In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: S.H. & L.H., (Children), and Sa.H. (Mother), and R.H. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 23 2017, 6:01 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
SA.H. Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Frederick A. Turner Attorney General of Indiana
Bloomington, Indiana
Robert J. Henke
David E. Corey
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Deputy Attorneys General
R.H.
Indianapolis, Indiana
Cara Schaefer Wieneke
Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Termination of the Parent- May 23, 2017
Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Case No.
60A05-1608-JT-1842
S.H. & L.H., (Children), Appeal from the Owen Circuit
Court
and, The Honorable Kelsey B. Hanlon,
Judge
Sa.H. (Mother), and R.H. The Honorable David Holt, Senior
(Father), Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Appellants-Respondents, 60C02-1603-JT-64
60C02-1603-JT-65
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v.
Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Barnes, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] R.H. (“Father”) and Sa.H. (“Mother”) appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their children S.H. and L.H. We affirm.
Issue
[2] Although they filed separate Appellants’ briefs, Father and Mother both argue
that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of their parental
rights.
Facts
[3] Father and Mother are married and are the parents of S.H., who was born in
June 2009, and L.H., who was born in April 2008. At some point Father and
Mother separated, and Father moved to South Carolina. The children visited
Father during the summer of 2014, and upon their return to Indiana, Mother
believed that Father had sexually abused S.H. In November 2014, Mother was
arrested for battery after she had a physical altercation with maternal
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grandmother. Mother was intoxicated at the time and was physically
disciplining L.H. “in an excessive manner,” and maternal grandmother
intervened. Tr. p. 14. Mother told Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
workers that she had substance abuse and mental health issues, including
“hearing voices and multiple personality disorder,” that she was fearful of L.H.,
that she had consumed alcohol and then drove to the grocery store with L.H.,
that Father had physically and sexually abused her, that Father was physically
abusive to the children, and that she believed Father had sexually abused S.H.
Id. at 12. Father denied physically abusing the children and sexually abusing
S.H. Although DCS was concerned because S.H. had disclosed the alleged
abuse to several family members, DCS was unable to substantiate the sexual
abuse due to S.H.’s lack of verbal skills.
[4] DCS filed petitions alleging that S.H. and L.H. were children in need of
services (“CHINS”), and the children were initially placed with their maternal
grandmother. In February 2015, after a fact-finding hearing, the trial court
found the children to be CHINS and made the following findings:
1. Respondent Mother engaged in a physical altercation [sic]
family members in the children’s presence, and was arrested for
battery.
2. Respondent Mother is currently incarcerated and unable to
care for the children.
3. Respondent Mother has untreated mental health concerns
that impair her ability to appropriately supervise and care for the
children.
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4. Respondent Mother has untreated substance issues that
impair her ability to appropriately supervise and care for the
children.
5. Respondent Father has been physically violent with [L.H.]
and there is some evidence of sexual impropriety between
Respondent Father and [S.H.]. [S.H.’s] speech difficulties have
made the allegations of sexual abuse difficult to investigate and
raise additional concerns about her safety in any setting.
Respondent’s Ex. A. The trial court ordered Father and Mother to participate
in a psychological evaluation, supervised visitation, a parenting assessment, and
ordered Mother to participate in a substance abuse assessment and to complete
random drug screens.
[5] Also in February 2015, Mother told DCS that she was moving to South
Carolina to live with Father. DCS informed parents that reunification with the
children was going to be difficult if they were not in Indiana to engage in
visitations and services and that DCS was unable to pay for them to engage in
services in South Carolina. Mother and Father said they would return once a
month to visit the children and that they would do the services in South
Carolina. However, the monthly visits did not occur.
[6] Father and Mother participated in a psychological assessment at Centerstone.
During his assessment, Father was “guarded and didn’t give a lot of
information,” and the therapist was unable to make a diagnosis or referral. Tr.
p. 25. Mother has a “significant trauma history” in both her childhood and as
an adult that affects her functioning. Id. at 95. She has been diagnosed with
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alcoholism, borderline personality disorder, PTSD, and sexual masochism.
Mother was referred to intensive outpatient addictions counseling for her
alcoholism and methamphetamine use and mental health therapy for sexual
abuse. Mother participated in some counseling in South Carolina and started
participating in an IOP substance abuse program, but she did not complete the
program. Although Father completed the Centerstone assessment and a few
supervised visitations, he has refused to participate in any other services
because “he does not feel he needs to participate because he has not done
anything wrong.” Id. at 116.
[7] During supervised telephone visitations, the children became anxious and
agitated and would sometimes run out of the room. The children would also
bury their heads in the couch during the calls and complain that they did not
want to talk. Father participated in only one of the calls. During one call,
Mother’s speech was very slurred. After the calls, L.H. would have outbursts at
home, and S.H. would be withdrawn.
[8] Mother’s relationship with Father is marked by physical and verbal abuse. In
April 2016, Mother and Father again separated. At the time of the termination
hearing, Mother was living with friends in Illinois. The Illinois home, however,
was very unstable, volatile, and unsuitable for children. During May and June
2016, Mother had three crisis episodes that required the intervention of her
therapist. During one of the episodes, Mother relapsed and drank a fifth of
vodka in an hour and was having suicidal thoughts. Her therapist called the
police, and Mother was taken to the hospital. Although Mother has engaged in
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services, she has made little progress in obtaining stable housing, obtaining
employment, improving her mental health, or ending her substance abuse.
[9] In March 2016, DCS filed petitions to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental
rights. After a hearing in June 2016, the trial court terminated Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights. Father and Mother now appeal.
Analysis
[10] Father and Mother challenge the termination of their parental rights to S.H.
and L.H. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their
children. In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010). “A parent’s interest in
the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests.’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65,
120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). “Indeed the parent-child relationship is ‘one of the
most valued relationships in our culture.’” Id. (quoting Neal v. DeKalb County
Div. of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 2003)). We recognize, of
course, that parental interests are not absolute and must be subordinated to the
child’s interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to
terminate parental rights. Id. Thus, “‘[p]arental rights may be terminated when
the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.’” Id.
(quoting In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied).
[11] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and
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reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. We must
also give “due regard” to the trial court’s unique opportunity to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Id. (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). Here, the trial
court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS’s
petition to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. When reviewing
findings of fact and conclusions thereon entered in a case involving a
termination of parental rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First,
we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we
determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the
trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly
erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the
conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.
[12] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the
allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true,
the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section
31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship
involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal
or the reasons for placement outside the
home of the parents will not be remedied.
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(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions,
been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child;
and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and
treatment of the child.
DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Egly v.
Blackford County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992).
I. Factual Findings
[13] Father argues that three of the trial court’s findings are not supported by the
evidence. First, Father contends that the following finding is erroneous:
Mother was released from incarceration on February 18, 2015.
On February 24, 2015, both parents met with Meagan Berkebile-
Guy, the DCS Family Case Manager assigned (“FCM”) and her
supervisor, Ashley Collins, regarding the Pre-Dispositional
Report of DCS and the proposed plan of DCS for the family. At
that time, Mother and Father informed DCS that they intended
to leave the State of Indiana where the children were placed, to
reside in the State of South Carolina. At that time, the FCM
advised the parents that this move would make it extremely
difficult for the parents to complete necessary reunification
services, and that, while the parents expressed their intent to
engage in services in South Carolina, Indiana DCS could not pay
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for such services. Mother and Father chose to reside in South
Carolina despite this information.
Father’s App. Vol. II p. 63. According to Father, this finding is erroneous
because he was already living in South Carolina in February 2015. Although
this finding does not mention that Father was already living in South Carolina,
the evidence presented at the hearing shows that nothing in the finding is
technically incorrect—both parents did go to South Carolina after the February
2015 meeting, DCS did inform both parents that it would be difficult for them
to participate in services while living in South Carolina, and the parents chose
to live in South Carolina anyway.
[14] Next, Father argues that the following finding is erroneous: “The children
exhibited behaviors tending to reflect fear of their parents and reluctance to
have contact with them.” Id. at 65. Father contends there was no evidence
presented that the children were afraid of Father and Mother. During
supervised telephone visitations, the children became anxious and agitated and
would sometimes run out of the room. The children would also bury their
heads in the couch during the calls and complain that they did not want to talk.
The trial court could have reasonably inferred that the children were fearful of
the parents.
[15] Father also argues that the following finding is clearly erroneous:
Father testified that he does not feel the need to engage in
services since he has done nothing wrong. He did acknowledge
attempting to enroll in an on-line parenting education course, but
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was told that DCS would not consider that service as successful
completion of the requirement, and felt that DCS should have
researched South Carolina service providers to refer for him. He
has done nothing to address the allegations of sexual misconduct
with [S.H.] that were made, despite understanding that was an
impediment to reunification.
Id. at 66. Father contends that he did participate in the psychological
evaluation and supervised visitations and that he tried to find service providers
in South Carolina but DCS would not accept them. Father blames DCS for
failing to find an acceptable service provider. Father also argues that the sexual
abuse allegations were unsubstantiated. Father contends that he “completed all
but one of his requirements for reunification with his children, but DCS
thwarted any attempt he made to compete the last requirement.” Father’s
Appellant’s Br. p. 19.
[16] DCS presented evidence that Father was ordered to participate in a
psychological evaluation, supervised visitation, and a parenting assessment.
Although Father participated in a psychological assessment, Father was
“guarded and didn’t give a lot of information,” and the therapist was unable to
make a diagnosis or referral. Tr. p. 25. Father made it clear that “he does not
feel he needs to participate [in services] because he has not done anything
wrong.” Id. at 116. Father participated in only one of the telephone visitation
calls with the children. As for the services in South Carolina, the DCS case
manager testified that Mother and Father sent her information for an online
parenting assessment that was “more for people that are going through divorce
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cases.” Id. at 117. She informed Mother and Father that the online class would
not be acceptable for DCS as a parenting assessment. She was unaware of any
other services that Father attempted to do in South Carolina. Finally, as for the
molestation allegation, DCS acknowledges that it could not substantiate the
allegation. However, DCS was concerned because S.H. had disclosed the
alleged abuse to several family members and S.H.’s lack of verbal skills
impeded the investigation. Father made no attempt to resolve the issue despite
these concerns. We cannot say that the trial court’s finding is clearly erroneous.
II. Changed Conditions
[17] Both Father and Mother challenge the trial court’s finding of a reasonable
probability that the conditions resulting in S.H. and L.H.’s removals or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. 1 In
making this determination, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care
for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing and take into
consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512
1
Father and Mother also argue the trial court’s conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the children is clearly erroneous. We need not address this
argument. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. Subsection (b)(2)(B)(iii),
which concerns repeated CHINS adjudications, is inapplicable here. Consequently, DCS was required to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that either: (1) the conditions that
resulted in the children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied, or (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
children. The trial court found a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children’s
removal and continued placement outside Father’s and Mother’s homes would not be remedied, and there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion. Thus, we need not determine whether
there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
well-being of the children. See, e.g., Bester v. Lake County Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 n.5
(Ind. 2005); In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
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(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. However, the trial court must also “evaluate
the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future
neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id.
[18] On this factor, the trial court found:
The Court finds clear and convincing evidence that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
children’s removal and the reasons for their placement outside
the homes of their parents will not be remedied.
a. The conditions that resulted in removal of these children
were domestic violence in the home perpetrated by Mother,
while Mother was intoxicated, and while Children were in the
home; Mother’s untreated mental health issues and substance
abuse issues; and Father’s physical violence and possible sexual
molestation committed against Children.
b. Mother has not made any significant, meaningful progress
toward alleviating any of those conditions. At the time of
removal Mother had a serious, long-standing issue with
alcoholism that interfered with her ability to make safe, sound
decisions for herself or for her children. Mother continues to this
date to have a serious issue with alcoholism that interferes with
her ability to make safe, sound decisions for herself or for her
children. The Court finds uncontroverted evidence that as
recently as two weeks before this hearing she was recklessly and
dangerously abusing alcohol and expressed suicidal ideations.
She continues to have a serious issue with alcohol abuse even
after completing a rehabilitation program and even after a
Petition was filed to terminate her parental rights. She continues
to reside in an unsafe, unstable home where drug use and other
criminal behavior has occurred. Mother continues to exhibit
serious mental health issues, including threatening self-harm, and
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engaging in self-harming behavior. While she is receiving
therapeutic treatment for her mental health issues, the evidence is
clear and convincing that she is nowhere near gaining any kind
of meaningful or lasting control over those issues. At the time of
removal, she had untreated mental health issues that caused her
to make poor decisions both for herself and for her children; poor
decisions like getting out of jail and immediately moving more
than 600 miles away from her children to be with the man who
she says has been physically and emotionally abusive to her and
who she believes sexually molested their daughter; poor decisions
like drinking and continuing to consider suicide. It is more than
reasonable to conclude based on the foregoing that she will never
be able to manage the lives of these children.
c. Father has failed to make any significant, meaningful
progress toward alleviating any of these conditions. Father has
denied the need for his participation in a reunification plan
throughout the underlying CHINS proceeding, and has therefore
not engaged in any services that would permit the Court to
consider placing these children in his care. He has engaged in no
services designed to improve his parenting skills or decision-
making. He has chosen to provide no financial support for the
children despite having been ordered to do so, and despite his
ability to contribute. This is another example of the father
attending to his own interests rather than those of these children.
Father’s App. Vol. II p. 69.
[19] On appeal, Father argues that the conditions resulting in the children’s removal
from him—Mother’s allegations that he had molested S.H.—were
unsubstantiated and cannot form the basis for termination of his parental rights.
Father also argues that he completed the psychological evaluation and
participated in telephone visits with the children. Father contends that he only
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failed to complete the parenting assessment, but he blames DCS’s refusal to
accept providers that he found in South Carolina. Finally, Father argues that
he, in fact, had been paying child support.
[20] DCS presented evidence that Father consistently denied that he needed to
participate in services because he did not believe that he had done anything
wrong. Although Father participated in a psychological assessment, Father was
“guarded and didn’t give a lot of information,” and the therapist was unable to
make a diagnosis or referral. Tr. p. 25. His participation in visitations, even
telephone visitations, was very limited. Although DCS was unable to
substantiate the molestation allegations due to S.H.’s speech impediment, there
were still concerns about the allegations. As for Father’s failure to pay child
support, the evidence demonstrated that Father paid child support during the
dissolution proceedings, but after the dissolution proceedings were dismissed,
he failed to pay child support to the relative care placement. In general, Father
simply refused to comply with the trial court’s orders and refused to participate
in the necessary services to have the children returned to him. The trial court’s
finding is not clearly erroneous.
[21] As for Mother, she concedes that there were issues with domestic violence,
mental health, substance abuse, and Father’s physical violence and possible
sexual molestation of the children. However, she claims that she had been
making progress, had moved away from Father, had abstained from alcohol for
six months, and was participating in therapy. The evidence demonstrated that
Mother had a significant substance abuse issue, that she had significant mental
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health concerns, and that she still did not have a stable living environment or
employment. Although she had made minor progress, she had also relapsed
and consumed shortly before the termination hearing. It was clear that Mother
simply was not in a position to parent the children and will not be for the
foreseeable future. The trial court’s finding is not clearly erroneous.2
II. Best Interests
[22] Father and Mother also challenge the trial court’s finding that termination of
their parental rights is in the children’s best interests. In determining what is in
the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of
the evidence. D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267. In doing so, the trial court must
subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id.
[23] On this issue, the trial court found:
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
termination is in the best interests of each of the children. The
children have now been out of the care of their parents since
November, 2014, a period of more than eighteen (18) months.
During the bulk of that time, they have been in the home of their
aunt and uncle, and their behaviors have improved dramatically
in that home. They have been safe, happy, nurtured and
2
Mother also argues that her due process rights were violated. She contends that DCS should have provided
her with therapy services earlier in the CHINS proceedings when she was still living in South Carolina. DCS
had informed Mother when she moved to South Carolina that providing out-of-state services to her would be
a problem, but Mother moved anyway. She also argues that the CHINS court indicated that the children
would be returned in November 2015, but in November 2015, the trial court indicated that reunification
might not happen. In June 2015, the trial court listed a “projected date” for the children’s return as
November 2015. Ex. 4. The date was “projected” not promised, and the parents lack of progress changed
the plan. Mother’s due process argument fails.
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protected. They are entitled to the permanency that termination
and adoption will provide them.
Father’s App. Vol. II p. 69.
[24] Father argues that DCS failed to “fulfill its statutory obligation to assist Father
in reunifying with his children.” Father’s Appellant’s Br. p. 23. Mother argues
that it was in the children’s best interests that she be given more time to
improve her circumstances. Neither parent focuses on the best interests of the
children; rather, they focus on themselves and the services DCS has allegedly
failed to provide. The totality of the evidence, however, shows that termination
is in the children’s best interests. After the children were removed, both
children were withdrawn. L.H. was very angry and aggressive, and S.H. had a
speech impediment. The children are now well adjusted, outgoing, happy, and
playful in their current placement. Neither parent has made much progress
with services or demonstrating an ability to care for the children. Both the DCS
case manager and the guardian ad litem recommended termination of Father’s
and Mother’s parental rights. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s
finding is not clearly erroneous.
III. Satisfactory Plan
[25] Father and Mother also argue that the trial court’s conclusion that there is a
satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the children is clearly erroneous.
In order for the trial court to terminate the parent-child relationship the trial
court must find that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
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child. D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 268. This plan need not be detailed, so long as it
offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the
parent-child relationship is terminated. Id.
[26] In addressing this factor, the trial court found:
The plan for the children is adoption by their relative caregivers.
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that this is a
satisfactory plan. Although the Court in the underlying CHINS
proceedings initial [sic] had sufficient reservations about the aunt
and uncle to order the children removed, the Court had a
subsequent hearing at which it heard significant evidence that
resulted in the Court ordering that they be returned to the aunt
and uncle’s care.
Father’s App. Vol. II p. 69.
[27] Father and Mother argue that the children’s placement in the home of their
maternal aunt and uncle is unsatisfactory, and they question the mental health
and disciplinary techniques of the aunt and uncle. The focus, however, on this
factor is whether DCS’s general plan is satisfactory, not whether the specific
placement is satisfactory. DCS’s general plan is the adoption of the children,
and this is a satisfactory plan. See D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 268 (holding that DCS’s
plan for the child to be adopted gave a general sense of direction for the child’s
care).
Conclusion
[28] The evidence is sufficient to support the termination of Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights to S.H. and L.H. We affirm.
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[29] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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