Michael E. Mattingly v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development, and Meijer Stores Limited Partnership

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Jan 22 2014, 9:32 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
MICHAEL E. MATTINGLY GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Fishers, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KYLE HUNTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MICHAEL E. MATTINGLY, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1304-EX-383
)
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA )
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )
DEVELOPMENT, and MEIJER STORES )
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, )
)
Appellees-Respondents. )
APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Cause No. 13-R-01529
January 22, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Judge
Case Summary and Issues
Michael Mattingly appeals the decision of the Review Board of the Indiana
Department of Workforce Development (“Review Board”) affirming the denial of
unemployment benefits. The Review Board has filed both a motion to dismiss Mattingly’s
appeal alleging Mattingly’s brief fails to comply with the appellate rules and an appellee’s
brief. In addition, Mattingly’s reply brief has not been filed by the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts. We conclude that Mattingly’s appeal does not need to be dismissed and that his reply
brief should be filed. However, we also conclude that the evidence supports the Review
Board’s conclusion that he was discharged for just cause, and we therefore affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Mattingly was employed by a Meijer store in Fishers beginning in October of 2002.
On November 10, 2012, Mattingly and another Meijer employee got into an altercation in the
store parking lot. Mattingly was discharged from his employment because of this incident.
Initially, a claims deputy declared Mattingly eligible for unemployment benefits. Meijer
appealed that determination. A notice of hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) was mailed to Mattingly, instructing him that if he wished to participate in the
hearing, he must deliver the enclosed Acknowledgement Sheet to the Unemployment
Insurance Appeals office and list one telephone number the ALJ could call to reach him at
the scheduled date and time. In addition, Mattingly was provided with a “U.I. Appeals
Hearing Instructions” sheet which provides:
Contact Number: Provide the judge ONE contact telephone number to reach
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you for the hearing on the enclosed Acknowledgement Sheet. . . . It is your
responsibility to ensure that the judge has your contact telephone number. . . .
If you have not returned the Acknowledgement Sheet with your telephone
number, the judge may attempt to call you at the number provided on your
appeal statement. However, the judge is not required to search for a valid
contact number. . . .
Transcript of ALJ Hearing, Exhibit 3. Mattingly returned the Acknowledgement Sheet
indicating that he would participate in the hearing, but he did not include a contact telephone
number. Id., Exhibit 5. At the hearing, the ALJ noted that Mattingly was not participating,
took testimony and evidence from Meijer’s representative, and ultimately concluded that
Mattingly was discharged for just cause and was not entitled to unemployment benefits
because Meijer had a reasonable policy prohibiting workplace violence which was known to
Mattingly and which he violated by directing threatening behavior and language toward a co-
worker. Mattingly appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Review Board, which adopted and
affirmed the ALJ’s decision, with an addendum noting Mattingly had failed to participate in
the hearing without good cause. Mattingly now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Procedural Issues
A. Motion to Dismiss
In response to Mattingly’s Brief, the Review Board filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging
the brief fails to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of Appellate Rule
46(A). The motion was held in abeyance and the Review Board was ordered to file its
Appellee’s Brief, if any, within thirty days of the order. The Review Board timely filed a
brief on the merits, while also reasserting the claims in its Motion to Dismiss and arguing that
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Mattingly has forfeited any and all issues in his appeal.
We acknowledge the shortcomings of Mattingly’s brief, and we further acknowledge
that pro se litigants are held to the same standard as trained legal counsel and are required to
follow the same rules of procedure. See T.B. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce
Dev., 980 N.E.2d 341, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Although we do not excuse the deficiencies
in Mattingly’s brief, the substance of Mattingly’s argument is apparent and we prefer to
resolve cases that come before us on their merits when possible. T.R. v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 950 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 956
N.E.2d 741. Accordingly, the Review Board’s Motion to Dismiss, previously held in
abeyance, is denied, and we will consider the merits of Mattingly’s appeal.
B. Reply Brief
Mattingly tendered a reply brief to the Clerk’s Office which was marked received but
not filed. The Appellee’s Brief was filed on November 7, 2013 and was served on Mattingly
by U.S. Mail. Mattingly therefore had until November 25, 2013 to file a reply brief. See Ind.
Appellate Rules 25(C) (three-day extension of filing deadline when served by mail) and
45(B)(3) (fifteen day deadline for filing reply brief). Mattingly’s reply brief was timely
received by the Clerk’s Office on November 25, 2013. To the extent the reply brief was not
filed for defects in form, we note that the Clerk’s Office did not issue a notice of defect
alerting Mattingly to the defects and offering him an opportunity to submit a corrected reply
brief. Accordingly, the Clerk’s Office is ordered to mark Mattingly’s reply brief filed as of
the date it was received, and we have considered the reply brief in rendering our decision.
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II. Substantive Issues
A. Standard of Review
The Indiana Unemployment Compensation Act provides that any decision of the
Review Board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. Ind. Code § 22-4-
17-12(a). By implication, this standard of review dictates that where, as here, the Review
Board adopts and incorporates by reference the findings and conclusions of the ALJ and
affirms the ALJ’s decision without accepting additional evidence, we are bound by the ALJ’s
resolution of all factual issues. T.R., 950 N.E.2d at 795. When a decision of the Review
Board is challenged, we inquire into “the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision
and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of facts.” Ind. Code § 22-4-17-
12(f). In reviewing the determinations of basic underlying facts, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor reassess witness credibility, but consider only the evidence most favorable to
the Review Board’s findings. J.M. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 975
N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2012). We will reverse only if there is no substantial evidence of
probative value to support the Review Board’s findings. Id. We review “ultimate facts” –
conclusions or inferences from the basic facts – for whether the Review Board’s inference is
reasonable. McClain v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314,
1317-18 (Ind. 1998). We review the Review Board’s conclusions of law using a de novo
standard. T.B., 980 N.E.2d at 345.
B. Due Process
Although the Review Board is allowed latitude in conducting its hearings, due process
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must be given parties whose rights will be affected. Art Hill, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 898 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” NOW Courier, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev.,
871 N.E.2d 384, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Whether a party was afforded due process in an
unemployment proceeding is a question of law. Scott v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of
Workforce Dev., 725 N.E.2d 993, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
The Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision in this case with an addendum noting
that Mattingly failed to participate in the hearing before the ALJ without good cause. There
is no doubt that Mattingly received proper notice of the hearing, as he returned the
Acknowledgement Sheet. However, despite clear instructions to provide a single telephone
number at which he could be reached on the date and at the time of the hearing and despite
warnings about the consequences of failing to do so, Mattingly did not provide a contact
number to the ALJ. “[A] party to an unemployment hearing may voluntarily waive the
opportunity for a fair hearing where the party received actual notice of the hearing and failed
to appear or participate in the hearing.” Art Hill, Inc., 898 N.E.2d at 368. Mattingly was
given notice, had an opportunity to be heard, and voluntarily failed to participate in the
hearing. We agree with the Review Board that because Mattingly was fully instructed in the
requirements for participating in the hearing but failed to ensure the ALJ could reach him, he
was not denied due process when the ALJ conducted a hearing without his participation.
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C. Discharge for Just Cause
Mattingly was denied unemployment benefits because he was found to have been
discharged for just cause. See Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(a) (providing that a claimant is
ineligible for unemployment benefits if he is discharged for just cause). When a claimant is
denied benefits, he bears the burden of showing error. Benard v. Review Bd. of Indiana
Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 997 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). If the employer
alleges that a discharged employee who is seeking unemployment benefits was discharged
for just cause, the employer bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of showing
just cause. Id. If the employer makes that showing, the burden then shifts to the employee to
produce evidence rebutting the employer’s case. Id.Indiana Code section 22-4-15-1(d)(2) defines “discharge for just cause” to include
“knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer . . . .” Here,
Meijer offered into evidence a written rule regarding workplace violence that is part of its
company policies and procedures. All employees are directed to read these policies when
they begin their employment. Meijer also offered into evidence a receipt Mattingly signed
acknowledging that he had been given the company policies and that he had read and
understood them. The Meijer representative testified that the workplace violence rule is
enforced on all employees. The Meijer representative also testified that a customer had
witnessed the incident in question and basically supported the other employee’s version of
events and that Mattingly had admitted to grabbing the other employee’s arm and asking him
to take the argument off-site. Meijer therefore met its burden of showing Mattingly was
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discharged for just cause. Even had Mattingly participated in the hearing and testified to the
version of events he has related in his appeal – for instance, that the other employee raised
his fist first – he would not have rebutted Meijer’s prima facie case of just cause in
discharging him.
Conclusion
Mattingly was afforded due process and a reasonable opportunity to participate in a
telephonic hearing with the ALJ. The ALJ’s decision that Mattingly was discharged for just
cause is supported by substantial evidence and is reasonable. The Review Board’s decision
adopting the ALJ’s findings and conclusions denying Mattingly unemployment benefits is
therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
BARNES, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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