Jermiane A. Broussard v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be May 10 2017, 10:43 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy P. Broden Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jermaine A. Broussard, May 10, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A04-1611-CR-2636
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven P. Meyer,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79D02-1510-F4-12
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jermaine A. Broussard (Broussard), appeals his sentence
following an open guilty plea to unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious
violent felon, a Level 4 felony, Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c); operating while
intoxicated with a prior conviction, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a); and
being a habitual offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8(a).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[3] Broussard presents us with two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing
consecutive sentences; and
(2) Whether Broussard’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense and his character.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] In the early morning hours of October 11, 2015, thirty-seven-year-old
Broussard, who had been drinking alcoholic beverages, lost control of his
vehicle and ran off the road in Tippecanoe County, Indiana. After concerned
citizens notified the police, police officers found Broussard unresponsive behind
the wheel of his vehicle, with a loaded .38 caliber revolver tucked in the
waistband of his pants. After medics awakened Broussard, he admitted that the
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possession of the handgun was unlawful due to a prior felony conviction. Later
testing verified that Broussard’s blood alcohol level was .194.
[5] On October 15, 2015, the State filed an Information, charging Broussard with
Count I, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4
felony; Count II, carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A
misdemeanor; Count III, carrying a handgun by a convicted felon, a Level 5
felony; Count IV, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C
misdemeanor; Count V, operating a vehicle with at least 0.15 gram of alcohol, a
Class A misdemeanor; Count VI, operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a
prior conviction, a Level 6 felony; Count VII, operating a vehicle with at least
0.15 gram of alcohol with a prior conviction, a Level 6 felony. On January 8,
2016, the State amended the Information to include Count VIII, which alleged
Broussard to be a habitual offender.
[6] On September 16, 2016, Broussard entered an open guilty plea to Counts I and
VI, and admitted to being a habitual offender, with all other Counts being
dismissed. On October 20, 2016, the trial court conducted a sentencing
hearing. During the hearing, the trial court took note of Broussard’s criminal
history, which began in 1995 when he was convicted of two felonies in Illinois,
i.e., aggravated vehicle hijacking/dangerous weapon and aggravated
battery/public place. He received seven years of incarceration. Charges of
disorderly conduct and burglary were later filed in Cook County, Illinois, but
were dismissed. Broussard admitted that during this time he was a member of
the Gangster Disciples, which he claimed was disbanded in 1997. In 2001 and
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2005 respectively, he was sentenced for two instances of felony aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon with a previous conviction in Cook County. In 2006,
Broussard moved to Tippecanoe County, Indiana, where he was convicted of
resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor and for which he received
probation. In 2009, he was arrested for public intoxication as a Class B
misdemeanor, but the case was later dismissed. Also in 2009, he was arrested
for domestic battery, which was dismissed as part of a plea agreement in
another cause where he was convicted of dealing cocaine. Pursuant to this plea
agreement, Broussard received twelve years’ imprisonment, with two years to
be served through community corrections. Within a year of this sentence, the
trial court granted Broussard’s request for a modification and commuted one
year to placement at Home for Hope. Upon his release from incarceration,
Broussard committed operating with a blood alcohol content of .08% or more.
In April 2014, Broussard’s two-year placement for the dealing cocaine charge
was revoked and the court imposed sixty days executed to be served
consecutively to the operating charge. Eighteen months after his release,
Broussard committed the present offenses.
[7] During the hearing, Broussard offered his version of the offense and claimed
that he had been at a party that evening where a shooting had taken place. An
unidentified man carrying a handgun approached Broussard and requested a
ride to the hospital because he had been shot. Broussard claimed to have taken
the man for medical help since his designated driver—who had driven
Broussard’s car to the party because Broussard was already intoxicated—could
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not be found. Prior to seeking medical attention, Broussard insisted that the
man handed him his handgun. After dropping off the injured man at the
hospital, he took some other guests from the party home. While returning to
his residence, Broussard admittedly passed out behind the wheel and drove off
the road. He claimed to be “shocked” to find the handgun in his waistband
when the police woke him up in his car. (Tr. p. 39).
[8] At the close of the evidence, the trial court found as aggravating factors: the
nature and seriousness of the offense; Broussard’s high level of intoxication
while possessing a loaded gun during the commission of the offense;
Broussard’s criminal history; his failed prior attempts at rehabilitation and
community corrections; and the repetitive nature of the crime. As a mitigating
circumstance, the trial court noted Broussard’s guilty plea, he took
responsibility for his actions, and Broussard’s “alcohol and drug problems
however diminished by failed attempts at rehabilitation.” (Appellant’s App.
Vol. II, p. 11). The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven years for the serious
violent felon charge, enhanced by seven years for his habitual offender
adjudication, and two years for his repeat operating while intoxicated offense.
The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively
[b]ased on the nature of the [operating while intoxicated charge]
and the fact that he ran off the road while intoxicated with a
loaded gun, causing, creating a very serious situation that could
have caused injury to others. I know that the element of the
[operating while intoxicated charge] is endangerment. However,
in this particular case, he ran off the road while in possession of a
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loaded gun, and I think that, that’s enough of an aggravator to
cause those two to run consecutive.
(Tr. pp. 64-65). Broussard’s aggregate sentence was twenty years, of which the
trial court ordered eighteen years executed with two years suspended to
supervised probation.
[9] Broussard now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Consecutive Sentences
[10] Broussard contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his
sentences to run consecutively as “it essentially does nothing more than cite the
statutory elements of the offenses to which Broussard pled guilty.” (Appellant’s
Br. p. 7).
[11] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound decision of the trial court and we
review only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490
(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of
discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions drawn therefrom. Id. We review for an abuse of discretion the
court’s finding of aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we
cannot review the relative weight assigned to those factors. Id. at 490-91.
When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the
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trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if “the record does
not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are
clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons
given are improper as a matter of law.” Id.[12] In order to impose consecutive sentences, a trial court must find at least one
aggravating circumstance. Sanquenetti v. State, 727 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ind. 2000).
Aggravating circumstances may include, but are not limited to, any of several
statutorily enumerated factors. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1. A single aggravating
circumstance may support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Lavoie v.
State, 903 N.E.2d 135, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Although a trial court is
required to state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, it may rely on
the same reasons to impose a maximum sentence and also impose consecutive
sentences. Id.[13] Here, in explaining its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, the trial
court referred to the extenuating circumstance of Broussard’s possession of a
loaded gun while inebriated to the point of passing out. Although the trial
court acknowledged that the charge of operating a vehicle while intoxicated
included an element of endangerment, here, the surrounding circumstances of
the charge alluded to more than merely an element of the offense. To be
convicted of a serious violent felon, Broussard was only required to possess a
firearm. I.C. § 35-47-4-5(c). To be convicted of an operating while intoxicated
charge, Broussard was required to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated in
a manner that endangered a person. I.C. § 9-30-5-2(b). In fashioning its
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consecutive sentence, the trial court was clearly referencing the danger
component surrounding the nature of the charge, i.e., the carrying of a loaded
handgun while driving a car and passing out from an overindulgence in alcohol
with a blood alcohol content well over twice the allowable limit. His conduct
clearly exceeded the elements of the offense and posed a significant danger to
the general public. “Generally, the nature and circumstances of a crime is a
proper aggravating circumstance.” Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 853 (Ind.
2014). Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly explained and
supported the imposition of consecutive sentences.
II. Appropriate Sentence
[14] Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may “revise a sentence authorized
by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” Under this rule, the question is not whether another
sentence is more appropriate, but whether the sentence imposed is
inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The
principal role of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers;” it is “not to achieve
a perceived correct result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,
1225 (Ind. 2008). The appropriateness of the sentence turns on this court’s
“sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage
done to others, and a myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.”
Id. at 1224. The defendant carries the burden of persuading this court that his
sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
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The defendant must show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of both his
character and the nature of the offense. Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 633
(Ind. 2006).
[15] When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting
point to determine the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at
494. The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is between two and twelve
years, with the advisory sentence being six years; while the sentencing range for
a level 6 felony is between six months and two and one half years, with the
advisory sentence being one year. See I.C. §§ 35-50-2-5.5; -7. The sentence for
an habitual offender charge for a person convicted of a Level 1 through Level 4
felony is an additional fixed term of between six and twenty years. See I.C. §
35-50-2-8(i). Here, the trial court sentenced Broussard to a sentence of eleven
years for the serious violent felon charge, enhanced by seven years for his
habitual offender adjudication, and two years for his operating while
intoxicated offense. With respect to the nature of these offenses, we reiterate
that Broussard carried a loaded handgun while heavily intoxicated and barely
able to drive a vehicle.
[16] Turning to Broussard’s character, we echo the trial court’s disbelief in
Broussard’s explanation of the circumstances put forward during the sentencing
hearing.
Your attorney indicated that the nature of this offense was not
that bad if you consider the fact that you were trying to assist and
take someone to the hospital and that this guy just handed the
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gun to you. This is the first time that I’ve heard that story. You
didn’t offer up that story at the time of your arrest. You didn’t
offer up that story to the probation, when you were given an
opportunity to give a statement to the [c]ourt and this is the first
time it’s been offered. There’s been no collaborating evidence
presented to support that. What I do see here, by your own
admission, is someone who [is] extremely intoxicated, who has
prior related offenses of [] unlawfully carrying a gun. You’re
driving the streets of this community extremely intoxicated and
you’re caught with a loaded gun in your possession after you
drove the car off the road.
(Tr. p. 61).
[17] Broussard’s criminal history is lengthy. The instant offense is “the third time”
in the last twelve years that Broussard has been caught unlawfully carrying a
gun. (Tr. p. 50). He continued committing crimes despite repeated displays of
lenient sentencing and correctional alternatives by Indiana courts. Although he
has amassed numerous convictions, Broussard habitually minimizes his own
culpability. He blamed his Illinois weapons convictions in 1994, 2000, and
2004 on his gang membership. Broussard elaborated that his dealing cocaine
conviction resulted from an attempt “to protect” his spouse. (Tr. p. 36). Even
before the trial court pronounced sentence, he was placing blame on everyone
except on himself. He blamed heavy drinking and “some bad decisions” he had
made in “hanging around with the wrong people.” (Tr. p. 51). The trial court
found that Broussard had failed alternative sentencing in the past: he had been
involved in community corrections on “four different occasions” and was now
back again before the court. (Tr. p. 64). As such, the trial court was “not that
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convinced that community corrections would be helpful or successful[.]” (Tr.
p. 64). In light of the evidence before us, we conclude that Broussard failed to
persuade us that the nature of the crime and his character provide a reason to
revise his sentence.
CONCLUSION
[18] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced
Broussard.
[19] Affirmed.
[20] Najam, J. and Bradford, J. concur
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