincingly overcome by
evidence proving that the child’s best interests are substantially and significantly
served by placement with another person.” Appellant’s App. p. 73. This is a
correct statement of the law, and in the absence of any indication to the
contrary, Mother has failed to establish that the trial court departed from the
above by placing the burden of proof on Mother instead of Spradlin.
[13] Mother also seems to argue that, even if the trial court applied the correct
standard, it abused its discretion in failing to find that she had carried her
burden in establishing a substantial change in one of more of the enumerated
statutory factors.2 We need not address Mother’s argument further, however, if
we conclude that Spradlin produced sufficient evidence to sustain the trial
2
In guardianship cases, e.g., M.N.S., 23 N.E.3d at 766, this court has applied the factors listed in Indiana
Code section 31-14-13-2, “Factors for custody determination”:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child. In
determining the child’s best interests, there is not a presumption favoring either parent.
The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the child’s parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child’s wishes if the
child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the child’s parents;
(B) the child’s siblings; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest.
(5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the
evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 2.5(b)
of this chapter.
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court’s finding that “[A.C.’s] best interests are substantially and significantly
served by placement with Spradlin.” Appellant’s App. p. 75.
[14] Even assuming, arguendo, that Mother carried her initial burden of proof, we
conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s
judgment. The trial court found, inter alia, that Spradlin had formed a strong
bond with A.C., provided daily care for A.C. both in Hartford City and
Frankfort, provided a stable home, enrolled A.C. in preschool and athletic
programs, and addressed A.C.’s long-neglected medical needs. The trial court’s
findings, amply supported by the record, indicate that Spradlin is able to
provide a stable, safe, healthy, and comfortable environment for A.C.
[15] In contrast, the trial court found that Mother’s life was in transition. The trial
court noted Mother’s continued unemployment, finding that her efforts to find
employment were “minimal in light of [Mother] being out of work for over one
year.” Appellant’s App. p. 74. The trial court specifically highlighted evidence
that Thompson had informed Mother of a potential employment opportunity at
Frito-Lay, which Mother then failed to pursue. In addition to financial
concerns, the trial court noted Mother’s history of frequent changes of address,
noting that Mother has been known to leave Clark’s home (and A.C.) for
months at a time with neither Clark nor Spradlin being made aware of her
whereabouts. Finally, the trial court expressed concern over Clark, with whom
Mother currently resides. The trial court specifically cited Spradlin’s report that
she had seen Clark and A.C. showering together, Clark with an erection at the
time. Essentially, Mother is asking us to overlook what the trial court found to
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be credible reports of extremely inappropriate behavior by Clark. We will not
do so. Needless to say, the trial court was well within its discretion in
considering A.C.’s safety around Clark to be a significant concern.
[16] In summary, the trial court concluded that to terminate the guardianship with
Spradlin and return A.C. to Mother would cause her life to be just as unstable
and transitional as Mother’s. See Barger v. Pate, 831 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005) (“The party seeking the modification bears the burden of
demonstrating that the existing custody order is unreasonable because, as a
general proposition, stability and permanence are considered best for the
child.”). We conclude that because Spradlin has carried her burden, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s petition to terminate
Spradlin’s guardianship.
[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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