Danette M. Roland v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Feb 17 2016, 8:22 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
John Thrasher Neal Bailen
Indianapolis, Indiana Stites & Harbison PLLC
Jeffersonville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Danette M. Roland, February 17, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A04-1508-MF-1241
v. Appeal from the Hamilton County
Superior Court
Nationstar Mortgage LLC, The Honorable William J. Hughes,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable William P.
Greenaway, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
29D03-1404-MF-3480
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Nationstar) filed a mortgage foreclosure action
against Danette Roland, and Roland filed counterclaims against Nationstar for
criminal conversion and alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Roland’s
counterclaims, and Roland appeals from the trial court’s order denying her
motion and granting Nationstar’s.
[2] Concluding sua sponte that the order from which Roland appeals is not an
appealable final judgment, we dismiss.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] In 1999, Wayne Roland (Wayne) executed a promissory note payable to
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. in the principal amount of $225,000. As
security for the note, Wayne and Roland, who were at that time married,
granted Countrywide a mortgage on their Carmel residence. Nationstar is the
current holder of the note and the assignee of the mortgage.
[4] In 2014, Nationstar filed an action to foreclose on the mortgage. Roland
asserted counterclaims for criminal conversion and alleged violations of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Nationstar and Roland filed cross-motions
for summary judgment on her counterclaims. After briefing and a hearing, the
trial court denied Roland’s motion and granted summary judgment for
Nationstar on the counterclaims, and the foreclosure claim remained pending.
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Roland filed a motion to reconsider,1 which the trial court denied. This appeal
ensued.
Discussion & Decision
[5] Except as provided in Ind. Appellate Rule 4,2 this court has jurisdiction in all
appeals from final judgments. Ind. Appellate Rule 5(A); Whittington v.
Magnante, 30 N.E.3d 767, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “Whether an order is a
final judgment governs the appellate courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.” Front
Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 757 (Ind. 2014) (citing Georgos v.
Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003)). “The lack of appellate subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and where the parties do not raise the
issue, this court may consider it sua sponte.” In re Estate of Botkins, 970 N.E.2d
164, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[6] A final judgment is one that “disposes of all claims as to all parties[.]” Ind.
Appellate Rule 2(H); see also Bueter v. Brinkman, 776 N.E.2d 910, 912-13 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that a final judgment “disposes of all issues as to all
parties, to the full extent of the court to dispose of the same, and puts an end to
1
We note that this motion was styled a “Motion for Correction of Errors.” Appellant’s Appendix at 595.
However, because the trial court’s summary judgment order was not a final judgment (as we explain further
below), a motion to correct error was improper. See Ind. Trial Rule 59(C) (providing that a motion to correct
error must be filed within thirty days “after the entry of a final judgment”); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d
1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (a motion to reconsider may be made prior to entry of final judgment; after
final judgment, a party may file a motion to correct error). Accordingly, Roland’s motion should be viewed
as a motion to reconsider.
2
App. R. 4 provides for appeal directly to our Supreme Court for a narrow class of cases, none of which are
relevant here.
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the particular case as to all of such parties and all of such issues” (quoting
Hudson v. Tyson, 383 N.E.2d 66, 69 (Ind. 1978)). Because Nationstar’s
foreclosure claim remained pending after the trial court granted Nationstar’s
motion for summary judgment on Roland’s counterclaims, that order is not an
appealable final judgment pursuant to App. R. 2(H)(1). Nor did the trial court’s
summary judgment order or its order on Roland’s motion to reconsider contain
the “magic language” set forth in App. R. 2(H)(2) (providing that a judgment as
to fewer than all claims or parties is nevertheless final if the trial court
determines, expressly and in writing, “that there is no just reason for delay and
in writing expressly directs the entry of judgment”). See also Botkins, 970 N.E.2d
at 167.
[7] Because the trial court’s summary judgment order was not a final judgment,
Roland cannot appeal unless the order is an appealable interlocutory order
pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 14. See id. at 168. App. R. 14(A) provides that
certain interlocutory orders may be appealed as a matter of right. “Such
appeals must be expressly authorized, and that authorization is to be strictly
construed.” Id. Because none of the grounds for interlocutory appeals set forth
in App. R. 14(A) are applicable to the case before us, Roland is not entitled to
an interlocutory appeal as a matter of right. Nor has Roland satisfied the
certification and acceptance requirements of App. R. 14(B) (providing that
“[a]n appeal may be taken from other interlocutory orders if the trial court
certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the
appeal”).
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[8] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the order from which Roland appeals
is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order. This court
therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Roland’s appeal.
[9] Appeal dismissed.
[10] Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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